29 May 1941. Ras El Ali, Libya.
Major-General Gambier-Parry (GOC 22nd Armoured Division) and Major-General Leslie Morshead (GOC 9th Australian Division) conferred over the current positions of their two Divisions. Two of Morshead’s Brigades had taken over the defensive positions, allowing 16th Brigade and the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade, with 22nd Armoured Brigade, to go back to El Agheila to regroup and refit.
16th Brigade (1st Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders, 2nd Bn Leicestershire Regiment, 2nd Bn Queens Royal Regiment) were being joined by 22nd (Guards) Brigade (2nd Bn Scots Guards, 3 Bn Coldstream Guards, 1st Bn Durham Light Infantry) and 23rd Brigade (2nd Bn York and Lancaster Regiment; 2nd Kings Own Royal Regiment and 1st Battalion the Buffs) to form 6th Infantry Division under the command of Major-General John Evetts. That would leave 22nd Armoured Division as a mixed Division with just one armoured Brigade and one Motor Brigade.
Major-General Gambier-Parry was conscious that not only was his Division much smaller than normal, but also his regiments had all taken casualties in men and machines. Drafts of Indian troops had arrived to bring the Motor Brigade up to strength, but the perpetual shortage of vehicles cut down their mobility. There were however, no replacements for the lost Valiant I* tanks, and none were on the horizon.
Along with the Australian Brigades, all three tank Battalions of 7th Tank Brigade (40th, 44th and 48th Bn RTR) in Valiant I Infantry Tanks had replaced the Valiant I* of 22nd Armoured Brigade at the front. For the most part the British and Australian positions had been left unchallenged since the Germans and Italians had withdrawn back to their main position at Sirte, with a large force protecting Nofilia. Occasional violent encounters between each side’s reconnaissance forces, and regular interference from the Luftwaffe were the main concerns.
Efforts by 22nd Armoured Brigade’s Light Aid Detachment to recover some of the knocked-out Valiant I* tanks after the failed effort to take Nofilia had been partially successful. Transporting the recovered tanks all the way back to Bardia, and in the worst cases to the Delta workshops, took a lot of effort by precious tank transporters. Forward RAOC and RASC workshops had been set up at Agedabia where simple fixes could be done to keep the tanks and lorries in the area running. It was believed that about fifteen Valiant I* tanks would be returned to the Brigade, but only five in time for Operation Battleaxe. Major-General Gambier-Parry had approached General O’Conner asking that the three tank battalions could supply some tanks and crews to make up the shortfall. While using two different versions of the Valiant would be complicated for resupply, especially in fuel, having the right number of tanks would be preferable. At this point in the planning, 7th Tank Brigade were not part of the plans for Operation Battleaxe.
When considering this request, and talking it through with his staff, then checking with General Wavell, O’Connor decided to change his plan. As 7th Armoured Division were all in Valiant I tanks, as were 7th Tank Brigade, using the same type would seem to simplify matters. Originally, he was going to send 22nd Armoured Division and 4th Indian Division on the inland route, while 7th Armoured and 6th Infantry Division took the coast road. With 22nd Armoured Division being short in both of its Brigades, then it would be better for two full divisions, 7th Armoured Division, supported by 4th Indian Division, to take the inland route. 6th Infantry Division, with 7th Tank Brigade in support, would take the coast road, leaving 22nd Armoured Division as a mobile reserve, capable of exploiting a break in the Italian or German positions.
Since 7th Armoured Division and 4th Indian Division already were familiar with each other, this change was warmly received by those two Divisions. Likewise, Major-General John Evetts was happy to have one tank battalion attached to each of his three Brigades. The coastal approach was meant to have the role of keeping the Axis forces concentrated on this threat, allowing the inland approach to flank those forces. Having two more Brigades, one Armoured and the other motorised, even if they were weaker than they should be, behind him was an excellent back-up, and gave a better chance of exploiting a breakthrough.
In addition to the Valiant I* tanks recovered from the battlefield, a few Panzer III and one Panzer IV which had been knocked out but not completely destroyed, were also collected. These had been transported back to Bardia for examination. These were the only German tanks found, and they were close to the British defences. The lack of other German tanks suggested that these must have been towed away during the withdrawal. It was also noted that some Valiant I* couldn’t be found, presumably now in the hands of the Germans for examination.
The difference between the Panzer IIIs encountered in Libya, compared with that taken back from Dunkirk were primarily that the H model in North Africa, rather than the F model captured in Belgium. The two main differences were that the H model had a new 50mm gun, (the German designation was 5 cm KwK 38 L/42) and had extra armoured plates bolted on, taking its protection from 30mm to 60mm. Similarly, the Panzer IV, although the same model as that captured at Dunkirk, had extra applique armour welded onto the hull and turret. The fact that the armour was found to face hardened confirmed the experience of gunners whose 2-pdr shells seemed to shatter rather than penetrate. Requests for increasing the numbers of Armour Piercing Capped shells available were passed on. The testing of the new 50mm gun on the Panzer III noted that the German shells, PzGr39 also were fitted with a Ballistic Cap for better aerodynamics, something which was probably worth copying.
The penetration of the 5 cm KwK 38 L/42 was obviously better than the older 37mm gun, but the Valiant I’s 3-inches of armour was still pretty safe from penetration, especially from the front, except at almost point-blank range. The Valiant I* was a bit more vulnerable but only from less than 500 yards. One of the Panzer IIIs was found to have shell which hadn’t been seen before. From the intelligence collected from papers found among the German vehicles it was called 5 cm Pzgr Patr 40. This looked as it might be dangerous even to the Valiant frontal armour out to 500 yards, if it worked as the paperwork said it would. The only consolation was that this type of ammunition seemed rare, and the experts thought it to be experimental. Eventually this shell was flown back to Britain to be examined more intensely.