Munich Shuffle: 1938-1942

[Garrison]

November 15th 1940 – January 1st 1941 – Germany – Challenges for the Wehrmacht – Part I – The Heer​

British intransigence after the fall of France and their outright rejection, and even ridicule, of Hitler’s ill-conceived peace proposals had left him angry and looking for someone to blame. If this weren’t enough of a problem for the General Staff, the fact that ‘his’ plan had succeeded where that endorsed by the Staff had failed simply inflamed matters further as they tried to restrain Hitler’s expectations about an amphibious assault in the spring. In the end it was only Hitler’s decision that the solution to all Germany’s strategic woes lay in the East and his loss of interest in a Cross Channel invasion that prevented von Kleist going the same way as Halder. This change in focus on Hitler’s part didn’t change the fact that Baccarat had been an enormous gamble and had required more than a little luck to succeed, but that it had nonetheless succeeded. Many, were describing Hitler as the Greatest Military Leader of All Time, Groesster Feldheer Aller Zeiten in German, colloquially shortened to Groefaz. For most this was simply a matter of ingratiating themselves with the Fuhrer, some appear to have genuinely bought into the idea that Hitler was indeed the Groefaz. This is often regarded as the moment when the professionalism of the Heer went into terminal decline and all the disasters that befell Germany in the war after this point could be laid at the feet of Hitler’s insane orders and the emasculation of the General Staff.

Hitler’s grip on reality had begun to deteriorate notably by the beginning of 1941, fuelled by a combination of megalomania and genuine, but often overstated, issues with his physical condition and drug consumption. The issue here lies not with the notion that Hitler was an increasingly delusional megalomaniac, instead it is with the idea that the Heer had ever been some apolitical professional body steadily undermined by Hitler as the war went on. Much of the history of the Heer after the Nazi’s came to power consisted of various Generals jockeying for power by attempting to win Hitler’s favour. Manstein’s plan for the Ardennes was certainly innovative, while at the same time bound up in his desire for advancement, and at the same time a certain amount of Halder’s resistance to Manstein’s proposal was based on the desire to put Manstein in his place and protect Halder’s own position, genuine strategic concerns notwithstanding. The politicking in the upper echelons of the Heer certainly got far worse after 1940, that though was simply the inevitable progression of an existing trend rather than some dramatic new development [1].

One area where Hitler was especially determined to whip the General Staff into line was improving the performance of German tanks. The General staff was in receipt of a deluge of complaints from field officers many of which, in typical Heer fashion, had also been relayed directly to the Fuhrer himself without bothering with such niceties as the chain of command. The overall thrust of the complaints was that the firepower of the existing models was inadequate. One misunderstanding that helped shape this narrative was that the Germans had come to the erroneous conclusion that the Valentine was a cruiser tank, which made the difficulties the 37mm anti-tank guns had in penetrating it seem even worse as cruiser tanks were supposed to be more lightly armoured overall than infantry tanks. Much of the reason for this misunderstanding was that the general layout of the Valentine was similar to that of some Cruiser tanks and indeed the British had pressed the Valentine into the Cruiser role on many occasions. Testing of captured examples should have corrected the false impression, the facts however lost out to myth as the original complaints provided a convenient excuse for the Panzer Divisions to press for more powerful vehicles [2].

Upgrading the Panzer III was not a serious issue, it had been allowed for in the original design to ensure the Panzer III remained the primary armoured fighting vehicle of the Panzer Divisions for years to come. Additional armour could be added to existing models by bolting it on to serving vehicles and increasing the thickness of the plates used on the production line. The gun issue could be most readily solved by fitting the 5 cm KwK 38 L/42 gun which would be more than adequate to the task of dealing with any enemy tank the Panzer III would have to face in the foreseeable future. This at least was the opinion of the General Staff. Hitler was hardly a technical expert, he simply believed that bigger was better and was not content with the L/42 gun and demanded The Panzer III be fitted with the most powerful gun possible, suggesting the 88mm Flak would be the ideal solution. Given the limitations of the Panzer III turret a larger calibre gun couldn’t be fitted so the only option was to go for the longer barrelled 5 cm KwK 39 L/60, much to Hitler’s intense disappointment. It would take time to produce this latter gun in large enough numbers, but the plan that was settled on saw the L/42 retrofitted to existing tanks while the L/60 would be introduced on the production lines as it became available. At this point it seemed the matter had been settled, however unhappy the Fuhrer was, and it might have been if Guderian hadn’t been given the opportunity to express his opinions on the future of tanks in the Heer directly to Hitler. Guderian was not only a hero of the race for the coast but also the author of Achtung Panzer, the blueprint for German tank operations. His opinions thus carried weight and he was the sort of man Hitler was eager to listen to, if only because Guderian was happy to reinforce his opinion about how ‘fossilized’ the General Staff had become.

It should be borne in mind is at this time the Panzer IV was not regarded by the Heer as a tank. It was classed as an assault gun, designed to support advancing infantry, paralleling the function of the British infantry tanks. The job of fighting enemy tanks was intended to solely be the responsibility of the Panzer III. In practice the two vehicles that came out of the design process bore so many similarities that it would seem obvious to ask why even bother two different designs with the inevitable separate production lines and a multitude of parts that were unique to each, complicating the Heer’s logistics [3]? This question lay at the heart of Guderian ideas. The assault gun role would be better suited to a turretless vehicle with the gun mounted in the hull. This would be simpler and cheaper to build, important points given the strain German war industries were already under. This assault gun could be fitted with a short-barrelled howitzer, though a long barrel gun would be better as this would allow the assault gun the ability to counter tanks if they attacked the infantry the assault guns were protecting, or indeed to engage in the tank destroyer role during defensive operations. Likewise, Panzers intended for tank combat should be equipped with a long 75mm gun by default, giving it superior armour penetration and the ability to knock out any strong points that might block their advance. Hitler seized on these ideas with enthusiasm, the General Staff was exasperated and irritated.

Guderian’s ideas about the utility of assault guns in the infantry support role was not simply a matter of theory. The Sturmgeschütz (StuG) III had seen service in France, where it seems to have impressed Guderian. The lack of enthusiasm on the part of the General staff was based on two issues, besides resenting being bypassed yet again by a subordinate. The first was that the StuG III was based on the Panzer III, so producing more StuG III would come at the expense of the tank the Heer still saw as its main combat tank and more were urgently needed to replace the likes of the Panzer II and Panzer 38(t), indeed the General Staff suggested that the latter two would be a preferable alternative as a basis for future assault guns. The other objection tended to play into the narrative of the General Staff as hidebound as they were insistent that the ideal infantry support vehicle needed a turret, even though combat experience suggested the performance differential was marginal and hardly justified the additional cost and complexity imposed by having a turreted design. Even if the objections of the General Staff had been sound, they were futile. Hitler had endorsed Guderian’s vision and that was that, the StuG III would be prioritized.

In a distinctly pyrrhic victory the General Staff’s idea about producing an assault gun based on the Panzer 38(t) would be pursued and would see service as the Jagdpanzer 38, colloquially knowns as the Hetzer. The Herzer’s development would be rather stop-start as the Heer’s priorities changed multiple times and it did not see service until the beginning of 1943. When it did enter service, it proved its worth in the defensive battles the Heer was forced to fight as the tide of war turned against them.

Hitler was equally adamant about the creation of a version of the Panzer IV with the long barrelled 75mm gun, this being the only current turreted vehicle that could mount it. More than that Hitler insisted that by spring at least one in four of every Panzer IV produced was to be so equipped, rising to one third by the summer, then increasing until all Panzer IVs were brought up to this standard. The Staff were horrified but any protests were muted and never uttered where Hitler might hear them. The timetable Hitler laid out was absurd and simply could not be met without utterly disrupting other critical arms production. This provoked much displeasure from Hitler, though strangely Hermann Goering served as any ally of the Heer in this matter, afraid that any diversion of resources to make this timetable work and maintain other Heer production would come at the expense of the Luftwaffe. Overall upgrading the firepower of the firepower of the existing Panzers was sensible, it was not though some act of foresight on Hitler’s part, simply an expression of his desire for Germany to be superior to its enemies in every way and he wasn’t finished yet with his demands [4].

Hitler was not content with shaping the current generation of tanks, he was determined to stamp his imprint on the next generation and his thoughts on the matter ran in parallel to those that had shaped the plans for the A22 and A24 tanks in Britain, indeed his demands vindicated the opinions voiced by Churchill and others that had led to the genesis of the A24 in the first place. This convergence of ideas was the result of both sides being faced with the same battlefield experience and, in an all too rare occurrence, drawing the same correct conclusions. As far as Hitler was concerned the evidence from France showed that the sloped turret armour deployed by the latest British models was highly effective and an area where the British had been allowed to steal a march on Germany, this was not to be tolerated and he flatly insisted that any new model of tank, be it medium or heavy, must be built with sloped armour on the turret. The latest tank in question had to be the Covenanter based on the descriptions offered in the surviving German records of the period. For a tank that was frankly something of a mechanical disaster the Covenanter seemed possessed of some strange ‘charisma’ that attracted attention from friend and foe alike and gave it a surprising legacy, influencing what became the Panzer VI Tiger as well as the A24 Churchill. As one post-war historian put it, ‘a terrible tank with a tremendous legacy’ [5].

