Munich Shuffle 1938-1942 - Hendon

Garrison

Donor
September 17th 1938 – Britain – Disaster at Hendon

After the Anschluss in March of 1938 there may have been hopes that Hitler might be satisfied with his gains and concentrate on consolidating them, at least for a year or two. There was a brief panic about the possibility of a German attack on Czechoslovakia in the weeks after the Anschluss. When this came to nothing many in Britain and France felt Hitler had been forced to back down by the possibility of action on their part. Since the panic was the product of nothing more than rumour, this reaction served to enrage Hitler and by the summer the threat of war was looming large as Hitler began issuing bombastic demands for the unification of the Sudetenland with Germany. This border region of Czechoslovakia did have a majority ethnic German population, and Czechoslovakia was allied with France and the USSR while the Sudetenland contained much of the Czechs border defences. This time war seemed almost inevitable, even some supporters of appeasement felt this might be the end of the road, that these fresh demands from Berlin could not be met.

The public reaction in Britain was alarm bordering on panic in some cases. The 1930s had been a decade marked by the rise of pacifism and demands for disarmament, fuelled by the rise of the view that all the sacrifices of the First World War had been futile. The promises of a ‘land fit for heroes’ rang hollow to those struggling with poverty and unemployment in the midst of the Great Depression. The infamous 1933 Oxford Union debate where the proposition, ‘This house will under no circumstance fight for its king and country’, was passed can be taken as a indication of the attitudes of the time, or students wishing to shock the establishment if one wishes to take a contrary position.

In the summer of 1938, there was still no appetite for war, either in the British public or in the corridors of power. Nonetheless by August air raid shelters were being constructed, gas masks were being distributed en masse and anti-aircraft defences were being put in place around London. A report circulating in Whitehall claimed that London would be destroyed by bombing within a week of war starting with 1,000,000 casualties. Unbeknownst to the British at almost the same time as this dire prediction was being taken as gospel in London the Luftwaffe High Command, in a panic at the prospect of a war it was far from ready to fight, was telling Hitler that no strategic bombing campaign could be carried out against the British mainland unless bases in Norway and Northern France could be secured first.

In this febrile atmosphere it is then far more comprehensible that Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, one of the chief architects of appeasement after all, was willing to go to extraordinary lengths to prevent war. Two questions have hung over Chamberlain’s actions ever since. Was he playing for time or genuinely convinced that peace could be had? And to what extent were his intentions changed by the events at Hendon Aerodrome on the 17th of September 1938?

On the 17th Chamberlain was flying back to London from his second trip to Germany. Neither had produced satisfactory results, which was all but inevitable given that a satisfactory result for Hitler was the outbreak of war. What Chamberlain’s intentions were at this point is uncertain, though it seems likely that he was still disposed to try again and perhaps offer greater concessions than those that had already caused some alarm in the cabinet. Whatever the Prime Minister’s intentions they were rendered irrelevant as the Lockheed 14 Super Electra carrying him made its final approach to land at Hendon Aerodrome and suffered a mechanical failure. As is all too often the case in such accidents eyewitness accounts were confused about the exact sequence of events, some claiming to have seen fire, smoke, or something falling off the Electra as it descended.

What can be said with certainty is that with the plane around 200ft off the ground the right wing dipped, sending the aircraft into a sharp turn, causing it to slow and lose lift, resulting in a rapid descent. At the last moment the plane seemed to level and struck the ground belly first, destroying the landing gear. That the wing didn’t clip the ground is probably why the plane didn’t cartwheel or roll as it crashed, though what did happen to the Electra was bad enough. The tail of the aircraft tore off and there was extensive damage to the fuselage as it skidded across the grass. Still it did remain upright, almost certainly saved lives, including that of Neville Chamberlain himself. This was one of seven accidents involving the Super Electra in 1938[1], which has not prevented multiple works of fiction, and alleged non-fiction, from creating plots involving sabotage and attempted assassination, including among their ranks a James Bond novel, which was considerably better written and more plausible than many of the increasingly bizarre conspiracy theories.

Disregarding the cause of the crash the central fact was that the Prime Minister had survived. Chamberlain had a broken leg and most seriously an ugly gash across the face that would cost him the sight in his left eye in addition to a plethora of cuts and bruises. Some at the time saw Chamberlain’s survival as an act of providence. Others, particularly after the war, saw it as a punishment for hubris, what is not in doubt is that fate of Europe was hanging on how London, Paris, and Berlin reacted to this new twist in the Sudetenland crisis.

