Sir John Valentine Carden survives.

[allanpcameron]

Operation Compass Part 2.

12-14 December 1940. Sidi Barrani, Egypt.

With time running out before two of the 4th Indian Division’s Brigades were to be withdrawn, O’Connor had to decide on priorities. A certain amount of time was wasted on trying to sort resupply and the mess of vast quantities of Italian Prisoners. For the latter, O’Connor gave the job to the Selby Force to march the miles of prisoners back towards Marsa Matruh, under the watchful pompom guns of the A11 Matildas.

O’Connor knew it was important that the 7th Armoured Division, with its Support Group, would continue to press the retreating enemy. The armoured cars of the 11th Hussars reconnaissance patrols reported that were in contact with the Italians on a line from Halfaya Pass to Sidi Omar, where an enemy rear-guard was resisting strongly.

The 16th Infantry Brigade, having taken the most casualties the previous day, along with 48th Bn RTR were given a day to rest and re-organise. The 16th Brigade would be staying as part of Western Desert Force when the two Indian Infantry Brigades were withdrawn. O’Connor wanted them as rested as possible until the 6th Australian Division were present and up to speed. It also meant that the dwindling supplies could be distributed between just to the two Indian Brigades, while 16th Brigade would have first choice of the Italian pickings, something much appreciated by them.

In the morning of 12 December, the headquarters of 7th Armoured Division was eight miles east of Sofafi, its 4th Brigade in the Buq Buq area, the Support Group in the Sofafi area, and the 7th Brigade, pursuing the enemy north-west, had reached Bir el Khireigat. O’Connor knew that 4th Armoured Brigade would need support, so he attached it to Major-General Beresford-Peirse's 4th Indian Division for the moment. After discussions with Horace Birks, its Commanding Officer, Beresford-Peirse ordered 11th Indian Infantry Brigade to support the tanks.

In return for receiving 4th Armoured Brigade, Beresford-Peirse detached 5th Indian Brigade to reinforce the 7th Armoured Division’s Support Group. With much stronger infantry forces, 7th Armoured Brigade began their attempt to cut the road from Bardia to Tobruk and thus isolate the garrison there. While the rest of the Armoured Brigade waited for the Indian Brigade to join them, an advance-guard, consisting of part of the ubiquitous 11th Hussars; 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade, two batteries of the 4th Royal Horse Artillery from the Support Group; and 3rd Sharpshooters in their Valiant Mark I*, set off to do so.

By the time the rest of the force had coalesced, 7th Armoured Brigade, the Support Group and 5th Indian Brigade, advanced in the evening to where Italian rear-guard remained in strength at Sidi Omar and, having surrounded it, waited until dawn to begin to break it down. After an intense bombardment by the RHA batteries, 1st Bn RTR closed to machine gun range of the Italian position, their A10s poured fire on any attempt to resist, the Close Support tanks with HE shells for their 3.7-inch tank mortars were particularly unpopular with the Italian defenders. The tanks then moved forward to point blank range before white flags began to appear. Sorting out the prisoners and resupplying held the British up most of the morning on 13 December, and then, when they were finally able to move forward again, the reinforced Italian artillery at Fort Capuzzo brought them under sustained and accurate fire.

By 11:00hrs 12 December, strong detachments of the 4th Armoured Brigade, had patrolled the main coast road finding numbers of Italian troops in Fort Capuzzo, Sollum, Sidi Suleiman, and Halfaya. O’Connor knew that Sollum would be needed to be one of the places where some of the shipping that had extra supplies could be unload. So, he ordered that this should be attacked as a matter of priority. The 2nd Royal Gloucestershire Hussars, equipped with Valiant Mark I* were given the task, supported by 11th Indian Brigade, backed up by the artillery of 4th Indian Division.

A frontal attack was always going to be difficult, and without being able to get through the Halfaya pass, there was no way round the flanks. The Royal Navy had pounded Sollum during the previous night, so that when the Valiant tanks approached at 15:00hrs, after a barrage from the 4th Indian Division’s artillery, the Italian force began to melt away back towards Bardia. A minefield slowed the progress of the tanks, but with the support of the 1/6th Rajputana Rifles they managed to put the Italians on the run. Here the speed of the Valiant I* came into its own, with the Cameron Highlanders in lorries accompanying them, they chased the retreating Italians along the road towards Fort Capuzzo. However, the light was fading and the weather continued to be appalling.

The inclination of the armoured regiment was to go into laager at night, but if they did so, the Italians would reach safety and have to be dealt with later. So, they kept going, machine gunning and firing their main guns at the Italian trucks whenever they could. Very quickly they came within range of the Italian artillery at Fort Capuzzo, which meant they stopped to regroup, resupply and hold the road. To go up against the Italian forces at Fort Capuzzo, they would need the artillery to catch up with them. Because of a communication breakdown, this took much longer to achieve than they’d hoped. Most of 13 December was wasted while 4th Armoured Brigade, 11th Indian Brigade and 4th Division troops sorted themselves out. They had been caught out by the speed of the Italian retreat, and were struggling to get their own re-supply forward, especially ammunition for the artillery.

6th Bn RTR in their A10s, with 4/7th Rajput Regiment made an attempt at the same time on 12 December as the attack on Sollum to dig out the Italian forces in Halfaya Pass, but it wasn’t until the Italians realised that they were on their own and in danger of being surrounded that they withdrew under the cover of night. The British tank regiment in this case did go into leaguer and so the Italians were able to join with the force at Fort Capuzzo along with those from Sidi Suleiman who also realised they were isolated.

When it became clear on the morning of 13 December that the British were approaching both from the direction of Sollum and Sidi Omar, the Italians at Fort Capuzzo decided that their position was untenable. They fell back to Bardia during the day, hotly pursued by the two pincers of the 7th Armoured Division. Fortunately for the Italians, they soon came under the protection of the artillery in Bardia, so the CO of 7th Armoured Division halted his forces. General Wavell confirmed with General O’Connor that the two Indian Brigades were to make their way back to the railhead at Marsa Matruh to begin the journey to Sudan as soon as possible. When O’Connor spoke to General Beresford-Peirse, the two men decided that this was an opportune moment. With the main body of Italians now in Bardia, O’Connor would need the fresh legs of the Australians to take them on. Urging Beresford-Peirse not to empty out any supply dumps on his way back to Marsa Matruh, they shook hands over what had been a very good piece of work.

The plan to cut the road from Bardia to Tobruk and thus isolate the garrison there continued. The force allotted advanced through Qaret Abu Faris, Gabr Lachem, Umm Maalif, crossed the Trigh Capuzzo (the track parallel to the main road and about fifteen miles south of it) at Point 211 and by 10:00hrs on the 14 December its patrols were overlooking the Bardia-Tobruk road from Bir el Baheira, and cut telephone wires along it. The 11th Hussars detachment however were badly hit by an Italian air attack, and once the road was secure returned towards the main British force to recuperate, while the 3rd Sharpshooters made the road impassable for Italian reinforcements to Bardia from the west, or to make withdrawal from Bardia very costly.

On 14 December the rest of 7th Armoured Division stood down to do whatever maintenance it could while waiting for the 6th Australian Division to move up, along with 16th Brigade, and the newly created 7th Army Tank Brigade, 40th, 44th and 48th Bn RTR in their Valiant Mark I (Infantry Tank Mark IIIs).

NB Text in italic differs from OTL. As with the previous update, I've taken the historical events as recounted in official histories and tried to imagine what differences have happened. One of the main ones, which happened in the previous part was that OTL 4th and 7th Armoured Brigades are swapped around, here they aren't so, while they did roughly OTL it was a different unit here. All in all I've basically cut three days off the OTL battle. Cutting the road between Bardia and Tobruk is the same, 10:00hrs 14 December. But the capture of Sollum and Halfaya pass, with subsequent withdrawal of the Italian forces into Bardia is ahead of schedule. As is the arrival of the Australians and obviously the non-existent 7th Army Tank Brigade. Sidi Omar didn't fall until 16 December, the attack on Sollum and Halfaya Pass didn't happen OTL, not sure why, it is 25 miles from Buq Buq to Sollum, too busy collecting prisoners? O'Connor was reported at being furious that Italians escaped during the night because the British tankies stopped at night. OTL the Italians pull back into Bardia on 16 December, here on 13 December. It made sense in my head when I was writing it.

 

[allanpcameron]

Operation Compass Part 3.

15-18 December 1940. Bardia, Libya.

The initial Field Supply depots created for the 7th Armoured Division and 4th Indian Division had been used up. The troop carrying transport ferrying the 6th Australian Division forward carried the Indian Brigades back. As this was taking place, other elements of the RASC were attempting to create two new depots, one at Sollum for the 6th Australian Division and the other at Fort Capuzzo for 7th Armoured Division, while a larger stockpile was begun at Sidi Barrani, much of it being moved forward by road from Marsa Matruh.

Sollum had no developed port facilities to speak of and Sidi Barrani was very dependent on the weather. Attempts to shift large quantities of water forward was a constant problem, not as much had been captured from the Italians has been hoped or expected. The haul of Italian trucks were pressed into service, a newly arrived Reserve M.T. Company, which hitherto had had no vehicles, had taken over 80 captured Italian 5- and 6-ton diesel trucks. Fifty heavy lorries, each with a 7½-ton desert payload, arrived with their drivers from Palestine to join the efforts, the work of General Hutchison back in Cairo was paying off.

What hadn’t been taken into account was that the lorries were making the trips back and forth fully loaded. They would arrive with whatever their cargo was, unload it into the Field Depot, then stop off somewhere else and pick up a load of Italian booty, or sometimes prisoners, to be carried back towards the railhead. Very few of the captured Italian weapons or ammunition were of much use to the British, but there was little doubt that there’d be a use for it somewhere. It did however extend the time taken for the round trip with the doubled loading and unloading.

O’Connor had warned the men of the Western Desert Force that they may have to accept lower rations of food and water for a time if it meant that they had enough petrol and ammunition, the Italian stocks of food notwithstanding. The 16th and 17th Australian Infantry Brigades had completed the process of replacing the two Indian Brigades, the 19th Australian Brigade, the least well trained and equipped was held back at Sidi Barrani to lighten the load for the supply system, help with the Italian prisoners and act as the reserve.

General O’Connor gathered his senior commanders to plan out their next move. Brigadier Caunter, in temporary command of 7th Armoured Division while General Creagh was hospitalised, was joined by Major-General Iven Mackay, GOC 6th Australian Division, each of the Brigadiers attended, including Reginald Naesmyth, commander of newly created and arrived 7th Army Tank Brigade.

While the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force softened up the Bardia garrison, the 6th Australian Division, would move 16th Australian Brigade to support the two Battalions of the Support Group to the north of Bardia, on the road that led to Tobruk. Mackay would bring up 17th Australian Brigade to take up positions around the western sides of the Italian positions, while the British 16th Brigade, under 6th Division’s command would invest the south. For the next days and nights aggressive patrolling was to be carried out, it was essential to have as much detail of the defences of Bardia as possible before an attack was launched. Looking at aerial reconnaissance photographs Naesmyth could see a tank ditch which would hold up his Valiant tanks. Engineers and Pioneers would be needed to clear minefields and create crossings over the obstacle if the tanks were going to be able to break in to support the infantry. The Australians hadn’t had much time to work with tanks, and O’Connor could see the value of having a few days of rehearsals for the attack, which would allow the artillery to build up the stocks of ammunition that they would need.

The 7th Armoured Brigade would support the reconnaissance work of the armoured cars of 11th Hussars pushing up towards Tobruk. 4th Armoured Brigade and the Support Group, held the flank against an attack from Tobruk, and probed for weaknesses on the Bardia perimeter. With the plans in place, there was plenty to do, especially for the quartermasters who’d certainly earn their pay in the next few days.

NB Text in italic differs from OTL. The big change is that 6th Australian Division is already forward and in position, especially 17th Brigade. Also presence of a tank brigade rather than a beat up regiment.

 

[allanpcameron]

Operation Compass, Part 4.

19-25 December 1940. Bardia, Egypt.

Major-General Mackay having been given command of the assault on Bardia and had spent time bringing up and siting all the artillery that O’Connor had attached to him. The Australian Division’s own artillery regiments weren’t at full strength, and some were even still equipped with old Great War era weapons. O’Connor made sure that nearly all the Western Desert Force’s artillery was assigned to Mackay, even the Medium Regiment that General Beresford-Peirse had attempted to take along with his 4th Indian Division. In addition, everything that could be scrounged for an attack on a prepared position was found and distributed between the men. Italian wire cutters, tape for guiding units into position, extra picks and shovels, were all put in the hands of the troops. In planning for the assault, Great War expenditure of artillery shells was planned for, each gun needing 500 shells on hand, and enormous task for the already over-stretched RASC units.

A map of the defences of Bardia had been captured in Sidi Barani, and night patrols had confirmed some of the details, giving it a degree of legitimacy. The size of the garrison was difficult to estimate, but Mackay knew the defensive line, in the form of an arc, was eighteen miles in length round harbour and town of Bardia. There was an almost continuous anti-tank ditch, behind which was a double line of underground posts, linked by rows of barbed wire. The posts were generally about 800 yards apart and each was protected by its own anti-tank trench. The posts were generally armed with one or two 47-mm guns and from two to four machine-guns. Four hundred yards behind the forward line lay a second arc of posts, similar to the first, but lacking an anti-tank trench and sometimes without wire.

From the plan it was noted that posts were numbered consecutively from south to north, odd numbers for the outer posts and even numbers for the inner, and the numbers were marked on the maps and, as the patrols discovered, on the posts themselves. Within the perimeter aerial photography revealed a considerable array of artillery, estimated at 110 guns, and some long stone breastworks. Each flank of the line lay on the inner bank of one of the steep-sided wadis carved into the cliffs which would be impossible to assault. Everywhere else the posts were in flat, almost featureless ground offering little cover to an attacker, and few landmarks.

Various version of plans for assaulting Bardia were investigated and discarded. What became clear in the exercises in the desert between the Australian infantry and the Infantry Tanks of 7th Army Tank Brigade, was that they were the most valuable asset. If the tank ditch and mines could be dealt with, then, as shown in the first phase of Operation Compass, letting the tanks loose inside the Italian camp, with infantry support would be almost impossible to resist. The Tank Brigade became aware that they could really do with having some kind of specialised vehicles. The job of clearing mines was crucial to the tanks, relying on the engineers, who had no protection was something that should be looked at. Having some tanks equipped with bull-dozers to level out the anti-tank ditches, perhaps even tanks carrying bridges, would be useful. Some of these had been experimented with, but since none of these things were actually available, it was clear that the engineers would need to clear mines and create pathways in and out of the anti-tank ditches.

For this the engineers would need the cover of an artillery barrage and probably smoke. None of the Battalions of Infantry Tanks had any close support tanks, and so General Creagh, now returned from hospital and back in charge of 7th Armoured Division was approached to see if he would lend his Close Support tanks to the endeavour. The advantage of being based in the Middle East was that the 3.7-inch mountain howitzer was a common enough gun, and so ammunition for the tank mortars in that calibre included a good HE round as well as the smoke round for which they were designed to fire. Creagh agreed, but noted that the armour of the A9 and A10s was vulnerable to Italian anti-tank guns, so requested they be protected as much as possible. Each of the six Armoured Regiment had six CS tanks so 7th Army Tank Brigade added twelve each A9, A10 and Valiant I* Close Support tanks to their number, spreading them out among the three Battalions.

With a plan now in place one more full rehearsal took place starting on the night of 20/21 December and continuing much of that day. While the lessons were being studied, the men and machines were given a day to recover. During the rehearsals it had been noted that the best assault formation was for each Infantry Company to accompany a Troop of three tanks, in effect, giving each platoon a tank in support. A Squadron of tanks had been assigned to each Battalion and the units had trained together and now would fight together. The attack was timed to begin in the early hours of 23 December, with the hope that the whole attack would be mostly completed on 24 December, Christmas Eve. If they were still fighting on Christmas Day, it would be because the Italians were putting up a better fight than they had done so far.

