5 June 1941. Chertsey, England.
allanpcameron
Donor
5 June 1941. Chertsey, England.
The office of Sir John Carden was already filled with cigarette smoke as his team reviewed progress on the various projects that they were involved with. The feedback from the army was generally very positive. It seemed there was a big operation brewing in Libya which would involve 7th Armoured Division, 7th Tank Brigade and 22nd Armoured Brigade in Valiant I and I*s. There was always a concern expressed among the designers and engineers that the weapons they’d put in the hands of the young men in the Armoured Regiments would help keep them safe and overcome the enemy.
The news from Glasgow regarding the A17 wasn’t surprising, but nor was it encouraging. As good as their word, North British Locomotives achieved building 8 A17s per month since November, so that the army were now in possession of just over half the order for 100 Mark VII Light Tanks. The first operational unit, C Special Service Squadron, were likely to be used in amphibious operations to support the Commandos. Tests on the Duplex Drive were due to begin in a few days, and Leslie Little was confident that Nicholas Straussler’s devised flotation screen would prove successful. There was also talk of examining the A17 as a possible addition to the Airborne forces that were forming, possibly being carried by glider!
Leslie Little continued that, ever since the A17 went into production, he had been working on the A25, an improved Mark VII Light Tank, which would be called the Mark VIII. This tank increased the size and armour of the A17, but used the same Meadows engine and suspension system. This was likely to mean that the three prototypes which had been ordered were going to be disappointing in terms of speed. There were plenty of rumours that the army were going to concentrate armoured cars for the reconnaissance role, so the chances of an increased order for the Mark VII or Mark VIII was remote.
Another possibility was that the army would prefer to take the American M3 Light Tank through the Lend-Lease system, allowing British firms to focus on Cruiser and Infantry tanks. There was not much difference between the 2-pdr on the Vickers tanks and the American 37mm on the M3, except that the Americans did have an HE and canister shell for it, which made it slightly more attractive to the War Office. Leslie reported that the three A25 prototypes would be ready for testing by the required date in September.
The question of when production of Matilda II tanks by North British Locomotive in Springburn would end was important because this was one of the main limitations on the production of the A17 and, possibly, the A25. As far as anyone knew the Matilda II was likely to be kept in production at least until 1942 as Vauxhall’s A22 was plagued with problems. Metro-Cammell had been one of the firms that had been interested in building the Mark VII Light Tank, but was currently fully committed to the Valiant. If the War Office decided that they did want the Mark VIII, then either North British Locomotives would need to stop building Matilda IIs, to concentrate on the Light Tanks, or a new firm would have to find space and workforce for it. That would likely mean it would take eighteen months to get it into production.
Talk turned to Vauxhall’s troubles with the A22 and the production facilities of Broom & Wade; Beyer Peacock; Charles Roberts & Co; Dennis Bros; Gloucester Railway; and Newton Chambers that Vauxhall had brought in. The original order of five hundred A22 tanks, ordered ‘off the drawing board’ were still to begin to be produced. Carden had learned that Vauxhall hoped to have the first production models before the end of the month, just a year after the design had been completed. While that was quite an achievement, whether it would be helpful was a separate matter. According to the Farnborough tests, it was underpowered, under-gunned and very probably unreliable. No one at Vickers could quite understand why Vauxhall had put the 3-inch howitzer in the hull, limiting its ability to use the high trajectory that a howitzer usually needed.
What Carden wanted to know was whether the Vickers production teams would be able to help retool all these companies to build Victors? From what could be gathered from their sources, Vauxhall’s group of companies would be able to produce about 80-90 A22s per month. Vickers conglomeration were probably going to be able to produce about 280-290 Victors per month, once they got going. Adding another eighty to that would be attractive to the War Office, if the Ministry of Supply could be convinced to concentrate on one type. Anything over 340 per month would equip an Armoured Division. Many of the men in the room had gone to other companies previously to help them set up tank shops, and while they weren’t entirely sure what the companies that had Vauxhall as the parent company for the A22, there was no doubt they would be able to help any change-over, without too much time lost.
