It was no problem for logistics at all.Standard reply"Well we don't have that part and if we did the truck is broken and out of gas so we couldn't get it here.......would you like this horse and cart,it only understands English thou......we got a deal on them ."
Sir John Valentine Carden survives.
- Thread starter allanpcameron
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Think you’re missing a troop or have too many guns here.
How many of those brands produced multiple models too? Not that the British stable was that much better IIRC. Sure they had fewer companies (and thus, fewer individual models) producing, but still far more than was truly practical.
not sure if I'm being a bit thick but it looks like you just received your first turtledove @allanpcameron . About bloody time tbf.
So just a thought but Britain may be about to find itself in a Logistical quandary, or to be more specific a shipping quandary.
It is pretty much accepted that Britain will want to send troops to Greece as soon as that option becomes a political possibility. In fact it is something that Churchill cant not do. The problem that Britain is possibly going to run into though is shipping. Currently a lot of effort is being put into supplying and building up XIII corps in Cyrenaica and I would suspect that at this point a lot of different groups are invested in seeing that done. In trying to support XIII corps a large amount of Britain's available shipping will likely being used, at least the shipping not crossing the Atlantic or getting things from the Empire. On top of that the Royal Navy will only be able to support so much shipping being sent through the Mediterranean. That could mean that when the option comes for an intervention in Greece does come up that Britain won't be able to send much in the first instance, the shipping simply won't be available.
Now you may expect that some of the material destined for XIII corps will simply be diverted but I think that is unlikely ITTL for a few reasons. The first and most important is all the parties with an Interest in knocking Italy out of North Africa. One of these groups will be the Admiralty, the Navy will very keen to see Libya in British possession not only for the added security it brings to Mediterranean shipping but also the lower burden imposed in having to support an active combat zone. That is not to say there ill be no forces sent to Greece, we have already seen Wavell earmark some forces for Greece, in addition the ships bringing troops and supplies to Tobruk and Benghazi could well load Italian tanks etc as ballast and drop them in Greece for use by the Greeks. Yes that will in some ways weaken the British forces but it won't have to be an immediate removal of all Italian equipment but more a gradual replacement. The other option of course is to drop some of them at Crete so that Greek troops can train on them on Crete before being sent back to the Mainland. That gives the Greeks a safe and remote area to train on.
What does all of this possibly mean then. Well it probably means all the troops and tanks etc on the way to North Africa carry on to North Africa. In addition any extra supplies meant to support the current and en-route forces will be sent as well. Any additional forces that might have been sent will likely be sent to Greece instead. That will mean though that the British presence on Greece will possibly be smaller than OTL though more tank heavy due to the 150 A13's being sent.
Just a possibility and it is not to say nothing will be sent too Greece, politically something will be done. It is just that in a week to ten days when an intervention becomes a probability then reality there won't be the shipping to immediately send anything. In addition there will be enough built in momentum and interested parties to see many supplies redirected.
It is pretty much accepted that Britain will want to send troops to Greece as soon as that option becomes a political possibility. In fact it is something that Churchill cant not do. The problem that Britain is possibly going to run into though is shipping. Currently a lot of effort is being put into supplying and building up XIII corps in Cyrenaica and I would suspect that at this point a lot of different groups are invested in seeing that done. In trying to support XIII corps a large amount of Britain's available shipping will likely being used, at least the shipping not crossing the Atlantic or getting things from the Empire. On top of that the Royal Navy will only be able to support so much shipping being sent through the Mediterranean. That could mean that when the option comes for an intervention in Greece does come up that Britain won't be able to send much in the first instance, the shipping simply won't be available.
Now you may expect that some of the material destined for XIII corps will simply be diverted but I think that is unlikely ITTL for a few reasons. The first and most important is all the parties with an Interest in knocking Italy out of North Africa. One of these groups will be the Admiralty, the Navy will very keen to see Libya in British possession not only for the added security it brings to Mediterranean shipping but also the lower burden imposed in having to support an active combat zone. That is not to say there ill be no forces sent to Greece, we have already seen Wavell earmark some forces for Greece, in addition the ships bringing troops and supplies to Tobruk and Benghazi could well load Italian tanks etc as ballast and drop them in Greece for use by the Greeks. Yes that will in some ways weaken the British forces but it won't have to be an immediate removal of all Italian equipment but more a gradual replacement. The other option of course is to drop some of them at Crete so that Greek troops can train on them on Crete before being sent back to the Mainland. That gives the Greeks a safe and remote area to train on.
What does all of this possibly mean then. Well it probably means all the troops and tanks etc on the way to North Africa carry on to North Africa. In addition any extra supplies meant to support the current and en-route forces will be sent as well. Any additional forces that might have been sent will likely be sent to Greece instead. That will mean though that the British presence on Greece will possibly be smaller than OTL though more tank heavy due to the 150 A13's being sent.