If the General Staff was unhappy about Hitler’s interference in their armament programs as well as matters of stratgy, the largesse he insisted on lavishing on the Panzers was regarded with envy by many in the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine.

[1] So no I don’t adhere to any notion that the Heer was some sort of ultra-modern army full of tactical geniuses only held back by ‘crazy Hitler’.

[2] The Germans ran into a lot more British and French tanks than they did OTL, and the British had a lot more vehicles that could bounce the Panzer III’s 37mm while putting a 2pdr round straight through them in return. The Panzer Generals are not taking this lying down.

[3] Not actually a rhetorical question, especially given the way the Panzer III and IV more or less swapped rolls later in the war with the Panzer III Ausf N being fitted with a short barrelled 75mm HE gun and all models of the Panzer IV after the Ausf F2 carrying the long barrelled 75mm anti-tank weapon in OTL.

[4] Yes, the Heer will be getting the Panzer IV Ausf F2 sooner, no it won’t help much in the USSR in 1941. A seized up 75mm gun operated by a frostbitten gunner is no more effective than a seized up 37mm gun with a frostbitten gunner.

[5] Obviously in OTL no one has ever had a kind word to say about the Covenanter, so ITTL it’s become sort of a challenge to rehabilitate it in the same way I somewhat did with Chamberlain. As to what the alt-Tiger looked like, that will be illustrated shortly.

 

[Garrison]

November 15th 1940 – January 1st 1941 – Germany – Challenges for the Wehrmacht – Part II – The Luftwaffe​

If the Panzer General’s had rather exaggerated the problems they had encountered in 1940 in the interests of getting higher priority and additional resources, Hermann Goering was remarkably complacent about the far more serious issues encountered by the Luftwaffe. He was not alone in this, certainly others were aware of the issues, but they also knew that new types were being developed that would address these issues. As the year came to a close it would become clear that the issues were not going to be resolved anytime soon and indeed were likely to grow worse rather than better.

What led to this situation was the unpleasant fact that some of the new models the Luftwaffe were pinning their hopes on were bedevilled with serious, even potentially fatal, issues. The He 177 ‘Greif’ was a four-engine bomber intended for the strategic role, filing a gap in the Luftwaffe’s arsenal that had become all too apparent during the bombing campaign against Britain. Rather than having four engines in separate nacelles like the British Lancaster or the American B-17 designs the Germans had adopted a more sophisticated approach, or more accurately a needlessly complicated one. To reduce the drag created by aircraft propellers the design mounted two DB 601 engines in a single nacelle driving contra-rotating propellers. Whatever advantages this arrangement theoretically conferred on paper the reality was repeated engine fires during testing that made the development process painfully slow. This would have been serious enough, but Goering insisted on the addition of dive brakes to the He 177 to enable dive bombing raised the complexity of the development process by an order of magnitude and still further delayed the aircrafts entry in to service. Even given Goering’s track record of poor decision making this one must be ranked quite high, how he envisioned an aircraft with a wingspan slightly larger than the Avro Lancaster successfully dive bombing defies comprehension [1].

If the He 177 illustrated the Luftwaffe’s tendency to embrace overly complicated solutions to straightforward problems the Me 210 program highlighted another issue, the constant desire to have new aircraft enter service long before they were ready to do so. The Me 210 was intended as the successor to the Bf 110, which had already proven wholly inadequate as an escort fighter over Britain, and the Me 210 making its first flight in 1939 should have meant that they could expect it to enter service sometime in early 1941 if not sooner. Unfortunately for the Luftwaffe this progress had been achieved by shortening the development cycle of the Me 210 from the more usual four years to three, drastically foreshortening the iterative process of testing and refinement so important in making the transition from prototype to production aircraft. This resulted in defects in the tailplane assembly that were not caught and corrected, which made the aircraft that rolled off the production line unstable and all but unflyable, resulting in large numbers of unusable airframes sitting in the factories waiting for time consuming remedial work and even when this was done the performance of the Me 210 was disappointing compared to its predecessor. This was not an unknown issue for the Allies either, the example of the Curtiss Helldiver versus the older Dauntless SBD is relatively well known, however the Allies had the resources to absorb such issues without seriously affecting their combat capabilities, the Luftwaffe of 1940 did not. The Me 210 had a very short production run because of these problems and the Luftwaffe had to fall back on the Bf 110 as its main twin engine fighter. That the Bf 110 proved effective in the night fighter role where speed and agility were less important was little comfort to the bomber crews forced to rely on the short-ranged Bf 109 for fighter support during daylight operations [2].

Naturally all the major aircraft companies were only too happy offer new designs to replace or supplement existing designs that were becoming obsolete, and even those that weren’t. Few of these manufacturers were prepared to take no for an answer and the Luftwaffe was plagued by lobbying from Heinkel and Messerschmitt, as well as infighting between the RLM and Goering over each other’s pet projects. This meant that multiple programs often went forward in parallel, or cancelled projects were revived on the whim of someone in Berlin. Again, the allies were not entirely immune to such issues, but they could afford the luxury of pursuing multiple lines of development. The De Havilland Mosquito for example was an aircraft developed entirely independently of RAF requirements, indeed the RAF regarded it as a waste of time and resources until they grasped its capabilities and adopted it into service, without meaningfully disrupting production of other models. This ironically meant that the RAF would have the very ‘schnellbomber’ that the Luftwaffe had sought for so many years with little success and indeed the Luftwaffe would eventually try to produce its own version of the Mosquito, even down to using the same name for the Ta 154, alas for the Luftwaffe the aircraft failed to match the stellar performance of its RAF counterpart and few were built, making it just another wasteful dead end. All too often for the Luftwaffe ‘cutting edge’ designs were allowed to continue consuming limited resources even when what the Luftwaffe needed was solid, capable, aircraft that were easy to produce and easy to maintain to counter the rising tide of improved British and US models [3].

One aircraft that did meet these criteria was the Fw 190. It’s designer Kurt Tank envisioned it from the start as a rugged aircraft that could be operated from rough terrain and be maintained by ground crews with limited expertise. It also possessed excellent performance in the air and would prove a formidable foe for the Allied air forces when it entered service. Logic might have dictated that the Fw 190 would become the dominant fighter of the Luftwaffe given the advantages it offered over the Me 109, this logic was thwarted by the reluctance to accept the disruption caused retooling production and the fearsome political connections Willi Messerschmitt possessed. Messerschmitt had no intention of seeing his aircraft eclipsed and this led to proposals for both new models, in the shape of the Me 209, and further updates to the Bf 109. The latter solution was problematic because the Bf 109 had reached the pinnacle of its development with the F or ‘Fritz’ model introduced in 1940. Thereafter efforts to revise or update the Bf 109 were essentially a nil sum game, adding a more powerful engine to improve top speed came at the expense of manoeuvrability and range, what had been an agile aircraft became leaden and more difficult to fly. Despite this the Bf 109 would see the G and K models introduced without producing any noticeable improvement in overall performance, and it would continue to dominate the Luftwaffe’s fighter forces for the rest of the war even as it lagged ever further behind the latest generations of Allied aircraft [4].

Added to the woes the Luftwaffe experienced during the Eagle Days these development problems meant that most of the senior leadership approached 1941 in a gloomy mood, with the inevitable exception of Goering. To make matters that bit worse by the end of 1940 the squadrons who found themselves engaging the RAF in daylight operations were beginning to suspect that the British had substantially increased the firepower of their fighters. These concerns were initially dismissed by Goering as another excuse for the failure of his aircrews to press the attack against Britain with sufficient vigour. It wouldn’t be until March 2nd 1941 that the crash-landing of a Spitfire during an operation against Luftwaffe airfields in France finally forced the Luftwaffe’s commanders to accept that Fighter Command was deploying 20mm cannon as its new primary air to air weapon [5].

The Luftwaffe entered 1941 facing a litany of issues and with no clear solutions in sight, this had severe consequences as combat took an increasing toll on experienced air crews and the Luftwaffe struggled to replace them even as the RAF, and later other Allied air forces, learned their craft and became increasingly capable and tactically astute. This was not a recipe for the long-term survival of the Luftwaffe as an effective fighting force [6].

[1] To be clear I did not invent that part, the He 177 was required to have dive brakes so it could dive bomb. Oddly Bomber Command and the 8th Airforce never felt the need for this capability in their strategic bombers.

[2] The Me 210 project was a disaster area and Messerschmitt was punished by being allowed to design yet another new aircraft to replace the Bf 110, the Me 410. This was basically a reworked Me 210with all the bugs worked out and proved quite effective when it finally entered service in 1943.

[3] the Ta 154 was not a carbon copy of the Mosquito more of an homage to the British aircraft and was afflicted with engine problems and a choice of glue that attacked the wood the airframe was built from owing to the RAF destroying the plant that made the original adhesive.

[4] I know there are arguments to be made regarding making best use of the existing aeroengines and not wanting to disrupt production, but the Luftwaffe really needed a new airframe with more room for development rather than continually trying to torture more performance out of the Bf 109.

