Sir John Valentine Carden survives.

A 3" armed Victor should prompt the US to pull their fingers out about putting a 76mm gun in the Sherman earlier. Provided of course they get get the high command to stop putting theory before actual combat effectiveness.
The Sherman's were not for fighting tanks that's the job of the tank destroyers so the 75mm was enough. So say's Brigadier General Lesley J. McNair another a-hole who would not change his views!
 
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The Sherman's were not for fighting tanks that's the job of the tank destroyers so the 75mm was enough. So say's Brigadier General Lesley J. McNair another a-hole who would not change his views!
Shermans will do what the British Army asks of them, even with a face lift for the main gun. The Americans can do what they like with their M4A1 etc.
 
I have no idea why this idea persists. Tanks were expected to take on other tanks, it's in all the field and training manuals I've come across.
Indeed. The tank destroyers were supposed to be fast, mobile reserves to deal with enemy breakthroughs.
 
Just a thought - the Sherman M4 as the best "cruiser" tank the British have paired with the "infantry tank" that is the Victor. Best of all worlds - punch, mobility and numbers

EDIT - put a 3" Vickers in the Sherman as per Firefly and the ammunition conundrum is solved as well
The Victor will probably be faster than the M4, as well as having a better gun and armour.
 
The Victor will probably be faster than the M4, as well as having a better gun and armour.
Victor II with a Meteor engine will be faster. Victor I if it only gets a 450 hp engine may be faster depending on which engine the Sherman gets.

I'd rather have Victors but the quantity of Shermans available potentially has a quality all of its own.
 
The Shermans will probably be easier to work on than the Victors.
Undoubtedly. I recall tales of Shermans being field-stripped of both their engines and transmissions and having both replaced and ready to head back to the front in 24 hours. Regardless of what the M4 turns out to be (fingers crossed, with the transfer case), it'll have that ease of access to critical components carry over from the M3. Mechanical reliability and ease of maintenance has always been the hallmark of the US tank models, I see little reason why that would differ TTL.
 
The Shermans will probably be easier to work on than the Victors.
Sort of, one of the issues Britain had with US tanks in WW2 was that design decisions often seemed strange or confusing to the British. This was mainly down to differing design philosophy and experience more than bad design and as Britain used more US tanks they learnt to work with rather than round or fight the quirks. ITTL that requirement probably won't happen as Britain has enough tanks (sort of) so wont learn to truly appreciate the US tanks. That means Britain will have mechanics far more comfortable working on their own tanks which will tip the scales somewhat.
Also the Victor taking in lessons from the Valiant means the Victor likely closes the gap somewhat.
 
It's not even just people in power. A lot of people, from all walks of life and in various positions, seem to form ideals and strongly held beliefs based on theory-crafting, philosophizing and other 'intellectual' approaches which they will hold above facts. The smarter ones will try to rationalize and treat situations where their pet theory fails as unexpected and unfortunate exeptions to the 'rule', but some otherwise very clever people can get stuck in their own opinions.
 
The Shermans will probably be easier to work on than the Victors.
From what I recall from Allan's story, Vickers has been working closely with the army to find out what works and what does not. After 2 years of war but without the pressure to have a tank now, development has a chance to mature. Why would any new tank under development, including the lessons of war be harder to work on than the Sherman tank? I see the Victor as a pre-Centurian with similar features. I would think that ease of repair, given the feedback that Vickers has been encouraging and responding to would be a design feature that would be considered in follow up models.
 
From what I recall from Allan's story, Vickers has been working closely with the army to find out what works and what does not. After 2 years of war but without the pressure to have a tank now, development has a chance to mature. Why would any new tank under development, including the lessons of war be harder to work on than the Sherman tank? I see the Victor as a pre-Centurian with similar features. I would think that ease of repair, given the feedback that Vickers has been encouraging and responding to would be a design feature that would be considered in follow up models.
Putting the transmission in the engine bay makes it more difficult to work on if you have to do so, at least when compared to the Sherman.
 
A 3" armed Victor should prompt the US to pull their fingers out about putting a 76mm gun in the Sherman earlier. Provided of course they get get the high command to stop putting theory before actual combat effectiveness.
to be fair they did put a 76mm gun in a Sherman in 1942, Armor Branch didn't want it due to what it and its evaluating personnel deemed terrible ergonomics. plus by that point a 75mm could kill all known German armored vehicles at a reasonable range since Tiger hadn't been run into yet and the Panther was still under development
 
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to be fair they did put a 76mm gun in a Sherman in 1942, Armor Branch didn't want it due to what it and its evaluating personnel deemed terrible ergonomics. plus by that point a 75mm could kill all known German armored vehicles at a reasonable range since Tiger hadn't been run into yet and the Panther was still under development
They eventually solved the ergonomics issue by replacing the Sherman turret with the one from the T23.
 