The team responsible for the Valiant II and II* production were able to give the numbers of the 6-pdr guns being produced per month (~100), and the progress of the opening of the first Royal Ordnance Factory to be begin producing quantities of the new gun. It was expected that when everything was up and running almost 1500 would be produced a month, but that was still a long way off. By the end of July, the new ROF would add another 200 per month and rising each month after that. The ROF was capable of producing the L/50 barrel which the Vickers plant couldn’t. This would mean that eventually the Valiant IIA and IIA* would be equipped with the longer barrel, with the increased muzzle velocity and therefore better penetration. As production of the 6-pdr ramped up, then they would start to be issued to anti-tank regiments.
The Prime Minister’s question about sending out turrets with the 6-pdr gun to North Africa to upgrade the Valiant I and I* had been passed onto Cardin. The reality of production systems was that Vickers, Metro-Cammel, and Birmingham Railway were all preparing for the Valiant II and II* as 6-pdr guns became available. While many A15s were being produced, but not equipped with 2-pdrs, the Vickers Board had resisted that temptation. If a Vickers product was to be handed over to the Army, then it needed to be ready to go into action with as little delay as possible. The fact that fitting turrets onto tanks was a fairly complex job, with a lot of technical skills, the chances of the depots out in Egypt being able to do it was questionable. Carden was happy enough to send a letter setting out the problems, and asking the question about the capacity in Egypt to do the job. That would delay any further discussion, at least until more 6-pdrs were being produced.
The production team responsible for the Valiant engine then gave an update on the numbers of engines coming from Perkins and Meadows to be fitted to the Valiant hulls. Perkins’ diesel Lion was receiving very good feedback from all who were using it. The reliability and ease of maintenance that they’d incorporated into the design meant that in comparison to other tank engines, it was popular with tank crews and their fitters. The Meadows petrol Lion for the Cruiser wasn’t as popular, it hadn’t been simplified enough, and so took more care and attention than the diesel. However, the word from North Africa was that the Valiant I* had done a good job, and the 6th Armoured Division at home were happy enough too. Production by both Perkins and Meadows was keeping up with demand, though other people were starting to look at these two engines for other projects. Someone remarked that the Meadows petrol Lion would solve a lot of the A22’s problems for Vauxhall, but it would take a lot of redesign work.
Which brought the discussion onto the Victor tank. Vickers, Rover, Meadows, Leyland and Rolls-Royce were collaborating on getting the Meteor, based on the RR Merlin aero-engine, fully developed to put it into production. Currently the Victor prototypes were using Merlin III engines which had been disposed of for a variety of reasons. The production manager remarked that he was glad that Meadows had been working on the Peregrine engine beforehand, because that had made the task somewhat easier. The company’s designers and engineers had learned at great deal about what worked and what didn’t. When they joined Robotham’s team at Belper, along with the Leyland and Rover engineers, it meant that a lot of shortcuts could be taken from what had worked and not worked with the Peregrine. The production manager also noted that Ford had been very helpful by sharing with Robotham’s team the way in which it had been producing the Merlin with every component part being interchangeable. Rover and Leyland were particularly keen on this method as it would take only semi-skilled labour to make the Meteor.
It was looking like production of a 600hp Meteor engine would be on schedule to start towards the end of 1941, more likely the beginning of 1942. With Rover, Leyland and Meadows all involved, the quantity and quality of the new engine should be enough for the planned production figures. The Ministry of Supply and the Ministry of Aircraft Production were still a bit at odds, but the Meteor, built from alternative, heavier materials than the Merlin, shouldn’t interfere with the aero-engine’s production. The Ministry of Supply was also urgently acquiring machine tools from America to boost production of the Meteor. The predictions were that if these machine tools were available within six months, then production wouldn’t have to rely on unflyable Merlins being modified.