[5] bear in mind it partly took a long time for the truth to sink in because Luftwaffe aircraft that engaged cannon armed RAF fighters didn’t often survive to limp home.

[6] Still as we shall see they are in a better position than the Kriegsmarine…

 

[Garrison]

November 15th 1940 – January 1st 1941 – Germany – Challenges for the Wehrmacht – Part III – The Kriegsmarine​

If the Heer was still in the twilight of that period where Hitler’s strategic gambles somehow paid off, and the Luftwaffe was insulated from criticism over its performance by the indisputable importance of airpower, as well as Hermann Goering’s seemingly unassailable position in the Nazi hierarchy, the Kriegsmarine had nothing with which to defend itself against Hitler’s escalating displeasure at their performance in the war to date. Norway may have been a victory for Germany, but the Kriegsmarine emerged from it with little credit in the face of appalling losses suffered in battle against the Royal Navy and they had played no role in the victories in France. Instead, Hitler had demanded to know why the Kriegsmarine had done nothing to intervene to prevent the evacuation of the BEF? Hitler had soon forgotten this complaint, only however because he was now blaming the Kriegsmarine’s ‘lack of spirit’ for the decision not to proceed with preparations for an amphibious assault on Britain, which by the end of 1940 Hitler had reinterpreted as the last chance to deal a knockout blow against the British. The ‘Groefaz’ would use the fact that an invasion of Britain now seemed to be beyond the competence of the Kriegsmarine as one of his justifications for fighting on two fronts as by 1941 he was determined to launch his crusade in the east, in the shape of Operation Barbarossa [1].

The U-Boats had achieved some successes in the Atlantic, but the British decision to release more ships for escort duty in the absence of any invasion preparations had already begun to have an impact by the middle of October, as had the release of more RAF aircraft for long range maritime patrol duties. Rather late in the day Doenitz expressed regrets about the decision not to at least mount the pretence of invasion preparations along the Channel Coast as he concluded this would have forced the British to devote their resources to protecting their homeland [2]. There is no evidence that Doenitz raised such concerns any time before November. Raeder emphatically disagreed with this viewpoint. He expressed the opinion that gathering the necessary shipping would have ‘significantly disrupted the industrial transport system of the Reich to no discernible benefit’. The British were after all a maritime nation and all too aware of the conditions in the Channel during the autumn and winter. In Raeder’s opinion the only results that such a plan would have achieved was to see large number of troops living in miserable conditions in temporary camps while the shipping offered the RAF target practice.

The issue of deceiving the British over a channel invasion was far from the only area where the two disagreed. Raeder was determined to press ahead with his prestige surface ships such as Bismarck and Tirpitz, and the aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin for that matter. Raeder was convinced that it was only these ships that could ensure the Kriegsmarine continued to receive its share of the Reich’s resources, abandoning them in favour of U-Boats would in effect be an admission that the Kriegsmarine was the waste of time and money some in Berlin were claiming and that the practical upshot would not be more U-Boats but the wholesale dismantlement of the Kriegsmarine, also meaning the loss of Raeder’s position and prestige into the bargain. Doenitz profoundly disagreed, only a substantial increase in the number of U-Boats would allow the Kriegsmarine to achieve a decisive victory in the Atlantic that would give them the prestige to secure the resources needed to build up a substantial surface fleet once more. Both ideas were flawed. The defects with Raeder’s plan were obvious, there was no prospect of the Kriegsmarine’s surface ships competing with the Royal Navy, especially not with so many new vessels laid down under the Chamberlain Mandate being commissioned by the Royal Navy, the British were not shy about showing off their latest battleship HMS King George V and the launch ceremony for the first of the successor class HMS Lion [3].

The problems with Doenitz’s plans were less immediately obvious given that the U-Boats were sinking large amounts of Atlantic shipping. However, Doenitz’s basic premise that with his ideal fleet of 300 U-Boats he could bring Britain to its knees in perhaps a year or eighteen months was just as unrealistic as Raeder’s plans for the surface fleet. Hitler wanted Britain brought to the negotiating table before 1941, not in the latter half of 1942. He had no intention of deferring his plans in the east and allowing the Red Army to reorganize and re-equip, Hitler was crystal clear that Germany could not afford a protracted war. Hitler also increasingly lost faith in the Kriegsmarine and wasn’t impressed by Doenitz’s assurances. Even if Hitler had been willing to offer Doenitz a blank cheque it is extremely unlikely that the U-Boats could have delivered such a victory as his plan made a series of fundamental assumptions about the relative capabilities of the U-Boats and the defenders of the convoys that proved to be completely wrong. Everything from Escort Carriers to airborne radar, to new Anti-Submarine Warfare weapons and tactics pushed the prospect of a Kriegsmarine victory further and further out of reach. The most significant factor may not have any new weapon system or naval tactic, rather the Liberty Ship program in the US that allowed lost shipping to be replaced at a rate that couldn’t have been dreamed of before the war [4].

The Liberty Ships also illustrated another issue with the U-Boat campaign, the more the vigorously Kriegsmarine pressed home its attacks the more President Roosevelt was able to press for an increasingly proactive role for the USN in the Atlantic, eventually provoking direct clashes between the U-Boats and the USN that might have led to war even without the actions of the Japanese [5].

As if Raeder didn’t have enough issues to deal with there was also pressure on him to act over the aftermath of the debacle with the French Fleet. Several of the French ships that fled from Toulon had defected to the Free French, but others had elected to make for neutral ports and be interned, with many of the crews hoping that by doing so they would avoid retaliation against their families, they did not have the luxury that Admiral Darlan had of getting their family out to Switzerland before defecting. The cruiser Foch and the destroyer Le Hardi had wound up in the port at Barcelona, perhaps thinking that the distinctly pro German neutral regime in Spain might offer the opportunity for them to perhaps be returned to France at some point. Under considerable international pressure the Spanish had interned both ships and their crews, which was a considerable embarrassment to all parties involved.

At some point the idea that the Kriegsmarine should take some action to either side or sink the two ships was floated in Berlin, much to Raeder’s horror. He knew any such operation by his surface ships was out of the question and while a U-Boat attack was possible Raeder was certain that this would be the thin end of the wedge, the Kriegsmarine would risk being drawn into every hare-brained plan Hitler or one of his cronies devised, risking the loss of valuable ships, or diverting U-Boat from operations in the Atlantic. The scheme that finally came to the forefront was a commando raid, using a neutral flagged cargo ship and German soldiers and sailors dressed in captured British battledress to divert blame. This plan allegedly originated with Otto Skorzeny, though several others are also credible sources who may be able to claim the credit/blame for it. In the end these schemes foundered because they all required the tacit complicity of the Spanish. Franco would have none of it, especially as neither the British nor the USA were going to be persuaded by such a false flag operation and Spain was heavily dependent on foreign food imports. This came as some small relief to Raeder, though it was the only piece of good news he received as 1941 approached [6].

To cap off this litany of woes for the Kriegsmarine in the autumn of 1940 there was the issue of naval aviation, or rather the lack of it. The FAA may have been treated as an afterthought by the RAF, it did however exist and in 1940 won battles over the use of the latest generation of fighters on its carriers and the development of the Monarch Barracuda. In the Wehrmacht all maritime patrol aircraft and land based anti-shipping units were firmly under control of Goering and the Luftwaffe. Even the air wing of the Graf Zeppelin would have been composed of Luftwaffe aircraft types, manned by Luftwaffe crews. Goering was resolute that everything that flew was to remain under his ultimate control. This meant the Kriegsmarine was utterly unable to counter any air threats from the RAF and the FAA without the assistance of the Luftwaffe. The Fw 200 Condor was the long-range patrol aircraft available to the Germans, and it was not a construction priority for the Luftwaffe, so as it came under increasing attack from British fighter and its numbers began to decline heavy restrictions were placed on its operations, forbidding them to carry out direct attacks on allied shipping. Given the state of the Luftwaffe strategic bomber program there was no prospect of Condor being replaced or supplemented by any other aircraft. Any sort of Kriegsmarine fighter or bomber capability was simply out of the question [7].

With all three branches of the Wehrmacht under considerable strain and facing major challenges it was no wonder that the cracks in the military infrastructure that had been glossed over in the wake of the victories of 1940 became increasingly apparent in 1941.

[1] OTL Hitler stated that the reason the British were being so intransigent was because they expected the USSR to turn on Germany. Obviously if the USSR were defeated then the British would finally see sense, because of course they would.

[2] Or if you prefer exactly what happened in OTL. The preparations for Sealion had no hope of leading to a successful invasion but it did pin down a lot of men, ships, and aircraft the British could have put to better use, and of course did ITTL.

[3] Raeder will not get Graf Zeppelin finished, sorry to those hoping for its hilarious demise in combat.

[4] So this is very much my view of Doentiz’s grand plan, it had little more chance of success than Sealion did.

[5] More U-Boats means more chances for clashes with the USN at the end of the day.

[6] Totally invented, but bear in mind the same people came up with the Gleiwitz affair.

[7] You can imagine how long the Fw 200s would last in the face of the rapidly increasing Escort Carrier force.

