Progress over the previous two nights of the 7th Armoured Division and 4th Indian Division had been fraught with various problems, meaning that when the call to advance was given just after 14:00hrs, they weren’t fully in a position to respond. Of the 320 tanks that had begun the operation, only 100 were actually at the rendezvous position. Most of these were being tended by their crews to fix some of the things which had broken and generally prepare them for battle. Likewise, the three Indian Brigades were all reduced in numbers, with 11th Brigade still to appear. Major-General Noel Beresford-Peirse was confident that his men, whose exploits in East Africa had been exemplary, wouldn’t let anyone down.
The plan was for a two-pronged attack. 4th Armoured, with 5th and 11th Indian Brigades would take the Italian defensive positions from the south in an attempt to roll them up, eventually joining 6th Infantry Division. 7th Armoured and 7th Indian Brigade, along with 7th Support Group, would aim to cut the road to Sirte a few miles to the west of Nofilia, to prevent any withdrawal along the coast road of the Italian and German forces. With the reduction in forces available there had been a consultation about whether to carry on with that plan, or to avoiding splitting the force which was already weakened. With radio silence now lifted, Lieutenant General O’Connor was contacted for his orders, and he was of the opinion that the forces currently available should follow the plan for cutting the road to Sirte. Although weakened, the current force should be strong enough to form an effective roadblock, pocketing the Italian and German Divisions. The command of this force would remain with General Creagh, GOC 7th Armoured Division. General Beresford-Peirse, GOC 4th Indian Division, along with the command staff of 4th Armoured Brigade would stay at the rendezvous position to organise the stragglers, so that once a sufficiently large force was in place, they would advance against whatever opposition was still holding out.
The first indication among the German and Italian troops around Nofilia of an unexpected force appearing to their south was a hasty, and abruptly ended, radio message from an Italian outpost about ten miles south of the main positions. It took some time for the message to be acted upon. The Italians had a number of these outposts and mobile patrols protecting the southern approaches from the desert. There had been a spate of odd sightings being reported, and it was presumed that some kind of British reconnaissance or ‘commando’ unit was active in the area. The fact that the radio message hadn’t mentioned the strength and make-up of the force they’d encountered confused the issue. Clarification about whether these were reconnaissance or heavier forces couldn’t be established as the outpost had gone off air. General Luigi Nuvoloni ordered that the mobile patrols should investigate what was happening. When asked if the information should be shared with the German HQ, he answered that it was probably nothing, and the Germans would just put it down to Italian incompetence if it was a false alarm.
New Zealanders made up the majority of the LRDG’s A squadron S and T patrols had guided the two Divisions to their start point. Without their navigational skills and ability to find pathways through the desert for the many tanks and vehicles, the plan would never have got anywhere. T Squadron went with Creagh’s force, guiding them through the last part of the journey. A few of the Regular Officers of the 4th Armoured Brigade, especially those not long in Africa, had found the New Zealand informality very difficult to deal with, and some were particularly dismissive of the ‘undisciplined’ colonials. Brigadier John Caunter had given short shrift to anyone who’d complained, inviting them to find their own way home if they weren’t happy.
It had been the New Zealanders of T patrol who’d found and neutralised the Italian outpost, and it was crucial now for the attack to go in as quickly as possible, before the Italians and Germans could re-orientate themselves to the new threat. The 11th Hussars in their Armoured Cars were ahead and out on flanks to give warning of other enemy positions and units. The dust cloud that all the vehicles were producing was another sign, if the Italians needed it, that danger was approaching from the south. Crossing the rough ground, the best speed for both tanks and troop-carrying lorries was just over 10 miles per hour, which meant that they’d arrive behind the Italian positions at about 16:00hrs, which would give them enough time to get themselves sorted out in before darkness fell.
