Well you cannot set fire to some ones house and then look askance if they refuse to dress for dinner
Sir John Valentine Carden survives.
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I don’t know for sure but I’d guess they didn’t bother when they invaded Finland either. It’s because the people of Soviet Union meant nothing to the leadership, completely disposable. Captured soldiers, and their families, were traitors who weren’t worth the effort of sending a list. The Soviet State was just vile.
The Winter war?
I'm not defending the vileness that was the Russian state but about 900 Finnish soldiers were made POW and 838 returned to Finland by April 41 (apparently the NKVD were expecting 25000 POWs)
So by the standards of the Eastern front they do appear to have been treated relatively well.
I do not know if 'lists' were exchanged.
The story for those captured later during the continuation war was not as good but again 60% returned - which again was pretty good for the Eastern front
So better to be a Finn than a German (or a Russian for that matter) if you were going to be a POW
I would argue that the current Axis occupation army in Greece is abit bigger than in OTL. The Peloponnese is now exposed and it needs a bigger garrison. Moreover, the Cyclades Islands are exposed, and if the Germans want to properly garrison the island chain (no need for a lot of occupation troops in OTL) they need the equivalent of an additional division (at least) spread out.
Fair enough I assumed wrongly about the Winter War. I wasn’t accusing you of defending the Soviet State, it just baffles me that they didn’t care at all about their own men who were captured
Original timeline, on September 15th, 1941, Churchill says he received a telegram from Stalin which (translated into English) included: '...It seems to me that Great Britain could without risk land in Archangel twenty-five to thirty divisions, or transport them across Iran to the southern regions of the U.S.S.R. In this way there could be established military collaboration between the Soviet and British troops on the territory of the U.S.S.R. A similar situation existed during the last war in France. The arrangement mentioned would constitute a great help. It would be a serious blow against the Hitler aggression...' (The Second World War, volume III, 1950 edition; chapter: 'Aid to Russia')
Assuming Churchill wasn't just making it up (and he was writing that at a time when Stalin was still alive and able to object if the documents weren't real) Stalin apparently was desperate enough at that point in time to accept large quantities of foreign troops on Russian soil as allies. (For some context, if I understand right, this was about the time that the German encirclement and destruction of multiple Russian divisions at Kiev was about to go down.)
Nature of the state as it stood given the man running it was a raging sociopath who left his own son to die.
As to Finland there was less of a grudge there (the Finn's didn't kill 20 million Soviet's and were largely fighting their own war for limited gains rather than a Nazi race war). Also after the Continuation war the Soviet's may already have hoped to pull off Finlandisation rather than having to sit on a country that had proved ready and willing to resist and has little strategic value once the approaches to Leningrad were safely in soviet hands.
If Britain holds Malaya and Burma, then Sumatra may well hold. (Weren't the troops used to take it the ones who took Malaya? If so, Japan's going to have to come up with new troops and transport. And this means even an attempt at sumatra will be rather later. )
If it does, everyone who isn't an ethnic German or Russian, and possibly a fair few who are, will be tempted to procure a union jack to wave at liberators. Would possibly lead to either amusing or heartbreaking stories regarding the Ukraine.
Ramp-Rat
Monthly Donor
The three principal Allied Military Forces in WWII after 1942.