 

[Garrison]

November 15th 1940 – January 1st 1941 – USA – Edging Towards War​

Franklin Roosevelt’s victory in the election held on the 5th of November may have been something of a foregone conclusion, still having the outcome confirmed was a great relief to the British and those who supported greater intervention on the part of the USA. Measures such as the Two Ocean Navy Act had passed in the summer and the bases for destroyers’ deal had left US neutrality looking rather threadbare, certainly from the perspective of the Axis powers. US Navy operations in the Neutrality Zone that Roosevelt had declared in 1939 were almost entirely designed to aid the British, with U-Boat sightings being quickly passed on to the Royal Navy and as 1941 progressed the Neutrality patrol would take on a ever more aggress posture.

This however did not mean that Roosevelt had a free hand to do as he wished, there was still a powerful isolationist lobby on the other side, with Charles Lindbergh being perhaps its most prominent public figurehead and one of the leaders of the America First movement. Lindbergh had visited Germany and been treated to carefully stage-managed tours of Luftwaffe bases and demonstrations of the latest aircraft. The reports he gave based on this highly selective showcase contributed greatly to the overestimation of the size and power of the Luftwaffe that plagued strategic planning in the US and Europe up until the truth became apparent over Southern England in 1940. Lindbergh’s was hardly the only voice and some of them were far more vicious and laden with pro-German and anti-Semitic messages that had found a receptive audience with many in the USA. Father Charles Coughlin had a national radio broadcast and used it as a platform for isolationist sentiment, and was increasingly seen as leaning heavily towards the Fascist dictatorships as a bulwark against Communism, though his reach had been curtailed by 1940 owing to a series of legal difficulties and the increasing reluctance of certain broadcasters to carry his speeches [1].

While the images of mass meetings and protests by America First are compelling, they conceal a more nuanced picture of isolationist sentiment. For many there was a simple pragmatism to their attitude. If Britain and France had been so willing to appease Germany, why should the USA care? Even if Germany did launch a war surely the might of the French army and the impregnable Maginot Line would bring about a swift defeat for the Nazis? Why should America be drawn into a war that would have no impact on their country in the name of political ideals that meant little to the average US citizen? The fall of France certainly provided a catalyst to change people’s opinions. The nation that had fought Imperial Germany for four years had fallen to Nazi Germany in four months and now the question was, what would happen if Britain was also forced to submit? This certainly pushed some to take an even more hard-line isolationist stance, others though were more willing to listen to Roosevelt’s rhetoric of offering all aid short of war and he would get the Lend-Lease act approved by Congress in March of 1941 [2].

One thing the British could offer in return for material aid was technical knowhow and the lessons of their combat experience. This was more welcome in some quarters than others. Admiral Ernest King, Commander in Chief, United States Fleet (COMINCH) was distinctly Anglophobic and dismissed advise about convoy operations and the use of airpower to help close the so-called Atlantic Gap. Fortunately, others were more willing to look at the evidence of the effectiveness of long-range patrol aircraft and a few would be deployed before the official entry of the USA into the war [3].

When it came to the air forces the relationship was rather more respectful and the USAAC was certainly willing to listen when the RAF explained their plans for the introduction of 20mm cannon as fighter weapon. The USAAC had already standardised on the .50 calibre machine gun for their fighters and there would be repeated arguments during the war over the merits of the destructive power of the 20mm cannon versus the larger ammunition capacity the .50 calibre, but the USAAC, and then the United States Army Air Force, did see the merits of the cannon when it came to the ground attack role [4].

The US Army on the other hand leaned a little closer to Admiral King. They were working on two tanks under the M3 designation, one light and one medium, the designations represented something of the different approach to tank design the American pursued versus the Cruiser and Infantry categories the British used. For the sake of simplicity, the British referred to the light tank as the Stuart, and the medium as the Grant. While the British had concluded that light tanks had no place in front line combat, they still had uses as reconnaissance vehicles and potentially as vehicle for equipping light ‘cavalry’ units, as well as in the role of Imperial security duties in places where they were not going to have to fight enemy tanks. The Stuart was far better armoured and armed than the British Mark VI B light tank, with a 37mm cannon instead of a machine gun. It was in many respects like the German Panzer II in its capabilities. In the end the British accepted them in substantial numbers given that it offered a means to finally remove the Mk VI B from service and expand their armoured forces, particularly in North Africa where the Stuart was superior to most Axis armour it faced and would also prove highly effective in Southeast Asia where heavier tanks would have struggled [5].

If the British were eventually won over by the merits of the Stuart, the same could not be said for the Grant. This was tank was intended as interim vehicle while the development of the M4 Sherman was still ongoing, and this reflected in a design that seemed to be neither one thing nor the other. It had two main weapons, a turret mounted 37mm gun and a 75mm mounted in the hull that could be used firing armour piercing anti-tank rounds or an effective HE round. It was a good gun but being mounted in a sponson in the hull meant that it had extremely limited traverse and prevented the Grant from adopting a hull down position when firing and its tall profile exacerbated this issue. The 37mm gun may have been better than the German equivalent fitted to the Panzer III, the British however felt it was inferior to their own 2pdr, which was academic as they had already decided a 6pdr would be necessary going forward. The two weapon positions necessitated a crew of seven and though the British suggested eliminating the separate radio operator the Americans were reluctant to embrace this at first and even if it was incorporated the Grant would still require a six-man crew. For comparison no British tank in service had more than a four-man crew and even the A22 and A24 would only require a five-man crew, in simple terms larger crews meant fewer crews for the British and the Dominion forces. On the positive side the tank was reasonably mobile and despite the crew size relatively spacious inside.

Overall, it was a design the British considered as already obsolescent, especially if one assumed, as the British did, that the Germans were pursuing the very same path of improved armour and a firepower that they were. This view wasn’t shared by the Americans, who felt the British were overstating both the performance of their own tanks and the likelihood of German upgrades in response. They were certain that their plans for the M3 and its long-term successor the M4 Sherman would be more than adequate. It would only be in late 1941 that it would become apparent that the British had been accurate in their assessment of the likely future of German tank development, which would create some issues for the US Army as it entered the war. The Grant did see some service with the British, though it was limited to South East Asia where it proved highly effective against the Japanese [6].

Despite ongoing resistance on the home front at the beginning of 1941 President Roosevelt was doing his best to support the British and prepare the USA for the prospect of becoming an active participant in the war. That remained a distant prospect however even as the US Navy became increasingly aggressive in the Atlantic and the USA would still be a long from ready when the ‘day that will live in infamy’ plunged them into the war.

[1] Coughlin is an interesting figure, an actual Catholic priest who was never directly connected to any US pro-Nazi organization but was claimed as an influence by at least one of them.

[2] Overall isolationism was neither monolithic nor as overwhelming as it sometimes portrayed.

[3] I honestly think King would have been happier fighting the British than the Japanese of Germans.

[4] So yeah, the 50 cal is more powerful the .303 but less so than the 20mm, but yes there have been many arguments on the topic.

[5] The name Lee doesn’t gain currency here.

[6] So given developments not surprising the British are not impressed by the Lee/Grant and equally unsurprising the Americans are sure it will be fine. This means not much chance of alt US tanks at this point, unless anyone has suggestions.

 

[Garrison]

January 2nd 1941 – January 3rd 1941 – Operation Judgement​

By the beginning of 1941 security measures at the port of Taranto had become rather lax. Barrage balloons damaged in bad weather had not been replaced. Some torpedo nets were not in place in as they had been damaged and the ones that were did not provide full protection. In general, the ships and shore establishment had settled into dull routine. Boredom led to lax discipline, made worse at this time by the fact that many officers who had departed for New Year celebrations had yet to return to their posts. Admiral Cunningham and the Royal Navy’s Mediterranean Fleet were in a far more proactive mood and had chosen to postpone their own celebrations in favour of finally being able to launch the long-postponed Operation Judgement. On the night of 2nd – 3rd January three Royal Navy carriers took up position off Taranto and launched their aircraft into the night while the Italians remained oblivious to the disaster about to fall on them [1].

Such night actions were no simple feet but the crews of HMS Illustrious, HMS Formidable and HMS Eagle had been practicing intensively for such operations until they were competent and confident in carrying them out. This was particularly impressive in the case of Formidable which had only been commissioned on the 6th of November and immediately been dispatched to the Mediterranean to take part in Operation Judgement. That Formidable was the sister ship of Illustrious proved a bonus for security as the Italians were aware of the presence of Illustrious and thus despite Formidable being spotted several times by Italian reconnaissance, they failed to realize Illustrious, and Eagle had been reinforced [2].

The idea for an airstrike on the Italian Fleet at Taranto went all the way back to the war scare of 1938. The then Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet, Admiral Dudley Pound, was concerned about the survivability of the carrier HMS Glorious if the Italian force at Taranto sallied for an attack. The Captain of Glorious, Lumley Lister, assured him that his aircraft were more than capable of putting in a night attack on the Italian ships and Pound ordered training to begin. At this time the Royal Navy were the only fleet who had this capability and they intended to exploit it to the full [3].

The period after the Italian declaration of war had been as frustrating for Admiral Cunningham as it had for General O’Connor in Egypt. Both found their hands tied as Britain regrouped after the fall of France as even Churchill was unwilling to risk provoking the Italians into action in what were still perilous circumstances. By the end of 1940 with the Italian attacks in Greece and East Africa under way and the British forces in Egypt bolstered with fresh troops and equipment Cunningham was finally give the green light to carry out Operation Judgement [4].