The RAF had been doing sterling work keeping the skies above the British relatively free of enemy aircraft. With most of the squadrons concentrating on interdicting 15th Panzer Division, it was the Luftwaffe who reacted first to the appearance of the British force which had seemed to suddenly materialise from the desert. A squadron of Stukas, heavily escorted, which had intended to support the 15th Panzer Division, noted the dust cloud and movement below them. The first that Rommel’s HQ knew of the pending attack was not from their Italian allies, but from the Luftwaffe liaison. Confirming that there were no German or Italian forces where the vehicles were coming from, led the commander of the Stuka squadron being given orders to attack, which he duly did, with some of the escorting fighters also coming down to strafe the British and Indian columns.
The two Divisions did have their own integrated anti-aircraft units, but none of these were self-propelled, some of the anti-aircraft units had been set up at the rendezvous point, but those travelling with Creagh’s force were unable to get into action quickly enough. The best defence seemed to be to keep driving and spread out, weaving as much as possible, and hoping for the best. The fact that the movement had been spotted meant that it was even more important to get to the coast road as quickly as possible.
Running battles between scouting forces began breaking out, with Rommel’s HQ getting a clearer picture of what was happening from the Luftwaffe than from General Nuvoloni, who was getting his information from his forces on the ground. General Rommel could see that the British were doing exactly what he’d have done. If they blocked the road back to Sirte, then his forces would be cut off and either have to fight their way out or surrender. Rommel’s problem was that a good deal of 5th Light Division was now in contact with the British attacking from the east and 15th Panzer Division was now out on a limb, heading in the wrong direction. He ordered General Hans Von Ravenstein to gather as much of his 5th Light Division and prepare to fight to keep the road open.
Rommel sent orders for General Neumann-Silkow to turn his panzers around. This would be a strong enough force to hit the British, and would likely be enough to save the position. When the order was acknowledged, with the estimated time of arrival back at Nofilia sometime around 18:00hrs. The problem would be that the panzers would need to refuel before combat, otherwise they could run out of fuel during the battle. That would need probably an hour to complete, and with darkness expected around 20:00hrs, they wouldn’t have much time to clash with the British before night fell. The 15th Panzer GOC also reiterated that his force was under almost constant attack by the RAF, so stopping to refuel would have an extra risk attached. In addition, the presence of the other British Armoured Division at Wadi Matratin was also a concern. If they chased 15th Panzer Division, and caught them while refuelling, it could be disastrous.
Rommel wasn’t too impressed by the British generals who’d planned this. They had taken a lot of risks, dividing their forces, and that was hopefully going to be their downfall. Wryly, he had to admit that was exactly what he had done himself. Now he didn’t have enough concentrated German forces to deal with each of the British advances individually. Rommel knew that the Italians would likely be good enough to hold their positions, but not to go up against the British tanks. He himself had had a chance to examine one of the Valiant I* cruiser tanks. It was impressive in some ways, its suspension was outdated, the engine seemed to be powerful enough, the gun needed to be replaced with something better, but otherwise against his Panzer III and IV it was a close match. In such a match, what mattered more were the men commanding and crewing the tanks. Of this, Rommel was still supremely confident of the training and capability of his panzer crews.
General Hans Von Ravenstein gave orders to the commander of II Battalion of Panzer Regiment 5 to prepare to engage British tanks to the rear. As many other assets as could be thrown into making some kind of attacking force were contacted and given orders, even the cooks and supply troops were told to pick up their rifles and join the fight. The Italians, once they’d been informed of the information the Germans had, weren’t in a position to shift much in the way of their own Division to meet the new threat. The British attack on their front was still their main focus.
By the time it took for Creagh’s force to reach the rear of the Axis positions, General Von Ravenstein’s scratch force was almost set. This consisted of a Battalion of panzers, a company of Jägdpanzers, two companies of anti-tank gunners, and a Machine-gun Battalion. The German artillery regiment had moved to be able to support their comrades. The tanks under 7th Armoured Division’s command kept to the right of the advance, giving some protection to the Indian troops who travelled on the left. The route to the sea meant that General Creagh’s force had to pass close to the Germans, giving them an opportunity to hit the British tanks from the flank.
