Then there's Calais. Despite the advantage of artillery, and at worst air inferiority, but more often parity, a brigade of troops and a small group of tanks took everything several divisions of Germans could throw at them for days.
Sir John Valentine Carden survives.
- Thread starter allanpcameron
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The Italians are being driven back by the Greeks in Albania
The Italians made little headway against the French despite German successes against the same country
Why would the Germans feel overly worried that the Italians being driven back by the British in Africa is a major game changer?
The Italians made little headway against the French despite German successes against the same country
Why would the Germans feel overly worried that the Italians being driven back by the British in Africa is a major game changer?
Have him be captured, OP. Wouldn't want to deprive our ATL counterparts from reading his war-crime denying, self-serving memoirs.
OTL Hitler ordered that the PzIII be upgunned to the 5cm L60. For some reason the Army substituted the less powerful L42 gun. ITTL I think the Army will go with the L60 immediately.* Increasing the armour is probable also. Given the role of the Pz IV as a close support tank increased armour is definitely required but I'm not so sure upgunning it is also essential. Would it take a 105mm howitzer that could also pack a punch against armour? (Just as well the Germans don't have a 25pr equivalent that is sort of dual capable.)
The interesting thing to ponder is the fate if the Czech tanks. Can they take any bigger calibre guns? Or would there perceived inadequacy give an early push to turning them into the tank destroyer role? But are there spare guns before the capture of Russian 76mm guns in Barbarossa?
* the change was discovered in early 1941 but even so few tanks had the L60 by the start of Barbarossa. This might be a small help for the Panzer force in Russia.
The interesting thing to ponder is the fate if the Czech tanks. Can they take any bigger calibre guns? Or would there perceived inadequacy give an early push to turning them into the tank destroyer role? But are there spare guns before the capture of Russian 76mm guns in Barbarossa?
* the change was discovered in early 1941 but even so few tanks had the L60 by the start of Barbarossa. This might be a small help for the Panzer force in Russia.
At this point he hasn't really had the chance to commit any. Plus, since he died OTL, he didn't have the chance to go back later and try to convince anyone otherwise. Sure he wasn't totally clean and innocent, but what senior officer can be said to have been (within the bounds of his own heirarchy)?Have him be captured, OP. Wouldn't want to deprive our ATL counterparts from reading his war-crime denying, self-serving memoirs.
Sources are a bit lacking on this subject but from my understanding the OG Pz III turret actually couldn't take the L60. They had to make the rear walls straighter to increase available space and the gun was possibly modified. Now the decision to commit to the development of a L60 Pz III was not made immediately, so development could possibly still be brought forward a few months (someone mentionned 50 L60 Pz III or IVs being ordered but then cancelled after France, so this could pretty much be 76 Sherman syndrome where committing to making the gun fit wuld bring development forward earlier).
Pz IV couldn't take a 105 howitzer, that was what the OG VK 36.01 was for, but in the end they had no interest in such a vehicle. Skoda did actually build LT vz.35 prototypes with a new turret with their 47mm gun, but the Czech only requested one man in the turret while the Germans crammed two, so I doubt they could actually fit a bigger gun in a German Czech Panzer. The Pz 38(t) n.A could take the Puma 50mm turret but the German light tank lobby killed it anyway, and there's no reason to think they will suddenly be Notzis here.
Hoping that's ignorance. Rommel by June 1940 is already badly tainted , 7th Panzer is accused by many historians of shooting prisoners, especially French colonial troops, during the Fall of France. He was also a committed Nazi , a friend and firm supporter of Hitler, commanding for a time his bodyguard. There has been a lot of whitewashing post WW2 as the Cold war required a "good German" to help rehabilitate German troops.
Was any of those on a par with the Battle of Hannut for example?
2 French Armoured Divisions verses 2 German ones
Verses the British nothing that happened in TTL did not happen OTL (just more of it) - with the exception of a more successful Arras for the British
The Battle of Hanuut is a different in a few ways. Firstly it was fought to tie down French forces rather than as an actual attempt to break the French Lines. The purpose of tying down the French was to allow the Army group going through the Ardennes to Break the French lines. Yes it was costly but it worked. The difference to the fighting against the British is that there was no opportunity to create or exploit a weakness, no equivalent of the Army charging through the Ardennes.
The worrying question that the fighting against the British raises is what if the Ardennes attack had not worked. How would we be doing/ have done if we had been having to fight multiple Hanutt's to break the French and British lines. In that case a Breakthrough tank is a big asset as is improved tanks in general, better able to stand up to punishment in battle and keep going.