The question was asked about how the engine cooling fixes were going. This was the bug-bear of many tanks, and had led to many of the problems of the A15, and the cancellation of the A13 Mark III. The Production Manager explained that a large part of the development time on the prototypes was trying various solutions to make the engine cooling effective. The solution which seemed best was to have transverse radiators and he described how a lot of work had been put into a new, very efficient and effective fan drive. This absorbed 32hp of the engine’s power, but pushed a huge quantity of air through the engine compartment at a very fast rate. So far, it provided the appropriate level of cooling, though further tests were required.
The team responsible for the Victor’s components expressed their worries over the 4-inch armour plate that would be needed. While much of the armour would be sloped to provide the equivalent of 4-inchs, there were sections that needed the thickest armour. With the ship-building programme in full swing, there were shortages of armour plate being identified and that some of the newer sites which had begun producing armour plate were struggling with quality control. Ultimately this was a problem for the Ministry of Supply, but the Vickers team wanted to make sure that their planning took into account that there might be a possible bottleneck to production further down the line. A discussion about alternative sources and sorting out quality control took up the next part of the meeting.
The second point that was brought up by the components team was the Merritt-Brown triple differential and gearbox. Both Vickers on the Victor, and Vauxhall on the A22, were using this system. Some of the members of the design and production teams had had meetings with Vauxhall, David Brown Ltd (the manufacturer) and with Dr Merritt himself. All the work that had been done at Brooklands and other places had discovered that many of the teething troubles were to do with sub-components from companies without enough experience or quality control. As the work was done on the system to make it reliable, these companies were invited to note some of the defects found and how to avoid them in the future.
Amongst the problems of getting everything to work together, the new gearbox and differential was then linked to the new suspension system developed by Sydney Horstman using horizontal volute springs instead of the coil spring used previously. By positioning the volute-springs horizontally, they allowed the pressure from the load to be transmitted to the opposite bogie wheel-arm, thus helping to keep tension maintained on the tracks. The first mild steel prototype (A23E1) had been back and forth from Farnborough to the Vickers factory to try to sort out the teething troubles.
The second and third Victor prototypes, with the improved systems, were now in the hands of the Mechanisation Experimental Establishment (MEE) at Farnborough for thorough testing. It was early days, but initial feedback was relatively positive, and at least the problems were already known and steps had been taken to overcome them.
The next team to give their update were those responsible for the main gun on the Victor. The HV 75mm that they had been working on, which had been fitted to the prototypes, was still proving problematical. The British passion for evenly balanced gun to enhance the elevation and traverse characteristics had been part of the problem, various attempts at counter-weights and fittings had had to be experimented with. Eventually they’d found a solution that seemed to work, though thorough testing would probably show up other problems.
The trunnions were now fixed to the inner sides of the mantlet, with their pivots being on the mantlet cheeks on the external face of the turret front plate. This meant that, although the mantlet was external to the turret, the trunnions were positioned within the diameter of the turret ring, ensuring the turret was as evenly balanced as possible. They had also been able to made the mounting more compact by using two recoil cylinders, containing both the buffers (the hydraulic apparatus for absorbing the recoil) and the recuperator springs (for returning the gun to the firing position after recoil). These were mounted on either side of the gun, rather than having the buffer above and the recuperator springs below as first tried. Remedial work to make sure that these cylinders could be properly serviced, by changing the position of the draining plugs, had to be carried out.
When the gun had been tested it was found that the breech block did not align perfectly with the chamber when it was opened. This produced a step between the two which could catch the nose of the round on loading, especially on the HE round. This misalignment had to be rectified, which had been relatively easy, but still took time. In the original drawings it was expected that the gun would be able to depress to 12.5° and elevate to 20°. It was found however that the muzzle tended to foul the rear corner of the engine side air intake, and so a depression gear had to be installed, and so the gun’s full depression was 12° except over the rear. Testing had shown that any depression over 9° meant that the gun was difficult to load, and solutions were being sought.
As to the test firing at Lulworth, the HV 75mm was found to be effective with AP rounds up to 1250 yards, the limit of the range, with both stationary and moving targets. The Besa co-axial was accurate to 1600 yards against a stationary target. The HE rounds were tested in two ways. Firstly, by bracketing, which was effective out to 2000 yards, and secondly by direct shooting which was effective at both 1400 and 2000 yards. All of this confirmed that, excepting the teething troubles, the gun was going to be a good tank gun, capable of both ‘hole punching’ and with a good HE round.
