23rd February – 3rd May 1944 – Greece – Part II – Operation Musket
In the weeks before the landings the German forces in Greece had as mentioned become aware that some sort of Allied attack was in the offing, though they couldn’t be certain whether it would fall on Greece or the Adriatic coast of Yugoslavia, nor did they know the scale of the attack they would face. Far from galvanising the local commanders into taking action to shore up defences the response to the prospect of an invasion somewhere in the Balkans was met with fatalism, a sense that there was little for the Wehrmacht forces to do other than stand where they were and fight, regardless of how futile it might be. Such attitudes were hardly surprising, after all what was the point of holding Athens, Split, or Belgrade, when the Allies were advancing on the Rhine? The war was coming to an end and nothing that could be done in Greece would hold back the invasion of the Reich by even a single day and no amount of propaganda could counter this grim reality. Even the usual demands from Berlin to fight to the bitter end and not to take one step back seemed rote and weary, issued because Hitler insisted, they be issued. Some of the Wehrmacht officers in Greece finally had an inkling of what life had been like for their Italian counterparts, lacking supplies and equipment and faced with carrying out completely unrealistic orders issued by superiors jockeying for position who were in turn following the edicts of a delusional megalomaniac [1].
Despite the warnings of a possible attack the invasion flotilla remained undetected as it approached Glifádha in the predawn hours of the 23rd of February and the first the defenders knew of their presence was when the naval bombardment opened up as dawn broke, supported by air attacks both from the supporting carriers and launched from Crete. Taken by surprise and under heavy fire there was little chance for the defenders to prepare as the Greek troops boarded their landing craft and made for shore. This first wave included a number of tanks, including modified A22 Black Prince models carrying the same sort of beach clearing equipment that had been deployed in Normandy, as well as the Crocodile variant, which carried a flamethrower in addition to a 17pdr gun. The Crocodile had to tow a trailer carrying 400 gallons of jellied petroleum, which was an awkward arrangement, but the impact of the powerful jet of flame the Crocodile could spout was more than worth it for the impact it had on the enemy. The Crocodile not only inflicted devastating physical damage, but it could also destroy the will to fight of even seasoned troops for whom the prospect of being burned alive carried a particular horror [2].
Given the circumstances it was all but inevitable that the thin beach defence rapidly collapsed, and the Anglo-Greek forces began to swiftly push inland, clearing the space needed to land and deploy waves of follow troops. Under the urgings of the German plenipotentiary to the Greek puppet government, and facing a total military disaster at Glifádha, The commander of the German forces in southern Greece, General Hellmuth Felmy, had little choice except to organize a hasty counterattack, not in the hopes of throwing the invaders back into the sea but simply to check their advance while he tried to pull together the rest of his forces to form a defensive line south of Athens. The weight of this fell on to the 26th Panzer Division, which had been scattered in support of counter insurgency operations and with little time to regroup was forced to mount the attack with barely half its strength and only limited infantry support. Matters were made worse for 26th Panzer by poor communications and a lack of reconnaissance, meaning that its leading regiment was unaware that elements of the 4th Independent (Greek) Armoured Regiment was now on its eastern flank until the 75mm guns of the Black Prince’s belong to Delta company opened up on the 93. Panzerjäger Battalion which had been sent out ahead of the rest of 26th Panzer to scout for the enemy. Given this regiment largely consisted of assault guns, supported by single company of Pz 38(t), this was not a task to which it was well suited. The superior position and firepower of Delta company more than offset the numerical advantage of 93rd Panzerjäger and it turned into an extremely one-sided engagement, with the crews of Delta company being far more experienced than their counterparts in 26th Panzer as well as being better equipped. 93rd Panzerjäger had been relegated to second line duties since the creation of 26th Panzer and even in a division that had never received a high priority for high calibre men and equipment it was regarded as second rate [3].
The engagement descended into a brawl as further elements of 26th Panzer and 4th Independent joined the battle and became entangled but by night fall on the 23rd the 26th Panzer was in retreat and had taken such heavy losses that the remnants were dispersed to reinforce defensive position closer to Athens, and this marked the effective disbandment of the division. In terms of holding up the advance the losses incurred by 26th Panzer was simply not worth the modest delay inflicted on the Allies, who continued to move towards Athens and successfully seized several small coastal harbours that helped to speed up the flow of men and supplies. Nonetheless by the 28th the advance was halted in the face of stiffening German resistance and the need for the Allied forces to reorganize their armour and artillery to soften up the defensive positions prior to an all-out assault. The British forces also began to move out to the east, looking to protect the flanks of the Anglo-Greek position and to impede the movement of German forces trying to further reinforce the defences. There was also the rather optimistic prospect that given the obviously hopeless position of the German forces they might yet choose to abandon Athens without the need for any street battles [4].