I mentioned the 50-100 Panzer 4's given the L60 5cm gun. I'm sure the order was placed after the fighting against the Matilda's around Arras and Dunkirk post evacuation. Then after France fell the order was cancelled, I assume the reason they asked for Panzer 4's was because it could actually take the gun without modification.
I don't think it takes much for the Germans to press ahead with the Panzer 4 up-gunning so it may well have happened ITTL.
The interesting question becomes what happens to German tank production and procurement if the decision is made. If the support tank is getting the tank fighting gun does that mean the Panzer 3 gets the short 75 a lot earlier ITTL? or does the Panzer 3 get cancelled and the production switched to only Panzer 4's with either the long 5cm or short 75? The other option would be to try and fit the long 5cm into the Panzer 3 from the off rather than the shorter one but that still raises the question of what about the support tank?
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I heard 80 too
Fine looking tank. Hard to say whether the Pz III will be cancelled earlier, the Germans needed a lot of tanks and there was concern about converting. Not implausible if the Pz III long 50 program is lagging behind, but they might wait to convert to a brand new tank rather than building Pz IVs instead, since the latter is not sufficiently superior to justify converting production.
That said, using some Pz IV production for 50mm gun tanks will lead to a lower production of 75mm gun tanks, which could make 75mm Pz III conversion possible in the meantime if the 75 fits older turrets better than the L60.
20 February 1941. Cairo. Egypt.
allanpcameron
Donor
20 February 1941. Cairo. Egypt.
British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, with Chief of the Imperial General Staff John Dill, had arrived from England the previous night. Having had a night’s rest, the two visitors met with Commander-in-Chief Middle East General Archibald Wavell, and Mediterranean Fleet chief Admiral Andrew Cunningham.
Eden’s mission was to work out how to aid the Greeks and to encourage the Turks and Yugoslavs to fight. If they wouldn’t fight, then at least to do what they could to support an anti-Axis alliance. With Dill acting as his military adviser, Eden had wide ranging powers to act, even in cases of extreme urgency, without having to consult with London. Before they left, the Prime Minister Winston Churchill had advised Eden and Dill, 'Do not consider yourselves obligated to a Greek enterprise if in your hearts you feel it will only be another Norwegian fiasco. If no good plan can be made, please say so. But of course, you know how valuable success would be.'
General Dill was of the opinion that any forces sent to Greece would inevitably be lost and that it would be better to concentrate on helping Turkey. Wavell and Cunningham however believed that the Greeks were already fighting, and doing well against the Italians. The Greek Prime Minister Alexandros Koryzis had already indicated that they would fight the Germans too, with or without British help. The chances were that Turkey would be unlikely to fight unless they were attacked. Yugoslavia would only fight if the Turks did, so the chances of forming a Balkans coalition against the Germans relied on helping the Greeks, even if that meant there was nothing left over for Turkey. If the British didn’t do anything, the loss of the whole of the Balkans piecemeal was the risk. Going to the help of the Greeks was also a risk, but it would show the Turks and the Yugoslavs that Britain’s word was good.
The next question was what could Britain actually send to help the Greeks. The question was whether General Wavell could reduce the operations in the Middle East Command to collect the largest possible force for Greece. The fighting in Eritrea needed the 4th and 5th Indian Divisions to complete the operation, which was currently held up at Keren. The South African Division in Kenya was doing very well, and would also be available when the Italian forces were defeated, but transport would need to be arranged. The capture of Rhodes was still of great importance to the Navy, for which General Wavell was trying to bring together the 6th (British) Division. This would be achieved when 9th (Highland) Division arrived to take over garrison duty of the Suez and Cairo areas.
General Wavell, under pressure from General O’Connor, wanted to keep the chance of an attack against Tripoli alive. For that he had earmarked the 16th Brigade, the Indian Motor Brigade, and 22nd Armoured Brigade, with the 9th Australian Division as the main units. 7th Armoured Division would still need time to be fully reformed, after its exertions, but it would be ready to back up the push within the time frame of an April attack.
Wavell had been keeping some units aside to send to Greece. The first contingent, already prepared to sail, was 1st Armoured Brigade together with two medium artillery regiments and some anti-aircraft artillery. The 2nd New Zealand Division (once their third infantry brigade arrived from England) would be next to be shipped. The Polish brigade group and 6th Australian division, with the possibility of the 7th Australian Division would be the third wave. The plan was that it would take thirty days from the decision to send them to the disembarkation of the first contingent. Then the second and third waves would be sent at intervals of three weeks.