The three carriers launched sixty-one Farey Swordfish bombers. The Swordfish from Eagle were designated to drop flares to illuminate the targets and to bomb shore installations while those from Formidable and Illustrious would carry out torpedo attacks on the Italian ships at anchor. No one could deny the Swordfish were obsolete, and by the end of 1941 they would begin being phased out in favour of the Fairey Monarch Barracuda. That though was in the future, in Operation Judgement they demonstrated they were still capable of getting the job done. Most were armed with torpedoes, some with aerial bombs and some with flares, to illuminate the targets and help the others line up their attack runs. The attacking aircraft from Formidable and Illustrious approached the harbour in two ‘columns’ broken into several waves with the flare aircraft from Eagle also arriving in waves to circle overhead to replenish flares and when they had exhausted those they would drop their bombs and head home. The two columns turned away from one another in their final approach before turning back in, creating a crossfire of torpedoes increasing the chance of the weapons scoring hits. The torpedo nets that were in place wouldn’t prove much of an impediment as they didn’t extend all the way to the bottom of the harbour and the British torpedoes were able to pass underneath them.

The first flares erupting over their ships alerted some of the Italian sailors and shore staff, but their initial reaction was confusion rather than outright alarm and the anti-aircraft guns and searchlights remained unmanned for precious minutes as the first wave of torpedo planes pressed home their attacks. It was only as some aircraft overflew the fleet after their dropping their torpedoes that it began to dawn on the Italians that they were under attack, which was made crystal clear as huge waterspouts were blasted into the air as the first torpedoes struck home, followed by explosions ashore as the aircraft armed with bombs dropped their loads.

Chaos reigned in the port as the second and third attacking waves added to the destruction. By the time the anti-aircraft guns were manned the last of the Swordfish were turning for home and only three were shot down, with all crews being rescued from the water by the Italians. The losses for the Royal Navy were incredibly minor given the risk of the operation and as soon as the aircraft were back aboard all three carriers and their escorts turned around and began proceeding away from Taranto in case the Regia Aeronautica should turn up after dawn or any Regia Marina submarines were in the area. The were was no need to worry as in the aftermath of the attack there was far too much chaos in the Italian ranks for any coherent response and the taskforce made a clean get away. Shortly thereafter aerial reconnaissance confirmed the scale of their success [5].

For the Italians the attack was a disaster. The Heavy Cruiser Pola was sunk, and three destroyers damaged, which was the least of the damage. Five battleships were hit by torpedoes. The Conte di Cavour, her sister ship the Giulio Cesare, and the Andrea Doria were badly damaged. The Conte di Cavour would be repaired within a few months, but the Giulio Cesare was out of action until early 1942. The Andrea Doria had taken heavier damage than either of them and attempts to repair her were constantly downgraded and ultimately abandoned as not being worthwhile. The situation with the battleships Littorio and Duilio was even worse. Both took multiple torpedo hits and settled to the bottom, though the Littorio sank in shallow waters. Even so it took nine weeks to refloat her, and repairs were estimated to require up to fourteen months. This proved hopelessly optimistic as despite being give the highest priority she never returned to service. Duilio sank in deeper water and efforts to refloat her were badly managed, leading to more damage and the decision to cut her up for scrap. The day after the attack on Taranto the Regia Marina withdrew all the remaining operational ships to Naples, with the only serviceable battleship, the Vittorio Veneto, leading the fleet in its retreat [6].

The Royal navy had achieved arguably its greatest victory of the 20th Century at Taranto, without a single shell being fired by any warship. The attack effectively ensured that the Regia Marina’s warships would never be a serious threat to British control of the Mediterranean again. Within a few weeks efforts would be under way to secure the Gulf of Aden, but this time the action would take place on land as the British Army move to drive the Italians out of East Africa [7].

[1] OTL the defences at Taranto were battered by bad weather in October, here much of that hasn’t been fixed and other equipment has not been well maintained in the face of the absence of any action.

[2] The fire damage that ruled Eagle out of the attack has either been repaired or never happened and as with many other ships Formidable commissioned a bit earlier, so three carriers available for the attack.

[3] This is the OTL background to the idea.

[4] By this point given the Italian performance to date the British are less worried about the Italian Army rather than the Regia Marina.

[5] So yeah this is a much larger attack, sadly while the Japanese are certainly paying attention the US Navy still isn’t.

[6] So that is five out of six battleships sunk or out of action. The Regia Marina can just about cover convoys to North Africa, but they are short of ships for everything else, which is good news for Malta.

[7] The counteroffensive in East Africa is called Operation Convex, an alt name for the fighting in Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland. Egypt is still to come.

 

[Garrison]

January 21st 1941 – March 1st 1941 – Operation Convex​

One date after another had come and gone for the planned Italian invasion of British Somaliland, with each being deferred as issues with weather and supplies left the commanders hesitant to commit. The supply issues were in no small part due to the efforts of the RAF and Royal Navy in disrupting Italian shipping heading for East Africa, though the scarcity of that shipping was also a factor. Far from building up to mount an attack the Italian troops were watching stockpiles dwindle and facing orders to conserve what was available that did nothing for their morale. A further impediment to the attack was a British disinformation campaign that persuaded the Italians that British Somaliland had been far more heavily reinforced than was the case. Concerned that the British might be planning their own attack Badoglio had been trying to reinforce his troops along the border and finding no easier than trying to mount an offensive given the chronic shortage of mechanized transportation. Badoglio had tried to persuade Rome to release more aircraft and ships to secure the routes to the Eritrean port of Massawa, the lynchpin of the Italian supply network. His pleas had gone unheeded and by January Badoglio was more concerned with taking advantage of the outcome of the invasion of Greece to bring about his return to Rome and reinstatement to his previous role than with advancing operations in East Africa. This was hardly a secret amongst the staff working under him and it did nothing for their confidence to know that their chief was doing his best to get as far away from Ethiopia as possible [1].

Badoglio finally got his wish on the 11th of January when he was summarily recalled to Rome in the aftermath of the halting of the Greek offensive in Albania. This hasty departure created a certain amount of confusion as command once again devolved to the Duke of Aosta, who was the Governor-General of Italian East Africa and had commanded Italian forces in the region before Badoglio’s arrival. Aosta had stayed on as Badoglio’s deputy and had tried to use his political position, plus his standing as a member of the royal family, to impose his views on the conduct of the campaign. Unsurprisingly two men had enjoyed a frosty relationship with Badoglio repeatedly failing to discuss strategic decisions with Aosta and Aosta trying to issue orders directly to Italian troops, contributing greatly to the disorganization rampant amongst the Italian forces and resulting in Badoglio being even more determined to keep Aosta out of the decision-making process. This meant that when Badoglio departed without providing him with any sort of briefing Aosta found himself scrambling to familiarize himself with the details of deployments and supply schedules, or the lack thereof. He was granted precious little time to carry out this urgent task [2].

Responding to what was now a clearly imminent British attack Aosta began sending what reserves he could muster to reinforce the positions near British Somaliland. This was exactly what the British had hoped the Italians would do, they were indeed about to launch their counteroffensive, but from the west not the east. On the 21st of January the attack began from Sudan, with three main lines of advance moving into Eritrea. Two columns advanced from the western border with Eritrea and one drove south. This force was led by 4th and 5th Indian Divisions, supported by elements of the Sudan Defence force and B Troop of the 4th RTR, deploying between six and eight Valentines depending on the vagaries of keeping the vehicles running. Within the first day of their advance the forces advancing from the west had retaken Kassala and the other Italian gains from October would be either retaken by secondary attacks or abandoned as the Italians realized the positions were hopelessly exposed. The three columns converged towards Keren, before moving south into Ethiopia and pressing on east to take Massawa and severe the flow of Italian supplies from the port altogether, while opening it up for British shipping [3].

The fighting overall followed the same ominous pattern for the Italians as the Greek campaign. In some places units put up a fierce fight even in the face of heavy odds, only to be completely undermined as larger, theoretically stronger, formations either abandoned strategic positions or simply laid down their arms after minimal resistance. Much of the blame for this can be laid at the door of the confusion that reigned amongst the Duke of Aosta and his staff. Orders were issued, countermanded and then frontline officers were berated for not following the cancelled orders, some were even relieved of command as their troops were surrounded by the British forces, rendering the act utterly pointless. Regardless of the cause of the issues the effect was that the British were able to make rapid advances and by the end of March Massawa was isolated and the southern spearhead was approaching Addis Ababa.

A similar pattern was followed by the southern forces attacking from Kenya. Here it was 11th and 12th South African divisions that were the main ‘British’ force, alongside the main body of Ethiopian troops under the titular command of Emperor Haile Selassie himself. The British had been covertly shipping arms to Ethiopian Partisans in the Southwest and they had been carrying out acts of sabotage and attacking Italian patrols for several months, discouraging the Italians from mounting their own patrols and instead falling into a ‘bunker mentality’. With the return of the Emperor, they escalated their attacks and ordinary Ethiopians who had been forced to labour for the Italians simply deserted in droves amidst the confusion in the Italian ranks as the British advanced [4].