There had been problems trying to sort out what to do with the Besa co-axial machine gun. With the external mantlet, a large square section aperture was needed for the gun, and the gas vent of the gun needed external armour protection, but it also ejected fumes into the fighting chamber. Further to this, when the breech of the HV 75mm gun was opened after firing, copious amounts of fumes came out of the chamber. These two guns made for thick fumes that showed that improvements were needed to the blower fan and bulkhead ventilation, which initially only spread the fumes throughout the turret. Like the Valiant, the Besa machine gun was positioned to the right of the main gun, which made it easier for the loader to service it.
The reports from the MEE had shown up a number of other problems that would have to be fixed. The position for the new sighting telescope had to be worked out and this was crucial. The driver, gunner and commanders’ positions were all satisfactory, but that of the loader was cramped. Various problems had been identified where he could be injured by the recoil of the gun if he wasn’t careful. This meant that more modifications would have to be implemented. The numbers of rounds that could be carried, because there was no hull gunner was about the same as the Valiant, but the increased size of the rounds meant that there were only twelve available immediately to the loader, then the rate of fire would slow as the rounds stored in the hull bins were transferred to the ready racks.
Sir John Carden’s secretary, who was taking shorthand for the minutes, tutted at the numbers of deficiencies that she’d had to note. Carden reassured her that this was perfectly normal in a new tank, and that was why the testing phase was essential. The rest of the team knew that Vauxhall were suffering because they were ultimately going to have build every tank as a prototype, until all the problems were identified, solutions found, modification made, then tested again until the tank was battleworthy.
The rest of the meeting was meant to look at the other varieties of the Valiant, but there was a lot still to discuss about the Valiant II and the Victor. Carden suggested a tea break, then going back over the issues raised to see if all the brains in the room might be able to help the individual teams think through the problems and see what solutions might suggest themselves.
The office of Sir John Carden was already filled with cigarette smoke as his team reviewed progress on the various projects that they were involved with. The feedback from the army was generally very positive. It seemed there was a big operation brewing in Libya which would involve 7th Armoured Division, 7th Tank Brigade and 22nd Armoured Brigade in Valiant I and I*s. There was always a concern expressed among the designers and engineers that the weapons they’d put in the hands of the young men in the Armoured Regiments would help keep them safe and overcome the enemy.
The news from Glasgow regarding the A17 wasn’t surprising, but nor was it encouraging. As good as their word, North British Locomotives achieved building 8 A17s per month since November, so that the army were now in possession of just over half the order for 100 Mark VII Light Tanks. The first operational unit, C Special Service Squadron, were likely to be used in amphibious operations to support the Commandos. Tests on the Duplex Drive were due to begin in a few days, and Leslie Little was confident that Nicholas Straussler’s devised flotation screen would prove successful. There was also talk of examining the A17 as a possible addition to the Airborne forces that were forming, possibly being carried by glider!
Leslie Little continued that, ever since the A17 went into production, he had been working on the A25, an improved Mark VII Light Tank, which would be called the Mark VIII. This tank increased the size and armour of the A17, but used the same Meadows engine and suspension system. This was likely to mean that the three prototypes which had been ordered were going to be disappointing in terms of speed. There were plenty of rumours that the army were going to concentrate armoured cars for the reconnaissance role, so the chances of an increased order for the Mark VII or Mark VIII was remote.
Another possibility was that the army would prefer to take the American M3 Light Tank through the Lend-Lease system, allowing British firms to focus on Cruiser and Infantry tanks. There was not much difference between the 2-pdr on the Vickers tanks and the American 37mm on the M3, except that the Americans did have an HE and canister shell for it, which made it slightly more attractive to the War Office. Leslie reported that the three A25 prototypes would be ready for testing by the required date in September.