[1] Yes that model of aircraft really did have a terrible accident record:

Lockheed Model 14 Super Electra - Wikipedia
-----------​
So, this is called Munich Shuffle because the above delays the Munich Agreement and that reshuffles the sequence of many of the events of 1938-1942. Some of this will be direct consequences of the POD, some will be the butterfly effect. Where bad luck or some thin chain of circumstance worked against the British the chain will often be broken and the luck reversed, so yes, it’s a britwank. It is also very much a draft, though its a complete draft so I won’t be running out of updates halfway through, please do point out mistakes, gaffes, and anywhere you think I could improve it. If you enjoy it, tell your friends. If you hate, tell your enemies...
 
same, I think that for all the stick he gets Chamberilain was not an osterich burying his head in the sand, he was buying for time.
 

Garrison

Donor
Nice start. Subscribed.
Thanks, will be aiming for a Saturday, Tuesday, Thursday update schedule, barring unforeseen circumstances.
same, I think that for all the stick he gets Chamberilain was not an osterich burying his head in the sand, he was buying for time.
I am deliberately trying to leave Chamberlain's motivations for the changes to come vague. Perhaps the accident left him in a state of long term depression that coloured his views, perhaps in the changed circumstances we will see in future updates he felt he had to push harder for rearmament or lose support, or may they just led him to conclude he had to accelerate plans he already had in mind. Maybe a bit of all three.
 

Cathleen

Banned
Yeah I think his wife and loved ones would press him to retire. At the very least, there will be several weeks, perhaps months with an “acting” prime minister.
 

Garrison

Donor
Chamberlain died in 1940 anyway. Would he retire in 1938 under these circumstances?
I don't think he really trusted anyone else to steer the course and he might even see his survival as providential. Back when I was originally pondering this idea I did consider simply having the crash kill Chamberlain, but honestly the likely candidates to replace him in 1938 were probably worse so I decided against it.

Yeah I think his wife and loved ones would press him to retire. At the very least, there will be several weeks, perhaps months with an “acting” prime minister.
I'm sure there will be pressure, but letting go of power is hard for politicians and in the circumstance I think he will want to see things through. There will almost certainly be someone acting as caretaker for domestic issues, but there is no formal Deputy PM as far as I'm aware at the time.

ETA: And courtesy of the above comments I am making some small tweaks to the next update, thanks!
 
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Garrison

Donor
So this is just a sort BTW post. I was thinking of having some little illustrations in the thread like the top image below. Unfortunately I derived from the bottom image and accreditation is a pain in the neck, especially when some original images appear in different versions on different sites, and since I couldn't use them if chose to turn this into a Kindle e-book I decided to drop it.


Crusader 1B.jpg
R (1).jpg
 
Nice start

I am of the opinion that Chamberlain was on the one side trying to prevent a war and on the other absolutely aware of how unprepared Britain and France were for a war they both did not want.

20 wasted years

That peace in our time picture - I imagine his internal voice was 'Fuck Fuck Fuck, those Berlin maniacs are insane rearm rearm rearm'

Edit: Oh and well done for not killing him - that would be too easy
 

Garrison

Donor
Nice start

I am of the opinion that Chamberlain was on the one side trying to prevent a war and on the other absolutely aware of how unprepared Britain and France were for a war they both did not want.

20 wasted years

That peace in our time picture - I imagine his internal voice was 'Fuck Fuck Fuck, those Berlin maniacs are insane rearm rearm rearm'

Edit: Oh and well done for not killing him - that would be too easy
Thank you. Yeah the point of the early part of the thread is that Chamberlain is either able to push a little faster or is pushed a little harder than OTL. So no you won't be seeing Centurions roaming Northwest Europe in 1943 but there will be a modest acceleration with will come together with some butterfly effect to allow a better British performance. Also there are several occasions when you look at events and that famous phrase from Tony Soprano comes to mind. :) They will be, different.
 

Cathleen

Banned
@Garrison *tosses coin* although his injuries mean his internal body events change or eliminate his cancer, he will still be seventy in 1939. That fact will also intensify the chatting among the Tory aristocrats and grandees who choose the leader of the party.
 

Garrison

Donor
@Garrison *tosses coin* although his injuries mean his internal body events change or eliminate his cancer, he will still be seventy in 1939. That fact will also intensify the chatting among the Tory aristocrats and grandees who choose the leader of the party.
Well first I have made some small changes to the next update regarding Chamberlain's family. Overall its entirely possible he would resign or be pushed out. I've simply chosen to take the view that he sees himself as the indispensable man and barring evidence Chamberlain is mentally incapacitated the party is reluctant to push him out when thecountry is on the brink of war and he will, superficially, appear to rebound from the accident. Overall I'll admit it was simply easier to keep Chamberlain around than try to work with the unknown variable of replacing him.
 