The opening salvo of the assault on Bardia was courtesy of the Royal Navy. The inshore squadron comprising of HMS Barham and Terror, with other gunboats, had been reinforced by HMS Warspite, Valiant, Illustrious, Gloucester, York, and eleven destroyers, on their way back to Alexandria from Malta. The majority of the shells were concentrated on the northern section of Bardia’s defences. The RAF, who’d been bombing the area constantly for over a week had been concentrating on the southern section, but the 15-inch guns of three battleships and a monitor with the Cruisers and destroyers adding their own weight of fire, concentrated the minds of the Italians. Swordfish from HMS Illustrious also bombed targets of opportunity.

When the artillery of the Western Desert Force added their voice to that of the Royal Navy’s, while it lacked in heavy shells, it was still more than enough for the Italian defenders to cling to the bottom of their dug-outs. The 2/1st Battalion, 16th Australian Brigade lead the attack, focussing on the area between posts 45 and 47. While some troops rolled up the first line of odd numbered posts, others went to suppress the even numbered, second line of posts. Meanwhile the attached engineers worked to clear the wire with bangalore torpedoes, clear safe passages through the minefields, and then, with the help of Pioneers to create ramps for the tanks to cross the main anti-tank ditch.

With smoke shells from the artillery and Close Support tanks adding to the confusion, much of this work was done before the Italians could respond. The engineers had broken down the sides of the ditch on each side of Post 47 and made six crossings for the tanks and trucks at 60-to-100-yard intervals. They had also discovered and marked the mines between the crossings and the wire. Within five minutes the first two crossings were ready, and at 06.35hrs in the half-light, B Squadron 40th Battalion RTR, 14 Valiant Infantry Tanks and two Close Support Valiant I*, who went to the aid of the 2/1st Battalion, now pushing north, continuing to roll up the flank of the Italian defenders, and prepared to throw up a flank against any Italian counter-attack.

A Squadron and 2/2nd Battalion moved through the gap in the wire and ditch at the heels of B Squadron and began to roll up the defensive posts to the south-east, widening the gap further and soon were on the line of the Bardia-Capuzzo road.

By the time 2/3rd Battalion arrived, with the tanks of C Squadron, the engineers and pioneers had extended the crossing points allowing the second wave to move forward more quickly. These moved down the incline in the direction of Bardia itself, advancing two miles in the company of the 6th Division’s cavalry squadron in Bren carriers. An Italian counter-attack by six Italian medium tanks was stopped in its tracks as the 2-pdrs on the Valiant tanks pierced them easily, with no reply.

With 16th Australian Brigade and 40th Bn RTR now fully engaged, some 1800 men and almost seventy tanks, they found Italian resistance to be patchy. Some posts and sangers of Italian gunners put up a stiff resistance and would only be overcome by heavy fire and at the point of the bayonet. Other positions showed white flags with barely a shot being fired in their direction. By 08.30hrs the 16th Australian Infantry Brigade had occupied practically all its objectives, and had captured about 8,000 prisoners for very few losses.

The second phase got underway as planned at 11:30hrs. 17th Australian Infantry Brigade, with the support of 44th Bn RTR, moved forward, and came under accurate artillery fire. The 2/5th Battalion lost its commanding officer, but with the tanks of A Squadron and twelve A10 Close Support tanks attached, the Battalion rallied, and began to find some of the same success as their comrades had done in the early morning. By 13:00hrs, now with 2/6th Battalion supporting, they had reached the ‘switch’ line, where Italian resistance seemed more coordinated.

Having had some time to regroup, 16th Australian Brigade and 40th Bn RTR got underway again. The 2/2nd Battalion made more progress straight towards Bardia, while the 2/3rd Battalion moved towards the Bardia-Tobruk road. Thousands of prisoners once more were taken, and so surprised was the enemy by the speed of the assault that the Australians were able to capture the water supply plant and the harbour facilities intact. By late-afternoon the only Italians still holding out were those in the extreme north and south. In the north, after being subjected to such a lengthy bombardment from the 15-inch guns of the battleships, when the infantry of the 7th Support Group made a breech in the wire, they found the Italians surrendering wholesale. In the south, the 2/7th Battalion, who were still fresh, with C Squadron and the A10 Close Support tanks firing almost at point-blank range, the 17th Australian Brigade were finally able to penetrate the artillery area, and as their supporting fire died off, the Italian infantry gave up.

In a single day 6th Australian Division had won a most comprehensive victory. The Italians lost over 40,000 officers and men, killed and captured; more than 400 guns; 13 medium and 117 light tanks—many of them serviceable; several hundred motor vehicles, and many documents of immediate value. The Corps Commander, General Bergonzoli, somehow had managed to escape.

The Australians had suffered 256 casualties, killed and injured. The 'I' tanks had been invaluable, though they were by no means invulnerable. Some were stopped by mines, and others had their turrets jammed by direct hits from shells. Of 140 tanks which had taken part in the assault ten were out of action but were repairable easily. Sixteen would need to be repaired at a workshop, including four which had mechanical failures. Almost every Valiant tank had some scarring from shells that failed to penetrate, some had external stowage bins shot away. Six tank commanders were killed because there was no way to communicate with the infantry except by sticking their heads out of the turret. One A10 Close Support tank was penetrated by a 47mm anti-tank gun and destroyed; its crew killed.

Christmas Eve was spent clearing up the battlefield, burying the dead, organising the prisoners and generally getting sorted out. The medical units from both armies worked together to care for the wounded. For all the advantages of the captured material, having 40000 extra mouths to feed and water, as at Sidi Barrani put an enormous strain on the Australians and their supply chain. An urgent request was sent to the Royal Navy asking that they take on board as many of the Italian prisoners as possible. Since the British ships were returning to Alexandria, taking thousands of POWs by sea would free up a great deal of land based resources. The Navy responded and took off five thousand prisoners from Sidi Barrani over the next twenty-four hours, as well as many of the seriously injured Australians and Italians who were carried back to hospitals in the Delta.

At midnight, with General Mackay’s approval, Padres offered Watchnight Services or Midnight Mass. While some attended, many of the men of 6th Australian Division simply slept, exhausted and relieved.

NB Text in italic differs from OTL. The map is OTL, but the attack follows the same plan. The main differences are able to happen because, the 6th Australian Division was prepared earlier to take over from the Indian 4th Division. The preparations for Compass are greater than the planned OTL five day raid. The presence of more tanks. When the battle of Bardia took place 7th RTR provided less than 30 tanks. Here there are three times that number, so I am guessing that increases the chance of success by a factor of three, meaning the assault takes one day instead of three. I am aware that there's a lot of conjecture and hand-wavium here present, but I hope it isn't too unbelievable.

 

[allanpcameron]

Operation Compass, Part 5.

25 - 31 December 1940. Tobruk

The reconnaissance work of the 11th Hussars, backed up by 7th Armoured Brigade, had allowed General O’Connor to have a good picture of the Italian position at Tobruk already. In many ways the Italian defences were very similar to Bardia’s, and as far as could be gathered, manned by fewer troops. This was confirmed on examining some captured papers in Bardia. Having allowed his force to rest on Christmas Day, General Creagh was given the task of moving up his two Armoured Brigades and the 7th Support Group, to capture the Italian airfield at El Adem, then cut the road between Tobruk and Gazala.

The British 16th Brigade was dispatched along the road towards Tobruk, accompanied by 48th Bn RTR, both units having been in reserve for the assault on Bardia. O’Connor thought about attempting to attack Tobruk ‘on the bounce’ just with the three British infantry battalions and the Infantry Tanks, backed up by the 7th Armoured Division. Too many things could go wrong, and if there were 25000 Italians, and if they resisted more comprehensibly than they’d done up until then, attacking with only 1800 men might be a disaster. The idea was shelved.

While Bardia’s harbour had been captured it was found to be badly damaged, not so much by the Italians, but by the Royal Navy, especially the gunboat HMS Aphis which had entered the port some days previously and laid waste to it. This had the effect that bulk cargoes still had to be offloaded at Sidi Barrani and Sollum. Work to improve the facilities at Sollum meant that it was increasing the tonnage it was able to deal with, it was hoped to increase this to 500 tons per day, but that was still some weeks away.

The RASC was therefore once more having to run long convoys of trucks over large distances, often in appalling sand storms. The windfall of Italian trucks was much needed, but these were unfamiliar to their new owners, and all too many were wrecked or damaged by ill-use. General Hutchison had hoped for the Italian windfall, and with his contacts in Cairo and elsewhere tried to get some RASC men trained in the use and maintenance of the Italian makes and models, as some of these were present in the civilian population. This would pay off over time, but the immediate needs were the priority. Losses among the trucks and lorries was running as high as 40% as time went on. Part of the problem was if a lorry broke down, rather than being towed back to a workshop and fixed, usually a small matter of a spare part, it tended to be stripped of parts by other lorries passing. Before long, it would be little more than a carcass stripped bare, and beyond repair.

The best news in the capture of Bardia for the quartermasters was that the water plant was intact. This was soon pumping water again back to Fort Capuzzo’s cisterns, having cleaned them out of the salty water first discovered there. The Italians also had large quantities of bottled mineral water. A lot of this had to be distributed among the Italian POWs, so that they had something refillable as they were marched back through Sollum to Sidi Barrani, then onwards towards the Delta.

The Italian artillery men had often destroyed their gun sights before surrendering, and radios were smashed, so that a lot of captured equipment, which would have been useful, had been put beyond use. This had caused rumours back in Cairo that the Australians were looting and pillaging, destroying valuable assets. None of this was particularly true. Large quantities of the Italian rations and clothing were having to be given to the POWs, as the numbers being processed were so much greater than what had been planned for.

Some things were taken over by the Australians. The Australians made up some of their deficit in anti-tank guns and mortars with captured Italian weapons. Italian groundsheets and boots had become much prized, the Australian’s own boots had been worn out with all their marching. Italian groundsheets were found to make reasonable tents, some pistols, watches and compasses were ‘acquired’ but systematic looting was an unfair accusation. The Australians also enjoyed a lot of practice with Italian grenades, mortars and guns to get used to them all.

The Divisional Cavalry Regiment had supplemented their Bren carriers with a variety of Italian tankettes, they’d even taken over six each M11/39 and M13/40 tanks. The Royal Tank Regiment lent them some fitters and mechanics to help them get used to the diesel engines, and soon their crews were soon proficient enough. The sides of the captured vehicles were emblazoned with a kangaroo to notify everyone that they were under new management.

When the 19th Australian Brigade arrived at Bardia from Sidi Barrani on December 27th, the other two Australian Brigades, along with the two Tank Battalions, began the journey to Tobruk. Having begun as the least well equipped of the three Australian Brigades, the 19th Brigade had made the most of the Italian weapons captured at Sidi Barrani and now was fully equipped, some would argue, over equipped.

The distance of some seventy miles to Tobruk from Bardia meant that two new Field Supply Depots had to be created for the two Divisions, halfway between Bardia and Tobruk at Gambut, 180 miles from the railhead at Marsa Matruh. Amongst the movement forward were some of the 7th Armoured Division’s support units. By moving an RAOC workshop to Bardia it would allow the stricken Valiants to be fixed up and provide the Cruiser tanks with support a bit closer to the front. Likewise, the RAF were moving some of their ground crew forward, with the aviation fuel and Italian bombs discovered on some of the landing strips, made life a little easier for the Desert Air Force.

With 7th Armoured Brigade in the lead, they found the Italian airfield at El Adem, which was also a repair depot for the Regia Aeronautica, (the Italian Royal Air Force), which was taken by 8th Hussars without any opposition by the evening of 26 December. A supply of water was found which, while not potable, was able to be distributed for the purposes of washing. The 1st Bn RTR carried on forward to Acroma, where, with a company of infantry from 1st Kings Royal Rifle Corps and a battery of guns, they dominated the coastal road. The Valiant I* tanks 3rd Sharpshooters repeated their role of cutting the road beyond the Italian position of Tobruk, with another company of 2nd Rifle Brigade and a battery of anti-tank supporting them.

4th Armoured Brigade had taken a more direct route through Gambut, clearing the way for the 16th Infantry Brigade coming behind them, and then moved up towards the eastern and southern perimeter of the Italian position. An Italian artillery barrage made the tanks, with the 1st Kings Royal Rifle Corps in lorries, pull back out of range. An attack on the bounce without enough artillery support would have been very costly. The 4th Armoured Brigade held these positions until the arrival of the three British infantry battalions, 1st Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders, 2nd Bn Leicestershire Regiment, 2nd Bn Queens Royal Regiment, who took up positions and dug in around the Italian’s perimeter. The 48th Bn RTR were held back out of sight of the Italians. Once the infantry was settled in, they began aggressive patrolling in their sectors looking for weak points and capturing unwary sentries.

To the south, 11th Hussars’ armoured cars found the Italian landing ground at Bir el Gubi deserted and carried on to Bir Hacheim. Further south again patrols from the Long Range Desert Group kept an eye of known and potential Italian positions.

When General Mackay came forward to Tobruk, consulting with Brigadier Greenfield (16th Brigade) and the two Armoured Brigade Commanding Officers, it was obvious that the same plan which had worked at Bardia would likely work just as well here. An infantry attack to open the door for the Infantry Tanks, which would then work their way through the Italian defences with infantry support, covered by artillery.

Brigadier Greenfield was keen for his men to make the initial assault, since they had sat out the last one. General Mackay thought that the two Australian Brigades could do it again without as much rehearsal of working with the tanks. All that was necessary was for the artillery to come up, with full stocks of ammunition, and if the British Brigade were able to do the reconnaissance patrols, finding the best place to break in, then the Australians would do the rest. One of the advantages of the speedy fall of Bardia was that the artillery still had good stocks of ammunition already at hand. What had to be brought forward was enough to replace what had been fired off during the assault.

General O’Connor found himself going back and forth chasing up supplies. If Tobruk’s harbour could be taken, then this would simplify his supply lines significantly. He was aware that the RAF were doing their best to keep up, and with the capture of El Adem, the Italian Air Force were now operating from further away, so the air situation was still in British favour. Having lost the 4th Indian Division to the attack on Sudan, O’Connor was aware that General Wavell was under pressure to keep supporting the Greeks. Two of the RAF squadrons that had been available at Sidi Barrani had already been withdrawn for that purpose.

O’Connor had consulted Wavell, who had come forward to Sidi Barrani, about what the objectives of Operation Compass were now. Having achieved the first objective, to knock the Italians out of Egypt, O’Connor wanted clarity about the follow up. Capturing Tobruk would allow the possibility of capturing Benghazi, and that was a port which would really open up the rest of Libya to the British if captured. That was a very different proposal to what was begun. Churchill, when consulted by Chief of the Imperial General Staff, over the matter still had one eye on Greece, but was delighted at the way Compass had gone so far. The Greeks had done an excellent job throwing back the Italians, what further help they would want would need to be assessed. Wavell could see the possibility that if Compass knocked the Italians out of Cyrenaica this would give Mussolini another major blow, especially if the work to be done in Sudan went well. Wavell supported O’Connor’s desire that Tobruk should be captured, then a proper review could be done.

Having this received this confirmation, O’Connor spoke to General Mackay and Brigadier Naesmyth to figure out how quickly they’d be ready. General Mackay had been thinking about it too, and he was concerned that the edge would come off the men if they stayed around too long in the living conditions they were enduring. From his point of view, the British patrolling had shown that there was a pretty obvious place to attack near post 57, but there were two issues. The first was the artillery support. As long as there were enough shells for the guns, then he’d be ready to go. The second was the discovery of a line of booby-traps in front of the anti-tank ditch. These would add to the burden of the engineers in the early phase of the assault.

Naesmyth agreed about being ready. While some of the Valiant Tanks that had been seriously damaged were still back at Bardia, and there were always a few that needed a bit of maintenance, his three battalions still numbered the best part of 150 tanks. The use of Close Support tanks with their HE shells had proven extremely useful, and if General Creagh would agree to lend them, even just the Valiant I* CS tanks, then Naesmyth’s Tank Brigade was ready to go. One difference to the attack on Bardia was noted however, and that was the need to get in among the Italian artillery line as quickly as possible.