The question of when production of Matilda II tanks by North British Locomotive in Springburn would end was important because this was one of the main limitations on the production of the A17 and, possibly, the A25. As far as anyone knew the Matilda II was likely to be kept in production at least until 1942 as Vauxhall’s A22 was plagued with problems. Metro-Cammell had been one of the firms that had been interested in building the Mark VII Light Tank, but was currently fully committed to the Valiant. If the War Office decided that they did want the Mark VIII, then either North British Locomotives would need to stop building Matilda IIs, to concentrate on the Light Tanks, or a new firm would have to find space and workforce for it. That would likely mean it would take eighteen months to get it into production.
Talk turned to Vauxhall’s troubles with the A22 and the production facilities of Broom & Wade; Beyer Peacock; Charles Roberts & Co; Dennis Bros; Gloucester Railway; and Newton Chambers that Vauxhall had brought in. The original order of five hundred A22 tanks, ordered ‘off the drawing board’ were still to begin to be produced. Carden had learned that Vauxhall hoped to have the first production models before the end of the month, just a year after the design had been completed. While that was quite an achievement, whether it would be helpful was a separate matter. According to the Farnborough tests, it was underpowered, under-gunned and very probably unreliable. No one at Vickers could quite understand why Vauxhall had put the 3-inch howitzer in the hull, limiting its ability to use the high trajectory that a howitzer usually needed.
What Carden wanted to know was whether the Vickers production teams would be able to help retool all these companies to build Victors? From what could be gathered from their sources, Vauxhall’s group of companies would be able to produce about 80-90 A22s per month. Vickers conglomeration were probably going to be able to produce about 280-290 Victors per month, once they got going. Adding another eighty to that would be attractive to the War Office, if the Ministry of Supply could be convinced to concentrate on one type. Anything over 340 per month would equip an Armoured Division. Many of the men in the room had gone to other companies previously to help them set up tank shops, and while they weren’t entirely sure what the companies that had Vauxhall as the parent company for the A22, there was no doubt they would be able to help any change-over, without too much time lost.
The team responsible for the Valiant II and II* production were able to give the numbers of the 6-pdr guns being produced per month (~100), and the progress of the opening of the first Royal Ordnance Factory to be begin producing quantities of the new gun. It was expected that when everything was up and running almost 1500 would be produced a month, but that was still a long way off. By the end of July, the new ROF would add another 200 per month and rising each month after that. The ROF was capable of producing the L/50 barrel which the Vickers plant couldn’t. This would mean that eventually the Valiant IIA and IIA* would be equipped with the longer barrel, with the increased muzzle velocity and therefore better penetration. As production of the 6-pdr ramped up, then they would start to be issued to anti-tank regiments.
The Prime Minister’s question about sending out turrets with the 6-pdr gun to North Africa to upgrade the Valiant I and I* had been passed onto Cardin. The reality of production systems was that Vickers, Metro-Cammel, and Birmingham Railway were all preparing for the Valiant II and II* as 6-pdr guns became available. While many A15s were being produced, but not equipped with 2-pdrs, the Vickers Board had resisted that temptation. If a Vickers product was to be handed over to the Army, then it needed to be ready to go into action with as little delay as possible. The fact that fitting turrets onto tanks was a fairly complex job, with a lot of technical skills, the chances of the depots out in Egypt being able to do it was questionable. Carden was happy enough to send a letter setting out the problems, and asking the question about the capacity in Egypt to do the job. That would delay any further discussion, at least until more 6-pdrs were being produced.
The production team responsible for the Valiant engine then gave an update on the numbers of engines coming from Perkins and Meadows to be fitted to the Valiant hulls. Perkins’ diesel Lion was receiving very good feedback from all who were using it. The reliability and ease of maintenance that they’d incorporated into the design meant that in comparison to other tank engines, it was popular with tank crews and their fitters. The Meadows petrol Lion for the Cruiser wasn’t as popular, it hadn’t been simplified enough, and so took more care and attention than the diesel. However, the word from North Africa was that the Valiant I* had done a good job, and the 6th Armoured Division at home were happy enough too. Production by both Perkins and Meadows was keeping up with demand, though other people were starting to look at these two engines for other projects. Someone remarked that the Meadows petrol Lion would solve a lot of the A22’s problems for Vauxhall, but it would take a lot of redesign work.
