Sir John Valentine Carden survives.

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I forget... are the Germans still getting the invaluable intelligence from the US Embassy they had in OTL? If Rommel isn't getting this he's a lot more likely to end up with his hand in the meat grinder
The US Black Code wasn't stolen from the US Embassy in Rome until September 1941, with the German cryptanalysts being able to break it after that. Rommel's in the dark therefore.
 
The US Black Code wasn't stolen from the US Embassy in Rome until September 1941, with the German cryptanalysts being able to break it after that. Rommel's in the dark therefore.
Yes at this point in 1941 it was mostly poor opsec on the British part and the excellent Oberleutnant Seebaum and his forward intercept company that was able to glean a great deal of operational data.

Of course that ended when he was killed and his unit over run during the period after Gazala coupled with vastly improved Opsec (which was given a kick up the arse when the British realised how much information the unit was gleaning and how - this helped them quickly paper over any cracks)

Although I would add that the Germans never broke the British Army's encryption (when they used it properly) despite capturing several Typex Cypher machines in 1940 (in all cases the wheels had been removed).

The problem is that large parts of the British army was still 'learning' and so despite the excellent encryption that they enjoyed - lower level opsec (Division and brigade etc) was still quite poor.

There is an eye opening account of the Germans listening in to a radio conversation between 2 Brigade commanders at Gazala who had a chat 'in the clear' regarding their inability to cover the minefield between their 'boxes' concluding that as there was nothing they could do except to just hope the Germans would not attack there.

Guess what?
 
The British hope to drive the Germans/Italians, out of their present positions, and then drive on to Tripoli, effectively ending the campaign in North Africa.

Reading the updates, I am under the impression that the objective of Operation Battleaxe is Sirte and not Tripoli. While Tripoli is the final objective of course, the current offensive is limited in scope.

Allowing for the relief of Malta, and the eventual opening up of the Mediterranean for the trough passage of shipping again.
It would extremely difficult to have regular shipping through the Sicilian Straits without controlling both shores. It didn't happen in OTL and for a good reason, not for a taste for lead paint.

For all intents and purposes, the strategic situation in Malta is better than OTL October 1942 when the siege ended. Hurricanes can be ferried directly from Cyrenaica without any need for Club Runs. The air defences of Malta can be developed much sooner and easier - although I doubt the RAF brass will send Spitfires during 1941. Likewise, convoys from Egypt have a much easier time reaching Malta compared to OTL. Between Cyrenaica and Crete there will be enough airpower and space for convoys to reach Malta, especially if the Fliegerkorps X is focused on sieging Crete. Convoys will be protected by air assets during the best part of their route.

I think that TTL strategic conditions allow for a positive self-enhancing loop over the tonnage and material reaching Malta.

The US Black Code wasn't stolen from the US Embassy in Rome until September 1941, with the German cryptanalysts being able to break it after that. Rommel's in the dark therefore.
This is an opportune moment then!

If it is stolen as in OTL, by September the air-sea battle over the Central Mediterranean interdicting the Axis supply and the Commonwealth built-up in Libya, would have made the Black Code of much more limited value compared to OTL.
 
1 June 1941. Bovington, England.
1 June 1941. Bovington, England.

Lieutenant-General Giffard Martel, GOC Royal Armoured Corps, watched keenly as the brand new A15 tanks were put through their paces. Just delivered from Nuffield’s factory, Martel couldn’t help but compare them to the Russian BT-2 tanks he had seen in 1936. The Soviet tanks were fast, agile, had limited armour, but carried a decent 45mm gun for the time. As a cavalry tank they had been a revelation, and the desire to adopt the Christie Suspension for British cruisers tanks had been Martel’s obsession.

Where the BT-5’s engine provided about 35hp/tonne, giving a top speed of 44mph, the A15’s redesigned Liberty proved only 17hp/tonne. The engine was less powerful than the Soviet engine, and the tank almost twice as heavy. Consequently, the A15’s top speed was 26mph on the road, and 15mph off road. To make matters worse, confirmation from Libya that the Germans had put a more powerful gun into the Panzer III, made the less than two inches of armour on the A15 marginal at best.