One place where the situation with partisans was reversed was in Italian Somaliland. A British column advanced into Italian Somaliland from Kenya before part of the force turned north into Ethiopia while the rest of the troops continued to take Mogadishu. Unlike Ethiopia Somaliland had been an Italian colony for decades and the settlers there provided a ready source of guerrilla fighters to resist the occupying British forces. This would however take some months to materialize and by the time it did the British forces had largely secured the colony and the partisans were unable to gain any support from Italy [5].

The last phase of Convex was launched in mid-February when the forces assembling in British Somaliland finally did launch an attack. By this point the forces facing them had been thinned out considerably by the need to shore up defences in Italian Somaliland and despite the reduction in numbers their supply situation had continued to deteriorate. The attacking British force was again largely composed of Indian troops, supported by Squadron C of the 3rd RTR manning Cruiser IVs. The Italian forces were also coming under heavy air attack from RAF bombers operating from Aden. Given that the Italians were still significantly overestimating the strength of the available British forces they soon began to retreat, and a further British column advanced into the north of Italian Somaliland, put yet further demands on the already overstretched defenders there [6].

By the end of March there was still hard fighting to come for the British Imperial forces, but the outcome of the campaign seemed in little doubt as the Italians were driven back on all fronts. At this point only a major reverse for the British elsewhere seemed to offer the Italians in East Africa any hope and would also prevent the British from intervening in Greece. With Badoglio back in Rome the choice of where to inflict a major defeat on the British seemed obvious [7].

[1] So things are obviously rather different, British Somaliland is still not occupied by the Italians and the Italian situation in East Africa is worse given the increased Italian navy losses.

[2] Obviously Badoglio wasn’t here OTL and his presence has not improved matters, nor did his sudden departure as Mussolini is panicking over the Greek situation and of course Operation Judgement.

[3] Amongst other things the British have a lot more tanks than OTL.

[4] The British did this OTL and Haile Selassie actually spent his exile in Britain.

{5] Also what happened in OTL, but here you can assume they are weaker even than OTL when they achieved little or nothing.

[6] Again more British tanks and RAF bombers available.

[7] Well its obvious if you are Mussolini and none of your Generals is willing to contradict you. I see East Africa as a clear indicator of what happened when it came down to a straight fight between the British Empire and the Italians.

 

[Garrison]

26th January – 25th April 1941 – The Balkans – Part I - Renewing the Offensive​

Making his way back to Italy proved no mean feat for Marshal Badoglio. On one leg of his journey the plane that was supposed to transport him was shot down en route, crashing in flames while Badoglio stood on the airfield watching, and another experienced an engine fire that forced a diversion and several days delay while a replacement was arranged. If nothing else these delays should have given Badoglio time to formulate some fresh strategic plans. If he had done so they went unspoken when he reached Rome on the 26th of January and was apprised of the details of the Taranto attack. Mussolini was, trying to keep the full extent of the disaster secret, largely unsuccessfully. Added to this word of the unfolding British offensive in East Africa had overtaken Badoglio and everyone on the General Staff on edge wondering where Mussolini’s wrath might descend. Badoglio might have found himself unceremoniously dismissed from the Army if he hadn’t been able to point to months of warnings about an impending crisis that his successor as Chief of Staff Marshal Cavallo had largely ignored. Cavallo had done because he was aware that prioritizing Badoglio’s request would not have sat well with Mussolini and it might have undermined Cavallo’s position, though the miserable failure of the Greek offensive had done all the undermining needed to have him dismissed and thus making a convenient scapegoat for all the ills of the Italian army [1].

As far as the situation in Albania was concerned the situation had stabilized, in no small part because the Greeks had exhausted their supplies and only modest amounts had arrived from the British, including the leading elements of the RAF squadrons assigned to provide air support. The arrival of these RAF personnel, largely ground staff preparing airfields and a small number of fighters at this point, was a matter of serious concern in Rome as it was a clear illustration that the British were prepared to put boots on the ground to reinforce the Greeks rather than simply dispatch some surplus weapons and attack Italian shipping heading for the port of Vlore. It would be fair to say that if Mussolini was fixated on the situation in Greece, then Badoglio was equally fixated on North Africa and his thoughts had swiftly returned to that theatre of war.

Badoglio’s solution to the Italian predicament in Albania was thus entirely predictable, launch an offensive against Egypt, where the British had obviously depleted their forces to carry out operations in East Africa and in preparation to deploy troops on the ground to support the Greeks. Despite the best efforts of Count Ciano to pour cold water on the idea that the Germans were going to launch a fresh offensive against the British come the spring it was still the underlying assumption behind much Italian planning until Operation Barbarossa was launched, a plan that the Germans failed to advise the Italians about. The irony was that by the spring of 1941 the British were in possession of far more information about German intentions than their Axis partners were. The sources of this information ranged from signals intelligence gathered by Bletchley Park, photo reconnaissance showing that what tugs and barges that had been accumulating to carry an invasion force were being dispersed, and the orders from Berlin to the luckless Abwehr agents sent to Britain who had fallen into the hands of British Intelligence, which in practice meant practically all of them. These instructions seemed focused on gathering information to facilitate acts of sabotage against British war production rather than details of beach defences or troop deployments. Overall then the British were increasingly confident that Hitler was turning his attention back to his long-held ambition of conquering new lands for the German people in the USSR, though the Soviets ignored British efforts to share this information, even when it came from Soviet agents inside the British intelligence services [2].

Even in the absence of such information Badoglio’s conclusions about British strength in Egypt flew in the face of the reports from Marshal Italo Balbo commanding 10th Army stating that in the light of increasing British strength in Egypt a substantial increase in supplies to the Italian forces in Libya was urgently required before any offensive could be contemplated. That Balbo had been making such requests since the idea of an invasion of Egypt was first put forward a year earlier somewhat undermined his credibility. This did not excuse Badoglio’s failure to either verify or refute Balbo’s claims about the strength of the British position in Egypt, or to try and gain an accurate picture of the reserves available to the British to deploy to North Africa and their ability to deliver such reserves. The latter was a particular issue in the aftermath of Operation Judgement, which also severely impacted the Regia Marina’s ability to escort Italian convoys, vital if any offensive were to maintain its momentum. Badoglio’s resolute refusal to consider any of this showed he every bit as guilty of believing what he wanted to believe as Mussolini was.

There was some irony in the fact that now, when conditions for an attack on Egypt were worse than they had been the previous Autumn, Mussolini was inclined to accept Badoglio’s argument about the Egyptian situation simply because it suited him to do so. The six divisions assigned to the original attack on Greece were being increased to twenty, which brought with it an inevitable demand for supplies and equipment. Accepting Badoglio’s arguments about British weakness in Egypt meant that he could ignore Balbo’s complaints while still demanding action, and instead of reinforcements Balbo received a stinging rebuke and orders to prepare an advance into Egypt at the earliest moment, orders heartily endorsed by Badoglio. Balbo did his best to comply, though the plan he came up with was for nothing more than a short advance over the border before digging in to accumulate adequate supplies for a further thrust, at some undetermined point in the future. This plan was accepted by Mussolini largely because it would at least achieve the goal of pinning down British forces in Egypt and preventing them drawing down troops to aid the Greeks. Badoglio was equally sanguine, because he expected that once the attack was mounted the thin British defences would crumble allowing Balbo to advance, taking advantage of captured British supplies and abandoned equipment, he even speculated that Alexandria would be in Italian hands by the summer, ensuring that Italy would not be ignored in the inevitable peace negotiations. This was an optimistic plan to say the least, Badoglio however would be partially vindicated in his views about the impact of the looming Italian offensive into Egypt on British efforts to support the Greeks, though it did nothing to aid the deteriorating situation in East Africa [3].

As far as the Greek front was concerned apart from building up Italian forces there was also the thorny subject of German involvement. That the Greeks had been able to neutralize any threat from Bulgaria had been a major boost to their efforts to repel the Italians. This had come about as result of pressure on Bulgaria from Turkey. Bulgaria was though firmly under the influence of Germany and if they applied persuasion, they could get the Bulgarians to take a more belligerent stance, while at the same time the Turks would shy away from anything that might lead to conflict with the Germans. Such persuasion would almost certainly have to take the form of stationing German troops in Bulgaria. Once such troops were in place, they could obviously be used to reinforce the threat to the border region and leave the Greeks little choice but to divide their forces [4].

In Berlin there was no great resistance to the idea of helping the Italians in the Balkans, despite what several German Generals claimed later, and there were sound strategic reasons for doing so. Not only would the removal of Italy from Albania undermine the influence of the Axis over countries such as Bulgaria it would place the crucial oilfields at Ploesti in Romania within easy reach of RAF bombers based in Greece, potentially crippling the Wehrmacht’s mobility. On top of this another humiliating defeat might destabilize Mussolini’s regime and it couldn’t be ruled out that Italy might align itself with the British if the fascists fell. Later Hitler bitterly complained that the diversion of forces to aid the Italians delayed the launch of Operation Barbarossa by crucial weeks and cost them the chance to take Moscow. Given that Barbarossa involved some three million German soldiers it is hard to imagine that what became Operation Marita had any appreciable effect. Far more likely is that wet weather and muddy ground conditions in the western USSR and the limitations of the German logistical situation meant that Barbarossa was launched at the earliest possible moment regardless [5].