A number of people have commented about the contribution and effectiveness of the Military Forces of the big three, America, British/Commonwealth and Soviet Union in the land campaign in Europe. So let us look at the various nations and what and why they made the contributions that they did, and what the effectiveness of their contribution was. Starting with the USA, which up until 1943, wasn’t committed in a major way to the land campaigns in Europe. From its entry into the war the USA was fighting on multiple fronts in vastly separate areas of the world, and very different types of warfare. It as did the British/Commonwealth in general decided to fight a war of equipment, not one of blood and flesh. In Europe up until late in 1943 it was a junior partner to Britain on land, sea and in the air. It never did become the signor partner at sea, it’s major navel contribution was in the Pacific campaign. While in the air, Britain didn’t trust the Americans to defend British airspace and cities from air attack, so it’s fighter force, was essential dedicated to the defence of its bombers, and supporting the American Army after D-Day. The Americans were fighting on various fronts all at the end of extended supply lines that involved major sea transit. Unlike the Soviet Union, the levels of equipment especially motor transport were high, with on average 1 vehicle for every 4 troops. And the ground that the Americans and British fought over was very different to that that the Soviet forces faced. The majority of the ground in the east was wide open planes, with few water ways and little development. In the west the ground was far more hilly, had numerous water courses, and was highly developed. The average western farmyard is an old building with a cellar and thick stone or brick walls, in sight of a similar building. It was very easy to convert to a strong point well covered by interlocking fields of fire from its neighbours. Fields in the west tended to be smaller and surrounded by thick hedges or stone walls and there were numerous small woodlands and thickets to provide cover. Unlike in the east, where farms were far more spread out and the buildings typically timber, there was just more open space in the east, to manoeuvre in. There was also a very different ratio of armoured forces in the west to that in the east. A Soviet observer with the British, remarked that the British were making very slow progress in comparison to that the Soviets were able to in the east, during the intense fighting post D-Day. To which the British suggested he do the maths, and work out what the ratio of armoured forces the British faced per mile, in comparison to that the Soviets faced on better ground in the east. Turned out that there were more German armoured units facing the British than were available to the Germans on a complete Soviet front that had a distance ten times that they British had.
Both the British and the Americans, were fighting on numerous fronts in different locations, while at the same time conducting major campaigns at sea and in the air. The Soviets up until late 44, were fighting inside the own sparse territory, and not at sea or strategically in the air. It wasn’t until they the Soviets got into Germany in 45, that they realised the power and destruction that they Anglo American bombers had done in Germany. While it is true to say that the Soviets broke the back of the German Army, in a brutal no holds barred conflict. They didn’t as they claim defeat the Germans without any help from the Anglo American forces. Yes the Anglo American forces were for political reasons reluctant to enter Berlin in 45, and Eisenhower who many of the British regarded as naive, was reluctant to exert his powers and force the Soviets to abide by their agreements. He was also looking over his shoulder at his reputation and a possible political position post war. He was both right and wrong, yes what was the point in occupying territory that you are going to have to give over to the Soviet Union. But a small part of that territory was yours to occupy, and had he taken Berlin he would have had boots on the ground inside Berlin to emphasise your right to be there. Note the British who had a much better understanding of the realities of what was what, made a particular effort to capture Hamburg and be the ones to liberate Denmark, thus preventing the Soviets from grabbing the key to the Baltic. So yes the Anglo Americans didn’t pay the price in blood and flesh that the Soviets did, but that wasn’t the war that they were fighting. They had decided even before the war that they were going to fight a war of material, which they did. The Soviets for all the brilliant ideas they had had in the thirties about armoured warfare, didn’t in the forties have the equipment to enact the ideas, and so relied on throwing more and more men at the problem. No front line German troops in the east watched wave after wave of heavy bombers fly overhead to pound their homeland. Nor were troops in the east under the cosh of constant air attack once they got within a hundred miles of the front. The ground and the situation in the west was very different to that in the east.
RR.