In most things the A15 had advantages over the Panzer III. The German tank was a bit heavier and its engine about 40hp less powerful than the A15, so its on and off-road speed was slightly slower, and its fuel capacity was lower giving the A15 better operational range. Crucially, the Panzer III had been up-gunned, while the A15’s 2-pdr was said to be struggling against the 60mm armour on the panzer. Nuffield’s design had a 55.5-inch turret ring, which made put a bigger gun, like the new 6-pdr, into the tank very difficult. The Panzer III’s turret ring was only just over 4 inches wider, but that made a lot of difference.

The process of getting the A15 from design to production, without proper prototypes, had allowed the tank to be manufactured in a relatively short space of time. The downside to this was that the problems that had been identified once the tank was completed had slowed production because of all the changes that had needed to be made. Some of those changes were probably never going to be completely ironed out, it would take a Mark II, or even a whole new design, to satisfy the need for reliability.

The first units which had been issued with the new Cruiser A15, 28th Armoured Brigade of 9th Armoured Division had been the guinea pigs that had had to figure out how to make the best of the tanks they had received. Each Armoured Regiment (5th Dragoon Guards, 15/19th Hussars, 1st Fife and Forfar Yeomanry) needed 46 A15s along with another 6 Close Support versions, and a further ten needed by the Brigade HQ, 166 tanks in all. Having received the first tanks in February, by the end of May they had 120 tanks in total, but had been promised that the shortfall would be made up in June as production picked up. As the tanks had been delivered the numbers of 2-pdr guns hadn’t been keeping up with the tanks, leading to the situation where a significant percentage of tanks were unarmed. This was being dealt with, but it meant that the Brigade was still some way off full operational readiness. The situation with 27th Armoured Brigade (4/7th Dragoon Guards, 13/18 Hussars, 1st East Riding Yeomanry) was even worse, each regiment only have about ten tanks each to train on.

This was all in contrast with 6th Armoured Division’s two Armoured Brigades (20th and 26th) which were now fully equipped with Valiant I* Cruiser Mark III tanks. Martel was still convinced that the Christie suspension on the A13 and A15 was a good choice, and with the right engine, could provide the mobility and protection a good Cruiser tank needed. Martel, despite his long-term friendship with Sir John Carden, still wasn’t happy with the Cruiser version of the Valiant. It was a compromise design, and as with most things, the compromise meant that it was neither quite one thing nor another. Too heavy and slow to really be a Cruiser Tank, but not quite with the protection of an Infantry Tank.

Martel had been disappointed when he had been informed that it had been decided to equip 7th Armoured Division in Libya with Valiant I Infantry Tanks. Second Armoured Division’s 22nd Armoured Brigade had done well in Libya with the Valiant I*, but so had 1st Armoured Brigade with A13MkII Cruisers in Greece. To Martel’s way of thinking, an Armoured Division’s role was still more to do with exploitation than fighting a defensive battle or going toe to toe with prepared enemy positions. Equipping an Armoured Division with Infantry Tanks was a betrayal of normal tactics.

What was clear from the reports of those who took part in the various tank actions since 1940 was that the Vickers tanks were more favoured, even the old A9 and A10s had done well against the Italians and in Iraq. As one of the A15s passed Martel couldn’t help but reflect that the fundamental problem with Nuffield wasn’t build quality, though that left something to be desired, but they just hadn’t been involved in tank design before. The still-born LMS A13 Mark III (Covenanter) was evidence that outside of Vickers, tank design was problematic. Which put Martel in a position where he was going to have back Carden’s Victor proposal as the way forward. The proposals for a follow-on to the A22 Infantry Tank and the A15 Cruiser Tank would likely the poor relations of the Vickers Victor. The idea of a ‘Medium Tank’ to sit somewhere between a Cruiser and an Infantry Tank was roughly where the Americans were going with the M3 Medium, the first of which was expected to be ready in July.

The Victor, with its new engine and transmission, was likely to need some time to mature, but other than North Africa, there wasn’t currently anywhere else it might be needed. Eventually the British army would be back on Continental Europe, and it would certainly be needed then. Though how the British and their Empire’s forces would be able to take on the sheer size of the German army was open to question.