Initially the Germans agreed to mount an offensive from Bulgaria to aid in the planned spring offensive against the Greeks. The German Generals though much preferred the strategic option of launching an attack from Yugoslavia and troops were moved into Austria, Hungary, and Romania in the expectation that the Yugoslavs could be pressured into granting the Wehrmacht transit rights, or simply invaded if these concessions were not forthcoming. The Yugoslavs did bow to pressure from Berlin to join the Tripartite Pact on the 21st of March, but with the frustrating condition of their signing that they would not have to provide any transit rights. This appeared to be a huge impediment to German plans, until a coup in Yugoslavia on the 27th, provoked in no small part by the decision to sign the Pact, meant that the Wehrmacht was free to invade. Yugoslavia’s armed forces were far weaker than those of Greece and the country was riven by ethnic tensions that would undermine their defence still further [6].

Even as the Germans were preparing their attack from Bulgaria, and with Yugoslavia still off limits, Mussolini was determined to launch a fresh offensive from Albania in the hope of breaking through the Greek lines and scoring a decisive victory before the Germans mounted their attack. This offensive was launched on March 9th, and it was not the success that Mussolini demanded. Even his personal presence at the opening of the attack did nothing to improve Italian performance [7].

[1] Changing command is largely just shuffling deckchairs on the Titanic.

[2] So they are still grossly underestimating the British, while being oblivious to Germany’s real intention.

[3] Overambition, the bane of all the Axis powers.

[4] This was pretty much what happened OTL, Turkey initially got the Bulgarians to stay on the sidelines and allowed the Greeks to focus on the Italians.

[5] Mud was a far bigger factor in setting the date than Marita, however loudly Hitler complained later.

[6] The terms of Yugoslavia’s entry into the Tripartite Pact seem to have genuinely frustrated the Germans, who could be oddly legalistic at times despite otherwise happily ignoring all norms of decency and reason.

[7] The major beneficiary of changes to the battles in Greece will be the British, which should come as no surprise…

 

[Garrison]

26th January – 25th April 1941 – The Balkans – Part II – Churchill’s Choice​

Despite the efforts of the Regia Aeronautica and the Regia Marina Britain supplies to the Greeks had largely been getting through, while the strength of the Italian air and naval forces had been further whittled away even as they were trying to support the last futile efforts to hold the line in Libya. Small arms, ammunition, rations, even surplus uniform items such as steel helmets had been dispatched in slowly increasing quantities as well as some larger items such as artillery pieces and tanks. As much as this had placed a strain on the British it was not enough for the Greeks. With a potential Italian counterattack imminent and the ominous prospect of the Germans opening up a front through Bulgaria the Greeks were far from confident about their ability to defend themselves. The uncertainty as to what the Yugoslavs were going to do made matters even more precarious and the Greek government, now headed by Alexandros Kyrgios after Metaxas death at the beginning of January, was calling not only for a substantial increase in material support but the dispatch of British troops to reinforce the defences [1].

The supply requests were greeted with considerable scepticism in London, delivering the tonnage the Greeks were asking for in a timely manner was considered all but impossible, indeed even if they were spread out over a longer timeframe it was seen as questionable whether they could be delivered without seriously impacting British operations elsewhere. At this point the dispatch of troops was less contentious. After some negotiation with the Greeks the Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden had an agreement in principle to dispatch two divisions to Greece, arriving around the beginning of April. The intention was to draw these troops, and any others that might be committed later, from Egypt, exactly what Marshal Badoglio had anticipated, Badoglio’s strategic obsessions were also the reason why the troops earmarked for Greece never set foot there.

General Wavell had been ordered not to mount an offensive operation against the Italians in Libya and he had been largely content to accept these orders. His subordinate, General Richard O’Connor, in charge of the Western Desert Force was however a proactive sort and had several officers under his command similarly inclined to not simply sit idly by and wait for the Italians to seize the initiative. As it happened patrol and reconnaissance operations were allowed, indeed even encouraged from London and Cairo and O’Connor exploited his latitude to the fullest. Some old hands in London might have envisioned something akin to the trench raids of World War I, a handful of troops stealing across No Man’s Land in the dead of night to try and seize prisoners and keep the enemy off balance. O’Connor certainly intended to seize prisoners and keep the Italians off balance, he was just planning to do things on a rather grander scale [2].

The first of what became known as a Long Range Patrol Group (LRPG) was formed in December 1940. They generally consisted of around one hundred men mounted in light vehicles, loaded down with supplies and heavy weapons to allow them to mount extended operations behind enemy lines. The first operations had largely been focused on probing the Italian defences looking for gaps or testing flanking routes that took the LRPGs into Sudan and Chad. By the spring they had conducted several deep incursions into Libya, targeting airfields and supply dumps and generally increasing the anxiety levels of Balbo and his staff. They did also take prisoners to interrogate, seized documents and maps and possibly most importantly acquired information on Italian codes that allowed much encrypted radio traffic that had been intercepted to be deciphered. Almost as Eden was finalizing his agreement with the Greeks an urgent report was winging its way to London warning that an Italian offensive was imminent and that all available reinforcements should be dispatched to Egypt at once [3].

General Sir John Dill was the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, the professional head of the British Army and the man primarily responsible for providing military advice to the War Cabinet. Once he was in receipt of the report from Wavell, he arranged an urgent meeting at No. 10 with Churchill and presented him with the latest information from Egypt. Churchill was initially reluctant to accept the contents of the report, it was not the first time that there had been reports of Italian movement in Libya. Dill though was clear that this was of a different order of magnitude than previous half-hearted preparations on the part of the Italians. The decoded Italian messages were particularly important in this respect as they made it clear how much pressure was being applied by Balbo’s staff to have troops ready for imminent action.

Dill had also consulted with Admiral Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord, who had provided a memo stating that if Alexandria were to be taken by the Italians, then the entire position of the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean would be compromised, completely erasing the gains made by the attack on Taranto. In such circumstances Malta would potentially be exposed to attack and support of the Greeks would be all but impossible if the Mediterranean Fleet were forced to withdraw to Gibraltar. Dill also pointed out that if the Italians had Alexandria their logistical constraints would be greatly eased and they might then be able to threaten Suez, which would render the current efforts in East Africa to secure access to the Red Sea moot. That Dill and Pound were engaging in a fair bit of scaremongering with these ominous scenarios. That they did so reflected their determination that the British armed forces should avoid any further humiliating retreats because they had underestimated the strength and guile of Axis forces. Arguably they were in fact being influenced by the ‘guile’ of Marshal Badoglio, though given the progress of the attack on Egypt Badoglio would have cause to regret this success [4].

From the perspective of British prestige, the loss of the Suez Canal would be a major blow. The practical impact was lessened by the decision to reroute much of the shipping that normally passed through the canal around the Horn of Africa and thus the Suez Canal was not critical as a supply route at this time. The threat to Alexandria was far worse in practical terms, unhinging the entire British position in the Middle East and the Mediterranean, would supporting the Greeks be worth the potential cost? Especially if as seemed increasingly possible the Germans might intervene in support of the Italian offensive. Further complicating matter would be the Iraqi coup at the beginning of April, which will be discussed in more detail later, suffice to say for the moment this put further demands on British forces in the region.

The threat to Alexandria was the clinching arguments for Churchill and the one that he would put to the War Cabinet when they discussed the matter on the 8th of March. Eden was unhappy at having to send diplomats to explain to the Greeks that the dispatch of troops would be ‘postponed’. Any final decision was postponed by the launch of the Italian offensive on the 9th of March and indeed the ebb and flow of the fighting in the Balkans would lead to the question of troops for Greece being repeatedly revisited, practically until the conclusion of Operation Marita [5].

This offensive provoked some apprehension in London, but it proved to be an abject failure for the Italians. The initial assault failed and a flanking attack on the 11th was equally unsuccessful. The Italians introduced fresh troops but by the 15th they were forced to shut the offensive down having gained no ground [6].

If any British diplomat expected that this would improve the morale of the Greeks and make the bad news they had to share more palatable they would be disappointed. The Greeks were fully aware by this time that the Yugoslavs were coming under pressure from the Germans to sign the Tripartite Pact and grant transit rights to the Germans. If the Yugoslavs capitulated to these demands it would massively extend the front the Greeks had to defend, not to mention the threat from the Bulgarian border and leave them facing forces that had proven themselves far more capable than their Italian counterparts.

The Greeks may have hoped that news of Yugoslavia signing the Tripartite Pact on the 25th of March would persuade the British to reconsider their position on sending troops, it simply reinforced opposition to the idea and the coup that overthrew the Yugoslav government on the 27th did nothing to change anyone’s mind. Dill consulted with his subordinates and presented the conclusion that holding Greece in the event of attacks from Yugoslavia would require the deployment of as much as twenty divisions and this was simply impractical barring completely denuding Egypt and compromising the defence of the home islands. An amphibious assault across the Channel may have been discounted but some sort of attempt at an airborne coup de main was still being taken seriously. The Greeks would continue to receive supplies, and measures would be taken to shore up the defences on Crete, but even though the matter would still be revisited in cabinet throughout April the Greeks would fight on alone [7].