Looking at Mackay’s plan O’Connor was conscious that while the two Australian Brigades had been enough for the battle at Bardia, he believed that the 16th Brigade would be needed to penetrate towards Tobruk itself while the two Australian Brigades rolled up the Italian defenders along the line. Mackay agreed and the fine tuning of the planning was able to begin. O’Connor also ordered General Creagh that when the time came, 7th Armoured Division were to demonstrate in support of the attack and to keep the Italians on the eastern side of the perimeter guessing. Meanwhile 11th Hussars would continue to press forward towards Derna and Mechili to see what the lay of the land was.

O’Connor consulted with the quartermasters, who assured him that more artillery shells were due, so they set the date for the assault for the early hours of the morning of 3 January 1941. His Royal Navy and Royal Air Force liaisons, now that a date was set, began to coordinate the help that would be needed from the sea and air.

Brigadier Herring, Commanding Officer Royal Artillery, 6th Australia Division, had his work cut out. His men had been assiduously working to map the Italian artillery positions using captured maps, aerial photographs and flash-spotting (taking bearings on the flashes of enemy guns and recording the time of flight of their shells). Once they had fixed the positions of the Italian batteries, they could ensure that accurate fire would be brought down on them on the critical day.

Herring and his staff also had a complex series of timed barrages to work out with the tanks and infantry. Once the battle started it was very difficult to coordinated between the attacking force and the covering artillery. The 16th British Brigade particularly needed a more flexible support plan, so an observer from the designated Field Regiment would accompany each Battalion HQ, and the 48th Bn Royal Tank Regiment would keep back a radio link tank between the infantry battalion and the Royal Artillery Field Regiment. Thankfully, there were enough tanks that leaving a few out of the assault was possible.

 

[allanpcameron]

Operation Compass, Part 6.

1-7 January 1941.

On 1 January 1941 the Western Desert Force was officially renamed the XIII Corps, recognising the expansion of the British Troops in Egypt. General O’Connor was confirmed as General Officer Commanding, but it didn’t affect him materially, he was still facing Tobruk with the forces already under his command.

For three hours in the early morning 3 January, two squadrons of Wellington bombers were over the Tobruk area, bombing and drowning the noise of the assembling tanks and artillery. These followed the bombardment from 00:00hrs to 02:00hrs when HMS Terror, with two gunboats and a minesweeper, focussed on the inner defences. Three Royal Navy destroyers stood ready to intercept the damaged Italian cruiser San Giorgio should she try to break out.

The artillery barrage had opened up so that at 05:40hrs the 2/3rd Battalion 16th Australian Brigade, crossed their start line and advanced to the attack. The Royal Navy and the RAF had provided cover for the engineers, who had been working from just after midnight to disarm the booby traps, clear the mines and make passages through the wire and over the ditch. Within an hour the 16th Australian Brigade, with eighteen Valiant tanks, had punched a hole a mile wide and a mile deep in Tobruk’s defences. The Australians found, once again, that Italian resistance varied from the negligible to the very stubborn.

The very stubborn defenders discovered that the Australian troops tended to do two things. Firstly, they would pause while one, then up to three, Valiant tanks would appear, and support the approach of the infantry with their main and co-axial guns. If that didn’t work, then, within a short time, very accurate artillery fire would start to rain down on the Italian position. At that point the tanks, often now reinforced by a Close Support tank, would then reappear and pummel the Italian position, often at point-blank range. While the 2-pdr gun on the Valiant had no HE capability, the tank gunners were getting very good at using the AP shots to knock away the defensive structures and knock splinters of rock and concrete onto the defenders. Very rarely did the Italian machine gunners have clear shots at Australian infantry who had become very good at using the tank’s bulk as a movable shelter.

At 07:40hrs, while the 16th and 17th Australian Brigades were still fanning out to east and west picking off the defence posts from the flanks and rear, the British 16th Brigade, with 48th Bn RTR, took up the advance northwards towards the heart of the Italian position. This was covered by a heavy barrage, with the Royal Artillery’s guns moving their aim forward 200 yards every two minutes. Those batteries not providing the rolling barrage concentrated on pre-determined Italian artillery battery positions.

The first main resistance to 16th British Brigade came at the Bardia-El Adem road junction, where dug-in tanks armed with machine-guns held up the 2nd Bn Queens Royal Regiment. C Squadron of 48th Bn RTR, supporting the Queens, concentrated, and the Italian tanks, armed only with machine guns, had no defence against the Valiants’ 2-pdr guns. As soon as the resistance was overcome Brigadier Greenfield’s brigade resumed its advance. Once more on the right and in the centre little opposition was met, but again the Queens battalion ran into trouble. The Italians had a large number of tanks within the perimenter, but very few of them were actually mobile, hence the dug in tanks at the road junction. The Italian commander had kept the tanks that were capable of moving as a counter-attack force. So, seven M13/40 medium tanks accompanied by some infantry covered by a barrage, were given orders to counter-attack, which they did with great courage. This was routed by the presence of six Valiant tanks, which destroyed the M13/40s within minutes. More stubborn resistance near Fort Pilastrino was overcome when the Royal Artillery observer with the Queens’ Battalion HQ was able to direct fire through the radio link provided by the tanks. Followed up quickly by a Company of infantry and a Troop of tanks, the Italians gave up in the face of overwhelming odds.

The Solaro area was captured by the Leicestershire Regiment, and with it the Fortress Commander, General Pitassi Mannella. Despite the strongest protests from his capters, he insisted that his own capture did not mean that the rest of the defenders of Tobruk would have to follow suit. The attacking forces were tiring fast, many had had a long march to the start line and then had been fighting for most of the day. Two lessons from the fighting at Bardia had been introduced. The carrier platoons from each Battalion were used much more for bringing forward ammunition for the men and carrying out the wounded. The walking wounded, rather than able bodied men, were tasked with moving the Italian prisoners, often with a carrier on overwatch.

In the same way the Tank Brigade had ‘acquired’ some Italian tankettes which they used for resupply. While the diesel engine of the Valiant Mark I had sufficient fuel for most of the day, the expenditure of both main and machine gun ammunition was prolific. The armoured resupply vehicles were able to come forward almost to the front line, so that the tanks accompanying the infantry didn’t have to withdraw too far to be resupplied. This also gave the infantry Companies time to get their own ammunition and water replenished.

It was the Australian 6th Division Cavalry Regiment that put the final gloss on the day’s action. With their captured Italian tanks, they raced ahead of 16th Brigade and made straight for Tobruk harbour itself. A roadblock was cleared for them by the Italian defenders who didn’t seem to recognise the significance of the kangaroos painted on the side of the tanks. On arriving at the harbour, the Australian tanks and accompanying infantry in carriers ripped into the heart of the efforts to destroy ammunition and fuel dumps. Once the naval garrison of 2000 sailors at the harbour, commanded Admiral Vietina, realised that they had been tricked and were incapable of doing anything about it, Vietina offered the Australian Captain in command his personal weapon and surrendered the facilities. The Australians insisted on stopping any further attempts at demolition of stores or facilities, which was agreed, and one enthusiastic Australian raised his bush hat on the flag pole to mark the change in ownership. The Cavalry commander fired off Very Lights to let the Royal Navy and the rest of 6th Australian Division know they'd captured the port.

As night fell most of the defended area had been captured, and it was clear that the battle had been won. The perimeter was so long that many of the outlying posts, with communications cut off, didn’t realise the full extent of their position. The 7th Armoured Division and its Support Group continued to press against the western edge of the Tobruk garrison all day, holding the attention of the forces at that end of the perimeter

The Australians had found a barbed wire enclosure, obviously intended for themselves, which they used it to collect the large numbers of Italian prisoners they’d captured during the day. During the night the Italian Air Force finally responded to the requests for help from the garrison. The Italian prisoners in the POW compound had lit fires to keep themselves warm during the night, and it was here that the Italian bombers concentrated their efforts. The number of prisoners killed was reported at somewhere between 50 and 300; the Italians were huddled together and the effect of the bombs was appalling.

At dawn on 4 January Major-General Della Mura, commanding 61st Sirte Division, surrendered, with several thousand officers and men of his Division to the commander of 16th Australian Brigade. At 10.45hrs the last strong point had surrendered. It still took most of the day for the Australian and British troops to occupy the whole area and disarm the garrison.

The defeat of the Tobruk garrison included 25,000 prisoners, and the capture of 208 field and medium guns and 87 tanks. The total casualties in 13th Corps were just over 300, 2nd Bn Queens Royal Regiment having suffered the worst.

Arrangements had been made to take over the port installations as rapidly as possible, and it was a great relief to find that the demolitions had been confined chiefly to guns and ammunition. The planned demolition of a naval fuel plant and the floating crane had been forestalled by the 6th Division Cavalry Regiment. Some of the jetties were damaged but usable; the power-station was in working order, with 4,000 tons of coal on hand. There was a complete bulk petrol storage installation; a refrigeration plant and a distillation plant all found to be undamaged; and 10,000 tons of stored water was found. The Royal Navy’s Inshore Squadron began at once its task of sweeping for mines and on the morning of January 6 the harbour was ready to receive shipping.

Once more, having learned from the experience of Sidi Barrani and Bardia, the Royal Navy assisted with the relocation of the Italian prisoners. As the lighters and coastal vessels, which had been waiting for the capture of Tobruk, came in and unloaded their cargos, they left crammed with Italian soldiers and sailors bound for a more convenient captivity, 1500 to 2000 were shipped out every second or third day.

Back at Bardia, the first elements of the 7th Australian Division started to arrive from training in Palestine. The 21st Brigade arrived to take over from 19th Brigade, now fully equipped, though with an Italian flavour, these arrived in Tobruk on 7 January.

General O’Connor already had his eyes on the next phase of the operation, and with 7th Armoured Division able to meet their fuel, food and water requirements from Tobruk’s resources already had them on the road east. General Mackay’s 6th Australian Division, with the arrival of 19th Brigade was a completely Australian outfit, and, despite its exertions, was ready for whatever came next. The 16th British Brigade were left to police Tobruk. Trying to sort out the prisoners was a difficult task, and great efforts had to be made with regard hygiene. The POW cage had been expanded to deal with the numbers, but providing latrines, and enforcing their use, took a lot of effort on the part of the Argylls, who’d been handed that particular role.

NB Text in italic differs from OTL. This goes pretty much the same as Bardia. Looking at Rommel's capture of Tobruk, where he had plenty of tanks within the perimeter it still takes a day and a half. Although the Italian garrison in Tobruk is much smaller than Bardia's the perimeter is much longer and so takes a lot of marching to get it all together. The Australian Cavalry did capture the port, but the next morning. I've taken liberties because I wanted the floating crane to survive. The use of Italian tanks is a bit of a ruse de guerre here, but it is in italics so it isn't real. Once again the presence of many more infantry tanks gives the 6th Australian Division a much stronger hand to take Tobruk, in roughly the same time frame, it is a large area to capture, but with roughly a quarter to a third less casualties.

 

[allanpcameron]

Operation Compass, Part 7.

8-15 January 1941.

Major-General Michael Creagh’s orders were explicit, the Italian 10th Army, or rather, what remained of it, had opened itself up to be defeated in detail. The 60th Sabratha Division had been split between Derna on the coast and Mechili inland. The detached infantry regiment at Mechili were reinforced by an armoured force, whose composition and capability were unknown, but it had to be considered as dangerous. 7th Armoured Brigade with part of the Support Group were to continue up the coast road towards Derna. 4th Armoured Brigade would cut across country to Mechili.

The newly arrived 19th Australian Brigade, which was fresh, was given the task of advancing along the coast road towards Derna following 7th Armoured Brigade. The 6th Australian Division’s Cavalry Regiment, with its captured Italian tanks would be act as 19th Brigade’s reconnaissance force. The Australian infantry were accompanied by 40th Bn RTR in their Valiant Infantry Tanks. This particular Brigade had had much less experience of working with tanks, and so they spent a day exercising around Tobruk with the tanks before setting off.

Creagh’s two Armoured Brigades were still in a reasonably good state of repair. Although they had been moving far and fast over the previous month, their overall level of availability was quite high. Despite being far from their workshops the fitters and mechanics had been doing their best to keep the cruiser tanks on the road. There was a certain amount of cannibalisation of unrepairable tanks to keep the majority on the road, but the six regiments, two each made up of A9, A10 and Valiant I*, had set off on 6 January, just a day after the capture of Tobruk.

Each Armoured Brigade had its own designated RASC Company, split into four platoons (workshop, ammunition, petrol and supplies). Consisting of 9 officers, 17 NCOs, 338 Other Ranks, they operated 90 3-ton lorries, 25 motorcycles, various cars and lighter trucks. The two Companies had been fully stocked before setting off from Field Supply Depot 10 and supplemented by some captured Italian stocks from Bardia and Tobruk. The mostly highly prized (and fought over) Italian trucks were the 2000l water trucks. Four of these were ‘acquired’ by 7th Armoured Division, adding to the 15-cwt water trailers that each of the RASC platoons were issued with.

Perhaps General Hutchison’s most treasured gift was that the petrol platoons of the two Armoured Brigades had been issued with the new ‘jerrycans’. The arrival of a large number of these in the convoy which arrived from England in December had been shipped forward to Sollum at the beginning of the month. From there they’d been brought up to Field Supply Depot 10 for the exclusive use of the Armoured Division. Having these to carry petrol meant that they would lose less from leakage, and were generally found to be more convenient for refuelling tanks. These, along with the external fuel tanks on the majority of the tanks, added to Creagh’s ability to manoeuvre. From previous experience the crews would now only ditch these external tanks in an emergency. If it was believed that the tank would go into action the next day, then the crew would dismount the extra fuel tank the night before, carefully, to avoid it being damaged. The petrol platoon had some spare fuel tanks, but it had been learned by the tank crews to treat the ones they had with care.

General O’Connor had recognised that what he was asking of Creagh men wasn’t going to be easy, especially as it wouldn’t be clear just when the RASC Companies would be able to replenish the supplies they were carrying forward. The 4th Reserve Mechanical Transport Company New Zealand Army Service Corps had brought forward the 19th Australian Infantry Brigade, so these, along with other RASC units were given the task to create two more Field Supply Depots (12 and 13) halfway between Tobruk and Derna/Mechili.

The first encounter with Italian troops for 7th Armoured Brigade was in the vicinity of Martuba, some 70 miles from Tobruk, and only fifteen miles short of Derna. The road was blocked and so the A9 tanks of the 8th Hussars began to patrol to look for ways around the obstacle. The closer the Armoured Brigade came to Derna the less conducive to tank operations it became. The arrival of the Australians of 19th Brigade with the infantry tanks allowed 7th Armoured Brigade to move off south to support the efforts of 4th Armoured Brigade at Mechili.

The 7th Hussars, equipped with A9 Cruisers, from 4th Armoured Brigade acted primarily as the reconnaissance force for the rest of Brigade. The three understrength Squadrons of 7th Hussars had cut south of Mechili, with one each blocking the tracks leading into Mechili from west, south and south-east. The two other regiments 6th Battalion RTR in A10s and 2nd RGH in Valiant I* approached from the east and north respectively. Because of the slower speed of the A10s the 6th Bn RTR were approaching directly, while the 2nd RGH had swept round to approach from the north. Half of the Support Group were with 4th Armoured Brigade and the batteries of the Royal Horse Artillery got into position to support the attack.

Brigadier John Caunter’s intelligence was that there were probably two battalions of Italian medium and light tanks ahead of him, and an unknown number of troops, but probably at least a regiment, so he had to presume they had anti-tank guns as well as artillery. The first Italian M13/40s that had been encountered had proven themselves an improvement over the previous Italian tanks and its performance now well known to the British. While its 47mm gun was a threat to the A9 at any range, the A10 at medium to close range, but the Valiant I* would need to be very close to be in danger. The Italian tanks had shown themselves unreliable and few of them were equipped with radios. The armour was about the same thickness as the A10, around 30mm, but the British thought it quite brittle.