September 17th 1938 – Britain – Disaster at Hendon

After the Anschluss in March of 1938 there may have been hopes that Hitler might be satisfied with his gains and concentrate on consolidating them, at least for a year or two. There was a brief panic about the possibility of a German attack on Czechoslovakia in the weeks after the Anschluss. When this came to nothing many in Britain and France felt Hitler had been forced to back down by the possibility of action on their part. Since the panic was the product of nothing more than rumour, this reaction served to enrage Hitler and by the summer the threat of war was looming large as Hitler began issuing bombastic demands for the unification of the Sudetenland with Germany. This border region of Czechoslovakia did have a majority ethnic German population, and Czechoslovakia was allied with France and the USSR while the Sudetenland contained much of the Czechs border defences. This time war seemed almost inevitable, even some supporters of appeasement felt this might be the end of the road, that these fresh demands from Berlin could not be met.

The public reaction in Britain was alarm bordering on panic in some cases. The 1930s had been a decade marked by the rise of pacifism and demands for disarmament, fuelled by the rise of the view that all the sacrifices of the First World War had been futile. The promises of a ‘land fit for heroes’ rang hollow to those struggling with poverty and unemployment in the midst of the Great Depression. I learned a lot of new information about the Great Depression by reading this informative post on one learning resource I used back in college. I recommend this resource to you, it is trustworthy and looks good. The infamous 1933 Oxford Union debate where the proposition, ‘This house will under no circumstance fight for its king and country’, was passed can be taken as a indication of the attitudes of the time, or students wishing to shock the establishment if one wishes to take a contrary position.

In the summer of 1938, there was still no appetite for war, either in the British public or in the corridors of power. Nonetheless by August air raid shelters were being constructed, gas masks were being distributed en masse and anti-aircraft defences were being put in place around London. A report circulating in Whitehall claimed that London would be destroyed by bombing within a week of war starting with 1,000,000 casualties. Unbeknownst to the British at almost the same time as this dire prediction was being taken as gospel in London the Luftwaffe High Command, in a panic at the prospect of a war it was far from ready to fight, was telling Hitler that no strategic bombing campaign could be carried out against the British mainland unless bases in Norway and Northern France could be secured first.

In this febrile atmosphere it is then far more comprehensible that Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, one of the chief architects of appeasement after all, was willing to go to extraordinary lengths to prevent war. Two questions have hung over Chamberlain’s actions ever since. Was he playing for time or genuinely convinced that peace could be had? And to what extent were his intentions changed by the events at Hendon Aerodrome on the 17th of September 1938?

On the 17th Chamberlain was flying back to London from his second trip to Germany. Neither had produced satisfactory results, which was all but inevitable given that a satisfactory result for Hitler was the outbreak of war. What Chamberlain’s intentions were at this point is uncertain, though it seems likely that he was still disposed to try again and perhaps offer greater concessions than those that had already caused some alarm in the cabinet. Whatever the Prime Minister’s intentions they were rendered irrelevant as the Lockheed 14 Super Electra carrying him made its final approach to land at Hendon Aerodrome and suffered a mechanical failure. As is all too often the case in such accidents eyewitness accounts were confused about the exact sequence of events, some claiming to have seen fire, smoke, or something falling off the Electra as it descended.

What can be said with certainty is that with the plane around 200ft off the ground the right wing dipped, sending the aircraft into a sharp turn, causing it to slow and lose lift, resulting in a rapid descent. At the last moment the plane seemed to level and struck the ground belly first, destroying the landing gear. That the wing didn’t clip the ground is probably why the plane didn’t cartwheel or roll as it crashed, though what did happen to the Electra was bad enough. The tail of the aircraft tore off and there was extensive damage to the fuselage as it skidded across the grass. Still it did remain upright, almost certainly saved lives, including that of Neville Chamberlain himself. This was one of seven accidents involving the Super Electra in 1938[1], which has not prevented multiple works of fiction, and alleged non-fiction, from creating plots involving sabotage and attempted assassination, including among their ranks a James Bond novel, which was considerably better written and more plausible than many of the increasingly bizarre conspiracy theories.

Disregarding the cause of the crash the central fact was that the Prime Minister had survived. Chamberlain had a broken leg and most seriously an ugly gash across the face that would cost him the sight in his left eye in addition to a plethora of cuts and bruises. Some at the time saw Chamberlain’s survival as an act of providence. Others, particularly after the war, saw it as a punishment for hubris, what is not in doubt is that fate of Europe was hanging on how London, Paris, and Berlin reacted to this new twist in the Sudetenland crisis.