Meanwhile Martel was entrusted with the job of expanding the Royal Armoured Corps from two to possibly as many as fourteen Divisions. The A15, preferably armed, would be one of the mainstays of that expansion. Once the 8th and 9th Divisions were fully equipped to join 1st and 6th in the Home Forces, along with 2nd, 7th, 10th and the odd 22nd Armoured Divisions in the Middle East, Britain would be fielding seven-and-a-half armoured Divisions. There was advanced talk in the War Office of creating an 11th Armoured Division, reconstituting 42nd Infantry Division into an Armoured Division, and also of creating a Guards Armoured Division.

Martel had seen the new estimates for a 55 Division Army which was supposedly going to be complete by 30 November 1941. In August 1940 the estimates had been that there would be a need for 6023 Cruiser and 4421 Infantry tanks, 10444 total. At the end of May that estimate had been increased to 13176 and 4325 respectively, 17501 tanks in all by the end of the year! By the end of 1942, the figure estimated was 19700. The Ministry of Supply had estimated that the total British output of tanks in 1941 was likely to be around 5300, rising to about 9400 in 1942. Obviously, even with Canadian production being added, the shortfall would have to be made up mostly by importing American tanks. The M3 Light Tank and the M3 Medium tanks on order weren’t all that great, though progress of the M4 Medium with a 75mm gun in a turret was looking promising.

One of the A15s, this one with a gun, passed and the tank commander must have seen Martel’s red tabs, and threw him a salute, which Martel immediately returned. The men riding these tanks to battle deserved the best the country could offer to protect it. The A15 wasn’t the best, but it would need to do, at least in the meantime.
 
At this point, one gets the impression that an ever-increasing number of top officers are absolutely going to dismiss anything from Nuffield with a Liberty in it as an outdated piece of crap the next time any new designs are presented.
 
And the problem with this is...? :p
For the soldiers and officers? None whatsoever. For the War Department? That's where it gets interesting. I can see Nuffield being told "stuff your tanks and Liberty engine, just build Valiants/Victors, as whatever you're making is a waste of steel and time." I suppose we'll see in the fullness of time.
 
At this point, one gets the impression that an ever-increasing number of top officers are absolutely going to dismiss anything from Nuffield with a Liberty in it as an outdated piece of crap the next time any new designs are presented.
Can the Army insist Nuffield uses a better engine at least? And tighten up quality control.

Or even take the factory and design team from him. Like the Castle Bromwich (?) Spitfire line.
 
A15 with a decent engine would be a useful light/cruiser tank. How many you actually need is a different question but it would provide a chassis for the funnies
 
At this point, one gets the impression that an ever-increasing number of top officers are absolutely going to dismiss anything from Nuffield with a Liberty in it as an outdated piece of crap the next time any new designs are presented.
There is a catch here. The A15 Crusader, as I mentioned is about equivalent to the Panzer III at this point, except for the gun. The problems associated with its unreliability, especially in North Africa, were due to a few issues that could have been easily avoided (eg the way they were shipped) and some that were just bad design flaws. The Liberty Mk 3 in the A15 had to be redesigned to fit, that messed up the cooling system, which was made worse by the positioning of the air cleaners. If the changes mentioned on 15 May 1941 are made, then the A15 isn't as unreliable, but still suffers the 2-pdr gun. Generally in mid-41 to mid-42 it isn't a terrible tank, that was the Covenanter, of happy memory.
Nuffield's follow on to the A15 is the A24, which eventually arrives as the Cavalier because they won't take the Meteor engine! So yes, 'outdated piece of crap' is pretty much true in this case!
 

Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
Oh dear, the British fixation with Christie Suspension continues, while it was in theory a brilliant system, offering many advantages over the others available at the time. It did however in practice, have a number of disadvantages, and post WWII, not used again, as the other systems all turned out to be better. As for Lord Nuffield, he was a man who was well passed both his best before date, and his don’t use after date. He suffered from numerous problems, among which were an overinflated sense of his own importance and abilities, and the fact that he was mean. He was notorious for constantly enquiring whether any money had been spent on modernisation in his companies, to which he objected. And in relation to this time line, his determination to get the value out of the Liberty V12 engines, which he had brought the production rights to. The fact that the engine was a very out of date design, and in comparison to the needs of the British tank arm, seriously underpowered. Britain though she doesn’t know it, is going to need a lighter more powerful engine, much more powerful, soon. No one could have predicted in 1939, that by 1944, Britain would be fitting a 650 plus hose power engine in its tanks. And even that would be in some was short of what was needed. So I for one am in complete agreement with those who suggest that tank production should be removed from under Nuffield’s supervision, and the factory, as was Castle Bromwich, taken under government control, the management was handed over to Vickers Armstrong. Maybe getting Ford UK, to take over the management of the tank factory would be a good idea.