General Babini commanding the forces at Mechili knew that a British force was approaching from his own scouts. He therefore set up his units to catch the British in an ambush, but the British were moving faster than he anticipated. The initial encounter took place as the 7th Hussars’ A9s were caught moving into position by some of the Italian tanks of III Medium Tank Battalion. The 2-pdr guns fired by pre-war professionals took out six Italian tanks in quick succession, but the 47mm guns on the Italian tanks took an equal toll of the lightly armoured cruisers.

The 10th Bersaglieri Regiment had recently arrived in Libya and this was their first action. The destruction of the Italian forces in Egypt, Bardia and Tobruk by the British, following on the losses to the Greeks in Albania had dented Italian pride. The Bersaglieri were a proud regiment and felt they had the power to restore something of that lost pride. They had set up their anti-tank guns well and as the A10s of 6th Bn RTR approached to within range they began to take a toll on the British tanks. Other than a couple of Close Support tanks with their 3.7-inch tank howitzer with the ability to throw HE rounds at the Italian anti-tank guns, the rest of the A10s suffered the lack of an effective weapon to deal with dug-in anti-tank guns. The 6th Bn RTR started to withdraw as losses mounted, the Italians were in a stronger position than expected. The Italian artillery began to fall among the British tanks, with two tanks being put out of action because of near-misses.

This withdrawal was seen by Babini as an opportunity and so he ordered the battalion of M13/40s to advance and finish off the British tanks. Unfortunately for Babini, this advance coincided with the arrival of 2nd RGH from the north. The Italian tanks were caught on the flank, their thin armour no protection against the 2-pdr guns on the Valiant I* tanks. As losses mounted, and attempts to take on the new British tanks, whose 60mm frontal armour dealt with the Italian 47mm guns quite well, the position in Mechili was now in grave danger.

While the Italians had prepared an all-around defence, the fifty Valiant I* which rolled over their positions were almost unstoppable. A couple of tanks were disabled due to mines, but the rest rolled over the Bersaglieri leaving them no option but to surrender. The other battalion of tanks present in Mechili was a Light Tank Battalion in L3/35 tankettes, when they’d seen the British tanks coming and knew their machine guns would be useless against the tanks, some of them attempted to escape. B Squadron of 7th Hussars which blocked the route to the west picked off a number of them. The A9 Cruisers had much the same top speed as the tankettes and so ten British tanks chased after the thirty tankettes, destroying twenty, before ending the chase due to failing light and low fuel. The ten of tankettes which escaped were last seen heading in the direction of Benghazi.

The situation at Derna was complicated by the wadi that ran down to the sea. The 19th Brigade and the Valiant tanks pushed forward, and kept the pressure on the Italian defenders, but attacking Derna from the east was no easy matter. The support of the tanks could only take the infantry so far, as the terrain militated against the tracked vehicles.

With the other two Australian Brigades now rested after the battle at Tobruk, O’Connor could see that he had two options. With 7th Armoured Division now in possession of Mechili he could either strike directly at Benghazi, or if, as he suspected, the Italians might withdraw their remaining forces from Cyrenaica, he could cut them off them off by advancing through Msus to Agedabia. If the Italians decided to stay where they were, this would mean he could attack Benghazi from the south. Consulting Creagh about whether his tanks and men could achieve this feat, the answer was yes, but the tanks would be in dire need of maintenance afterwards. General Mackay’s opinion was that his 19th Brigade, with the infantry tanks would be able to keep moving along the coast road, but it would likely be hard going. One of his other two Brigades, 16th or 17th, if they had the transport, could follow 7th Armoured Division across country to support them. If the reports about Italian strength in Derna and beyond were correct, he would probably need two Brigades to clear them out.

The quartermasters of XIII Corps, who rightly felt that they had been doing miracles on a daily basis, looked at the O’Connor’s plan and sighed. They were being asked to supply an Armoured Division and an Infantry Division over waterless camel tracks. As the crow flies, a much shorter distance than driving over the desert tracks, Agedabia was over 250 miles from Tobruk, now the nearest place where supplies could be unloaded. It was five hundred miles from the railhead at Marsa Matruh, as the crow flies. Supplies were starting to arrive in Tobruk from Egypt and Tobruk was capable of dealing with around 900 tons of cargo per day. The number of prisoners being fed and watered was reducing as they were shipped back to Egypt, making life a bit easier for the quartermasters. But it was still an undertaking with considerable risk and difficulty. Like General Creagh’s assessment of his tanks, the supply chain could do it, but what kind of state it would be in at the end of it didn’t bear thinking about. The new plan for advancing across the desert made it absolutely essential to have sufficient reserve stocks well forward at the outset; another Field Supply Depot (No. 14) was therefore to be formed 25 miles south-west of Mechili, into which ten days' stock of food and petrol and two refills of ammunition were to be put—nearly 3,000 tons in all—with special arrangements for water. To do this over and above the daily routine running was estimated to require twelve days. O’Connor didn’t want to wait that long.

After consulting with General Wavell, O’Connor got permission to cut off the Italians in Cyrenaica, with the capture Benghazi a priority. That port would be needed to support the British formations so far from their own supply bases. The 7th Armoured Division would wait at Mechili for their own supplies to be topped up for four days’ worth of supplies. The 16th Australian Brigade would join the two Armoured Brigades, with the Support Group, they would move together to Msus, where another Field Supply Depot would be established. Then 16th Brigade would move forward with 4th Armoured Brigade continuing west to the sea at Ghemines. The Support Group would accompany 7th Armoured Brigade, travelling southwest towards Agedabia. Here they would block the road between Cyrenaica and Sirtica, preventing the Italians either withdrawing from, or reinforcing Cyrenaica. In the meantime, 19th and 17th Brigades, with the Infantry Tank battalion would continue the drive past Derna towards Benghazi from the north.

The other two Battalions of Infantry Tanks of 7th Tank Brigade would wait at Tobruk along with the British 16th Brigade in the meantime to act as a reserve. The planned arrival of the rest of the 7th Australian Division would be halted at Mersa Matruh, so that that Division’s transport could be utilised in moving supplies forward from there to Sollum and Fort Capuzzo, allowing the RASC units already at these sites to concentrate on moving supplies forward to Mechili.

At Derna the 19th Brigade had managed to clear the Italians from their positions on the eastern side of the Wadi, but the fire from the Italian artillery on the western side was heavy and accurate. The Australian’s artillery batteries were being frugal with their ammunition expenditure because of the difficulties in supply. To move forward against the Italian positions would need much greater artillery support than was available. The arrival of 17th Brigade allowed an attempt to outflank the Italian position at Derna, but involved a lengthy, almost fifty miles, detour along the track that ran from Martuba towards Chaulan and Giovanni Berta. This route was not without opposition, with the Italians using mobile forces to sting the Australians and slow them down. A Squadron of 40th Bn RTR’s Valiants joined the 17th Brigade along with B Squadron of 6th Division’s Calvary Regiment, mostly in Australian Pattern Carriers.

On the morning of 15 January, the Australians at Derna were approached by some locals to say that the Italians had pulled out of Derna during the night. When Australian patrols went forward, they found this to be true and so the process of moving forward began. The Italians had cratered the main road out of Derna preventing any vehicles from moving forward until the engineers were able to fill the crater in and make the roadway suitable. The 17th Brigade found a similar situation, as they neared Giovanni Berta it became clear from aerial reconnaissance that the remainder of 10th Army were pulling back and heading towards Benghazi. Over the next few days the Australians in both Brigades moved forward on the heels of the retreating Italians, but between demolitions and rear-guard actions, the Italians managed to keep the Australians at arms-length.

The map is OTL, but gives you the place names etc. The full sized map is here
NB Text in italic differs from OTL. There's a couple of changes here. First it is happening significantly earlier than OTL, which means that the Italian forces at Mechili aren't reinforced as much as they were by the time the fight happened. Also the 7th Armoured Division is much stronger, far fewer light tanks and the cruisers are generally in better condition. The meeting engagement with 7th Hussars is roughly the same destroying about 6 tanks each, but obviously the 2 RGH Valiant I* changes things dramatically in the main attack. OTL much of this Italian force escaped and later were involved at Beda Fomm. Here they're mostly dead or captured. The advance through Derna by 19th and 17th Brigades is much the same. Although they have infantry tanks, from my reading of the situation these would be of limited value in those actions.

 

[allanpcameron]

Operation Compass, Part 8.

16 – 25 January 1941.

General Mackay’s experience in Derna had left him livid. The fact that the Italian Air Force had left his Division alone for the most part was a relief. Having watched the divisional transport working its way through Derna and up the road to the top of the escarpment, his only thought was it was worse than a circus. All it would take would be one squadrons of Stukas, and the whole Division would come to an agonising stop. The Luftwaffe would have had a field day, there was almost no anti-aircraft defence beyond Bren guns. There was no effort to enforce normal road discipline among the vehicles. He tore a strip off his own Divisional HQ transport commander. If the HQ didn’t follow proper procedures, no wonder the rest of the Division didn’t. The Army Service Corps had been doing tremendous work, but they’d become particularly complacent about the absence of a threat from the air.

The fact that the Luftwaffe had arrived in Sicily and had given the Royal Navy a black eye had to be noted. His memorandum to the Division was scathing about the way the road was clogged by officers driving about in unauthorised captured Fiats, burning Australian Government petrol, and undermining the work done by the engineers to get the road opened to allow the Division to advance. The Italians would probably try to hinder the progress of the Division, and it was essential that the men of 6th Australian Division didn’t aid them by a failure to properly follow the established procedures. The memorandum made it very clear that the Military Police were to enforce road discipline and that any breaches of it would be severely punished.

Roads would be difficult to maintain, and the Division’s supply vehicles would need the roads to keep the Division moving. Mackay didn’t mention the damage done by the tracks of the Valiant Infantry Tanks which tended to tear up the already flimsy road surface. He was just glad he had them, though some kind of tank-transporter would be useful to save some of the wear on the tanks and the roads.

For the next week the 17th and 19th Brigade made steady progress, with regular contacts with Italian rear-guards and halts imposed by the need for the Divisional engineers to clear mines, fill in craters in roads and fix broken bridges and destroyed culverts.

The Australians had thought that the Italian settler population might give them problems, and they did, in not in the expected way. The local Arab population, having been mistreated for so long were taking advantage of the Italian army disappearing. Settler properties were being raided and goods and possessions stolen, the settlers were generally unarmed and in fear for their lives. When the settlers found that the Australians weren’t coming raping and pillaging, then they were welcomed, in so far as they brought law and order, protecting the settlers from the natives.

It was clear to both Brigade Commanders, Horace Robertson (19th) and Stanley Savige (17th) that the only way to keep up with the Italians, was to use as much motor transport to move forward one or two battalions at a time. The Australian infantry were footsore and weary from all their marching, boots and socks being worn down and most of the men suffered from some problem with their feet. Mackay agreed, realising that there were dangers in doing so, the danger of dividing one’s force was always a lesson to be wary of. An order of march was formulated where a force consisting of elements of the Divisional Cavalry, a troop of Infantry Tanks, and a battalion of infantry in lorries, with a battery of field guns and an engineering company would move as quickly along as possible. When an Italian rear-guard or demolition caused the column to halt, the troop-carrying lorries would return to the main force and pick up the next battalion. By the time this arrived, the road-block would be cleared, and the column would advance, essentially each battalion would leap-frog each other.

This method put a great strain on the Division’s vehicles, and once more the captured Italian lorries helped with this. At least the movement forward of the Australian Brigades was managing to keep closer tabs on the retreating Italians. For some of the British officers of XIII Corps could see the Australians as the hounds harrying and chasing the fox into the trap awaiting it.

The delay in building up the extra supplies in Field Supply Depot had meant that the two Armoured Brigades were sitting on their heels at Mechili for almost a week. When the Australian 16th Infantry Brigade joined them, General O’Connor decided to wait no longer. Each Brigade were to take with them enough essential supplies for 48 hours and move to their objectives. The progress of the 6th Australian Division showed and the aerial reconnaissance confirmed that the Italians were abandoning Cyrenaica. Blocking their exit would mean that any future progress would not be hindered by having to fight a foe that should already have been destroyed.

The first fifty miles of the movement towards the coast from Mechili was over difficult terrain, slowing the tanks and lorries. But eventually the tracks got better, even if the weather didn’t. By the end of the day on 22 January the whole force had arrived at Msus and the next morning two columns left. The first, 16th Australian Brigade and 4th Armoured Brigade continued west towards Soluch. The 7th Support Group and 7th Armoured Brigade, travelled southwest towards Agedabia via Antelat.

As Commander-in-Chief of North Africa and Governor-General of Libya, Rodolfo Graziani had realized that a withdrawal from Cyrenaica was inevitable almost as soon as Bardia fell so quickly. When the British secured the use of Tobruk, he decided to save what he could from the wreck as quickly as possible. On 4 January he reported to Mussolini that he intended to withdraw the remains of 10th Army to the vicinity of Sirte, where General Gariboldi, commanding in Tripoli, had been instructed to organize the defences. The next day he ordered General Tellera to take over command of all forces in eastern Libya, with the task of withdrawing from Cyrenaica and reassembling in Sirtica. Graziani himself left Benghazi by road on 5 January.

As if the situation in Cyrenaica were not bad enough, Graziani also received disquieting news from Rome of sinister stirrings in Algeria and of a possible British intention to attempt a landing in French North Africa. Mussolini himself sent him a warning against French dissidents. The presence of Weygand, although he was not a follower of de Gaulle, was regarded with great misgivings. The need to keep one eye on the French, while trying to stop the British from sweeping up the Mediterranean coast, seemed next to impossible. Reassurances from Rome however also arrived. In addition to the Ariete Armoured Division and the Trento Motorized Division being shipped to Tripoli, Hitler had decided to support the Italian Empire. Already the Luftwaffe were based on Sicily, and had achieved great results against the Royal Navy. German anti-aircraft units would begin arriving in Tripoli just as soon as ships could be formed into a protected convoy. German ground troops were also likely to arrive to stiffen the defences of Libya. Exactly when this would happen depended on a number of different factors. What was important, was that the British be stopped.

General Giuseppe Tellera, having been informed that the British had overwhelmed his mobile counter-attack force at Mechili, knew that his lines of communication were threatened. It was now a matter of a race. If he could get the majority of his men and equipment, especially the artillery, along the road through Benghazi to Brega, then the work being done by Gariboldi would be greatly strengthened. If the whole of 10th Army were lost, then stopping the British would be a matter more of luck and logistics than anything else. Tellera appealed for more air support, it seemed that the RAF ruled the skies above him, and it was disheartening for the men. Looking at the maps, tracing the probable movement of the British from Mechili it looked as if he would need to put some kind of blocking force in the vicinity of Agedabia. The 27th Infantry Division "Brescia" were already through Benghazi. Contacting General Giuseppe Cremascoli, Tellera ordered him to stop at Agebadia and prepare to act as a rear-guard for the rest of the surviving 10th Army to pass through. Cremascoli had permission to attach units passing him to strengthen any weaknesses in his Division’s resources.

While this was a perfectly good plan, by the time Tellera and Cremascoli had made the arrangements, they had already lost the race. The first units of 4th Armoured Brigade had reached the fort at Sceleidima in the late morning of 23 January. This Italian position controlled the track down the escarpment that allowed access to the main coast road. Brigadiers Caunter and Eather had decided to split their force up into three columns. Each Armoured Regiment paired off with an Australian Infantry Battalion. The 6th Bn RTR, A10 tanks were the slowest, were left at Msus along with 2/3rd Bn 16th Brigade. Once the 2nd RGH in their Valiant I* tanks and 2/1st Bn 16th Brigade, along with the majority of the artillery assets had cut the road, the transport would return and bring 2/3rd Battalion forward with 6th Bn RTR. The 7th Hussars were the weakest of Caunter’s Regiments, the A9s had suffered a number of casualties and were the tanks with the thinnest armour, so they along with 2/2nd Battalion they would follow the first column ready to back them up. At Sceleidima the Italians held out for just over an hour before being overwhelmed. Leaving the 7th Hussars group to deal with the aftermath, 2nd RGH and 2/1st Battalion continued westwards reaching Soluch and Ghemines by early evening.