They eventually solved the ergonomics issue by replacing the Sherman turret with the one from the T23.
The 17 pdr was even larger(size of US 90mm), and laid out worse, but was done with the original Turret when the British felt the need for a big gun Right Now
 
The 17 pdr was even larger(size of US 90mm), and laid out worse, but was done with the original Turret when the British felt the need for a big gun Right Now
Well here they won't have that issue. Actually, that makes me wonder, with less need for the M4 initially, will they eventually switch over to the T20 series tanks down the line?
 
Putting the transmission in the engine bay makes it more difficult to work on if you have to do so, at least when compared to the Sherman.
However that is what all tank designers have done since the Sherman and the British wanted the engine/transmission all together in the back to free up space in the fighting compartment. The ease of access to the transmission was fortuitous in the Sherman, although they took suitable advantage of the opportunity.
 
However that is what all tank designers have done since the Sherman and the British wanted the engine/transmission all together in the back to free up space in the fighting compartment. The ease of access to the transmission was fortuitous in the Sherman, although they took suitable advantage of the opportunity.
The difference between the Americans and the British (and Soviets) was that, for the Americans, tanks were fighting vehicles, with emphasis placed on reliability and ease of maintenance, because, no matter how good a tank is, it's worthless if it's not working, and/or where it needs to be. For the British and Soviets, tanks were fighting vehicles, with emphasis on being as good in combat as possible. Of course, that American drive for reliability eventually got to the point that there was no longer the need to make the transmission easy to access, and so they followed the British and Soviet leads.
 
19 March 1941. Cairo, Egypt.
19 March 1941. Cairo, Egypt.

General Wavell had arrived back in Cairo having been at Keren talking to the men who had won another victory over the Italians. The force moving north from Kenya was making good progress, and it looked like the final nails in the Italian East Africa coffin were being hammered in satisfactorily.

Whenever he had a visit from his special intelligence detail, the ones with the most highly classified material, he always felt a jolt of worry. Most often the material gave indications of what was happening with the Luftwaffe, it seemed that their code was the most commonly broken. The summary told Wavell that all leave for the Luftwaffe had been cancelled and that their units should expect detailed operational orders to be issued shortly. An offensive was obviously on the cards, and Wavell’s eyes were drawn to the map of the Mediterranean on the wall and settled on Greece. It was the only logical place.

Wavell knew that the build up of Empire forces in Greece was continuing, another Australian Infantry Brigade were arriving in Athens this very day. The fear that the whole thing would turn out to be another Norway was constantly on his mind. His eyes ranged over the map and looked to the south of Benghazi. The reconnaissance forces of the Germans had been probing further and further from Sirte, and it wouldn’t be long before they pushed up towards the British positions at El Agheila.

The reports from Generals O’Connor and Morshead about the situation of XIII Corps were all relatively positive. The port of Benghazi was drawing the German and Italian Air Forces like a magnet, and the Royal Navy were getting wary of sending anything too precious there. The Australians had been doing sterling work with the captured Italian AA guns, which was making the place a dangerous place, but it was still contested. The good news was that the RAAF squadron protecting the port now had a working radar, and that was giving the Hurricanes a bit of an advantage, though they were usually outnumbered. What it had done, and O’Connor was pleased to note, was that air raids and minelaying against Tobruk had reduced a great deal.

The fundamental problem was that just about everything Wavell had spare was being sent to Greece. If, as believed, the Italians and Germans were reinforcing through Tripoli, Wavell was confident that he had sufficient men and tanks south of Benghazi to hold them off. If the worst came to the worst, and they had to withdraw, even as far as Tobruk, the build-up of supplies there could sustain the Australians. It would be a shame to lose all that ground, just to have to take it again, but any sensible German General would be digging in, and preparing for the next phase of the British attack. The longer the affair in Greece went on, the more difficult it would be for Wavell’s forces to make an attack on Tripoli. Even General O’Connor was conscious that the Germans would complicate matters, and possibly, even the Italians might have wised up. Once the two Indian Divisions, and possibly the South Africans, had finished off in East Africa, and if he could lay his hands on more transport, pushing onto Sirte might certainly be possible.

Which brought him back to Greece. The word coming from Athens was that the Greeks weren’t falling back as planned to the Aliakmon Line, and that the Divisions that were being transferred there were second line troops, and under strength. It occurred to Wavell that basically it would be a race for the Australians and New Zealanders to get to those positions and dig in before the Germans arrived. The reports from 1st Armoured Brigade’s reconnaissance were revelatory about the lay of the land and the inherent dangers of the plan that had been worked out. There was nothing that could be done at this point, but Wavell noted he needed to speak to General Wilson again and make sure that he had a solid plan for falling back towards the ports for evacuation. As he looked at the list of men, weapons, transport and supplies that were being sent to Greece as part of Operation Lustre, Wavell could only regret that they weren't available to General O’Connor to finish off the job in North Africa.
 
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