RR.
 
So while I agree with everything everyone has said against both Nuffield and the A15 I have a slightly different take.

As things stand Britain has a 2 tiers of tanks in active production. Tier 1 is the Valiant sisters, both infantry and cruiser are the premier tanks of their class and arguably in the world right now. Tier 2 however contains the A12 Matilda II and A15 Cruiser tank, both front line tanks in OTL but now relegated to second line status.

Now while the tier 2 tanks are good for both training and garrisoning places they are lacking in combat effectiveness, in Europe. In the far East however the tier 2 tanks will be very competitive compared to what the Japanese have, particularly the A12.

As reinforcements are sent East during the year I would expect the armoured forces to be sent with A12's and A15's. That will give the tanks a chance to prove their worth in combat. So yes they aren't the best tanks available, particularly the A15, they are both competent and have a role to play.
 
Can’t help but think that the world would have been a better place if something forced William Morris (as he was born) to retire from his career as an industrialist in the mid 1930s. It would be great if he carried on his philanthropic work, but just think of the amount of lives saved by having more spitfires earlier and better tanks for the British Army.
 

marathag

Banned
and post WWII, not used again,
Merkava 1 and 2 used a variant, with the springs not protected by armor,
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as did the US with the T67 GMC Hellcat prototype before the change to torsion bars and radial engine.

Another variant of the single swing arm, hydro-gas, has replaced torsion bars in a number of AFVs since the '70s
1635000208544.png
 
There is a catch here. The A15 Crusader, as I mentioned is about equivalent to the Panzer III at this point, except for the gun. The problems associated with its unreliability, especially in North Africa, were due to a few issues that could have been easily avoided (eg the way they were shipped) and some that were just bad design flaws. The Liberty Mk 3 in the A15 had to be redesigned to fit, that messed up the cooling system, which was made worse by the positioning of the air cleaners. If the changes mentioned on 15 May 1941 are made, then the A15 isn't as unreliable, but still suffers the 2-pdr gun. Generally in mid-41 to mid-42 it isn't a terrible tank, that was the Covenanter, of happy memory.
Nuffield's follow on to the A15 is the A24, which eventually arrives as the Cavalier because they won't take the Meteor engine! So yes, 'outdated piece of crap' is pretty much true in this case!

Due to its importance and the resources being directed towards its mass production, is there any chanve a regiment of A15's can be given to Percy Hobart to "sort out"? He would be ideal to methodically assess what is worthwhile doing in terms of post-production tweaks for machines having already come off assembly lines, as well as looking ahead towards mocking up what a Mark II should look like (new engine?). Buy both in terms of improving mechanical reliability and working out "2 pounder alternatives" he may quite enjoy the challenge.....and as importantly someone in the UK needs to be assigned the tasks as it's critically important to their war effort.
 
The A15 isn't a terrible tank - its as good as the better Italian tanks in the desert - but its main problem is lack of capability to be upgraded.
The engine wont allow the weight of applique armour to be added, and the turret ring wont take the 6pdr.
Its best use is probably as a chassis for SP Artillery and all the odds and sods the Armoured Divisions would like armoured - OP tanks, engineering tanks, AA tanks, all those sorts of vehicles, while quietly not expanding the production line and instead concentrating on a better vehicle. It would also possibly be useful in the Far East. Its a match for Japanese tanks, although overheating might still be an issue.

Martel's problem isn't so much his fixation on exploitation - a perfectly sensible use of tanks - but his fixation on absolute tank speed. What's needed is a tank which can move reliably at a useful speed - which WW2 showed was a maximum of 25-30mph. Which means you don't need the Christie suspension.
 
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