The problem, as Admiral Cunningham put it, wasn’t so much the sending of the force, but that the maintenance of a force of this size would strain the resources of the Middle East Command and the Mediterranean Fleet to the utmost, and would call for a large amount of improvisation. At least fifty ships would be needed for the passage, which meant that many of the ships arriving at Suez in convoys would have to be diverted to the Mediterranean through the Canal. The Luftwaffe had already threatened the ability to do so by mining the Canal. He also noted that there would be a knock-on effect. The retention of these ships in the Mediterranean would affect the United Kingdom's imports and the subsequent flow of men and material to the Middle East. Eden noted that perhaps the Greek merchant marine might be called into play if the Greeks wanted British help. Cunningham agreed that would be helpful, but not solve the problem.
General Dill wasn’t entirely convinced. The fact that it was New Zealand and Australian troops that would make up the lion’s share of the infantry force, permission would need to be sought from both those governments. It was also necessary to learn what plans the Greeks had made. Sending such a force would rely on coordination between the Empire forces and the Greek army. If that plan was unsatisfactory, if it threatened to become ‘another Norway fiasco,’ then Dill would oppose sending forces, only for them to be lost, or have another Dunkirk situation. It was agreed to approach the Greek Government to confer on the British offer and the Greek plan. They heard back almost immediately that the Greek Government welcomed the proposal for a secret meeting, and the date was set for 22 February.
NB This is pretty much as OTL, I've used The Official History as the basis for this update. Two things that interested me, one was Churchill's quote and the other was Dill's reticence. Notice also the timings. 30 days from 'go' to disembarkation, then three weekly cycles of reinforcements.
British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, with Chief of the Imperial General Staff John Dill, had arrived from England the previous night. Having had a night’s rest, the two visitors met with Commander-in-Chief Middle East General Archibald Wavell, and Mediterranean Fleet chief Admiral Andrew Cunningham.
Eden’s mission was to work out how to aid the Greeks and to encourage the Turks and Yugoslavs to fight. If they wouldn’t fight, then at least to do what they could to support an anti-Axis alliance. With Dill acting as his military adviser, Eden had wide ranging powers to act, even in cases of extreme urgency, without having to consult with London. Before they left, the Prime Minister Winston Churchill had advised Eden and Dill, 'Do not consider yourselves obligated to a Greek enterprise if in your hearts you feel it will only be another Norwegian fiasco. If no good plan can be made, please say so. But of course, you know how valuable success would be.'
General Dill was of the opinion that any forces sent to Greece would inevitably be lost and that it would be better to concentrate on helping Turkey. Wavell and Cunningham however believed that the Greeks were already fighting, and doing well against the Italians. The Greek Prime Minister Alexandros Koryzis had already indicated that they would fight the Germans too, with or without British help. The chances were that Turkey would be unlikely to fight unless they were attacked. Yugoslavia would only fight if the Turks did, so the chances of forming a Balkans coalition against the Germans relied on helping the Greeks, even if that meant there was nothing left over for Turkey. If the British didn’t do anything, the loss of the whole of the Balkans piecemeal was the risk. Going to the help of the Greeks was also a risk, but it would show the Turks and the Yugoslavs that Britain’s word was good.
The next question was what could Britain actually send to help the Greeks. The question was whether General Wavell could reduce the operations in the Middle East Command to collect the largest possible force for Greece. The fighting in Eritrea needed the 4th and 5th Indian Divisions to complete the operation, which was currently held up at Keren. The South African Division in Kenya was doing very well, and would also be available when the Italian forces were defeated, but transport would need to be arranged. The capture of Rhodes was still of great importance to the Navy, for which General Wavell was trying to bring together the 6th (British) Division. This would be achieved when 9th (Highland) Division arrived to take over garrison duty of the Suez and Cairo areas.
General Wavell, under pressure from General O’Connor, wanted to keep the chance of an attack against Tripoli alive. For that he had earmarked the 16th Brigade, the Indian Motor Brigade, and 22nd Armoured Brigade, with the 9th Australian Division as the main units. 7th Armoured Division would still need time to be fully reformed, after its exertions, but it would be ready to back up the push within the time frame of an April attack.
Wavell had been keeping some units aside to send to Greece. The first contingent, already prepared to sail, was 1st Armoured Brigade together with two medium artillery regiments and some anti-aircraft artillery. The 2nd New Zealand Division (once their third infantry brigade arrived from England) would be next to be shipped. The Polish brigade group and 6th Australian division, with the possibility of the 7th Australian Division would be the third wave. The plan was that it would take thirty days from the decision to send them to the disembarkation of the first contingent. Then the second and third waves would be sent at intervals of three weeks.