Just a possibility and it is not to say nothing will be sent too Greece, politically something will be done. It is just that in a week to ten days when an intervention becomes a probability then reality there won't be the shipping to immediately send anything. In addition there will be enough built in momentum and interested parties to see many supplies redirected.
16 February 1941. El Tahag Camp, Egypt.
allanpcameron
Donor
16 February 1941. El Tahag Camp, Egypt.
It may have only have been forty miles from Cairo, but the camp near the railway stop of El Quassassin, had been growing into a major transit and training camp. The camp was made up of numbered blocks each being a rectangle 500 yards by 1000 yards. As well as tents, cookhouses, toilet blocks, water towers and everything else needed to sustain troops, had been carved out of the desert.
The newest arrivals had had a day to settle into their allotted block, but training for survival and war in the desert was about to begin. The 3rd Indian Motor Brigade had been established from the 2nd Lancers (Gardner's Horse), 11th Prince Albert Victor's Own Cavalry (Frontier Force) and 18th King Edward's Own Cavalry. Brigadier Edward Vaughan had moulded the force into the first motorised element of the Indian Army to be ready for service overseas. Mounted in Fordson trucks rather than anything armoured made them a Motor Brigade rather than an Armoured Brigade.
The Indian cavalrymen were well-trained in their new role, but they suffered from the limitations of the Indian economy, in as far as each man was armed with his personal weapon, and most platoons had their squad weapons. There were deficiencies in numbers of radios, the anti-tank platoons had no weapons, and there was no attached artillery. When Brigadier Vaughan had reported to Middle East Command, Generals Wavell and ‘Jumbo’ Wilson had both promised to do their best to find the necessary equipment to bring the Brigade up to full strength, but admitted that it wouldn’t be easy. Thought had been given to using captured Italian weapons, but the good equipment not taken over by the Australians, was earmarked to be given to the Greeks.
Having a Motor Brigade, with its own integral transport, was actually a real asset to Middle East Command. Of the three Australian Divisions only 6th Division had its full establishment, but these had been worked hard during Operation Compass. 7th Division was very short and 9th Division had about half of its requirement. Under normal circumstances, either the Australian’s own ASC or the RASC would be able to make up the shortfall. However, the wear and tear on all the supply units had left the whole Command in trouble. More lorries had been requested and were due to arrive in the convoys coming from Britain, the fast element of WS5A, thirteen ships, had just started to arrive at Suez that very day.
While the Indians were waiting for more equipment, there was a lot of training in desert warfare to be done. Brigadier Vaughan had been given the target of the middle of March to be fully prepared. If an advance against Tripoli was to go ahead at the beginning of April, then the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade would be an excellent addition to the forces involved in that operation.
NB: This is mostly OTL, except the last part.
The Wiki page says
It may have only have been forty miles from Cairo, but the camp near the railway stop of El Quassassin, had been growing into a major transit and training camp. The camp was made up of numbered blocks each being a rectangle 500 yards by 1000 yards. As well as tents, cookhouses, toilet blocks, water towers and everything else needed to sustain troops, had been carved out of the desert.
The newest arrivals had had a day to settle into their allotted block, but training for survival and war in the desert was about to begin. The 3rd Indian Motor Brigade had been established from the 2nd Lancers (Gardner's Horse), 11th Prince Albert Victor's Own Cavalry (Frontier Force) and 18th King Edward's Own Cavalry. Brigadier Edward Vaughan had moulded the force into the first motorised element of the Indian Army to be ready for service overseas. Mounted in Fordson trucks rather than anything armoured made them a Motor Brigade rather than an Armoured Brigade.
The Indian cavalrymen were well-trained in their new role, but they suffered from the limitations of the Indian economy, in as far as each man was armed with his personal weapon, and most platoons had their squad weapons. There were deficiencies in numbers of radios, the anti-tank platoons had no weapons, and there was no attached artillery. When Brigadier Vaughan had reported to Middle East Command, Generals Wavell and ‘Jumbo’ Wilson had both promised to do their best to find the necessary equipment to bring the Brigade up to full strength, but admitted that it wouldn’t be easy. Thought had been given to using captured Italian weapons, but the good equipment not taken over by the Australians, was earmarked to be given to the Greeks.
Having a Motor Brigade, with its own integral transport, was actually a real asset to Middle East Command. Of the three Australian Divisions only 6th Division had its full establishment, but these had been worked hard during Operation Compass. 7th Division was very short and 9th Division had about half of its requirement. Under normal circumstances, either the Australian’s own ASC or the RASC would be able to make up the shortfall. However, the wear and tear on all the supply units had left the whole Command in trouble. More lorries had been requested and were due to arrive in the convoys coming from Britain, the fast element of WS5A, thirteen ships, had just started to arrive at Suez that very day.