The Allies had good reason to be concerned about the consequences of a direct assault on Athens as the orders had come down from Berlin that both demanded that the garrison not withdraw and insisted that if the German forces did have to give ground that they should lay waste to the city, including the destruction of its historic monuments. This horrified some German officers, who still liked to think of themselves as cultured and civilized men despite everything they had done in the name of the Reich, who among them wanted to go down in history as the man who destroyed the Parthenon? Naturally there were also more pragmatic considerations at work. For one thing the means to carry out such large-scale destruction were simply unavailable. The troops fighting to hold the city had decidedly limited supplies of munitions, there certainly weren’t enough to spare to raze Athens, or even inflict large scale damage. Another consideration was what would happen to the men who carried out such acts if they fell into the hands of the Allies afterwards? The defenders chose instead to prepare a series of limited demolition actions aimed at slowing down the Allies and preventing them from pursuing if the Wehrmacht had to withdraw, something that could be justified as a legitimate military act. What threw this plan into disarray by the decision of the Communist Partisans, EAM - ELAS to take to the streets and seek to seize control of the city. This attempt was tragically misguided and generated huge bitterness in Greece over the reaction of the Anglo-Greek forces to this battle for Athens [5].
Those partisans who leaned towards the government in exile concentrated their efforts on disrupting German lines of communication in support of the Allied advance, having been firmly discouraged from co-operating with the Communists, and were in turn aided by the SOE and detachments from the Greek army in doing so. Given the apparent disarray in German ranks the Communist partisans elected to order their supporters in Athens to prepare for an uprising and began to infiltrate the city with as many men as they could muster. Their plan was to take advantage the disorder and seize control of key areas in the city, holding them until the Allies advanced to relieve them, effectively claiming credit for liberating the city. This plan was flawed in several respects, most of which were nothing to do with the refusal of the Anglo-Greek forces to rush the city when the uprising began on the 28th [6].
The Communist uprising did not take the Germans by surprise, as their plan had been leaked, either deliberately as some historians have alleged or owing to the capture of several people involved in the planning who cracked under torture. The result either way was that as the insurgents moved to break out stashes of arms that had been built up over the preceding months, they found themselves ambushed by the Wehrmacht, who were not interested in taking prisoners. Even worse, German reinforcements that had reached Athens were ordered into the city rather than being deployed to hold open the eastern perimeter, heavily weighting the odds against the partisans. This resulted in their efforts to seize key administrative buildings and a radio station turning into costly failures. The partisans were soon scattered and forced to ground, reduced to hoping that their action would inspire the Anglo-Greek forces to move swiftly on the city and it was the fact that besieging forces refused to abandon their methodical plan for taking the city that provoked so much acrimony in later years [7].
The Greek forces sat to the south of Athens did launch several probing attacks on the 1st of March, but these were intended to clear away obstacles to a full assault, there was no intention drive on the city, which the Anglo-Greek forces were still concerned could see the city reduced to ruins unless they could overrun it quickly. They were far from happy with what they saw as the reckless action of the partisans, and it would be fair to say that the fact that it was the Communists leading the uprising coloured their views. There were indeed some in the senior ranks of the Greek forces who were not unhappy to see the Communists being driven back and defeated, though equally there were those calling for action to support the uprising. The British were by this point heavily engaged with reinforcing their positions east of the city and engaging in sporadic fighting with German troops trying to break through their lines to reach the city. The fact that the Germans had directed their reinforcements to the city allowed the British to extend and reinforce their perimeter to the east with only moderate resistance. Choosing to do so was cold-blooded but strategically sound as it increased the pressure on the Germans to withdraw from the city before they were completely isolated [8].
To the Germans the situation seemed crystal clear, the Greeks had deliberately sacrificed the Communist partisans to weaken the defences of Athens and eliminate a group who would oppose them once the government in exile tried to reassert control over the country, and on this one matter the Communists would wholeheartedly agree with the Wehrmacht, which led to the rather odd situation of former Nazi officers being used as sources by distinctly left leaning historians in an attempt to prove that the Greek government had actively betrayed the partisans rather than simply being indifferent to their fate [9].