While the 50mm gun on the Panzer III had been relatively effective against the Valiant I*, the extra frontal armour of the Valiant I Infantry Tank Mark III would give the Panzers a lot more trouble until the range got very short. Against the side armour however, the 50mm gun was capable of disabling the British tanks. The Panzer IVs’ 75mm HE shells were also able to disable the British tanks, a direct hit on a tank from an artillery shell will always do some kind of damage to men or machine. The anti-tank gunners, with a mixture of 37mm and 50mm guns were also able to take a toll on the British vehicles. The 2-pdr and CS 3-inch guns on the Valiant I tanks had the advantage of numbers. Even although 7th Armoured Brigade were short of a good percentage of their tanks, they still had at least a two to one advantage in numbers. The German kill ratio was in their favour, but every German tank destroyed left the remainder much more vulnerable.
Brigadier Hugh Russell, OC 7th Armoured Brigade ordered his tanks to turn towards the German positions and hit them hard, to let the Indian troop carry on to the coast road. The frontal armour provided better protection for the tanks, and their rate of fire and accuracy improved as they faced their opponents. It also allowed the German anti-tank gunners, even those using 37mm guns, to knock out more British tanks as the range closed. Once the Indian Brigades reported that they had cut the coast road, the surviving British tanks reversed away, with the Indian Brigades’ artillery, now deployed, providing covering fire.
6th Infantry Division also increased their artillery fire to fix as many of the Italians and Germans as possible. A Royal Artillery Observation Post Officer had managed to identify where the 88mm Flak guns were emplaced which had been taking a toll of the tanks. The Germans were well dug in, but the British 25-pdrs eventually were able to put them all out of action. 7th Tank Brigade CO, Brigadier Naesmyth, ordered his tanks forward, supported by the 22nd Guards Brigade, with extra companies from 23rd Brigade, who, although they took considerable casualties, breached the Italian second line of defence. This had been held mostly by the 7th Bersaglieri Regiment, with elements of the 5th Light Division. When news of this reached General Nuvoloni’s HQ, almost simultaneously with the news that the road back to Sirte was now blocked, it caused a degree of panic. The entire Trento Division was now surrounded, by what was clearly a superior force. Only the 61st Motorised Regiment was at full strength, holding the third and final line of defence.
The Indian Infantry had been given the time by 7th Armoured Brigade to form a box shaped formation, with their backs to the sea, to stop anyone travelling by the coast road in either direction. The greatest strength faced the current Axis positions, but a strong force faced west in case an attempt was made to relieve the Italian and Germans. More than half the 7th Brigade’s tanks had been disabled, but there were still enough to provide the Indian troops with a strong armoured presence when they arrived. The losses among the panzers meant that the force that should have attacked the Indian troops was now primarily an infantry force. Another attack by the Luftwaffe was requested to support the attempt to break through and re-open the road. This delay allowed the Indians to dig in more deeply, especially providing some protection for the gunners.
General Neumann-Silkow’s worry that the British Armoured Division at Wadi Matratin would enter the fray was proved correct. As the main force of 15th Panzer Division moved westwards, the British artillery began a sustained barrage against the German forces which had been left as a rear-guard. Major-General Gambier-Parry ordered two of the three Armoured Regiments, with two of the Indian Cavalry Regiments to attack the rear-guard troops, the third Regiment (2nd RGH) with 18th King Edward's Own Cavalry, were to be prepared to push through and attempt to snap at the heels of the retreating Germans. The two City of London Yeomanry (Sharpshooters) Regiments once again took losses, but they crushed the German rear-guard, allowing the chase to begin. 3rd CLY, joined by 2nd Lancers (Gardner's Horse), followed the 2nd RGH and 18th Cavalry promptly, while 4th CLY and 11th Frontier Force policed the battlefield before setting off.
