15 May 1941. London, England.
The War Office staff had been over the figures coming out from Wavell’s GHQ in Cairo. The numbers of A13 Cruiser tanks lost in Greece meant that 1st Armoured Brigade could no longer be considered operational. About a Squadron’s worth of A13s was all that had been lifted off the beaches of Greece and these had been shipped to Crete. The decision had been made to leave them there. There were likely more useful than the A9, A10 and A11s of 51st RTR which made up the entirety of the armoured fighting vehicles on the island. It would be a pain for the 51st RTR’s Light Aid Detachments to have yet another type of tank to maintain, but it would give the defenders of Crete a bit more flexibility. The officers and men of 1st Armoured Brigade were now kicking their heels in and around Cairo. In the short term they’d taken possession of whatever Italian tankettes and light tanks that were still in working order and trying to familiarise the survivors and replacements of the Greek Cavalry Division with the joys of mechanisation.
Of the three Cavalry Brigades of 1st Cavalry Division, only 4th Brigade was fully mechanised, and their jaunt to Baghdad had taken a heavy toll on what were already pretty worn-out tanks. Wavell requested that priority should be given to shipping out 340 cruiser tanks for the Cavalry Division, the full quota for an Armoured Division, with it would come the designation of 10th Armoured Division. In addition, another 150 cruisers for 1st Armoured Brigade, with enough spares to be battle replacements, were needed. The Valiant I* tanks of 22nd Armoured Brigade had suffered losses during Operation Brevity and also needed replacements. Since that Brigade was now the nucleus of 22nd Division (a mixed Division of one Armoured Brigade and two Infantry Brigades), Wavell wanted 1st Armoured Brigade to do the same in another ‘mixed’ Division, probably with the 1st South African Division.
Wavell was conscious that with the imminent victory over the Italians in East Africa he would be able to bring the 1st South African and 5th Indian Division to Egypt. Another infantry Division (50th Northumberland), was due to arrive from England in June, giving him an extra three Divisions, though the two coming from East Africa would need time to rest and re-equip. Once the Cavalry Division was redesignated 10th Armoured, then that would give Wavell two armoured Divisions (7th and 10th). Using the two Armoured Brigades that originally comprised 2nd Armoured Division, he would be able to field two mixed Divisions (22nd and possibly 1st South African). If this was proven unsuccessful, 2nd Armoured Division could be reconstituted from the 1st and 22nd Armoured Brigades, giving three Armoured Divisions (one in Infantry tanks and two in Cruiser Tanks).
By the time Wavell would be ready to take on Tripoli, he would have, in addition to the Armoured and Mixed Divisions, nine infantry Divisions (6th, 9th and 50th British, 6th, 7th and 9th Australian, 4th and 5th Indian and 2nd New Zealand) at his disposal, presuming the South Africans became a mixed Division. The Greeks, Poles and Free French were also in theatre, though the Greek army needed a lot of time to become effective. As long as he had all the right support, and Wavell emphasised it was essential that the RAF was strengthened, then Middle East Command would be able to field an army of three full Corps, and still maintain its other responsibilities. Once the Italians and Germans were kicked out of Libya, Wavell wanted to secure the eastern Mediterranean, hopefully capturing Rhodes and dealing with the Vichy French in Syria. After all that, if the Royal Navy had the right ships, then some kind of attack on the continent might be feasible.
Wavell’s request to ship another 500 tanks to the Middle East, to many in the War Office, seemed that it was a lot to ask for when 8th and 9th Armoured Divisions in the Home Force were very short of tanks, even for training. On the other hand, the first quarter of 1941 had seen another improvement in the numbers of tanks being produced by Britain’s workers. 720 tanks had been delivered in three months. The best estimate for the second quarter was that the numbers would increase again to about 1000.
Of these 720 tanks produced in the first quarter of 1941, 220 were Valiant I* cruisers and 90 were A15 Cruisers. There was still a higher proportion of tanks being made that were Infantry Tanks: 108 Matilda II and 280 Valiant I. 32 Mark VII Tetrarch Light tanks were also completed. In addition, deliveries of self-propelled guns based on the Valiant I hull were beginning to be produced, as were advanced prototypes of the A22 Infantry Tank. It was expected that while the numbers of Infantry and Light tanks would remain about the same in the next quarter.