Which brought the discussion onto the Victor tank. Vickers, Rover, Meadows, Leyland and Rolls-Royce were collaborating on getting the Meteor, based on the RR Merlin aero-engine, fully developed to put it into production. Currently the Victor prototypes were using Merlin III engines which had been disposed of for a variety of reasons. The production manager remarked that he was glad that Meadows had been working on the Peregrine engine beforehand, because that had made the task somewhat easier. The company’s designers and engineers had learned at great deal about what worked and what didn’t. When they joined Robotham’s team at Belper, along with the Leyland and Rover engineers, it meant that a lot of shortcuts could be taken from what had worked and not worked with the Peregrine. The production manager also noted that Ford had been very helpful by sharing with Robotham’s team the way in which it had been producing the Merlin with every component part being interchangeable. Rover and Leyland were particularly keen on this method as it would take only semi-skilled labour to make the Meteor.
It was looking like production of a 600hp Meteor engine would be on schedule to start towards the end of 1941, more likely the beginning of 1942. With Rover, Leyland and Meadows all involved, the quantity and quality of the new engine should be enough for the planned production figures. The Ministry of Supply and the Ministry of Aircraft Production were still a bit at odds, but the Meteor, built from alternative, heavier materials than the Merlin, shouldn’t interfere with the aero-engine’s production. The Ministry of Supply was also urgently acquiring machine tools from America to boost production of the Meteor. The predictions were that if these machine tools were available within six months, then production wouldn’t have to rely on unflyable Merlins being modified.
The question was asked about how the engine cooling fixes were going. This was the bug-bear of many tanks, and had led to many of the problems of the A15, and the cancellation of the A13 Mark III. The Production Manager explained that a large part of the development time on the prototypes was trying various solutions to make the engine cooling effective. The solution which seemed best was to have transverse radiators and he described how a lot of work had been put into a new, very efficient and effective fan drive. This absorbed 32hp of the engine’s power, but pushed a huge quantity of air through the engine compartment at a very fast rate. So far, it provided the appropriate level of cooling, though further tests were required.
The team responsible for the Victor’s components expressed their worries over the 4-inch armour plate that would be needed. While much of the armour would be sloped to provide the equivalent of 4-inchs, there were sections that needed the thickest armour. With the ship-building programme in full swing, there were shortages of armour plate being identified and that some of the newer sites which had begun producing armour plate were struggling with quality control. Ultimately this was a problem for the Ministry of Supply, but the Vickers team wanted to make sure that their planning took into account that there might be a possible bottleneck to production further down the line. A discussion about alternative sources and sorting out quality control took up the next part of the meeting.
The second point that was brought up by the components team was the Merritt-Brown triple differential and gearbox. Both Vickers on the Victor, and Vauxhall on the A22, were using this system. Some of the members of the design and production teams had had meetings with Vauxhall, David Brown Ltd (the manufacturer) and with Dr Merritt himself. All the work that had been done at Brooklands and other places had discovered that many of the teething troubles were to do with sub-components from companies without enough experience or quality control. As the work was done on the system to make it reliable, these companies were invited to note some of the defects found and how to avoid them in the future.
Amongst the problems of getting everything to work together, the new gearbox and differential was then linked to the new suspension system developed by Sydney Horstman using horizontal volute springs instead of the coil spring used previously. By positioning the volute-springs horizontally, they allowed the pressure from the load to be transmitted to the opposite bogie wheel-arm, thus helping to keep tension maintained on the tracks. The first mild steel prototype (A23E1) had been back and forth from Farnborough to the Vickers factory to try to sort out the teething troubles.
The second and third Victor prototypes, with the improved systems, were now in the hands of the Mechanisation Experimental Establishment (MEE) at Farnborough for thorough testing. It was early days, but initial feedback was relatively positive, and at least the problems were already known and steps had been taken to overcome them.
