Munich Shuffle: 1938-1942
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19th January – 7th November 1944 - USA & Britain – Fall of the Giants
Garrison
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19th January – 7th November 1944 - USA & Britain – Fall of the Giants
There is an axiom in democratic politics that, ‘every political career ends in failure’, meaning that those who rise to the very top must inevitably fall. Those who are fortunate get to choose their moment to depart but more often they cling to power to long and face the indignity of being ousted either by their party or the electorate at large as their popularity declines or changing circumstances demand leaders with different skills. Sometimes the end comes for no better reason than the fact that voters have grown tired of the same old faces occupying the corridors of power, regardless of how well they may have served their nations. At the beginning of 1944 it was all but certain that Germany would be defeated soon, even the most cautious could not see the war in Europe lasting beyond the summer. Japan would almost linger on a little longer, assuming they didn’t suffer a certain outbreak of common sense, but their end too was inevitable, as was the fact that the prospect of the war being raised serious questions about the future of two of the most important architects of Allied victory in the west, Franklin Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill. In the case of Roosevelt, the voices calling for him to stand down and make way for a new man didn’t only come from his political opponents. Even amongst his most ardent supporters there was a strong feeling that he had given his all for the country and suffered the inevitable consequences. The US Presidency takes its toll even on the most physically vigorous of men and Roosevelt had already been confined to a wheelchair by effects of Polio when he won his first term in 1932, with the media had colluded in hiding just how seriously impaired he really was, with carefully stage-managed pictures of him standing being widely circulated in the press. No other president had served three terms, Washington himself had declined to run for more than two, and the toll on Roosevelt was obvious to those around him. If he were to run for a fourth term and win, which seemed perfectly possible though far from certain if the war had ended before election day, then that term would not begin until January of 1945 and last until 1949. the prospect of Roosevelt dying in office was not one that any of Roosevelt’s friends and political allies wanted to contemplate. ‘The job was done’ ran the argument, why should Roosevelt not stand aside and have the time to enjoy the accolades. Not everyone was motivated by such noble thoughts, naturally there were those who saw an opportunity to ascend to the White House if Roosevelt was only willing to clear the way. Whatever the motivations of those putting it forward the idea that it would be better for Roosevelt and the country if he declined to run and allowed someone else who could present a fresh face and fresh policies for peacetime to take up the mantle of Democratic nominee steadily gained ground [1].
On the Republican side there was also a sense that even if Roosevelt did run, he was far more vulnerable than he had been in 1940, especially if the war was over or nearly over by election day. This inevitably changed the calculations of who might choose to run for the party’s nomination and the question intensified when rumours began to circulate that Roosevelt would not run for a historic fourth term. Even if a fresh Democratic nominee was endorsed by Roosevelt that might carry far less weight in a post-war election and of course such a nominee would not be the beneficiary of the advantages that tended to accrue to an incumbent president running for re-election. The road to the White House might be wide open and so feelers were put out and options discussed in back rooms as potential Republican candidates sought to line up support for a run in November [2].
The rumours were confirmed by Roosevelt announcing on the 19th of January 1944 when he announced ‘he would neither seek nor accept the Democratic nomination for the office of President of the United States.’ Whether it was the pressure from inside the Democratic Party, weariness, or as was claimed in public, that the job was done and it was just the right time to go, remains open to debate as even the material left by Roosevelt himself obfuscates his reasoning. Regardless the election was suddenly wide open, with Roosevelt’s Vice-President Henry Wallace emerging as an obvious front runner, only to rapidly fade under the intense scrutiny such a position inevitably brings. The problem for Wallace was that large sections of the Democratic Party leadership had been unhappy enough with him as Vice-President, upset by his open sympathy towards the Soviet Union and suspected communist leanings, they certainly weren’t support him a run for the presidency. Claims that Wallace was a Communist or even a Soviet spy are untrue, but they reflect the distrust that had grown up around the Vice-President. Wallace fought hard to overcome this, with the support Roosevelt but the fact was that even if Roosevelt had chosen to run many senior Democrats wanted Wallace off the ticket regardless. The prospect that he might be called upon to occupy the Oval Office seemed all too likely in 1944, the party was not prepared to countenance him as their candidate. With Wallace’s fortunes waning Roosevelt had to look elsewhere for a candidate that both had his trust and could win the support of the party. He went so far as to suggest General George Marshall as a successor, though Marshall wisely declined the opportunity and remained as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Several other candidates’ names were thrown into the ring, such as Senator James Byrnes, but none seemed able to command the support of a majority in the part and each threatened to reopen old fault lines in the Democratic Party if they were selected. In the end the Democrats landed on Senator Harry S. Truman from Missouri as the party nominee. He had not been a front runner initially and it would be fair to say he was no one’s first choice, which turned out to be his strength. He emerged as a solid compromise candidate around whom the party could maintain at least the appearance of unity and Truman embraced the nomination despite his own reservations [3].