At Ghemines they caught the tail of 27th Infantry Division "Brescia" passing through. As most of the Italian Division’s infantry were travelling in convoy with a minimum of armoured cars or tankettes providing security, the combined tank and infantry force met little resistance and soon much of the Italian convoy were flying white flags, and being guided off the road into a laager where B Company of 2/1st Battalion were organising their prisoners.

Soluch was at the end of a railway that stretched from there, through Benghazi to Barce. When the 6th Bn RTR came forward on the evening of 23 January, with 2/3rd Battalion, they stopped at Soluch, with the intention of advancing northwards following the rail-line towards Benghazi.

The 7th Support Group and 7th Armoured Brigade, travelling southwest reached Antelat mid-afternoon of 23 January. Here the 8th Hussars (A9 tanks) began patrolling north and south while 3rd Sharpshooters (Valiant I* tanks) passed through Beda Fomm and cut the road from Benghazi. This was now the third time they had fulfilled this role, after Bardia and Tobruk, and with the men of the Rifle Brigade they knew exactly what to do. The 1st Bn RTR (A10 tanks) with the 1st Bn Kings Royal Rifle Corps carried on towards Agedabia. Here the intention was not only to cut the road, but also to keep an eye out for any reinforcements coming up from the direction of Sirte.

Just as 4th Armoured Brigade had caught the tail of 27th Infantry Division "Brescia" so 7th Armoured Brigade’s 3rd Sharpshooters caught another element of that Division, with the same results. The Italians were surprised, and unable to deploy to meet the attack properly, so some units put up some resistance, but the rest ‘went into the bag’.

The arrival of 1st Bn RTR at Agedabia in the early evening found the forward elements of 27th Infantry Division "Brescia" digging in as ordered. The fact that the British tanks and infantry arrived almost simultaneously with the Italians meant that this was only a brief exchange of fire. Before they could get properly into the fight, the British tanks appeared at the Italian artillery gun line. While a few tanks were destroyed by point blank fire from guns already emplaced, the rest of the Italians didn’t have time to do much more than either try to run, or raise their hands in surrender.

With the complete 27th Infantry Division "Brescia" now incapable of acting as the rear-guard, more of the 10th Army rolled down the road from Benghazi during the night into the waiting arms of the British and Australian forces.

When the sun rose on the morning of 24 January, General Tellera was informed, not only that the road had been cut by the British, but also that the Australians moving from Barce were likely to be at Benghazi by that night at the latest. Reports that a strong force was moving up towards Benghazi from Soluch along the railway line left the Italian general with no options. He had no real armoured punch to break through the British to the south, and short of making a last stand in Benghazi itself, he could see no option but to surrender. He sent out messengers asking for terms from the British commander. General Creagh at Msus and General Mackay at Barce both got the message at roughly the same time.

Consultations with General O’Connor were quickly made and both the GOCs of 7th Armoured Division and 6th Australian Division were driven into Benghazi under a flag of truce to complete the negotiations. With the general hopelessness of the situation, the fact that Tellera had decided to capitulate rather than fight it out, provided the British and Australians the chance to offer an honourable deal, as long as the Italians didn’t damage or destroy any important structures in Benghazi harbour or any large stocks of material. General Tellera accepted the terms and all Italian resistance in Cyrenaica ceased at midnight on 25 January 1941.

Once more XIII Corps found themselves outnumbered by POWs. Some 25000 Italian troops were processed in the days following the surrender of Benghazi. Getting them all back to Egypt was going to be a nightmare. As promised, the harbour at Benghazi was fully functional, and plenty of water, petrol and food was available to look after the needs of both the Italian prisoners and the British and Australians.

NB Text in italic differs from OTL. The map is obviously OTL, but it shows the places involved. The changes at Mechili in the previous post means that 10th Army have far fewer tanks. So the OTL battle of Beda Fomm isn't going to happen the way it did. The British/Australian force arriving to cut off the Italians is also much more powerful. So the destruction of 27th Division seemed to me to be a realistic alternative. The overall surrender is different, but my thinking is that the speed and power of the British victory would have made Tellera more open to this ending of Operation Compass.

 

[allanpcameron]

26 January 1941. Farnborough, England.

Progress on various vehicles had been examined over the previous months and various reports were being written up. Major-General Vyvyan Pope came to see for himself what was going on. In order to prepare for the next Tank Board meeting it would be crucial to have the latest information so that decisions could be made.

First was Nuffield’s A15 Cruiser tank. The MEE had been impressed that the company had taken on board much of the criticisms made. The latest vehicles that had come for testing had a redesigned driver’s position, with the worst of the problems dealt with. To achieve the modifications the front of the tank had had to be changed. The hull gunner’s auxiliary turret had been removed altogether, so that the driver’s position could be made more effective. Trials of the auxiliary turret had shown it to be a death trap for the gunner, so deleting it had been seen as the easiest way to fix the interconnected problems at the front of the hull.

The problems with the suspension, especially the axle arms, which had shown themselves too fragile, had been looked at and changes made. The other major problem that had been looked at was the cooling system. With the possibility that the tank might have to work in hot climates, this was a particular concern. There were two problems identified which combined created most of the problems. The first was the chain to the cooling fan. There were constant problems with broken teeth on the driving sprocket and the chain would be over-stretched and break. Because of its inaccessible position it was very difficult for the crew, or indeed the mechanics to be able to fix the problem. Nuffield had modified the system, but the modifications were still a long way from solving the problems. The second cooling problem stemmed from the air intakes for the engine. This used a concertina dry felt air cleaner, but with the positioning of it, it was prone to be overwhelmed by the quantity of dust being ingested, blocking the filters and starving the engine. Changes had been made to change to an oil-bath cleaner system, similar to the Vickers’ system for the Valiant and A9 and A10s. It had been hoped for the ease of the maintenance of the various tanks, that Nuffield would use exactly the same system. Instead, Nuffield opted for a system made by Vokes Ltd.

The deletion of the auxiliary turret meant that Nuffield were able to adapt the front turret and hull of the tank to take the armour protection up to the equivalent of 50mm, a little less than 2 inches. The discussion about a version of the turret to take the new 6-pdr gun was still unresolved, Nuffield were of the opinion that it would need a completely new design. The MEE felt that the changes made to the original prototypes meant that the A15 was now able to be put into production. Pope agreed, it wasn’t going to be the best tank, but it would still be a useful tank. Continuing modifications would need to be done, but that was true of every tank.

Vauxhall’s A22E1 prototype had also been fully tested over the last couple of months. The list of defects had been lengthy. If this was the tank proposed to take over from the Vulcan Matilda, it left a lot to be desired. Yes, it was much more heavily armoured, and the Bedford engine did give it a bit more horsepower than the Matilda’s diesel twin bus engines. In terms of speed there was little to tell them apart, in fact in a straight race between the two, the Matilda won. The operational range was significantly less, partly because the Matilda used diesel while the A22 used petrol. The armament in the turret was the same, but the A22 was designed to have the 3-inch tank howitzer in the hull. The new gearing system on the A22 were certainly an improvement, especially with the triple differential steering. If the defects could be overcome in the second prototype, then it could possibly be put into production. In the meantime, Vulcan’s Matilda would continue in production.

In contrast to the A15 and A22, the Vickers Victor had also been put through its paces. There were certainly defects, and these would need to be ironed out. The improved Perkins diesel engine was sufficient for the moment, but the Meadows Peregrine, which should have been the engine was still being fine-tuned. Like the A22 the new Merritt-Brown gearing and steering system was judged good, but there were still bugs that had to be fixed. The turret had the 6-pdr gun currently as work on the new 3-inch gun was continuing. The suspension system, although new, was based on existing systems and during the trials had been found to be successful in providing the tank with a reasonable ride at all speeds over all kinds of terrain. A second prototype would be needed, especially with the Meadows engine and 3-inch gun, but as a replacement to the Valiant, the Victor was certainly an improvement.

Vickers had been busy with three other projects which had also been tested over the winter months. After the first attempt to create a self-propelled gun using an A10 hull and a 75mm field gun, the second version used a Valiant Mark I hull and the standard 25-pdr howitzer. A lot had been learned from the first experiment, and the Royal Artillery, having tested the Birch Gun at Larkhill and were very pleased with it. The Royal Horse Artillery requested an initial 400 of the Birch Gun to equip ten regiments with a reserve and training needs.

The second prototype of a self-propelled anti-aircraft gun had also been tested. Again using the Valiant Mark I hull, this had a Bofors 40mm gun instead of the original pompom on the test vehicle. The trials at both Farnborough and Larkhill had gone very well, and once again the Light Ant-Aircraft regiments that were likely to work with Armoured Divisions would need at least 300 of these as an initial order.

Pope knew that ordering 700 Valiant hulls for the Royal Artillery would be a problem. The obvious solution would be to get Vauxhall to cease work on the A22, and tool up to make the Valiant hull instead. Then there would be the problem of getting Perkins to make enough engines, unless Vauxhall’s Bedford engines could swap over to make the diesel engine. This idea was above Pope’s ability to implement, but he noted it for discussion at the next Tank Board meeting.

The final vehicle that had been tested was new type of carrier designed to carry infantry closer the action than the current use of lorries which couldn’t come too close to the fighting. This project had been a cooperation between Leslie Little and Vivian Loyd. In his carrier, Loyd had moved away from the flexible steering of the universal carrier, mostly to simplify production. The A17 Tetrarch light tank had taken the flexible steering to its logical conclusion and there were advantages to it. When the idea of Tracked Personnel Carrier had been thought of, Vickers had asked these two designers to work on it together.

The original plan was to use the engine and suspension of the A17 and creating a body that would comfortably carry a squad of infantry. This would need the vehicle to be a good deal longer than either the Loyd carrier or the A17. Adding an extra wheel to the A17 on each side would provide the extra length but the flexible steering would struggle. The Meadows 12 cylinder of the A17 tank doubled the power available, which would allow the bullet-proof plate to be increased to half an inch, the same as the A17. The alternative plan was to use the Horstman suspension of the Loyd Carrier, adding an extra double bogie on each side to increase the length. This wouldn’t use the flexible steering system of the universal carrier, but the simpler braking system that Loyd had used on the carrier. The decision to go with this design based on expanded version of the Loyd carrier was partly to allow the various firms currently making the carriers to continue to be able do so. The more complex A17 system would by its nature, eat into companies who were needed to build tanks.

Various experiments had been made with the layout of the Tracked Personnel vehicle. Putting the engine sideways in the front, similar to the layout of the Mark VI light tank, with the driver alongside, would allow the rear of the cabin to be free for the soldiers and their equipment. The size of the engine meant that the width of the vehicle would have to be increased proportionately to the length. A lot of thought went into the positioning the fuel tank to prevent it being penetrated and immolating the crew or infantry.

The first drawings and wooden mock-up had been open topped, but it was felt that an enclosed cabin, with hatches on the roof for soldiers to stand up and fire on the move was a better idea. Just behind the driver’s position was the commander of the vehicle, this position had a cupola to allow all round vision, and there was space here for a radio. A Bren gun mount was provided to allow the commander to give covering fire for the infantry who would dismount from a rear double door.

When the vehicle, given the Vickers code name of Viking, was put through all its tests it was found to be more than adequate. Since much of it was already being used on other vehicles, there was very few criticisms of the mechanicals. The layout of the hatches on the roof was criticised, as it was felt that it weakened the roof armour. The infantrymen who’d taken it out into the field for an exercise said they would prefer having a fixed roof which would allow extra gear to be carried on top. They did like the idea of being able to see what was going on around them and the ability to fire on the move. They would prefer this to be done by having some kind of armoured shutters on the sides. Opening them would allow light and ventilation in, allowing some degree of awareness of where they were, and with the possibility to firing out through them.

Vyvyan Pope could see why the Viking would be popular with the troops. About forty of these would be needed to equip an Infantry Battalion. That would mean that equipping the infantry in just the Support Groups for each of the Armoured Divisions would need about 750 of these Tracked Carriers Personnel. This might reduce the numbers of universal carriers being made, but as long as Meadows could produce enough engines, then production could begin quickly.

NB All of this is different from OTL. So, without the need to rush the A15 into production, some of the OTL problems can be resolved, like removing the auxiliary turret, thickening the armour and sorting out some of the other problems. Some things, like the cooling fan drive chain would need a major redesign. The A22, also not being rushed is looking more and more like a waste of time. The Victor still isn't up to scratch, Meadows was slow OTL in getting engines to work, so it is here. Also the SPG, SPAAG and APC are all desirable, but would eat into production of other things. Whether the Ministry of Supply gives the go ahead, we'll need to see. Thanks to @Claymore for the Vampire image.

 

[allanpcameron]

27 January 1941. Benghazi, Libya.

Generals Wavell, Blamey, Wilson and Hutchison, flew in to Benghazi to meet with General O’Connor, and the two Divisional Commanders. After much congratulations and recalling of events, the question had to be discussed about what happens next. The men and machines had been on the move for a long time. Having a period rest and repair was unavoidable and necessary. General Creagh wanted to send most of his A9 and A10s back to Bardia, where the RAOC had established a forward workshop for tank repair. The two regiments of Valiant I* were in fair condition, but had done well over 600 miles. The A9 and A10s had been in 7th Armoured Division for longer and were all past their 1000-mile service requirement, just getting them back to Bardia would be problematical.

General O’Connor was conscious that the Italians were reeling, and there was part of him that wanted to keep up the pressure. The 11th Hussars had been probing forward and finding next to nothing along the coast for some miles. The current dispositions of his force were such that he wanted to move the British 16th Brigade forward from Tobruk, now that they were rested. If he could move along the coast to the west of El Agheila, there was a water source there, and it was a reasonable place to put up a defensive line. It would be difficult to outflank it, because of the salt pans inland from it. If it was held by an infantry Brigade, with an Armoured Brigade in support, it would likely be strong enough to hold against an Italian counter-attack. If it was the Germans that attacked, then it would be at least a couple of months before that could happen.

If that was the plan, then 6th Australian Division could move into reserve and lick their wounds. It wouldn’t be long before 7th Australian Division was fully equipped and trained. Concentrating them around Tobruk would mean that if the Italians or Germans stated probing, then there was a complete Division with a few days travel away. While 16th Brigade held the line, the supply lines could be organised, with much work needed to repair and maintain the thousands of vehicles that had been overworked for too long.

Back in the Delta the rest of 2nd Armoured Division was fully prepared for work in the desert. 1st Armoured Brigade (3rd, 4th Hussars, Kings Dragoon Guards) was equipped with A13MkII, Cruiser tank Mark IV. The 22nd Armoured Brigade only had one regiment, 4th Sharpshooters (County of London Yeomanry), equipped with Valiant I* cruiser tanks. The other two regiments, 3rd Sharpshooters and 2nd RGH, had been transferred to 7th Armoured Division.

Wavell wanted to keep the 1st Armoured Brigade in reserve. The A13 cruiser tanks added another level of supply and maintenance, which moving them forward to Cyrenaica would complicate. He also admitted that if he was forced to send a force to Greece, then 1st Armoured Brigade would be his first choice for that mission. 4th and 7th Armoured Brigades had far too much experience of working in desert conditions for that to be lost.

In the meantime, the easiest answer to O’Connor’s idea for an Armoured Brigade to hold the line, would be to move 4th Sharpshooters forward, along with 22nd Armoured Brigade’s HQ and then have 2nd RGH and 3rd Sharpshooter re-join their original Brigade. At least that would keep all the Valiant I* Cruiser Tank Mark Vs together, easing supply and maintenance.