The next team to give their update were those responsible for the main gun on the Victor. The HV 75mm that they had been working on, which had been fitted to the prototypes, was still proving problematical. The British passion for evenly balanced gun to enhance the elevation and traverse characteristics had been part of the problem, various attempts at counter-weights and fittings had had to be experimented with. Eventually they’d found a solution that seemed to work, though thorough testing would probably show up other problems.
The trunnions were now fixed to the inner sides of the mantlet, with their pivots being on the mantlet cheeks on the external face of the turret front plate. This meant that, although the mantlet was external to the turret, the trunnions were positioned within the diameter of the turret ring, ensuring the turret was as evenly balanced as possible. They had also been able to made the mounting more compact by using two recoil cylinders, containing both the buffers (the hydraulic apparatus for absorbing the recoil) and the recuperator springs (for returning the gun to the firing position after recoil). These were mounted on either side of the gun, rather than having the buffer above and the recuperator springs below as first tried. Remedial work to make sure that these cylinders could be properly serviced, by changing the position of the draining plugs, had to be carried out.
When the gun had been tested it was found that the breech block did not align perfectly with the chamber when it was opened. This produced a step between the two which could catch the nose of the round on loading, especially on the HE round. This misalignment had to be rectified, which had been relatively easy, but still took time. In the original drawings it was expected that the gun would be able to depress to 12.5° and elevate to 20°. It was found however that the muzzle tended to foul the rear corner of the engine side air intake, and so a depression gear had to be installed, and so the gun’s full depression was 12° except over the rear. Testing had shown that any depression over 9° meant that the gun was difficult to load, and solutions were being sought.
As to the test firing at Lulworth, the HV 75mm was found to be effective with AP rounds up to 1250 yards, the limit of the range, with both stationary and moving targets. The Besa co-axial was accurate to 1600 yards against a stationary target. The HE rounds were tested in two ways. Firstly, by bracketing, which was effective out to 2000 yards, and secondly by direct shooting which was effective at both 1400 and 2000 yards. All of this confirmed that, excepting the teething troubles, the gun was going to be a good tank gun, capable of both ‘hole punching’ and with a good HE round.
There had been problems trying to sort out what to do with the Besa co-axial machine gun. With the external mantlet, a large square section aperture was needed for the gun, and the gas vent of the gun needed external armour protection, but it also ejected fumes into the fighting chamber. Further to this, when the breech of the HV 75mm gun was opened after firing, copious amounts of fumes came out of the chamber. These two guns made for thick fumes that showed that improvements were needed to the blower fan and bulkhead ventilation, which initially only spread the fumes throughout the turret. Like the Valiant, the Besa machine gun was positioned to the right of the main gun, which made it easier for the loader to service it.
The reports from the MEE had shown up a number of other problems that would have to be fixed. The position for the new sighting telescope had to be worked out and this was crucial. The driver, gunner and commanders’ positions were all satisfactory, but that of the loader was cramped. Various problems had been identified where he could be injured by the recoil of the gun if he wasn’t careful. This meant that more modifications would have to be implemented. The numbers of rounds that could be carried, because there was no hull gunner was about the same as the Valiant, but the increased size of the rounds meant that there were only twelve available immediately to the loader, then the rate of fire would slow as the rounds stored in the hull bins were transferred to the ready racks.
Sir John Carden’s secretary, who was taking shorthand for the minutes, tutted at the numbers of deficiencies that she’d had to note. Carden reassured her that this was perfectly normal in a new tank, and that was why the testing phase was essential. The rest of the team knew that Vauxhall were suffering because they were ultimately going to have build every tank as a prototype, until all the problems were identified, solutions found, modification made, then tested again until the tank was battleworthy.
The rest of the meeting was meant to look at the other varieties of the Valiant, but there was a lot still to discuss about the Valiant II and the Victor. Carden suggested a tea break, then going back over the issues raised to see if all the brains in the room might be able to help the individual teams think through the problems and see what solutions might suggest themselves.
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