On the Republican side Roosevelt’s announcement that he would not run changed all the calculations. Some who had been reluctant to run if they had to face Roosevelt belatedly tried to throw their hats in the ring. In the end however the Republican nomination fell to the man who had been a likely candidate even if Roosevelt had run, New York Governor Thomas Dewey, who handily outpaced the other major candidates, Wendell Willkie, and former Minnesota governor Harold Stassen. In the national interest Roosevelt chose to break with tradition and chose to brief the Republican candidate on important matters relating to the conduct of the war, including US code breaking successes, much to the chagrin of Truman who felt this gave far too much weight to his opponent and suspected it might even be a form of retaliation for the treatment of his Vice-President, which did nothing to improve relations between Truman and the man he hoped to succeed. One notable aspect of the campaign was the way that both candidates went out of their way to establish their anti-communist credentials. Dewey attacked what he claimed were communist influences in the White House, clearly looking in the direction of Wallace. Truman, no fan of Wallace either, laid out his own views to the effect that the war in Europe had not been fought to liberate people from Nazi tyranny just to hand them over to a Soviet one. Neither candidate felt the need to focus on social issues, which was the very opposite of the situation in Britain [4].
Unlike Roosevelt Churchill had no intention of standing down in 1944, wanting to oversee the peace just as he had the war, and he was quite content to wait for an election until after Japan was defeated. On the other hand, Clement Attlee and the Labour party pressed for a general election to follow within weeks of the defeat of Germany and would brook no delays. There had not after all been a general election in Britain since 1935 and the electorate was entitled to have the opportunity to exercise their democratic mandate sooner rather than later, especially when there were major questions over the future direction of the country and how it would provide for those who had given so much to win the war. Labour got their way in a sign of things to come, and the date was finally set for Thursday the 10th of August 1944 [5].
Churchill remained confident of winning regardless of the timing of the election and securing a majority that would provide him with a mandate to pursue his own political agenda, even if some in the Conservative Party were less than enthusiastic about the prospect of another five years of Churchill’s sometimes erratic leadership. Churchill was convinced that his conduct of the war made his position unassailable, and it was his determination to focus his political campaigning on this that would cost him dearly for most voters were now focusing on what the country would be like after the war, regardless of the acknowledged contributions of Churchill to making that future one that was free of the threat of Germany. Some political analysts have rather crudely portrayed this as attitude as one of ‘what have you done for me lately?’, but the reality was that Churchill had never been strong on domestic issues, leaving much of the responsibility for them fall on the Labour representatives in the National Government during the war, allowing them to demonstrate both competence in power and to put forth a manifesto for change that resonated with much of the electorate, especially as Labour had embraced the recommendations of the Beveridge Report. Commissioned by the government and published in 1942 under the auspices of Sir William Beveridge the report laid out a series of proposals to tackle what he referred to as ‘the five giants’, idleness, ignorance, disease, squalor and want. It struck a chord with the public, even cutting across the class boundaries that been blurred by the wartime ideal of a nation pulling together, but it was dismissed contemptuously by Churchill, who saw it as an expression of the Socialist ideas that he had always rejected and the very firmly Socialist Labour Party had reciprocated his disdain, never forgetting his actions during his tenure as Home Secretary in the 1920s, even as they worked with him to win the war. When Labour chose to support Churchill in 1940 it was despite of his previous record in domestic politics, few had forgotten his actions during his tenure as Home Secretary, when he took somewhat heavy-handed measures to deal with strikers. After the Norway campaign Churchill had been seen as the man willing to prosecute the war to the hilt and Churchill had delivered on that, with all sides effectively declaring a political truce while the country remained in grave peril. That truce was well and truly over by the summer of 1944 and as normal politics resumed Churchill made a series of vitriolic remarks about the Labour Party that many in the Conservative Party blanched at. Comparing a party whose leaders and supporters had worked diligently to bring about victory over the Nazis to the Gestapo was ill-judged to say the least [6].