[1] Yes that model of aircraft really did have a terrible accident record:

Lockheed Model 14 Super Electra - Wikipedia
-----------​
So, this is called Munich Shuffle because the above delays the Munich Agreement and that reshuffles the sequence of many of the events of 1938-1942. Some of this will be direct consequences of the POD, some will be the butterfly effect. Where bad luck or some thin chain of circumstance worked against the British the chain will often be broken and the luck reversed, so yes, it’s a britwank. It is also very much a draft, though its a complete draft so I won’t be running out of updates halfway through, please do point out mistakes, gaffes, and anywhere you think I could improve it. If you enjoy it, tell your friends. If you hate, tell your enemies...
Very cool article! I liked!
I want to add a little bit about the Great Depression. Everything was so bad that in the United States one in four was unemployed, and in Britain one in five was out of work. Imagine something like this now, it's very scary!
 
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September 20th – 6th October 1938 – Britain - Recovery

Garrison

Donor
September 20th – 6th October 1938 – Britain - Recovery

After several days of obstruction from Chamberlain’s doctors, and much political haggling in Westminster, a delegation was finally dispatched to meet with the Prime Minister. The party consisted of the Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax, the Chairman of the 1922 Committee Hugh O'Neill, and Herbert Morrison Deputy Leader of the Labour Party. This trio was not dispatched merely to relay the messages from Parliament and the King wishing Chamberlain a speedy recovery, but to address a very simple question, was Neville Chamberlain capable of continuing as Prime Minister of Great Britain or had his mentally faculties been permanently diminished by the accident? The ‘men in grey suits’ of the Conservative Party could be ruthless about such matters, here however they were caught on the horns of a dilemma. With the country teetering on the brink of war and the threat of London being ravaged by Nazi bombers they were inclined to be cautious. No one after all wanted to find themselves accused of being responsible for such carnage

In short order the delegation concluded, possibly reluctantly, that Chamberlain was fully compos mentis and not planning to simply surrender the reins of power at a moment when the peace of Europe hung in the balance. Chamberlain did concede that responsibility for domestic matters would have to be left in the hands of the cabinet while he remained hospitalized, though it was notable that he did not name anyone to act as his formal deputy. Until Chamberlain’s return cabinet meetings were usually chaired by the Chancellor of the Exchequer Sir John Simon and the looming spectre of the Sudeten Crisis dissuaded those with ambitions to occupy No. 10 from making any power plays.

Chamberlain was adamant on one point, that decisions relating to the Sudetenland crisis would remain in his hands. Lord Halifax was unsurprised by this, having previously made it clear that he was unhappy about the concessions Chamberlain was proposing to make to Germany[1]. He was content to keep his hands clean on the matter, and he certainly tried to take advantage of Chamberlain’s absence to build up support for his position. In later accounts of this meeting Halifax stated he saw signs of a change in Chamberlain even at this early point, that his determination to see things through in his negotiations with Hitler had taken on a darker tone. Since these thoughts were only committed to paper after Chamberlain’s death from cancer in 1940, they may represent nothing more than the benefit of hindsight.

This decision to carry on was deeply disappointing to Chamberlain’s wife Anne, who was firmly of the opinion that her husband had given more than enough for his country and should now pass the burden to someone else. Privately Chamberlain did not reject this idea out of hand, instead insisting that he could not do so until the country was safe, and the looming clouds of war dispersed, which begged the question of how that happy circumstance was to be brought about?

The day after the visit by the delegation Chamberlain dictated a series of telegrams from his hospital bed to Berlin, Rome and Paris, even now the Czechs were not offered the courtesy of being invited to discuss the disposition of their own territory. Each telegram was tailored to its audience, but each called for the resumption of talks as soon as Chamberlain was fit to travel and concluded with the same words, ‘if men of sound character are willing to negotiate in good faith the peace of Europe can be preserved’ [2]. This turn of phrase caused some eye-rolling in Westminster, and Paris for that matter. Again, with hindsight it is possible to see a barb hidden in the platitudes, what after all if some of the parties involved were not ‘men of sound character’?

In Rome Mussolini preened over Chamberlain’s telegram which implored him to continue in his role attempting to bring all parties together to negotiate. In practice Rome had little say in the events that unfolded over the following weeks, the final decision between peace and war was to be made in Berlin.