The problem, as Admiral Cunningham put it, wasn’t so much the sending of the force, but that the maintenance of a force of this size would strain the resources of the Middle East Command and the Mediterranean Fleet to the utmost, and would call for a large amount of improvisation. At least fifty ships would be needed for the passage, which meant that many of the ships arriving at Suez in convoys would have to be diverted to the Mediterranean through the Canal. The Luftwaffe had already threatened the ability to do so by mining the Canal. He also noted that there would be a knock-on effect. The retention of these ships in the Mediterranean would affect the United Kingdom's imports and the subsequent flow of men and material to the Middle East. Eden noted that perhaps the Greek merchant marine might be called into play if the Greeks wanted British help. Cunningham agreed that would be helpful, but not solve the problem.
General Dill wasn’t entirely convinced. The fact that it was New Zealand and Australian troops that would make up the lion’s share of the infantry force, permission would need to be sought from both those governments. It was also necessary to learn what plans the Greeks had made. Sending such a force would rely on coordination between the Empire forces and the Greek army. If that plan was unsatisfactory, if it threatened to become ‘another Norway fiasco,’ then Dill would oppose sending forces, only for them to be lost, or have another Dunkirk situation. It was agreed to approach the Greek Government to confer on the British offer and the Greek plan. They heard back almost immediately that the Greek Government welcomed the proposal for a secret meeting, and the date was set for 22 February.
NB This is pretty much as OTL, I've used The Official History as the basis for this update. Two things that interested me, one was Churchill's quote and the other was Dill's reticence. Notice also the timings. 30 days from 'go' to disembarkation, then three weekly cycles of reinforcements.
I am sure that the vastly larger number of SOMUA S35 and Char B2s had a far greater influence regarding the up armouring of tanks than the handful of Matildas (77 Mk1s and 23 Mk2s in total) that were met - even in this TL.
Panzer III Production was IIRC about 88 tanks built in Jan 41 while the Pz IV was something like 33 the same month
It would take a significant slow down and then total halt of Pz III production to switch over to Pz IV or as OTL a slow down in production to up gun it which was done early 1941 (May IIRC)
The Germans are still going to need their "Halfaya Pass" experience where 9 Matilda II held of 160 Axis tanks and while the Germans were ultimately victorious 5th Panzer Divisions commander was court martialled, in order to make 'rapid' improvements to their tanks (and the short 5cm armed Panzer III was already in production at this time)
So I cannot see long 5cm Pz III and Long 75 Pz IV introduced much before they were
We might very well see an earlier long 5cm Pz IV introduced if TTLs "Halfaya Pass" experience is an earlier and significantly more emotional experience for the Germans than OTL
Derek Pullem
Donor
6th British could be an interesting butterfly. IOTL they weren't (re)formed until the Syria-Lebanon campaign in June. Here the presence of the "extra" 9th (Highland) division after the 51st did not surrender seems to have freed up a division for a possible operation at Rhodes.
Of course if Greece goes pear shaped then they could be deployed to Crete.............
Of course if Greece goes pear shaped then they could be deployed to Crete.............
I think it would be somewhat interesting to see Dill prevail and Greece to be called off but I doubt it will happen.
Just genuinely never seen a TL go that way.
Just genuinely never seen a TL go that way.
The order for the Long 5cm panzer 4's came in early June, before the fall of France but after Dunkirk IIRC. The Matilda's being the only cause is probably wrong but the Matilda's playing a part seems to be a given. I think @Bougnas is right about the order being for 80, that order progressing ITTL is, I think at least, likely. Now the question becomes if it does go somewhere what changes over time occur, I agree the changeover won't be quick, I was merely speculating on possible events further (months to years) down the line.
The Long 5cm in the Panzer 3 was an order from Hitler that the army sidestepped by going with the short 5cm. If the Long 5cm is getting more attention ITTL then the switch to the short 5cm may not happen.
The 7.5cm could see some changes, mainly getting a bit more development attention, that is feasible I think. It could get a lot more if things with the VK36.01 progress but that was and still is very speculative.
Well, for them, it'll be either Hitler denying them permission to storm the place, Göring fucking up air support or half the Home Fleet off shore.
The clean Wehrmacht myth would still be something he'd forward.
I thought that South African forces could not be used outside Africa - and it was only reluctantly North of the Equator.
Derek Pullem
Donor
They were all volunteers to get around the South African law and the terms of their volunteering were that they would not fight outside of Africa. Later they just changed the terms but I don't think conscripted troops ever served outside of South Africa?
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