Churchill’s campaigning was no aided by his attempts to try and put a brake on the plans for India to move to Dominion status. He exasperated many senior members of the cabinet by trying to revisit what was regarded as a done deal. Trying to renegotiate it would most likely have led to Britain being unceremoniously ousted from the subcontinent after the war risking an explosion of intracommunal violence and being seen to renege on their promises would have made future negotiations with other nations all the more difficult. In terms of the election, it was an issue the voters didn’t care about, Churchill’s focus on foreign rather than domestic policy simply further alienated potential voters, even among those who might normally have been inclined to vote Conservative [7].
One effect of the potential political upheavals in the USA and Britain was that when the Potsdam conference was held at the end of July instead of it being a meeting of the ‘Big Three’ the Western presence had more of the appearance of a grand committee as both Roosevelt and Churchill were forced to bring their potential successors in to the discussion of the final disposition Europe. For the British that meant that Attlee and a delegation from the Labour Party had to be invited and things were even more complicated for the Americans. Roosevelt was bound to include some representation from Truman in his team at Potsdam, but he could hardly snub Dewey, especially as that would allow Dewey the room to attack Truman on any concessions that were seen as too generous to the Soviets, thus Roosevelt had to balance both camps in the US delegation. The Potsdam conference will be discussed in detail later but suffice to say for the moment that the disparate views in the western camp did nothing to make the discussions any easier [8].
Although the British General Election took place on the 10th The result was delayed until the 19th of August to allow for the counting of overseas votes from servicemen, but the outcome was clear well before the official result. Labour won 391 seats to the Conservatives 213 and Clement Attlee would visit Buckingham Palace to be formally invited to form a government on the 20th, with Winston Churchill departing office the same day, the British system not allowing for any drawn transition of power [9].
The presidential campaign in the USA had opened with opinion polls showing Truman with a modest lead, in no small part because he was able to ride the coat tails of Roosevelt’s popularity. Some unhelpful statements from Vice President Wallace regarding post war economic policy and the desirability of a continued friendship between the USA and USSR forced Truman to go on the defensive and distance himself from Wallace, and to some extent Roosevelt. Dewey kept punching away at his favoured talking points and the polls swayed back and forth. The voting took place on the 7th of November and as the counting took place no one was willing to predict the outcome. In the end Truman was beaten by a narrow margin, with Dewey receiving 279 electoral votes to Truman’s 252. Dewey would not take office until January 20th 1945, however his position as President elect place considerably constraints on US policy during the closing months of Roosevelt’s term in office [10].
[1] The political calculus that led Roosevelt to stand for a fourth term is very different here, the war is won, its just a matter of finishing off the Axis.
[2] And for the Republicans suddenly there seems to a be real opportunity, with the argument in favour of continuity being drastically weakened.
[3] So they settle on Truman, for much the same reasons they picked him as VP in OTL.
[4] The relatively friendly relations between the USA and the USSR at the height of the war are on their way out.
[5] The war may have gone better than OTL, but there is still an appetite for change that Churchill isn’t in tune with.
[6] That is as per OTL, Churchill really did compare Labour to the Gestapo.