Whether it was for political or pragmatic reasons the uprising certainly did disrupt the German efforts to defend the city and hold open their lines of retreat. By the 3rd the partisans in the city had been crushed and the survivors scattered and snuck out of the city in complete disarray. This was a pyrrhic victory for the Germans as the Anglo-Greeks launched their attack on Athens on the 4th. At first this seemed as if were simply a continuation of the previous probes and it was not until well into the afternoon that General Felmy realized this was indeed a major assault. At the same time, he was in receiving reports that made it clear the British were succeeding in extending their position to the east of the city and it was only a matter of time before elements of the British Corps pivoted to push into Athens and cut off the lines of retreat. The British were in fact deliberately leaving a line of withdrawal open to the Germans, not only to avoid bloody street fighting but also to expose the German forces to the full weight of Allied airpower and armour [10].
The Germans were certainly aware that this might be the British intention; however they had no good options at this point, only selecting the lesser of the evils facing them. With the rapidly worsening situation in Eastern Europe and in the Reich itself the choices open to the German forces in Athens narrowed considerably. On the 5th of April the orders went out for the defenders of the city to prepare for a phased withdrawal, one that noticeably did not include the destruction of the great cultural icons of Western civilization. While the Germans had resigned themselves to abandoning the city, they had no intention of simply handing it over without a fight and a series of fallback positions were laid out to slow the Greek advance and allow troops to be redeployed toward the northeast of the city. Effectively the larger German plan called for the creation of the inverse of the Metaxas Line in 1941, this time intending to maintain lines of communication with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia rather than defending against attacks from those countries, though as the Reich’s situation continued to deteriorate even this could not be ruled out and the Wehrmacht forces in Greece falling back towards Thessalonica certainly could not expect any reinforcement from those directions [11].
The last German rear guards in Athens were forced to surrender on the 17th of April, at which point the Greek troops largely came to halt, with the British taking most of the weight of harrying the retreating Germans, though it was not the most vigorous pursuit. The British were equally aware that the war in Europe was drawing to a close and no one wanted to take excessive casualties when the main strategic objectives of Operation Musket had been achieved, Nonetheless the fighting last for several more weeks and the campaign officially ended on the 3rd of May 1944 [12].
The Greek government moved quickly to re-establish itself in Athens, with the first contingent of ministers an bureaucrats arriving only a week after the official liberation of the city. Any hopes that this would bring peace and order to liberated Greece would be swiftly dashed as the government demanded that all partisan groups accept their authority or agree to be disarmed. These orders were couched in language intended to provoke the Communists into refusing and the partisans who were willing to align themselves with the government soon turned their attention to attacking the Communist forces. The government in Athens tried to pretend this was simply infighting among the partisan groups at first, fearful of alienating the Allies, but as the political attitude to the USSR became increasingly hostile during the latter part of 1944 the Greek government became ever more overt in supporting what many historians have characterised as death squads and with the Communists receiving support from Yugoslavia Greece was facing a civil war that would drag on into 1946, and also led to their support for the Croatian independence movement.
[1] This is karma at work.
[2] A lot of this hardware is available because its considered surplus to requirements in northern Europe.
[3] Sending out Tank Destroyers to block an advance makes sense, if they get into position first and don’t get caught on the move.
[4] The Germans are just too dispersed to mount a proper defence and feeding in units piecemeal is just making their position worse.
[5] IOTL the various Greek partisan groups agreed to work together and even to serve under British direction. ITTL the rather stronger position of the Greek government in exile and the swifter progress of the war has undermined those efforts and the EAM – ELAS has decided to go it alone.
[6] Think of the Athens uprising being thought of in the same terms as the OTL Warsaw uprising by some people, with the British in place of the Soviets.
[7] Acrimony here covering everything from rather suspect history books to the occasional bomb being thrown.
[8] They are leaving the Germans an escape route, believing its unlikely they will be able to regroup to counterattack.
[9] the full quote seems appropriate, ‘Misery acquaints a man with strange bedfellows’.
[10] The British are definitely not doing the Germans any favours by leaving that door open.
[11] They aren’t just pulling out of Athens; they are giving up big chunk of Greece to buy themselves some breathing room.
[12] The job is done and no one wants to die fighting German troops who will probably be surrendering in a few weeks/couple of months.
[13] It’s a different flavour of bad post-war in the Balkans, but still pretty bad, unless you are the Croats.