The 40th Bn RTR’s Valiants were in poor shape having made it to Benghazi along with the Australians. But, like the Valiant I* they were still good for a defensive role. Leaving them here under O’Connor’s command would give the 16th Infantry Brigade their own integrated tank support. General Creagh then put in a bid for the other two Valiant regiments. These two 7th Tank Brigade Regiments (44th & 48th Bn RTR) had already been taking advantage of the Bardia workshop. The Valiant Mark I and the A10 weren’t too different in top speed, and while it would complicate matters having both diesel and petrol tanks, it would allow 7th Armoured Division to have the full six regiments, at least until reinforcements arrived. He also noted that since both the A9 and A10 were no longer being made, there would come a point where they would no longer be able to be supported with spares. He also appealed for the 7th Support Group to be given a break. The Rifle Brigade and the Kings Royal Rifle Corps, with the Royal Horse Artillery and everyone else, had done extraordinary work, and needed a proper time to rest and refit. Wavell agreed to swap them for the 2nd Support Group currently in the Delta with 2nd Armoured Division.

General Blamey wasn’t entirely happy. His efforts to create the reality of an I Australian Corps was being hampered by the 6th and 7th Australian Divisions being used separately, while 9th Division were arriving in Palestine and still forming. The suggestion was that the arrival of the rest of the New Zealand Division would permit the creation of the ANZAC (Australian and New Zealand Army Corps). Blamey was aware that he and General Freyberg would need to have a lot of time to settle with their respective governments, and London, just how exactly that would work. The idea of another Gallipoli kept a lot of Australians up at night.

General Wavell was of a mind to make I Australian Corps responsible for Cyrenaica in the meantime. This would in some ways be a static command, and some troops would be needed to sort out the problems of law and order in Italian Settlement areas. General O’Connor argued that the command echelon of XIII Corps had proven itself. Breaking it up now would mean, if an advance on Tripoli was to be undertaken, a lot of expertise might be lost. If he was to lose the 6th Australian Division, as he had lost the 4th Indian Division, then it was all the more essential to keep the Corps Level Command HQ together.

The fact was that when they had flown in Wavell’s plan was to appoint General ‘Jumbo’ Wilson as Military Governor and General Officer in Command of Cyrenaica. This would allow Wavell to promote O’Connor to GOC British Troops in Egypt. If Australian I Corps provided the majority of the troops in Cyrenaica, then Wilson and Blamey had a good working relationship, which couldn’t exactly be said for Wilson and O’Connor.

For Wavell the question was now who would he trust with command to move against Tripoli, O’Connor or Blamey? London seemed to be in two minds. On the one hand the victories over the Italians were being greeted with great rejoicing as well as much relief. The fight in East Africa was about to get serious, and if Wavell could knock Italy out of Africa, then that would be an extraordinary achievement. On the other hand, there was still the promises that had been made to Greece and Turkey. If Wavell was forced to send a significant force to Greece, realistically, he would need to send the Australians. That would mean he would need Wilson to lead the Greek mission and Blamey’s I Corps to make up the majority of the infantry. There was no doubt that O’Connor needed to be promoted for what he had achieved, but should it be now, or as the victor of Tripoli?

While in the short-term putting together a holding line at El Agheila made sense, that question remained. Should the pause be just long enough for supplies to be brought forward to allow an advance on Tripoli to take place? Sirte was 170 miles away. After that, Misurata was another 150 or so miles. From there to Tripoli would be a further 120 miles. The distance of just short of 450 miles altogether. That was roughly the same distance that most of 6th Australian Division had covered from Tobruk. It wasn’t clear whether the Italians would do a better job in defence than they had up until now, but it had to be presumed that it would be a harder fight. The real danger would be if the Italians withdrew and destroyed the water sources. There was no doubt that the Royal Navy would do its best to support an advance from the sea. The problem was the arrival of the Luftwaffe. It wasn’t unreasonable to believe that the Navy’s job would be harder, just as the army’s would be.

There was talk of German reinforcements already arriving to support the Italians with both infantry and panzers. While the fighting in France and Flanders had been hard on the British army, when they had gone toe to toe with the Wehrmacht they had done well. The withdrawal to Dunkirk was forced on them strategically, they had no particular reason to fear a German force in Libya. Wavell wanted to know how long it would take for 7th Armoured Division to be ready for another 500-mile advance. General Creagh thought, short of getting completely new tanks from England, he would need at least six weeks, possibly more, depending on how well the RAOC workshop at Bardia was set up. If many of his tanks had to go all the way back to the Delta, then he would need months.

General Hutchison was asked how long it would take to bring sufficient supplies forward to enable at least a month’s worth of operations. He reflected for a few moments before answering. The efforts of Operation Compass had almost broken his command. If it hadn’t been for the captured Italian material, especially the vehicles, petrol and water, they would not be sitting in Benghazi at the moment. If the Royal Navy were able to run supplies into both Tobruk and Benghazi, it would take at least a month to build up enough supplies, probably longer. The Royal Navy had expressed the opinion that Benghazi would need strong anti-aircraft defences to make it viable for the navy to operate there effectively. The RAF would also need to be strengthened, preferably with radar, to protect the port.

The only way Wavell could respond to the Admiral Cunningham’s request to protect Tobruk and Benghazi with enough anti-aircraft artillery would be to speak to Brigadier John Slater CO of 4th Anti-Aircraft Brigade to see what he could do. There was a real threat that now that the Luftwaffe were ensconced in Sicily, they could operate out of bases on Rhodes, which would put the Suez Canal in jeopardy. While the Egyptian Army had a strong anti-aircraft force, Wavell couldn’t rely on them completely.

Hutchison noted that the RAF, for all the extra Hurricanes and Wellingtons they had flown into Egypt, they were now suffering with a backlog of maintenance too. There were no spare Merlin engines in Egypt, a convoy was expected with more, but at the moment much of O’Connor’s air support was mostly grounded, exhausted like everyone else. The maintenance of all the lorries, with the multiple miles they would need to do to reach Tripoli, according to the notes he’d received from his staff, would take a minimum of two months, and that figure relied heavily on getting spares from England.

Taking more than 100000 prisoners hadn’t helped matters, that was a lot of extra mouths to feed. The movement of the prisoners out of Egypt had begun. The convoys coming from India were returning with their ships full, taking prisoners there, and then from India some would eventually find their way to Australia.

Having listened to all the opinions, Wavell expressed the thought that any advance would have to wait until at least the beginning of April to begin. Eight weeks was the minimum time required to prepare for the next steps. He decided to leave O’Connor’s XIII Corps HQ intact but as Cyrenaica Command, with O’Connor as GOC. The plan for 16th Brigade and 22nd Armoured Brigade to hold a line west of El Agheila was approved. Active patrolling was allowed as long as it didn’t endanger the basic position, and he explicitly warned O’Connor that active patrolling did not mean a general advance.

Blamey’s I Australian Corps would begin to assemble between Bardia and Tobruk. The 7th and 9th Australian Division would use the next eight weeks to train hard, and would join 7th Armoured Division as the main force to attack the Italians. 6th Australian Division would use the time to rest and recuperate and be ready to reinforce them if the Italians put up a better fight. The New Zealand Division, currently only two Brigades strong, would also need more time to learn to work at Divisional level, they would concentrate at Marsa Matruh. The Polish Brigade Group, which was still under-equipped, and since technically Poland and Italy weren’t at war, they wouldn’t be able to take part in an attack on Tripoli. If Wavell absolutely had to send a strong force to Greece, he could send 1st Armoured Brigade, the Polish Brigade, and possibly, the 6th Australian Division and New Zealanders, while keeping one Armoured and two Infantry Divisions preparing for an attack on Tripoli.

There was a list of things that Wavell urgently needed from England. 6th Infantry Division really needed to be reformed as a complete unit. While the Dominion troops were excellent, Wavell needed a complete proper British Infantry Division. 16th Brigade would need another two Brigades to bring the Division up to strength. 14th Infantry Brigade's HQ had taken over Crete as Creforce. So Brigades would need to either come from Britain, or be formed from existing units here already. The 2nd Battalion Scots Guards and 3rd Bn Coldstream Guards could be put together to form a Brigade of Guards with another battalion. Perhaps the 1st Bn Durham Light Infantry would be a good choice, if they could be persuaded to stop pretending to be 10th Bn RTR with their dummy tanks. All the troops in the Delta were needed there. Wavell asked London for another fully equipped Brigade to be sent, as he was having to reinforce so many different places. He would prefer a full Division to be sent, even a second line territorial division that would free up some of the regular battalions protecting the lines of communications in the Delta. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff agreed, and recommended that 9th (Highland) Infantry Division could be spared and therefore they were preparing to be sent to Egypt.

Wavell had also requested that 200 Valiant I* tanks be sent out to re-equip the four 7th Armoured Division regiments to replace their A9 and A10s. If possible, he asked for another two Armoured Regiments with Valiant I*, to make 7th Armoured Division wholly equipped with the one type of tank, and also allow 2nd Armoured Division to be a complete unit. Prime Minister Churchill, on the back of the victories had agreed to the request, so 320 tanks would be shipped out at the earliest possible moment. The idea of sending them, heavily escorted by the Royal Navy, though the Mediterranean had been considered, but rejected as being too dangerous. The request had been made that the tanks be prepared, as far as possible, for use in the desert before being shipped out, to cut down the time needed to prepare them once they arrived. The last convoy to arrive, WS4, had docked at the end of December. The next convoy, WS5A was due to arrive in mid-February, and WS5B, was due to arrive in Egypt at the beginning of March. The reinforcements requested by Wavell would leave on 9 February, but it would be the middle of April before WS6 arrived with the extra men and tanks.

NB. Text in italic differs from OTL.

 

[allanpcameron]

28 January 1941. Kassala. Sudan.

The 24 Matilda II Infantry Tanks of 42nd Bn RTR, A Squadron (less one troop), with C and HQ Squadrons, organised themselves having gotten off the train that had carried them up through Khartoum. They had arrived with 30 tanks, but discovered that whoever had packed the spares had made a serious error. Instead of Matilda II spares, there were 15 tons of material to keep Mark VI light tanks going. It was decided to cannibalise six Matildas to keep the rest running. At least the fuel shipped along with them was diesel and not petrol, otherwise their presence in Sudan would have been completely pointless. Messages were sent back to Egypt to see if the mistake could be corrected, but since there weren't any Matilda IIs in Egypt, it would take a long time to fix the problem.

Waiting for them were B Squadron of the 51st Battalion RTR. Only seven of their original 15 A11s were still running, but they were going back to Egypt to rest and refit, possibly also to take over some new tanks and were happy to do so. There was the usual back and forth between two units of men, with some useful advice being passed and lots more insults and banter.

Also waiting for the Infantry Tanks was General Beresford-Peirse, GOC 4th Indian Division. The role the 48th Bn RTR had played in the battle at Sidi Barrani was now legendary, and Beresford-Peirse and his men were looking forward to cooperating with tanks again. The Matilda II was a different kettle of fish from the Valiant, but the Indian troops were waiting to show what they had learned cooperating with tanks. In some ways over the next day or so, it was the Indians who taught the 42nd Bn RTR men how best to overcome an enemy by artillery, infantry and tanks working together.

Meanwhile the men of B Squadron 51st Bn RTR were fast asleep as soon as the train pulled away from the siding where they had loaded their tanks.

NB Text in italic differs from OTL. The part about sending the wrong parts happened. Cannibalising six out of 30 is proportionate to what they had to do. It still gives them far more Infantry tanks than they had. I'm not going to do much about the East Africa battles. They will go much the same as the did OTL, but having more tanks might shave a bit of time off the campaign. The A11s heading back to Egypt is most of the reason for this update.

 

[allanpcameron]

29 January 1941. Rome, Italy.

The German Military Attaché in Rome Major-General Enno von Rintelen had been keeping Berlin well informed of developments in Cyrenaica. He was personally acquainted with the ground, and had been following with great interest the clash in the desert between two European Powers, each with up-to-date weapons and equipment. The problem, as he saw it, was that the Italians weren’t are as advanced in their re-armament as the British. Also, the British understood the use of mobile warfare much better. The Italian invasion of Egypt had relied on mass, but the logistics made that too slow. The British however had used their motorised troops to pick off the Italians piecemeal. It was really quite impressive.

In his current report von Rintelen noted that the Deputy Chief of the Supreme General Staff General Alfredo Guzzoni had informed him it would only be possible to hold a fortified camp at Tripoli itself. Von Rintelen had told him to his face that he was far from satisfied with this defeatist outlook. If nothing more than a local defence of Tripoli were intended it would be useless to send German troops to Africa at all. The Italians were strengthening their air force, but their navy was making no attempt to intervene with the British establishing a new base at Tobruk. When pressed whether the Italians could hold the British for long enough to allow the German forces to arrive, Guzzoni had replied in the affirmative. The two Italian Divisions that were being rushed to Tripoli would allow a forward defence, possibly at Sirte, with the main line at Misurata.

The initial German plan had been for an anti-tank formation to be sent, but now was obviously insufficient. From a German point of view, it was essential that the defence should be conducted aggressively. Von Rintelen had communicated that there were conditions on German divisions being sent. Firstly, the Italians needed to hold on, and did not retreat to Tripoli. Secondly, Malta must be bombed incessantly to reduce the scale of attack on shipping, and the British fleet must be prevented from establishing any new bases to support the advancing forces. These conditions had been accepted, Marshal Graziani had resigned, and replaced by General Italo Gariboldi.

When von Rintelen’s report arrived in Berlin and was discussed, orders were sent out to the units designated as 5th Light Division to prepare for embarkation to Libya.

NB This is all as OTL, though some of it is slightly accelerated.

 

[allanpcameron]

30 January 1941. Port Said, Egypt.

Gunner Robert Bryant of 8th Battery, Australian 2/3 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, was never as glad to step foot on dry land as he was that evening. The Devonshire had brought his mates from Ceylon, but the ship had a terrible tendency to list. Bryant, brought up in Castlemaine, Victoria had never been to sea before. Sailing from Melbourne on 29 December on board RMS Mauretania had been an adventure, it was a great liner and Bryant had been lucky to get one of the half-decent cabins with seven of his mates. Ceylon had been fun, but the Devonshire was a pigsty in comparison with the Mauretania. When the ship was docking, most of the men had come to the starboard side to get a look at the place, at which point the ship’s crew starting shouting and waving their arms about, the list was getting dangerous.

The rumour had been that the ship would sail on to Haifa in Palestine. Instead, they’d been told to pick up their kit and disembark. So, Bryant and the men of E Troop, 8th Battery, like the rest of the Regiment, shouldered their kit bags and marched off to troop train. The usual waiting about happened, by now the soldiers were well used to it. In an amazing feat of organisation, each man was given a bun and an orange. After the despicable food on the Devonshire, it was a real treat to get some fresh fruit. Only having to wait two hours before boarding the train seemed like a good deal, and since the train would be travelling overnight the men got themselves settled down and happily asleep. Bryant wasn’t much of a praying man, his mother took care of that in the family, but he couldn’t help it when his thoughts drifted out over the ocean he’d crossed. He managed to recreate the picture in his mind of his parents and siblings waving him off, and if he worked really hard, he could remember the kiss his Marjory had given him as he left her after the last leave in Melbourne. He drifted off to sleep, if any of his mates saw he did so with a smile on his face, they could probably guess why.

NB text in italic differs from OTL. @Icedaemon was asking for a POV. So this photo was on Wikipedia when I was looking at Italian anti-aircraft weapons, so I thought I'd use Bryant as one of three or four POV characters every now and again. The arrival of 2/3 LAA Regiment is much as above, but they did go on to Palestine. Here the decision to bring 9th Australian Division towards Tobruk/Bardia earlier changes that. Don't know anything about the chap in question, so just making up a back story for him.

 

[allanpcameron]

31 January 1941. Camp Borden, Ontario, Canada.

The men of the A Squadron of First Canadian Cavalry Regiment (Mechanized) proudly drove their first real tanks back to the depot after a field exercise, and since the tanks had been built right here in Canada, the pride was doubled.