The expected rise of almost 25% production would be primarily as the Nuffield Organisation began to ramp up production of the A15. After much discussion, and secret consultations with both Vickers and the Royal Ordnance, the primary problem besetting the tank was found to be the external mounting of the air cleaners. This meant that the Liberty engine experienced rapid wear and tear, leading to the other problems which were the symptoms, not the cause, of its unreliability. An experiment was made which put concertina air cleaners inside the fighting compartment. From the trials this looked as if it might be a real solution. If Nuffield were prepared to modify the A15, probably having to call it a Mark II, then the tank would be considered capable of being used overseas. Some issues regarding the build quality and, unremarkably, the operational maintenance of a new type, was also brought to Nuffield’s attention. The fact that the A15 tank was still under-gunned and under-protected, without the capacity be upgraded, was problematic, but at least the main design fault could be rectified.
Wavell had made the point that only his men and tanks were actually fighting. With the way in which the German panzers had done in the fighting around Nofilia, he needed to make sure that he could fight them on equal terms, he needed the tanks now. At home meanwhile there was a growing sense that the threat of a German invasion had all but disappeared, meaning the 1st, 6th, 8th, and 9th Armoured Divisions based at home would need to think about doing more than simply defending Britain against invasion.
The official programme of the War Office was to provide fifty-five divisions by the end of November 1941. Various estimates about how many of these would be armoured had come and gone. Currently there were only three fully equipped (1st, 6th, and 7th), not counting the Army Tank Brigades. By November, if tank production continued to increase, then the 2nd, 8th, 9th and 10th could all be fully equipped. Just as with the 1st and 7th Armoured Divisions currently, some would be equipped with Infantry Tanks rather than cruisers. There were plans to expand from the current seven to at least ten Armoured Divisions, not counting the Canadians, Australians and Indians who were all committed to having their own Armoured Divisions too.
Wavell’s request for another 500 tanks to be sent to the Middle East as a priority was considered by the War Cabinet. With the success of the 4th Cavalry Brigade in Iraq; the clear will of Wavell to knock the Italians and Germans out of Africa; and the prospect of taking the fight to the Germans somewhere, the Prime Minister was enthusiastic. He judged that the 1st and 6th Armoured Divisions, along with the Tank Brigades, were adequate for the defence of the Home Front at the moment. For Churchill, the 8th and 9th Armoured Divisions could wait awhile longer, what mattered was getting the weapons into the hands of the fighting man where he could hit the enemy.
The fact that the Cabinet was also having to consider General Percival request for more men and equipment complicated the decision. Percival, who’d recently taken over command in Singapore, was clearly aware that the plan for defence of Malaya and Singapore required many more units than he currently had at his disposal. Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir John Dill, has some sympathy with Percival’s request. The 10th Indian Division was now in Iraq, when it should have gone to Malaya, leaving Percival even more short-handed. Consideration was given to the 5th Indian being redirected from East Africa to Malaya rather than Egypt, along with the 12th (African) Division. The Australian Government, who were also concerned about the Japanese, had already sent the 8th Australian Division to Malaya. The idea that perhaps one or two of the Australian Divisions, after their efforts in Greece, might also be sent to reinforce Malaya had to be considered.
If Wavell wanted 500 tanks, and was also getting the 50th Division, losing two or, even potentially, three Infantry Divisions to Percival’s command, wouldn’t be critical to the success of the plan to take Tripoli. There was some discussion about whether tanks should also be sent out to Percival. The impression within the War Cabinet was that Malaya wasn’t entirely suitable for tank warfare. However, the same had been said about East Africa, but the reports of what 42nd Bn RTR had contributed to that campaign were excellent. Churchill thought that a battalion of Matilda IIs could probably be spared for Malaya, even if it was just to reassure the Australians to some extent. General Dill agreed, and so Wavell would get his 500 tanks, and Percival would get about fifty.