Sir John Valentine Carden survives.

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May I ask a historical question of those who know more than I do?

Why did the RN send out "hunting parties" of 2 ships against an enemy formation of 2 ships? Why would you try to make it an even fight? Why wouldn't you send out hunting parties of 3-4 ships and then use smaller faster cruisers and fleet destroyers to screen and identify them, then use radio to bring your big ships onto target?
They sent 2 battleships (Hood was a battlecruiser with a similar Armor scheme to a QE!), 2 Heavy Crusiers, and half a dozen DDs

Verses

1 Battleships and 1 heavy cruiser
 
Why did the RN send out "hunting parties" of 2 ships against an enemy formation of 2 ships? Why would you try to make it an even fight? Why wouldn't you send out hunting parties of 3-4 ships and then use smaller faster cruisers and fleet destroyers to screen and identify them, then use radio to bring your big ships onto target? lol

In spite of its material superiority, what the RN did not have enough of was fast capital ships. They effectively had 4 available for immediate use (KGV,POW, Hood and Repulse) Repulse was the oldest and lightest, and so went with the more completely worked up KGV to cover the UK-Iceland Gap. Hood meanwhile was as fast as Repulse but much better armed and armoured and was backed up by the modern but still working up POW.

It was the best use that could be made of the assets at hand.
 
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Battle of Slim River?

Excellent example of a well lead small Armour force (20 tanks) with some motorised support (couple of companies of Infantry and some Engineers) unleashing blitzkrieg - decimated 2 Brigades and unhinged what was left of the defensive plans in Malaya by lunchtime!

One of the things tanks does is place more educated officers and experienced NCOs in country and lots of extra radios as well as 'tank knowledge' (as you say) into the garrison.

One of the reasons those 2 Brigades were routed was that they were defeated in detail due to a lack of trained officers and having lost or not being equipped in the first place with sufficient numbers of radios.
just imagining what a single Matilda II could do for the British in that situation. I'm guessing most of the Japanese tanks would end up perforated.
 
Maybe they could capture a few japanese tanks and give some to the Australians for studying.
R.9dc13059a16ee1a089135849a8928348


The little one is Japanese (and keep in mind the Sherman isn't that wonderful in of itself) why give the Aussies crap tanks?
 
Japan's strength (like Britain's) was always its Navy, and in this TL Britain has the right tanks early on. I'd say Japan's odds are even lower this time.
Also even though the they were the second most industrial power in the axis, they just didn't have the resources and industrial capacity that the allies have.
 
Also even though the they were the second most industrial power in the axis, they just didn't have the resources and industrial capacity that the allies have.
When your second of three (and a few minor guys) that isn't a huge achievement. While Germany is very much a top five industrial power its taking on all the rest of the top 10 and eventually about 80% of the planet so its own relative strength didn't mean much as well. Sad thing is that they lasted so long and killed so many.
 

marathag

Banned
What strengths?
Reliable, good mobility, enough weapons to deal with the Chinese, and enough armor for what passed for Chinese AT weapons.
So for what the IJA needed in the late '30, they met the requirements. They used diesel motors, and had some insulation so the tanks wouldn't be pure ovens.
In OTL, an early gift of an IJA tank could show it was possible to make a track that was reliable, something the British had real problems with thru 1942
 
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12 May 1941. Salisbury Plain. England.

Major-General John Crocker’s driver skidded to a halt, barely avoiding himself and his car being crushed by a Valiant I* tank rolling around a blind corner. The tank continued on as if nothing had happened. Crocker hopped out of the car with his aide and climbed onto an embankment where he might be able to see better. The movement of troops and vehicles on a Divisional Exercise was always fraught, but the death of the Divisional CO was probably best avoided.

Crocker had been making his way from a meeting with Brigadier Evelyn Fanshawe, (CO 20th Armoured Brigade) to meet with Brigadier Alex Richardson (CO 26th Armoured Brigade). Along with the 6th Support Group, this was the first full exercise of what was now an almost fully equipped Armoured Division. There were shortages of various things, such as a proper command vehicle for the Division’s CO, but all six armoured regiments were now equipped with Valiant I* tanks, 340 of them.

What was clear from the first two days of the exercise was that the new tank was popular with its crews. The Cavalry Regiments of 26th Armoured Brigade (16/5 Lancers, 17/21 Lancers and 2nd Lothian and Border Horse) had gone to war in Light Tanks, but now felt that they had something they could rely on to go toe to toe with the enemy and win. The Yeomanry Regiments of 20th Armoured Brigade (1st Royal Gloucestershire Hussars, 1st and 2nd Northamptonshire Yeomanry) had had longer to get used to the Valiant I*, and they had been heavily involved in working out the best use and maintenance of these tanks in the field.

The Division was formed along the fourth iteration of the Armoured Division’s Basic Organisation. The Derbyshire Yeomanry had been added to the Division’s strength as an Armoured Car Regiment. Equipped currently with a mixture of the Daimler Dingo, Scout Carriers and the new Humber Armoured Car, they would be the reconnaissance force for the Division. Each of the Armoured Brigades now had an Infantry Motorised Battalion integrated to the Brigade structure. 10th Battalion Kings Royal Rifle Corps in 20th Armoured Brigade and 10th Battalion Rifle Brigade joined 26th Armoured Brigade. The 6th Support Group had the 9th Battalion Royal West Kent Regiment as its infantry component, along with the 12th Royal Horse Artillery Regiment, 72nd Anti-Tank Regiment and 51st Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment. The 6th Armoured Division had its own integrated Divisional Royal Engineers, consisting of two Field Squadrons (5 & 8) and 144 Field Park Squadron. The Divisional Signals and all the other ancillary services made 6th Armoured Division a force to be reckoned with.