General Rommel had been in contact with General Gariboldi, Governor-General of Libya, asking that the Ariete Division be sent forward from Sirte to strike the roadblock to allow the Trento Division, and the German forces to retreat. Gariboldi knew that the Ariete Division was the best Italian formation in Libya. Sending them the seventy miles to Nofilia to take on a British force of unknown strength could seriously hinder any chance of holding Libya. While it might be all that would be needed to tip the balance in favour of the Axis forces, its loss, would leave almost no tanks to stop the British if the German Panzer Divisions were also captured. Gariboldi replied to Rommel that he would need to consult with Rome before he could release the Ariete Division, much to Rommel’s disgust.
The question for General Rommel now was to wait for 15th Panzer Division to arrive back at Nofilia, refuel, and then, with the remaining German and Italian forces attempt to break through towards Sirte. The numbers of destroyed British tanks led him to believe that whatever force had arrived from the south must have been severely weakened. With all of 15th Panzer Division, including much of the other battalion of 5th Panzer Regiment, he would have enough power to achieve a breakout. He might have to sacrifice the remainder of the Trento Division in doing so, but they would likely be defeated anyway. The latest update from General Neumann-Silkow was that he was still on course to arrive at Nofilia at about 18:00hrs, but he reported that he was being chased by the British Armoured Division.
It was all now a question of timing. Darkness would fall just after 20:00hrs. If 15th Panzer Division could be ready to attack before 19:00hrs, preferably in conjunction with a Luftwaffe strike, then a breakthrough before sunset and the retreat to Sirte during the night was possible. If the remaining anti-tank units formed a rear-guard to slow the British Armoured Division coming from the east, then that would probably give the panzers enough time to refuel. It was all going to be very tight, especially if the Italians couldn’t hold their positions long enough in the face of the main attack on the coast. To Rommel’s mind the plan was bold enough to work, especially as the British forces were still spread out.
General Wavell, with Lieutenant General O’Connor, discussed the position as the reports from the four Divisional Commanders came in. 6th Infantry Division were making progress, but resistance was still fierce. 22nd Armoured Division were spread out as they attempted to catch up to the German Panzer Division. 7th Armoured Division, had taken heavy losses but with elements of 4th Indian Division were now on the coast road. The other parts of those two Divisions, under General Beresford-Pierce, were arriving at the rendezvous point in dribs and drabs. He reported that by morning he would have a sufficiently strong force to commit it to battle. O’Connor knew that the habit of the Armoured Regiments was to withdraw before sunset into Laager, to refuel, rearm and rest. His own reading of the situation was that he expected the German and Italian forces make one effort before dark to break out. It was crucial therefore, that the tank units broke with tradition and stayed deployed at least until night had fully fallen. Wavell agreed, and this was the message that was sent from XIII Corps.
The RAF, reaching the end of four days of intensive operations, were feeling the effects. The light bomber squadrons had been back and forth attempting to interdict 15th Panzer Division. The fighter pilots had been flying four or five sorties per day, and were exhausted. The force of just over 100 fighters and 100 bombers had been reduced considerably through losses to enemy action and other causes. When Air Marshall Tedder was asked for one last effort from the fighters to protect the 7th Armoured Division box he was able to send just twenty fighters, ten Tomahawks and ten Hurricanes to patrol over the position until dark.
With the fighting having been going on all day, everyone was close to exhaustion. The arrival of 15th Panzer Division was met with as much of the supply forces to get each panzer refuelled, while the crews tried to grab something to eat. Those panzers that had fallen out of the march had been ordered to attempt to slow the British tanks down, so that the leading elements of 22nd Armoured Division were about thirty minutes behind the Germans. An anti-tank screen had been put in place facing east, and to this was added some of 15th Panzer Division’s own anti-tank resources.
The 6th Infantry Division and 7th Tank Brigade had run out of steam as they overran the second line of the defensive positions. The Royal Artillery had burned through a high percentage of their ammunition and their rate of fire slowed as shells and fuzes were brought forward to replenish their stocks. The Indians under the command of 7th Armoured Division had worked non-stop to prepare for the expected onslaught, while their officers and sergeants tried to make sure there was enough ammunition and water for everyone, hot sweet tea was an added bonus for those who could get it.