Ever since the 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade had been authorised on 13 August 1940, the regiment, along with The Fort Garry Horse, The Ontario Regiment, and The Three Rivers Regiment had been training primarily on American M1917 tanks. These had been built at the end of the Great War and were copies of the French Renault FT. The Canadian Government had bought them from America at scrap prices, and for the troopers that was exactly what they thought about them.

The Canadian built tanks were a whole different beast. The Valiant Mark IA*, designed by Vickers in England, was a cruiser tank, but unlike the British version it was powered by a diesel engine built by Cummins in Columbus, Indiana, USA. The first trickle of tanks had started to arrive at Camp Boden in December. These had been used primarily to familiarise the men with the maintenance and care of all elements of the tank. Some parts of tanks had been coming over the last few months, so that the engine, gun and radios would be already familiar to the crews before the complete tanks arrived.

The Angus Shops of the Canadian Pacific Railway Company in Montreal were hoping to get production up to between 60 and 75 of these tanks per month. December had been the first full month of production, with fifteen being completed. While January wasn’t yet finished, another thirty had been delivered to Camp Boden, so that each of the Regiments now had ten Valiant IA* to work with. It would be another few months’ before they were at full production, but the four regiments expected to be fully equipped and trained by mid-summer. Plans for shipping them overseas were already under way.

 

[allanpcameron]

1 February 1941. Marada. Libya.

11th Hussars patrols had been patrolling as far afield in the south as the oasis at Marada, to Jalo, and to the west to Ras el Ali and Nofilia. At Nofilia the Italians were found in strength for the first time. The Morris CS9 armoured cars were getting long in the tooth, they had given excellent service, and weren’t really meant for fighting in, but for reconnaissance. Luckily the Italian armoured cars were poor, so if patrols ran into each other, the Hussars usually came off best. Since the 7th Armoured Division had been receiving A9 and A10 tanks, some of their old Mark VIB light tanks had come into the possession of the Cherry Pickers. Along with D squadron, two sections of the RAF’s 2nd Armoured Car Company, whose Rolls Royce Armoured Cars were even more venerable, the 11th Hussars had been the eyes of Generals O’Connor and Creagh.

The arrival of 16th Brigade (1st Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders, 2nd Bn Leicestershire Regiment, 2nd Bn Queens Royal Regiment) wasn’t due for another few days, and so the 7th Support Group, with Valiant I* tanks of 3rd Sharpshooters were organising the defensive positions between the sea at El Agheila and the salt pans.

B Squadron of 11th Hussars, with a troop of 3rd Sharpshooter, had been hanging around Marada for a couple of days, and the dust cloud coming from the south indicated that the people they were waiting on were getting closer. ‘Y’ Patrol of the Long Range Desert Group had been exploring the area west of Jalo and Aujila to check for any Italian presence. The rendezvous with 11th Hussars had been arranged to pick up some supplies and pass on any relevant information.

Y Patrol was made up of men of the Nottinghamshire Yeomanry, Royal Northumberland Fusiliers and the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. Their patrol had had almost no contact with the enemy, but they were happy to enjoy the hospitality of the Hussars. The Valiant I* had been of great interest to the troops, its performance in the desert had been pretty good. It had a thirsty engine, but otherwise had been reliable. Lieutenant Peter Allsup, OC 2 Troop, A Squadron, 3rd Sharpshooters, was fascinated by the way in which the Hussars and LRDG operated in such a hostile environment. Although it was winter, and sandstorms and cold nights were common, the way in which they adapted to the circumstances were impressive.

What the Hussars and LRDG group thought of the Sharpshooters wasn’t quite as positive, but a tank regiment was a different beast from what both reconnaissance units were about. What became clear to Allsup was that the desert wasn’t quite like he imagined. It was clear that the main coastal road was essential for the majority of troops, the desert was easily negotiable, if you knew what you were doing and had the right equipment and training. What became very clear, very quickly was that, although most of the 4th and 7th Armoured Brigades were familiar enough with the desert, the men and machines of 22nd Armoured Brigade wouldn’t be. If the line at El Agheila was to be held, then the left flank, the desert, would have to be covered, even as much as 70 miles inland.

Over the forty-eight hours that the Hussars and LRDG spent at the oasis, Allsup, with the two other tank commanders, spent as much time as possible, trying to learn everything they could about the desert and how to survive. Instruction in using a sun compass had been something Allsup and the other officers had received when they’d arrived in Egypt, but working with the 11th Hussars navigator had over the deployment to the oasis had given him a bit more familiarity with it. Captain John Moore, OC B Squadron 11th Hussars, as commander of the patrol, was asked by Allsup why there wasn’t a garrison established here? If the Italians pushed up again, then a mobile column could easily use this oasis as a supply and support base. That would allow patrols to keep watch on the open flank and prevent, or at least warn of danger. Moore thought it wasn’t a bad idea, and suggested that when they got back to Mersa al Brega that they should propose it to whoever was in command. In addition, Moore suggested Allsup should do the navigation back to the main force, under supervision of course. That way, if higher command did agree then Alsupp would be capable of finding his way here again.

NB Text in italic is OTL. Allsup will appear as another one of the POV characters.

 

[allanpcameron]

2 February 1941. Dorset. England.

After its trials in October the Valiant Mark II tank had been passed for pre-production models to be built. From the two experimental turret types, what had been chosen to be used was one where the 6-pdr gun mantlet had been moved forward so that it was external to the turret, but also had the commander’s cupola, modelled on the German Panzer IV. The first of the pre-production models had been sent to Bovington Camp for field testing and sorting out any problems before they got into the hands of particular units.

So far six had been delivered, three to Bovington and three to Linney Head gunnery range. The hull and engine were the same as the Mark I, only the turret differed. Missing from all six was the No 19 radio which there still weren’t enough of to be put into pre-production models. What all six did have was the new Cooke, Troughton and Simms sighting telescope, which as far as anybody knew was the most advanced piece of British optics. The fact was that it was actually a straight copy of the captured German Turmzielfernrohr TZF 5b. With a 2.5x magnification and 25° field of view, and 5mm lens diameter, it was quite an improvement on the No 30 tank telescope all the 2-pdr armed tanks had used. The change from a crosshair to a graticule in the sight was also something to get used to for the gunners, but so far, after a few attempts ‘to get their eye in’, they were very positive about it, they felt it didn’t obscure a distant target as much. The company was still gearing up to put the ‘No 39 Sighting Telescope’ into full production, but they knew they had to keep their production rate up to the same level as Vickers were building the turrets and 6-pdr guns. The Ministry of Supply were also keen on the production of No 19 Wireless Sets to increase greatly, they were in high demand.

The 6-pdr gun were being made by Vickers, but only one set of machine tools, the production rate was relatively low. Once the 2-pdr production could be drawn down, then more resources could be transferred over the new gun, even if these were only the tank gun version. The Ministry of Supply and the Director of Artillery were still discussing this, but with the A15 and A22 proposals needing 2-pdr guns, as well as all the anti-tank regiments, shifting more production over to the 6-pdr would diminish 2-pdr production and that was a problem. Vickers had been arguing long and hard for permission to increase their own production, simply for their own Valiant Mark II tanks.

Vickers argument was gaining traction, strengthened by the intervention of the Prime Minister himself. Having seen a film of the aftermath of Sidi Barrani and Bardia, and reading the reports of the action, the clear message that the 2-pdr gun lacked an adequate HE round. On being informed that the new 6-pdr did have a proper HE round to go with the AP round, then the Prime Minister wanted the men at the front to have it. An ‘action this day’ memo had broken the deadlock with the Ministry of Supply who were prepared to accept fewer 2-pdr guns coming from Vickers to allow the Valiant Mark II turret into full production at their main tank shops.

 

[allanpcameron]

3 February 1941. London, England.

In the fourth quarter of 1940, output from British factories had delivered a total of 494 tanks. Of these, 181 were Cruisers, (65 A13MkIV and 116 Valiant I*); 296 Infantry tanks (95 Matilda II and 201 Valiant I); and 17 Mark VII Tetrarch Light tanks. The January figure was already at a total of 249; 114 Cruiser Tanks (26 A13MkIV and 88 Valiant I*), 174 Infantry Tanks (33 Matilda II and 141 Valiant I); and 8 Light Tanks.

It was just as well that late in 1938 the War Office, and then the Ministry of Supply, had been proactive in asking that the production of 2-pdr guns be increased to meet the demand of the large numbers of tanks being ordered. So far, the Royal Ordnance Factories had been able to keep up with demand, increasing their output by between 10 and 15% since September 1939. The losses of so many 2-pdrs at Dunkirk had dealt a blow to equipping the new anti-tank regiments, as replacing those that had been lost was added to the requirement for the increasing numbers of Divisions. A new worry was that the move towards 6-pdrs from Vickers would likely cause problems for having enough guns for the A15 and A22 projects.

When the Valiant I* had gone into production Vickers had built the first ten, then Metro-Cammell had taken over production. By the end of June, they had produced 40 Valiant I*; in the third quarter of the year, another 93 had been produced, including the initial production numbers of Harland & Wolff, English Electric and Leyland. In September Metro-Cammell had been badly damaged by the Luftwaffe, which had slowed their production, but still 116 Valiant I* tanks had been delivered in the fourth quarter. Now in January, while all four firms were still moving towards full production, they had produced 88 tanks between them. A total of 347 tanks had been built since April 1940, an amazing feat, it was just enough tanks to equip an Armoured Division.

Of these, 150 Valiant I* had already been shipped to Egypt with 22nd Armoured Brigade. This meant that there were only 197 left in the country, either in training establishments, or being issued to 20th Armoured Brigade in 6th Armoured Division.

Despite these excellent production figures, the War Office were in a quandary. When the Prime Minister had promised General Wavell over three hundred tanks as reinforcements, Wavell had asked specifically for Valiant I* Cruiser Mark Vs. The problem was that there weren’t that many of that kind of tank in the country to send.

Then, when the War Office were informed that 7th Armoured Division had taken over 44th & 48th Bn RTR, in place of the two Valiant I* Regiments reforming 22nd Armoured Brigade, a solution to the quandary presented itself. Production of the Infantry Tank version of the Valiant was higher than the Cruiser model. 201 Valiant I had been produced in the last quarter of 1940, and now, with Birmingham Railway Carriage & Wagon Company getting up to speed and joining Vickers own production, a further 141 had been delivered in January.

If General Wavell wanted the whole of 7th Armoured Division equipped with the same kind of tanks, then sending the 340 Infantry Tank Mark IIIs built in four months, would achieve that. Compared to the A9 and A10s the Valiant Mark I would be replacing, they weren’t that much slower than the A10s. The Valiant Is’ diesel engines would give the 7th Armoured Division a better radius of action and have just one fuel type for the whole Division. The fact of the matter was, that the difference in speed and armour protection between the Valiant Marks I and I* wasn’t so great, that the distinction between the Vickers’ Infantry Tank and Cruiser Tank was marginal.

From the War Office’s point of view, General Wavell already had 2nd Armoured Division (1st and 22nd Armoured Brigade) with A13Mk II Cruisers Mark IV and Valiant I* Cruiser Mark Vs under his command. He also had, if he chose to use it that way, 7th Tank Brigade with Valiant I Infantry Tank Mark IIIs. The 4th and 7th Armoured Brigades’ four regiments worth of A9 and A10 tanks, while needing overhauled, were still reasonably good tanks. If General Creagh would accept 210 Valiant Mark Is to replace them, then the A9 and A10s could be given to one of the Cavalry Brigades in Palestine, hastening its mechanisation and availability. Sending another two Regiments equipped with the Infantry Tank Mark III would allow the 7th Tank Brigade to also be fully operational. Sending the Valiants to the Middle East was both possible and an attractive solution for the War Office. As well as sending 210 tanks for re-equipping the four Regiments of 7th Armoured Division, 41st and 45th Bn RTR were also equipped and trained on the Valiant Mark I and they would provide the extra two regiments, either for 7th Armoured Division or 7th Tank Brigade.

All of this had been communicated to Cairo, and reluctantly agreed to. The process of gathering the tanks; preparing them as far as possible with the correct cooling system for Egypt; and preparing them for loading onto the ships of the convoy was creating havoc in many depots and workshops. It would be a challenge to have everything done on time for the ships to leave as planned. The decision to send the entire 9th (Highland) Division had also caused a great deal of anxiety, as did the request for as many extra lorries as could be spared, along with complete RASC and RAOC units. This would slow the operational readiness of some of the home divisions, but the chance to knock the Italians out of Africa was too good an opportunity to pass up.

It wasn’t unusual to organise a ‘Winston Special’ convoy into two sections, one fast and one slow. The need for extra troopships for all these extra men and the fast transport to carry as many of the tanks, crated Hurricanes and ammunition as possible, meant that the Royal Navy had to add more capable escorts to the convoy.

NB None of this is OTL. Actual production of tanks in the 4th Quarter of 1940 (and January 1941 201). I've been working on a 10% increase generally but also that production of the TTL Valiant began before OTL Valentine so numbers are about one or two months ahead of OTL (1st Q 1941). I added the paragraph about increasing 2-pdr production after the feedback since the last update.

October–December (Jan-Mar 41)

449 total (653)

78 cruisers (184)

354 infantry (469)

17 light (nil)

 

[allanpcameron]

4 February 1941. Chertsey, England.

From the after-action reports of Operation Compass, a list of suggestions had been made regarding British tanks in general and the Valiant in particular. The management team at Vickers were working their way through these trying to sort out what could be done about it.

The issue of preparing the tanks for Egypt before they left Britain, and made sure that they were properly prepared for a lengthy sea journey had already been received and was being applied. Among the other recommendations was the need for a greater number of spare parts to shipped along with the tanks. Parts for the engines, gears, cooling system and tracks were highest on the list. In addition, both the main gun and co-axial machine gun needed spares, as did the sighting telescopes. Vision blocks and periscopes had been damaged by Italian artillery fire, as had the external storage boxes. More replacement parts for these were needed.

The question of availability of spares was something of an on-going dispute. The need for more and more tanks to be produced as quickly as possible meant that the numbers of spare parts available was never going to be enough. Parts could either be used to build tanks, or be kept as spares. If the availability of spare parts was to be increased, then the production of complete tanks would need to be reduced. The army couldn’t have it both ways. The suppliers of the various parts of the tanks were doing their best to fulfil their orders. Now that Britain had been at war for over a year, industrial capacity was continuing to increase, but demand continued to outstrip supply.

One of the specific recommendations noted was that something was needed to allow the tanks and the infantry to communicate better. Better radio communications would help, having a radio system that was common to the infantry, artillery and tanks would be a good place to start. The death of a number of tank commanders and infantry officers and NCOs had occurred when coordination was required between the tank and the infantry. This was done by an infantry officer or NCO having to mount the tank, bang on the commander’s hatch and then have the commander stick his head out in the midst of an on-going action.

The types of radio that were issued to the various part of the armed forces wasn’t something that Vickers was involved in. Fixing some kind of communication device between the outside and inside of the tank wasn’t beyond the mind of man. A few ideas and been considered and rejected, but the easiest solution would be to put some kind of powered phone onto the tank, probably on the rear hull for safety’s sake. Running a wire from the back into the turret would be possible, and putting a phone into the turret for the commander wouldn’t be difficult. A team at Newcastle-upon-Tyne were given the task to see how it would work, and answer the question whether it could be retro-fitted to existing tanks as well as put into new tanks.

The success of the Close Support tanks, with their HE rounds, available because of the 3.7-inch ammunition, was noted and emphasised in the after-action reports. The absence of an effective HE round for the main 2-pdr gun was noted again. The success of the A11 armed with the 2-inch pompom gun at Sidi Barrani was recalled. As previously at Arras, the presence of an effective, even if limited, HE round was an essential tool for tanks, who had had very little experience of taking on enemy tanks, and much more of trying to unseat the enemy from prepared defences.

A number of requests for more pompom armed tanks had been received, but the Royal Navy just weren’t going let anyone have any of ‘their guns’. It was noted that once production of the Vanguard with the Bofors gun was begun in earnest, these could well be used against ground as well as aerial targets. The development of an HE round of the 6-pdr had been done, and the whole point of the 3-inch gun for the Victor was to provide a decent dual-purpose gun.