The Nazi leadership in Berlin was gripped by fear and frustration and frustration at this moment. The fear was amongst those desperately trying to persuade Hitler that war over the Sudetenland was ‘premature’ and their ranks included Hermann Goering himself who may not have been interested in the day to day running of the German war industries regardless of his position at the head of the Four Year Plan committee, but he was well aware that Germany was not yet ready for war. Numerous reports and memos were sent to Hitler from all quarters, fully agreeing with the Fuhrer’s ultimate aims, ‘but…’

Some senior officers were sufficiently alarmed about the prospect of a catastrophic declaration of war that they were actively plotting the overthrow of the Fuhrer. They had even tried to persuade the British to support them and some sources have them as the origin of the claims that Chamberlain’s plane had been sabotaged, launching the seemingly endless conspiracy theories covering everything from mysterious men boarding Chamberlain’s plane prior to take off to Nazi secret weapons that somehow struck the aircraft when it was over England. Regardless the plotters were dismissed in London as lacking credibility and given the way they scattered at the first sign of trouble it is hard to argue with this assessment.

The frustration in Berlin was all Hitler’s. He was being bombarded from all sides with pleas from ‘weak-willed’ subordinates who failed to understand the necessity of war sooner rather than later and then the negotiations he had reluctantly agreed to had been put on hold by the accident at Hendon. He largely greeted Chamberlain’s telegram with contempt, except the words about ‘men of sound character’ which had resonated with Hitler, if not in the way Chamberlain had intended. The Adolf Hitler of 1938 had not consolidated the cult of personality that would crush dissent in later years, and he still retained some slender grip on reality, enough that he understood that the German people were anything but enthusiastic for war. If war was to come as Hitler intended, and having been drawn into the peace talks in the first place, then the blame would have to be firmly pinned on those foreign powers determined to keep Germany from assuming its rightful place. It must be seen by everyone that it was those foreign powers that left Germany no choice but to fight. The man who craved the tempering fire of war wanted to be seen by all the world as a thwarted peacemaker. It was a futile hope but no one in Berlin was going to tell Hitler that.

Added to this concern with public opinion was the fact that despite his derision for those who argued against war Hitler was forced to accept that there were practical considerations that worked against an immediate declaration. This did not mean that he decided against war, he simply decided to hedge his bets and pursue a two-pronged approach to achieve his objectives. First, he would accept a further round of negotiations on the clear understanding that they be final and lead to a resolution ‘satisfactory to all German people’ [2]. The second decision was to demand a redoubling of efforts to make the Wehrmacht ready for a ‘swift, decisive, strike to seize the Sudetenland and destroy the unnatural entity that is Czechoslovakia once and for all’ [2] if such a resolution proved impossible to reach, which was precisely what Hitler expected to happen.

[1] It seems that Halifax was not happy about Chamberlain’s efforts at Munich, not enough to resign though and he certainly seemed to swing back the other way after Dunkirk.

[2] Invented quote.
 

Garrison

Donor
Very readable update. Still laying the foundations, but nice work.
Thanks. There will be a few more updates up to December 1938, but then only a couple in 1939 because its very similar to OTL, or it is currently always open to suggestions. :) Once we hit 1940 the updates become a lot denser, for reasons that will become obvious.
 
Intersting, if Hitler goes and does something in 38 there's probably not much France and the UK can do apart from make suitably offended noises whilst the Germans have their way with the Czechs. Neither country was ready for war or had the will for it really (politically or socially) and couldn't do much offensively. But what it does is shows Hitlers true colours at long last to the members of the leadership of France and the UK that 'that nice Mr Hitler' isn't nice at all and any form of appeasement should stop immediately. 38 is when the UK and France started re-arming seriously but here, if it starts early and is seen as a far higher priority then I think the cheque book comes out and is just signed before being passed to the War Office.
 

Garrison

Donor
Intersting, if Hitler goes and does something in 38 there's probably not much France and the UK can do apart from make suitably offended noises whilst the Germans have their way with the Czechs. Neither country was ready for war or had the will for it really (politically or socially) and couldn't do much offensively. But what it does is shows Hitlers true colours at long last to the members of the leadership of France and the UK that 'that nice Mr Hitler' isn't nice at all and any form of appeasement should stop immediately. 38 is when the UK and France started re-arming seriously but here, if it starts early and is seen as a far higher priority then I think the cheque book comes out and is just signed before being passed to the War Office.
Hitler will show his true colours before this version of the meeting in Munich takes place. It always seems odd to me that the French seem to avoid the blame for the outcome of OTL Munich. They after all were the ones with the large army not the British and if they had said 'non' to Chamberlain's concessions that would pretty much have scuppered the deal.
 
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