Just after 19:00hrs all hell broke loose. The Luftwaffe arrived in force to batter the box on the coast road. The British fighters did well to harry the attack, but the much stronger Luftwaffe escort of Bf109s eventually gained air-superiority. The Light AA units that had made it to the coast did their best to defend the British position, but it wasn’t enough to prevent a solid plastering by the Stukas. The German artillery began to rain down on the 7th Armoured Division’s positions, but the Royal Artillery units had been the main target of the Luftwaffe, and so were slow to respond, and when they did so they were a reduced force.
The combination of 15th Panzer Division and what was left of 5th Light Division began to close with the British positions under the cover of the artillery barrage. Very few of the British in the defensive box had any of the APC rounds left, and so the panzers were able to close the distance without too many losses. The 2-pdr guns of both the anti-tank regiments and the tanks of 7th Armoured Division took a growing toll of the German panzers as the range lessened. The German infantry found the Indian troops to be well-disciplined and fearless warriors. The Indian troops found the Germans to be a very different kettle of fish to the Italians they’d fought before, their professionalism and the liberal use of the MG 34 was a trial for them. Both sides were just about evenly matched, but the British had the slight advantages of the setting sun behind them, and fighting from prepared (albeit hurriedly) positions.
The thicker frontal armour of the Vickers Valiant I tanks was put to the test, and the panzer crews used all the tricks in their book to attempt to find their way through. Positions changed hands several times, with General Creagh having to commit his reserves in some desperate counter-attacks. The 25-pdrs of the Royal Artillery found themselves firing directly at German panzers, something that should never had happened. They proved very effective anti-tank guns, but by concentrating on defending themselves, they were less able to support the infantry who desperately needed artillery support.
General Gambier-Parry, now able to communicate with General Creagh directly, urged his own 22nd Armoured Brigade and 3rd Indian Motor Brigade on to relieve their colleagues. 2nd Royal Gloucestershire Hussars however ran into the German anti-tank screen and were stopped dead. The 18th King Edward's Own Cavalry began to make headway once they deployed to root out the anti-tank gunners, and by the time 3rd CLY and 2nd Lancers caught up, the German position was about ready to collapse. 3rd CLY were able to break through, though once again with a cost in burning tanks and then it took time to sort themselves out before they could carry on.
General Beresford-Pierce had also been listening to General Creagh’s communications and was very conscious that the Indian troops undergoing their agony were his men. In the hours since General Creagh had moved, more tanks and infantry had arrived at the rendezvous. While he had informed General O’Connor that he wouldn’t have a strong enough force until the next morning to commit to the battle, many of his subordinates were requesting permission to move forward immediately. As tempting as that was, with darkness coming soon, he was sure that committing inadequate units into the battle piecemeal wouldn’t be wise. Since they were twenty miles away, they probably couldn’t get to the battle in time to make a difference anyway.
The LRDG’s S patrol were going back over the line of march trying to gather in the lost and assisting the broken down. 11th Indian Brigade were found, an officer had mistaken a compass reading so the whole unit had wondered off-course. They would definitely be available to move forward at first light, along with growing numbers of tanks in 4th Armoured Brigade.
Major-General Evetts had brought his Brigade Commanders together to see if there was anything more that could be done for General Creagh’s force. Brigadier Naesmyth, CO 7th Tank Brigade, reported that he’d lost almost two thirds of his tanks, most of which were recoverable in time, and so was only able to offer three full squadrons, those which had been kept back in case of a panzer counter attack. 16th and 22nd Guards Brigades were both completely exhausted, but Brigadier Lomax noted that 2nd Bn Leicestershire Regiment and 2nd Bn Queens Royal Regiment were still in good form. He volunteered to go with his men and Naesmyth’s tanks to finally break through the Italians, who must be just as concerned as anyone that they were cut off. The Divisional artillery commander agreed to do his best to support one last push with everything at his disposal. The time for this to happen was fixed at 19:15hrs. Delays meant that it was 19:30hrs before the artillery barrage could be followed up by the tanks and men of 6th Infantry Division’s last throw of the dice.