[7] Churchill’s desire to backpedal on India creates dissent in the Conservative ranks that makes his campaigning just that bit worse than OTL.
[8] There will be a full update on Potsdam later.
[9] The slight difference in the result is basically a matter of timing and some minor butterflies around some marginal seats, I do not have a detailed breakdown.
[10] If anyone can come up with a decent electoral map for the US election, please feel free to do so.
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Also how to add images correctly.
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marathag
Banned
Thing was, FDR liked Henry Wallace, and would have really worked behind the scenes on that, where he didn't so much for him continue as VP.
This would be because OTL he didn't think he would die in office, and would complete his 4th term, even if others around him didn't believe it.
He did.
Here in the ATL, he would want Henry to continue his work in DC, as they saw more eye to eye that he did with Harry, whom he really sidelined right up to where he died OTL.
I don't see a living FDR wanting a nobody Machine Politician like Truman to follow him.
This would be because OTL he didn't think he would die in office, and would complete his 4th term, even if others around him didn't believe it.
He did.
Here in the ATL, he would want Henry to continue his work in DC, as they saw more eye to eye that he did with Harry, whom he really sidelined right up to where he died OTL.
I don't see a living FDR wanting a nobody Machine Politician like Truman to follow him.
I pretty much agree with you but don't know enough about US politics of that time in history having focused more on the military aspects of the time but I think having Dewey defeat Truman this time around was an interesting touch.
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Dewey was a liberal with a good civil rights record so lets see what he cooks for African Americans
Lycaon pictus
Donor
I haven't got a map, but I looked over the state-by-state '44 election IOTL. Assuming Truman won his home state of Missouri, Dewey would need to win Michigan, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Idaho, Illinois, New Hampshire, New York (Truman distancing himself from Roosevelt was not a good plan), Massachusetts, and either Nevada or Delaware to win 180 more electoral votes than IOTL.
Well the 270towin 1944 election map doesn't have a clear way to share so here are the changes to get that balance in the electoral college. Flip six out of the seven lowest percent wins for Roosevelt OTL over to Dewey which are Michigan, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Idaho, and Oregon. Missouri was in the middle there but assume Truman holds his home state. You did not mention who was Dewey's VP choice. In 44 he eventually went with John Bricker of Ohio, but his choice in 1948, Earl Warren was his original preference. Without Roosevelt running, maybe he feels confident enough to go with his gut and the Dewey-Warren ticket takes their home states of California and New York for a total of 279 electoral votes. It's a pretty big swing for California compared to OTL 44 but OTL 48 was razor close I can see it.
Anyway, finaly glad to see Dewey come out on top.
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I think they have a good shot at that. The British are in a much stronger fiscal position thanks to the Battle of the Atlantic taking a much reduced toll and the Battle of Britain being a much shorter affair, mean less recontruction needed. If they can get the food supply situation sorted to avoid bringing back rationing, Labour can keep a healty majority in the next election even if they fall from their high water mark of 391 seats. Plus events in Egypt might have made an alt Suez crisis much less likely and the British took such a body blow from the fallout including retaliation from the Eisenhower administration. I know the notion 'Special Relationship' is more a wink and nudge joke ITTL but avoiding that prevents like a decade of bad blood and havoc for British finances.
And India looks to be going independent differently here.
Apartheid too may be different from otl - with an earlier end to the war, there’s a fair chance that Jan Hofmeyr might not suffer the health collapse he did as a result of taking on half a dozen portfolios while filling in for Smuts while he was overseas during the war. If he’s able to take part in the 1948 election, that could really shake things up.
Yes, I tend to agree with what you say here
It’s funny really, because in OTL whoever won in 1945 was essentially confirming their defeat within the next one or two elections because the start conditions were so poor
On the one hand Labour only won the 45 election, not the one after.
On the other hand, in that single parliament they did a lot.
On the other hand, in that single parliament they did a lot.
They did win the 1950 election but it was like a five seat majority so they called a snap election the next year that they lost.