allanpcameron
Donor
16 February 1941. El Tahag Camp, Egypt.
It may have only have been forty miles from Cairo, but the camp near the railway stop of El Quassassin, had been growing into a major transit and training camp. The camp was made up of numbered blocks each being a rectangle 500 yards by 1000 yards. As well as tents, cookhouses, toilet blocks, water towers and everything else needed to sustain troops, had been carved out of the desert.
The newest arrivals had had a day to settle into their allotted block, but training for survival and war in the desert was about to begin. The 3rd Indian Motor Brigade had been established from the 2nd Lancers (Gardner's Horse), 11th Prince Albert Victor's Own Cavalry (Frontier Force) and 18th King Edward's Own Cavalry. Brigadier Edward Vaughan had moulded the force into the first motorised element of the Indian Army to be ready for service overseas. Mounted in Fordson trucks rather than anything armoured made them a Motor Brigade rather than an Armoured Brigade.
The Indian cavalrymen were well-trained in their new role, but they suffered from the limitations of the Indian economy, in as far as each man was armed with his personal weapon, and most platoons had their squad weapons. There were deficiencies in numbers of radios, the anti-tank platoons had no weapons, and there was no attached artillery. When Brigadier Vaughan had reported to Middle East Command, Generals Wavell and ‘Jumbo’ Wilson had both promised to do their best to find the necessary equipment to bring the Brigade up to full strength, but admitted that it wouldn’t be easy. Thought had been given to using captured Italian weapons, but the good equipment not taken over by the Australians, was earmarked to be given to the Greeks.
Having a Motor Brigade, with its own integral transport, was actually a real asset to Middle East Command. Of the three Australian Divisions only 6th Division had its full establishment, but these had been worked hard during Operation Compass. 7th Division was very short and 9th Division had about half of its requirement. Under normal circumstances, either the Australian’s own ASC or the RASC would be able to make up the shortfall. However, the wear and tear on all the supply units had left the whole Command in trouble. More lorries had been requested and were due to arrive in the convoys coming from Britain, the fast element of WS5A, thirteen ships, had just started to arrive at Suez that very day.
While the Indians were waiting for more equipment, there was a lot of training in desert warfare to be done. Brigadier Vaughan had been given the target of the middle of March to be fully prepared. If an advance against Tripoli was to go ahead at the beginning of April, then the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade would be an excellent addition to the forces involved in that operation.
NB: This is mostly OTL, except the last part.
The Wiki page says
It may have only have been forty miles from Cairo, but the camp near the railway stop of El Quassassin, had been growing into a major transit and training camp. The camp was made up of numbered blocks each being a rectangle 500 yards by 1000 yards. As well as tents, cookhouses, toilet blocks, water towers and everything else needed to sustain troops, had been carved out of the desert.
The newest arrivals had had a day to settle into their allotted block, but training for survival and war in the desert was about to begin. The 3rd Indian Motor Brigade had been established from the 2nd Lancers (Gardner's Horse), 11th Prince Albert Victor's Own Cavalry (Frontier Force) and 18th King Edward's Own Cavalry. Brigadier Edward Vaughan had moulded the force into the first motorised element of the Indian Army to be ready for service overseas. Mounted in Fordson trucks rather than anything armoured made them a Motor Brigade rather than an Armoured Brigade.
The Indian cavalrymen were well-trained in their new role, but they suffered from the limitations of the Indian economy, in as far as each man was armed with his personal weapon, and most platoons had their squad weapons. There were deficiencies in numbers of radios, the anti-tank platoons had no weapons, and there was no attached artillery. When Brigadier Vaughan had reported to Middle East Command, Generals Wavell and ‘Jumbo’ Wilson had both promised to do their best to find the necessary equipment to bring the Brigade up to full strength, but admitted that it wouldn’t be easy. Thought had been given to using captured Italian weapons, but the good equipment not taken over by the Australians, was earmarked to be given to the Greeks.
Having a Motor Brigade, with its own integral transport, was actually a real asset to Middle East Command. Of the three Australian Divisions only 6th Division had its full establishment, but these had been worked hard during Operation Compass. 7th Division was very short and 9th Division had about half of its requirement. Under normal circumstances, either the Australian’s own ASC or the RASC would be able to make up the shortfall. However, the wear and tear on all the supply units had left the whole Command in trouble. More lorries had been requested and were due to arrive in the convoys coming from Britain, the fast element of WS5A, thirteen ships, had just started to arrive at Suez that very day.
While the Indians were waiting for more equipment, there was a lot of training in desert warfare to be done. Brigadier Vaughan had been given the target of the middle of March to be fully prepared. If an advance against Tripoli was to go ahead at the beginning of April, then the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade would be an excellent addition to the forces involved in that operation.
NB: This is mostly OTL, except the last part.
The Wiki page says
The brigade was mobilised for active service on 7 January 1941 and sailed from Bombay on 23 January, arriving at Suez on 6 February. By April, the brigade was tactically mobile but had no artillery, no 2-pounder anti-tank guns, only half its establishment in radios and was armed mainly with rifles. From there the brigade entrained and travelled to El Qassassin and then moved by lorry to El Tahag camp for training. The brigade moved to Mersa Matruh on 8 March and had two months' desert warfare training, then moved to El Adem from 27–28 March.