A number of people have commented about the contribution and effectiveness of the Military Forces of the big three, America, British/Commonwealth and Soviet Union in the land campaign in Europe. So let us look at the various nations and what and why they made the contributions that they did, and what the effectiveness of their contribution was. Starting with the USA, which up until 1943, wasn’t committed in a major way to the land campaigns in Europe. From its entry into the war the USA was fighting on multiple fronts in vastly separate areas of the world, and very different types of warfare. It as did the British/Commonwealth in general decided to fight a war of equipment, not one of blood and flesh. In Europe up until late in 1943 it was a junior partner to Britain on land, sea and in the air. It never did become the signor partner at sea, it’s major navel contribution was in the Pacific campaign. While in the air, Britain didn’t trust the Americans to defend British airspace and cities from air attack, so it’s fighter force, was essential dedicated to the defence of its bombers, and supporting the American Army after D-Day. The Americans were fighting on various fronts all at the end of extended supply lines that involved major sea transit. Unlike the Soviet Union, the levels of equipment especially motor transport were high, with on average 1 vehicle for every 4 troops. And the ground that the Americans and British fought over was very different to that that the Soviet forces faced. The majority of the ground in the east was wide open planes, with few water ways and little development. In the west the ground was far more hilly, had numerous water courses, and was highly developed. The average western farmyard is an old building with a cellar and thick stone or brick walls, in sight of a similar building. It was very easy to convert to a strong point well covered by interlocking fields of fire from its neighbours. Fields in the west tended to be smaller and surrounded by thick hedges or stone walls and there were numerous small woodlands and thickets to provide cover. Unlike in the east, where farms were far more spread out and the buildings typically timber, there was just more open space in the east, to manoeuvre in. There was also a very different ratio of armoured forces in the west to that in the east. A Soviet observer with the British, remarked that the British were making very slow progress in comparison to that the Soviets were able to in the east, during the intense fighting post D-Day. To which the British suggested he do the maths, and work out what the ratio of armoured forces the British faced per mile, in comparison to that the Soviets faced on better ground in the east. Turned out that there were more German armoured units facing the British than were available to the Germans on a complete Soviet front that had a distance ten times that they British had.
Both the British and the Americans, were fighting on numerous fronts in different locations, while at the same time conducting major campaigns at sea and in the air. The Soviets up until late 44, were fighting inside the own sparse territory, and not at sea or strategically in the air. It wasn’t until they the Soviets got into Germany in 45, that they realised the power and destruction that they Anglo American bombers had done in Germany. While it is true to say that the Soviets broke the back of the German Army, in a brutal no holds barred conflict. They didn’t as they claim defeat the Germans without any help from the Anglo American forces. Yes the Anglo American forces were for political reasons reluctant to enter Berlin in 45, and Eisenhower who many of the British regarded as naive, was reluctant to exert his powers and force the Soviets to abide by their agreements. He was also looking over his shoulder at his reputation and a possible political position post war. He was both right and wrong, yes what was the point in occupying territory that you are going to have to give over to the Soviet Union. But a small part of that territory was yours to occupy, and had he taken Berlin he would have had boots on the ground inside Berlin to emphasise your right to be there. Note the British who had a much better understanding of the realities of what was what, made a particular effort to capture Hamburg and be the ones to liberate Denmark, thus preventing the Soviets from grabbing the key to the Baltic. So yes the Anglo Americans didn’t pay the price in blood and flesh that the Soviets did, but that wasn’t the war that they were fighting. They had decided even before the war that they were going to fight a war of material, which they did. The Soviets for all the brilliant ideas they had had in the thirties about armoured warfare, didn’t in the forties have the equipment to enact the ideas, and so relied on throwing more and more men at the problem. No front line German troops in the east watched wave after wave of heavy bombers fly overhead to pound their homeland. Nor were troops in the east under the cosh of constant air attack once they got within a hundred miles of the front. The ground and the situation in the west was very different to that in the east.
RR.
Churchill's main cited objection to sending troops to Archangel (25th October, 1941, 'Aid to Russia' chapter of volume III again) was '...all our shipping is fully engaged, and any saving can only be made at the expense of our vital upkeep convoys to the Middle East or of ships engaged in carrying Russian supplies...'
Now, if the British have the Mediterranean reopened during mid-1941 in this timeline, (edit: then shipping) may be less of a problem.
(And in the south, the problem was limited overland 'supply lines' across the mountainous parts of Persia and adjacent regions.)
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Unless you hold Tunisia, you can't really offer protection to convoys running through the Med, so the objection stands.
This is why the Soviet leadership erected such large memorials to the dead of the Great Patriotic War, and hold vast military parades to honour their sacrifice?
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