For the men of the Italian 61st Motorised Regiment the four minute barrage which fell among and around them was in many ways the final straw. Rumours of being cut off had become reality from the clear sound of fighting to their rear. It seemed that the Germans were abandoning them to their fate, counting on the Italians to cover their backs. The Italian troops knew full well that the Germans looked down on them, and while Trento Division hadn’t been part of the disaster in Cyrenaica, somehow the whole Italian army was suspect. The sound of approaching British tanks, which they knew their anti-tank guns would struggle to stop, pushed them over the edge. While some units stayed where they were and fought valiantly, these were the minority. A great deal of the men of the Regiment surrendered, though many fled back to where the Regimental transport was under camouflage and attempted to flee, heading south into the desert, hoping to get round the fighting and make it back to Sirte.
General Creagh got the messages from both General Evetts and Gambier-Parry that help was on its way. If he could hold out for another thirty minutes or so, the remaining tanks of 7th Tank Brigade and 22nd Armoured Division would arrive to hit the Germans in the back. These messages were sent in the clear over the radio to save time. The German signals unit that overheard them passed on the news to General Rommel that at least two regiments of British tanks were soon to arrive behind him. Surrendering wasn’t an option General Rommel considered. He gave the order for all Afrika Korps to disengage from the British forces and make their way south initially and then west to get around the British roadblock. Not all of his vehicles would be capable of night navigation, but they were to do their best to head southwest for 20km, then northwest for another 30km, which should bring them to Wadi Harawah, which they could follow north until it brought them back onto the coast road. Any surviving reconnaissance units were to guide as much of the Korps to safety.
Generals Neumann-Silkow and Von Ravenstein’s reactions to this order verged on disbelief. They were being ordered to turn tail and run. To lose the ground of the battle would mean that all their knocked-out panzers would be unable to be recovered. Even if they were able to disengage and flee, there was no guarantee that the surviving panzers would make it back to Sirte, over 140kms by the route being suggested. Despite their losses, they felt that the British defensive box was near to collapse. If they could reopen the road, then turn round and stop the approaching British tanks, it would allow them to hold the ground. Abandoning so many men, and so much equipment, would be a defeat unparalleled in the Wehrmacht since the beginning of the war. What they didn’t know at this point was that Rommel’s signals had identified another set of signals to the south. This had been identified as another British Division which would arrive in the morning. Without the Italians coming from Sirte, two weakened Panzer Divisions would struggle against a fresh British Division, along with whatever forces were still to the east of them.
Disengaging from the kind of fight that the Panzer Divisions were involved in was a most difficult thing to achieve. The fact was that it was also something they hadn’t had much experience of doing either. The skill of the various levels of command however was very high and as the sun was dipping below the horizon the majority of the German force were heading away from the British position. The Indian infantry were in no position to follow. The tanks of 7th Armoured Division were in dire need of replenishment, their ammunition levels were critically low. General Creagh had to order his men to stand down, sort out the wounded and try to reorganise themselves. Patrols were sent out to try to scoop up any German or Italian stragglers, and there was the German wounded to look to as well.
The darkness gave the surviving panzer troops cover, but a lot of the infantry were without transport. As the lead Valiant I* of 22nd Armoured Division, with the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade arrived on scene some prisoners were taken both individually and in whole units. As time went on, the exhausted British and Indian troops began to slow down, occasional streams of tracer marked an encounter in the dark between two foes who were like two punch drunk boxers swinging fists and missing. It was only the urge for survival that had the remnants of 15th Panzer Division and 5th Light Division continued their flight towards safety. General Rommel stood by the side of the coast road at the Wadi Harawah and watched through most of the night as his broken Afrika Korps lurched onto the road and turned west towards Sirte.