The problem that Crocker had, and in his view, it was a problem he welcomed, was that the Division was being used like a guinea pig in an experiment. The 12th RHA was being equipped with the new ‘Birch’ Self-Propelled Gun, a 25-pdr howitzer on a Valiant I hull. Progress was being made and one full battery was now fully worked up. Likewise, the 51st LAA Regiment was receiving the new Vanguard Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Gun, a 40mm Bofors gun on a Valiant I hull. Fewer of these were in their possession, but they hoped that by the autumn all the shortfalls would have been made up. The three Infantry Motorised Battalions had also been chosen to test out the new Viking Tracked Personnel Carrier, designed by Vivian Loyd, an expanded and better protected version of the Loyd Carrier. These had been arriving more slowly, and for the most part, the infantry were still being moved around by lorry.

These innovations were playing havoc with the Division’s attempt to be a full readiness. It was clear that any possibility of a German sea-borne invasion was extremely remote. 6th Armoured Division, attached to Eastern Command, would have been one of the most important parts of facing that threat. Now there was time for experimentation. Learning how to use the new tools at their disposal and bringing many of the officers and men up to speed on all the lessons that had been learned from the fighting so far in the war was a large part of this exercise.

The reason that Crocker was moving from one Armoured Brigade HQ to the other was that Brigadier Tristram Lyon-Smith, (CO 6th Support Group) had been declared KIA by the Exercise Umpires following a simulated dive-bombing attack on his HQ. Command and control of the Division was becoming more difficult as the Commanding Officer of the Divisional Signals Regiment had also been declared WIA in the same attack. From the way things were going it was obvious that the Opposing Force were able to listen into the Division’s wireless transmissions and Crocker had called for radio silence. The need to send messages by dispatch rider was slowing down the ability of the Division to react to changes in the situation.

Finding and reaching Brigadier Richardson’s HQ had taken Crocker two hours, during which he had been out of touch. It wouldn’t be long to dark, and with the mess he found once he had been updated on that had happened, the end of the exercise couldn’t come soon enough. It was apparent that there were a lot of problems that still had to be resolved. Crocker had been informed that the Opposing Force had been able to divide his two Armoured Brigades, and the separation meant that the single RHA Regiment couldn’t support both Brigades adequately, even when communications were working. Richardson had split his Infantry Battalion up between the three Armoured Regiments, and it was clear that a single Company of infantry wasn’t strong enough to push back the Opposing Force’s anti-tank gun screen. There would be a lot of head-scratching and post-mortems to see all that could be learned from this exercise. What was worse, General Alan Brooke, Commander-in-Chief Home Force, was overseeing the exercise and no doubt would have a lot to say on how things went.
View attachment 683222

The British Army in the United Kingdom 1939-45. 15-cwt trucks, carriers and motorcycles of a motor battalion in 6th Armoured Division, lined up for an inspection by the King near Brandon in Suffolk, 12 September 1941.
(From here)
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Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
On Japanese tanks.

The Japanese designed tanks to suit their operational requirements, and not those of the western powers. They also had the problem that Japan was short of much of the natural resources that were needed to produce the materials for tank production, and these had to be shared with the Navy. Even if they had been able to produce a 50 plus ton tank like the German Tiger, where could they have used it. Given the primitive infrastructure of the majority of the areas that they were going to be fighting in, they would have been lucky to get such a monster more than 10 miles away from the dock. Against a 3rd rate power China, the Japanese tanks were more than adequate, a real conflict winner. Against a 1st rate power the Soviet Union in tank county, Manchuria 1945, they weren’t even speed bumps, to what was a superb example of a Blitzkrieg operation. And it should always be remembered that a tank that was basically obsolete by European standards, the British Matilda II, was in Australian hands still better than anything it faced in the Far East. The 25 mm of armour on most Japanese tanks was totally inadequate against even the smallest tank/anti tank guns of the British, Americans or Soviet Union, and no better than wet cardboard, against the larger guns available by 1943.

RR.
 
The Japanese designed tanks to suit their operational requirements, and not those of the western powers. They also had the problem that Japan was short of much of the natural resources that were needed to produce the materials for tank production, and these had to be shared with the Navy. Even if they had been able to produce a 50 plus ton tank like the German Tiger, where could they have used it. Given the primitive infrastructure of the majority of the areas that they were going to be fighting in, they would have been lucky to get such a monster more than 10 miles away from the dock. Against a 3rd rate power China, the Japanese tanks were more than adequate, a real conflict winner. Against a 1st rate power the Soviet Union in tank county, Manchuria 1945, they weren’t even speed bumps, to what was a superb example of a Blitzkrieg operation. And it should always be remembered that a tank that was basically obsolete by European standards, the British Matilda II, was in Australian hands still better than anything it faced in the Far East. The 25 mm of armour on most Japanese tanks was totally inadequate against even the smallest tank/anti tank guns of the British, Americans or Soviet Union, and no better than wet cardboard, against the larger guns available by 1943.
That is true. Still, I think their experiences in Malaya will change Japanese tank doctrine and design. For starters, for medium tanks I would expect the design for the Type 1 to never get off the drawing-board, thanks to its anaemic gun (the same used in the Type 97, which will be running up against the British Matilda IIs). Or maybe they'd be rushed into service, because they're better than anything else the Japanese have on their books right now.
 
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