As to the Close Support variants, the new 3-inch tank howitzer, replacing the 3.7-inch tank mortar, did have an HE round as well as smoke, so presumably the Armoured Divisions would make sure adequate numbers of these were loaded. There was also something to be said for the Tank Brigades to increase the numbers of Close Support tanks from six to at least twelve. Harland & Wolff were concentrating on the Close Support variant of the Valiant. If necessary, Vickers could also increase their numbers, but it would depend on enough guns being available.

Generally, criticism of the Valiant tanks was limited to cosmetic matters, such as the need for more and better external stowage boxes. What had become apparent however, was the need for an efficient way to clear mines and to bridge gaps, like the anti-tank ditches at Bardia and Tobruk. The need for Royal Engineers to go in ahead of the tanks to remove mines by hand and dig out ramps for the tanks to cross the ditches had slowed the assault.

The Coulter Plough and the Fowler Rollers had already been tested as possible mine-clearance devices. The plough had shown the most promise, but it wasn’t clear how effective it would be on the kind of ground experienced in the desert. The roller system had proven too fragile to stand up to a number of mines being detonated under it. Once parts of the roller were blown off, it was meant to be jettisoned, but that wasn’t easy in the middle of a minefield in the middle of a battle. A joint Vickers/Royal Engineers team were tasked with coming up with ideas. These could either be something attached to a normal gun tank, or be designed as a dedicated armoured vehicle.

Bridging equipment carried on tanks was a well-known and tested capability. During the Great War a 21 feet canal lock bridge, that could carry a load of 35 tonnes had been developed, though not in time to be used during the war. The tank launched Inglis Mark II Assault Bridge, the Batemans Assault Bridge, the Scissor Assault Bridge and the Wild Assault Bridge had all been tested, but lack of funds had left them unproduced. Of all of these, the No 1 30-foot scissors bridge was considered the best option, so another team were given responsibility to work with the Experimental Bridging Establishment to get a working example for full testing, then, if successful, ready for production.

Two other ideas that had come back from the fighting in Libya were firstly, the need for more bulldozers, especially in dealing with the anti-tank ditches. Attaching a bulldozer blade to the front of a tank that could be lifted and lowered into position didn’t look too difficult a challenge, so yet another joint Vickers/Royal Engineers team were given the task of making it happen. Secondly, it was also important for tanks damaged by mines or other reasons, to be able to be recovered as quickly as possible. The RAOC’s tractors were too precious and vulnerable to do this while the battle was continuing. Having an armoured recovery vehicle to tow out damaged tanks would be useful. In the short term, having each tank equipped with a length of steel cable to enable towing was also recommended.

Lastly some Italian Light tanks had been captured which had a flame-thrower capability. For dealing with bunkers and entrenched positions this would be a terrifying weapon. To design such a weapon was task that would take some thought and work. More information about the Italian tanks was requested to see if they had come up with simple solutions to complex problems, rather than the Vickers team having to begin with a blank piece of paper.

One of the questions that all of these types of specialist tanks raised was whether these should be issued to the Royal Engineer’s Field Squadrons attached to each Armoured Division, or whether the Royal Engineers would be better off having their own specific Armoured Brigade, perhaps called an ‘Assault Brigade’. At some point the British Army would need to consider how to invade Europe. All these different types of armoured vehicles, and more, would be required. Putting together a team to discuss all of this was recommended to the War Office, which agreed. General Percy Hobart had been pestering friends and acquaintances in the War Officer for a job since he had come back from Egypt and retired. Someone in the War Office saw this as a perfect opportunity to kill two birds with one stone.

NB None of this is OTL, at least, not as early as this. The various experiments with bridges and mine clearance systems had been done before the war, so this is just speeding things along a bit.

 

[allanpcameron]

8 February 1941. Bardia, Libya.

The A10 tanks of 1st and 6th Battalion RTR, and the A9 tanks of 7th and 8th Hussars had picked their way carefully back over the tracks of Cyrenaica to Bardia. 7th Armoured Division’s RAOC workshops had taken over Italian installations which allowed a fairly efficient processing of vehicles. While the rest of the Division had been in action, the wrecked tanks had been gathered from various points and entirely stripped of anything of value. This added to the supply of spare parts.

The tanks went through what in other situations might be described as triage. The tanks that were literally on their last legs, usually they had been towed back to Bardia, were put to one side. The RAOC Officer in Command marked them to be shipped back to the Delta to the main depots and workshops. They would need a lot of man-hours to get them fixed up, and would drain the stores at Bardia of vital parts.

The second lot of tanks were those with known defects. Each tank was inspected and a report of what was needed to bring it up to full operations was noted. The question was whether or not the defects could be fixed from the existing stores and how long it would take. If it could be done with the resources at hand and in a timely manner, they were put to one side and would be worked on. Those needing more profound work would join the shipment back to the Delta.

All the other tanks, the Division’s ‘runners’, tended to be overdue on their servicing needs and there were jobs beyond the capability of their own crews that needed time in the workshop. These were the first to be worked on. All four Regiments had been together a long time, and were used to mucking in with the fitters and mechanics of the Divisional workshops. The objective was getting as many of the ‘runners’ up to full capability. If possible, General Creagh wanted at least one Regiment’s worth of each type ready for action, just in case.

With word coming through that the Division was to be re-equipped with Valiant Mark I Infantry Tanks, the men of the four regiments started working with the 44th & 48th Bn RTR to become familiar with the new type of tank. For the men of the two Royal Tank Regiment Battalions swapping an A10 for a Valiant was like an upgrade. For much the same speed, they were getting vastly more protection, range and comfort. The same 2-pdr gun meant that it wasn’t a complete upgrade, but so far, the 2-pdr had proven itself a useful tool. The Hussars were more conflicted. The speed difference between the A9 and Valiant wasn’t that vast, and if pushed for honesty, there weren’t that many times that the A9 had been driven at its supposed top speed. The increased armour was certainly a big change. The Italian anti-tank guns were a real threat to the A9, the Valiant would be all but invulnerable. The problem was that the tank was the Infantry Tank Mark III, not a cruiser tank. Somehow it felt that their cavalry heritage was being lost using a tank designed to support the foot-infantry, rather than the dashing efforts of reconnaissance, screening and exploiting.

In the days that followed, as the men worked hard, and had their stories to tell of the victories over the Italians. Generally, there was a very positive mood in 7th Armoured Division about the new tanks they were going to get. There was much to learn about diesel engines and a suspension system that felt like a step backwards over the ‘slow motion’ of the A9 and A10. There was a lot of discussion about the relative merits of one kind of tank against another, and some had feared that like the Australian Division’s Cavalry Regiment some Italian tanks might end up having to be used. The men had all been fully informed about the Panzer II, III and IVs captured in Flanders. If the rumours were true and that Hitler was going to prop up Mussolini, then going up against the German tanks in a Valiant was likely to be a much better experience than facing them in an A9 or A10.

NB. None of this is OTL.

 

[allanpcameron]

10 February 1941. El Agheila, Libya.

The arrival of the 4th Sharpshooters and elements of the 2nd Support Group (1st Tower Hamlet Rifles, batteries of 104th Royal Horse Artillery, 102nd Anti-Tank Regiment, 15th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment) at El Agheila completed the revival of 22nd Armoured Brigade. Brigadiers John Scott-Cockburn (22nd Armoured Brigade) and Cyril Lomax (16th Brigade) were responsible for the forward defence of Cyrenaica. The 11th Hussars had been untiring in their reconnaissance and the two Brigadiers were given a number of potential spots where a decent defensive line could be organised.

Lomax had been appointed as the CO of the position by General O’Connor, and he had some ideas about how best to make any Italian counterattack suffer. The 11th Hussars had noted that there were a few places on the road between El Agheila and Ras el Ali which would lend themselves to the defence. The water supply at El Agheila was obviously central to the British position, and towards the rear, Marsa al Brega and Agedabia were important positions.

What Lomax proposed was that a defence in depth. The Support Group elements, with one of the armoured regiments would position themselves towards Ras el Ali initially. The would be prepared for a fighting withdrawal. This had worked well when the Italians had initially invaded Egypt, as the British fell back from Sollum to Marsa Matruh.

The first main line of resistance would be between the sea and the salt flats to the west of El Agheila. This would be held by two battalions of the 16th Brigade, with the majority of the Infantry Tanks of the 40th Bn RTR. The third Battalion of 16th Brigade, with the other Squadron of 40th RTR would be held back in Marsa al Brega. Defensive positions would be dug there, so that if the position at Al Agheila had to be abandoned, then the second line of resistance would be formed at this point. The rest of 22nd Armoured Brigade would be held at Agedabia to act as either as a counter-attacking force, or to be prepared to meet any flanking attacks coming from the desert. If the positions at Marsa al Brega were lost, then the plan was for a general retreat towards Benghazi, while the 22nd Armoured Brigade would protect the overland approach via Msus to Mechili and beyond.

The plan was agreed between the two Brigadiers, and approved by Generals O’Connor and Wavell. The commander of 11th Hussars wanted one added element. The work of his own Regiment and the Long Range Desert Group had noted that the oasis at Marada would be crucial to any out-flanking manoeuvre. Lomax agreed that a suitable force should take up positions there to secure the oasis. After some discussions, a troop of Valiant I* tanks, a Company of infantry, with a couple of field pieces, some anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns should be enough for a garrison.

The Royal Engineers were given the task of reusing a lot of captured Italian mines to provide the defensive positions with some extra protection. All of the other units began to work out how to put the plan into operation. The vast majority of the troops in the area were pre-war professionals. Putting together defensive positions with interlapping fields of fire, artillery support plans and covered lines of communication and movement was a bread and butter exercise for them. There had been more noticeable activity by enemy aircraft, so concealing and camouflaging what was going on was even more important.

NB This is all different from OTL. In fact the situation was (from) this

After an armoured brigade group had been prepared for Greece, the formation remaining for use in Cyrenaica, although described as 2nd Armoured Division, was nothing of the sort. The divisional reconnaissance regiment, 1st King's Dragoon Guards, had been converted from horses to armoured cars in January. The one armoured brigade (the 3rd: Brigadier R. Rimington) had one regiment of light tanks greatly below strength, and one which was being equipped with the best of the captured Italian M13 tanks. The third regiment, of British cruisers, only joined the brigade from El Adem during the second half of March, and suffered greatly from mechanical breakdown on the way. The fact is that all the British tanks had considerably exceeded their engine-lives and suffered from many other defects; the Italian tanks mounted a good 47-mm. gun but were slow, unhandy, uncomfortable, and unreliable. The Support Group had been broken up to provide units to accompany the 1st Armoured Brigade Group to Greece, and now consisted mainly of one motor battalion, one 25-pdr regiment and one anti-tank battery, and one machine-gun company. The division had little of its transport, its Ordnance Workshop was short of men, and its Ordnance Field Park had very few spare parts and assemblies. In short, this so-called division amounted to barely one weak armoured brigade, not fully

mobile, and likely to waste away altogether if it did much fighting, and an incomplete Support Group.

-

---

 

[allanpcameron]

12 February 1941. Benghazi, Libya.

Gunner Robert Bryant of 8th Battery, Australian 2/3 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, tried to take in his new surroundings but was dog tired. The battery had travelled by train to Marsa Matruh, then on board a ship to Tobruk, where they’d arrived on 6 February. While there, for three days they’d had an intensive instruction on their new guns. The guns came courtesy of the Italian army, the instruction from the gunners of 13th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment. The Breda 20mm light anti-aircraft guns had a rate of fire of about 220 rounds per minute, fed by trays of 12 High Explosive or Armour Piercing rounds. Bryant’s E Troop were issued four of these guns, as had D and F Troops, giving the Battery twelve anti-aircraft guns. Having been declared fully operational, the men had climbed onto the back of lorries, which towed the guns, and had delivered to their new accommodation in Benghazi.

The Australians’ arrival in Benghazi was the beginning of an intensive period of work, setting up their guns, sorting out ammunition storage, getting their own accommodation up to standard. All this was exhausting work, and Bryant was looking forward to standing down from his watch, getting something to eat and then sleeping like a log. His gun was sited on top of the customs house by the harbour. It had a tennis court sized flat concrete roof, with a parapet about three feet high. The men hadn’t been able to manhandle the gun up the stairs, so they’d borrowed ropes and hauled it up in pieces. Then they’d reassembled it, then brought up sandbags to provide themselves with some sort of protection on one corner of the roof. All of this had been completed during the day, and as the sun wasn’t far from setting, the men were ready to stand down, when whistles started to blow, signifying an incoming air raid.

Bryant cursed the officer who thought it’s be funny to organise a training session after the day they’d been through, but the growing noise of aircraft engines meant that the whole gun crew realised that this was no exercise. Frank Nicholson jumped into the gun seat and started laying the gun for elevation. Bryant and his mates ran for the ready ammunition trays and were soon shoving trays of 20mm shells into the slot at the side of the gun, while Nicholson pressed the firing pedal. During training the gunners had felt that the Italian sights were pretty useless, so Nicholson was hose-piping the tracer shells allowing for lead and the slightly curved trajectory of the hi-velocity projectiles. Sergeant “Mac" McGillivray, the gun’s number one, was calling out corrections and Bryant and the others were running back and forth collecting new trays of ammunition. The Dornier that Nicholson had focussed on began to pour smoke and it plummeted into the Mediterranean.

When the ‘all-clear’ had been sounded, the Battery Commander, Major Phil Stokes, made his way around the guns, and was overjoyed. He insisted that McGillivray’s gun had 'downed' the first plane by an Australian Anti-aircraft Battery. Nicholson of course came in for particular praise, and when asked about his shooting ability remarked about going duck shooting back home. The excitement of their first engagement had replaced their tiredness. When darkness fell, all the talk while eating their rations was all about their success, ‘first time lucky’ was the general consensus of the Battery. When Bryant finally got himself settled to sleep his thoughts drifted back to Australia, to his family and to his Marjory. He imagined telling her of the events of the day, and what her reaction would be. He didn’t get very far into the story before sleep overwhelmed him.

Bryant was therefore unaware of the work being done to unload as much from the ships in the harbour before the Luftwaffe reappeared, probably just after dawn. One of the ships had been hit, and already settled, its entire cargo under the water. If supplies were going to be built up through the port of Benghazi, then the anti-aircraft defences were going to have to be strengthened. The Royal Navy’s Harbour Master was sure he’d seen mines being laid, and he had a shortage of mine clearing capacity. The light AA gunners had done well, but they needed to be able to reach out further if they were truly going to defend the port.

NB. The basis for these events comes from here, but it happens a bit later than this does. OTL:

On the night of February 4th the German Air Force joined in by mining the (Tobruk) harbour; the next day a petrol ship struck a mine, caught fire, and set alight an ammunition ship. This was a serious turn of events, as the two minesweepers were under repair. Owing to bad weather the force detailed to clear Benghazi harbour could not sail from Tobruk until February 12th, and no sooner had it arrived than the Luftwaffe began to make regular attacks on Benghazi. The Army's slender resources did not allow of a reasonable anti-aircraft defence to be provided here in addition to Tobruk, and this fact coupled with the shortage of small ships made it impossible for Admiral Cunningham to accept the commitment of building up Benghazi as an advanced base; all that he could undertake was to send an occasional small convoy there, perhaps once a fortnight. The first supply convoy of four ships arrived on the 17th but was so heavily attacked that it could not be unloaded and had to return to Tobruk.

The upshot was that the possession of Benghazi did almost nothing to relieve the Army's long overland haul from Tobruk, which to the farthest post, El Agheila, was as much as 450 miles by the coastal road. The German aircraft did not, however, confine themselves to the persistent bombing and mining of Benghazi. They also attacked lorry convoys, airfields, and the troops in the forward area, though not without loss to themselves.

While things are more advanced and better here than OTL, there are still problems in building up for an advance on Tripoli.