While the Indians were waiting for more equipment, there was a lot of training in desert warfare to be done. Brigadier Vaughan had been given the target of the middle of March to be fully prepared. If an advance against Tripoli was to go ahead at the beginning of April, then the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade would be an excellent addition to the forces involved in that operation.
NB: This is mostly OTL, except the last part.
The Wiki page says
This divergence makes a lot of sense because they had far less time OTL to set things up, few looted Italian AA guns they did have were nowhere near where they would have done much good. Hopefully there will be more and more knock-on effects as time goes on.
I was wondering would it be possible to have trucks produced in India brought over to North Africa they should have some lines in place I mean they were capable of producing an armoured car in the form of the Indian Pattern Carrier they should have the some have some truck lines already in place prewar but I'm not sure.
the armored cars were built on chassis made in canada.
truck kits were sent from Canada to India and Egypt for final assembly,the ones going to Egypt needing to be unboxed then tires,wheels and upper cab installed and off you go.
I think i posted this before but here it is again.
allanpcameron
Donor
As mentioned in the post, the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade brought its Fordson trucks with them from India. The India Pattern Carrier Mark I only started production in late 1940, can't find when the Mark II (with rear engine) started. So yes, it should be possible, but it is difficult at this point in early 1941 to see much coming, as the big gearing up process is still going on. By mid-41 the South Africans were producing enough Marmon-Herrington Mk II armoured cars for themselves and other commonwealth forces. I can't find Canadian Pattern Truck numbers by year, only the total produced in wartime.
Allan
Apparently annual production of CMP trucks is a closely guarded secret and start date of serious production is muddy to say the least,atleast on the web.Best I can find is serious production only started after a certain army "loaned" all their vehicles to another army.
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There is one resource I know about at http://hotrod.gregwapling.com/chev-trucks-47-55/canadian-chev.html which is a dense listing of serial numbers on vehicles produced by Chevrolet Canada between 1915 and 1951. As Chevrolet along with Ford were the main producers of CMP trucks this gives some indication of numbers by specific periods.
Well that clears some of the mud away.So basically GM had built enough CMP trucks to issue one to each and every man of the Empire forces in North Africa,if they could be shipped there.
Have to say that I have really enjoyed the last few updates. The main reason is the sense of calm and purpose they give off for the British ITTL. Even the situation of the Australian AA having to use captured Italian 20mm AA guns rather than the Bofors they would have wanted was presented in a way that gave off an air of planned and deliberate decisions being made rather than an ad hoc this will do approach.
That feeling is probably the biggest and most important change so far. OTL the British give of an air of making do and reacting to events far too often in the early years of the war and that in turn likely led to the situation they found themselves in. ITTL they are likely going to be led by events far less often or not to the same amount as OTL and that can only have a positive outcome.
That feeling is probably the biggest and most important change so far. OTL the British give of an air of making do and reacting to events far too often in the early years of the war and that in turn likely led to the situation they found themselves in. ITTL they are likely going to be led by events far less often or not to the same amount as OTL and that can only have a positive outcome.
Agreed. It's been less 'muddling through' as 'being pragmatic', which has a whole different set of associations to the word.
It's not been 'making it up as we go and hope for the best', it's been 'we can make use of this as the situation develops'.
It implies a whole extra level of professionalism and adaptable thinking that the usual narrative of 'we're just clever enough to be lucky' doesn't really apply.
The making it up as we go approach is prevalent in all armies simply because as situations develop you have to adapt to them. For the British army in WW2 the professionalism was always there, as much as it is in any army at least. The British problem in WW2 was that during the first few years of the war events always seemed to come up before Britain had time to properly come up with a plan. This in part was down to industrial and logistical issues they could not control as well as political.
Take the current time period ITTL, the end of Compass and the lead up to the Greek Campaign. In OTL Compass has been finished for only 3 days, pretty much the whole of XIII corps needs rebuilding and Britain isn't in a position to quickly and easily do that OTL. Then the prospect of Greece comes up as things are being evaluated and that changes everything again. All this was made worse by the shoestring Britain was running the war on during this time period.
Now compare that to TTL. Compass has finished a couple of weeks earlier and the XIII corps is in much better shape. That gives Britain a much better foundation to work with moving forward which, combined with the extra time, allows for decisions to be made sooner. This is because the scale of the decisions being made are a lot smaller, reinforcing a force rather than rebuilding it in essence. In addition Britain, while still operating on a shoestring in many respects, has a far more sturdy and determined shoestring. The extra tanks Britain has over OTL alone are a major benefit, that they are far more capable than the OTL tanks only multiplies that benefit. That gives Britain a much easier time making decisions as they have not only time but also pieces to play with, something they lacked OTL.
The whole affect is cumulative. More time to make a decision leads to better decisions being made generally. More equipment to allocate to the forces means decisions are easier to make so less time is wasted making them again leading to better decisions. The extra freedom this is granting commander means more time can be spent on the smaller details, again improving the force as a whole.
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