This seemed like a success for Italian strategy, though they would have been far less happy to learn how badly Balbo’s plan for the attack on Egypt had been compromised. Nonetheless when the 10th Army finally launched their invasion of Egypt on the 5th of April things seemed to go well at first, and with the opening of Operation Marita there seemed to be a light at the end of the tunnel for Mussolini, though it would soon turn out this was the eponymous oncoming train [8].

[1] So yes, the Greeks have been getting more British equipment, but most of it is hardly the newest and as mentioned before a fair bit is US Army surplus and the Greeks are not feeling valued.

[2] As will become clear when the TL covers Iraq, Syria and Iran Wavell is far less confident about the British position than O’Connor and this will not go over well in London.

[3] So LRPG rather than LRDG here but still the same sort of derring do.

[4] It’s one thing to reluctantly go along with sending troops to Greece when the Italians seem all but beaten, quite another to do so when they are ominously massing on the Egyptian border so Dill and Pound win fight over sending troops to Greece.

[5] At this point the British still haven’t quite grasped how shockingly bad the Italian forces really are, assuming that the Italians have concentrated the best of their forces in Egypt, which they have to a degree, but they are islands in a sea of ineptitude.

[6] Skimming over this since this is basically the OTL Italian March offensive, basically another embarrassing Italian failure.

[7] That 20 division estimate was made in OTL, but somehow never shared with the War Cabinet. So bad news for Greece, but what of Crete? A multi part answer to that question will be forthcoming.

[8] And there will be not one, but several multi-parters covering Egypt and Libya.

 

[Garrison]

26th January - 25th April 1941 – The Balkans – Part III - Operation Marita​

Arguably the Yugoslav coup on the 27th of March is what ended any hope of Greece continuing to hold out against the Axis until the British decided to honour their commitments and send troops to aid them. The Yugoslav government under Dragiša Cvetković that signed the Tripartite Pact did so with the greatest reluctance and insisted on a provision that Yugoslavia would not allow the right of transit for Axis troops across their territory, this did little to quell public demonstration by Serbs denouncing the treaty and the government. The denial of transit rights was a serious impediment to German plans and while an attack from Bulgaria may have proven fatal to the Greek position regardless there was perhaps some small chance of it being held or repulsed considering the complete failure of the renewed Italian offensive. The prospect of a pro-Allied coup in Yugoslavia had been bubbling away for months, with the support of Prince Peter, the heir to the Yugoslav throne. He was only 17 at the time of the coup and Yugoslavia was technically under the regency of Prince Paul. Part of the coup’s political process was to pronounce Peter of age and make him king. This was followed by a repudiation of Yugoslavia’s membership of the Tripartite Pact. As much as the British had encouraged the formation of a pro-Allied government in Yugoslavia the timing was catastrophic. The German forces that had been gathered to pass through Yugoslavia were now free to carry out an invasion and push into Greece [1].

Worse was to come for the Greeks on the 2nd of April with the Italian attack on Egypt and the British being routed and fleeing before the vastly superior Italian forces, or at least this was what happened according to Italian propaganda, which seemed far more plausible than British assurances that they had prepared for this contingency and would swiftly strike back. Whichever version of the situation anyone chose to believe this development meant that there was now no hope of British reinforcements being dispatched, indeed it seemed possible that the British would be ousted completely from the Mediterranean. Some in the USA claimed made these exact claims, primarily those who had opposed Lend-Lease and it was perhaps fortunate that this had been passed into law before the Italian invasion and the British response would swiftly dispel such notions of imminent collapse. Even with their entire strategic position seemingly unravelling the Greeks were not about to simply surrender and prepared themselves as best they could for a renewed Axis offensive. They didn’t have to wait long as the Axis Launched Operation Marita on the 6th of April and it was every bit as devastating as the Greeks had feared [2].

The German 2nd Army, LI Corps and XLIX Mountain Corps, struck from Austria advancing towards Zagreb. The Italian Second Army struck east and south from Trieste towards Ljubljana and down the coast targeting Split and Dubrovnik. XLVI Panzer Corps attacked from Hungary alongside the Hungarian 3rd Army, with the former initially aimed at Zagreb and the latter at Novi Sad. The XLI Motorized Corps was stationed in Romania and its attack was aimed at Belgrade itself. From Bulgaria 1st Panzer Group attacked towards Nis and the German 12th Army sent XL Panzer Corps towards Skopje while XVIII Corp and XXX Corps attacked Greek Macedonia and Thrace.

The Yugoslav cause also faced major setbacks from the air. The Luftwaffe bombed and strafed the airfields of the Yugoslav Air Force, despite this many of the YAFs aircraft survived and they launched continued attacks on German mechanized columns and on Bulgarian airfields. The Luftwaffe also mounted heavy attacks on Belgrade. These killed about four thousand civilians and severed the lines of communication between the Yugoslav high command and their forces in the field.

On paper the Yugoslav armed forces were still about twice the strength of the invading forces, the situation on the ground was quite different. Croat and Slovene soldiers simply refused to fight in the defence of the entity called Yugoslavia, immediately undermining defence efforts. Worse was the abysmal situation with supplies and equipment. Front line troops were supposed to receive priority but even amongst these units there were critical shortages of such basics as clothing and boots. The situation with food and medical supplies was even worse and such supplies that were available couldn’t be replenished.

Under these circumstances the rapid deterioration of the Yugoslav position was all but inevitable and the XLI Motorized Corps reaching Belgrade on the 17th. King Peter III and much of the Yugoslav government had been airlifted out by the remnants of the YAF to Greece, along with Yugoslavia’s gold reserves, two days earlier. An armistice and the unconditional surrender of all Yugoslav forces was agreed the same day the Germans reached Belgrade, and this came into force on the 18th, meaning the German forces were now free to concentrate on the Greeks. In response to the rapid German advance urgent discussions were underway in London, the subject was no longer intervention but evacuation [3].

[1] Basically this was a suicidal move on the part of the Yugoslavs, and I doubt a few divisions of British troops would have affected the outcome. What the Germans would have done if the coup had been prevented is an interesting question though.

[2] As politically awkward as it might have been this is the right decision and will be bad news for 10th Army and the Fallschirmjägers.

[3] So the Yugoslav develops as per OTL. In the end barring the British conjuring 20 extra divisions from somewhere the best that could be done would have been to postpone the inevitable, with serious consequences elsewhere.

 

[Garrison]

26th January – 25th April 1941 – The Balkans – Part IV - The Metaxas Line, the Aliakamon Line and Evacuation​

The Greek response to the threat of invasion from Bulgaria was the formation of the Metaxas Line, a defensive position stretching across Thrace and Macedonia, manned by the Greek 2nd Army. This was further broken down into the Eastern Macedonia Army Section and the Central Macedonia Army Section, who would largely fight their own separate battles until the retreat from the line forced them to merge together. Many of the divisions with the 2nd Army were newly formed, filled with reservists and lacking in heavy weapons and other equipment, far from ideal to face heavily armed and highly experienced Wehrmacht troops. The 19th Mechanized Division for example had been raised only in January and its formation was only completed in March. Its complement of vehicles was largely composed of captured Italian tankettes and British Universal Carriers, as well as Mk VI Bs and the last remaining running Covenanters, probably no more than four of them in total. Some tank historians claim this as the last combat action seen by the Covenanter; the evidence suggests however that the Covenanters fell victim to accidents and mechanical breakdowns rather than enemy action [1].

The fate of the 19th was representative of the whole Eastern Macedonia Army Section, the division was destroyed in a series of piecemeal fights with the advancing Germans and by the 9th it was finished as a fighting formation. The whole of 2nd army had no choice but to fall back. In fact, many of the senior commanders in the army had advocated doing so far earlier. Politically it had not been possible to agree to giving up so much territory without a fight, however with no British divisions being dispatched to reinforce the line contingencies were put in place. Essentially the Greek Army was permitted to withdraw ‘if absolutely necessary’. In the case of 2nd Army that necessity had been recognized far too late in the day. 1st Army fared somewhat better.

1st Army began falling back almost as soon as the Axis forces attacked, even so they had underestimated the speed of the German advance and only about half its divisions successfully withdrew, joining the surviving elements of 2nd army on the far shorter and more defensible Aliakamon Line, a position they should arguably have been deployed to in the first place once the lack of British troops and the likelihood of German attack was confirmed. The scale of the Axis attacks meant that even at full strength it is unlikely that 1st and 2nd Armies could have held the Aliakamon Line. Given their weakened state the 2nd Army had no choice except to withdraw, taking some of the remnants of 1st Army with them. The larger part of 1st Army’s surviving formations found themselves pitched into the role of rear-guard and soon found themselves surrounded and isolated by superior forces with no prospect of breaking out. That they managed to hold out until the 22nd of April, delaying the German advance in the process was a testament to their tenacity[2].

The remnants of 2nd Army and the survivors of the 1st fell back into the Peloponnese and towards Athens, heading for the ports of Kalamata, Nauplia, Rafina, and Porto Rafti desperately hoping for British intervention in the shape of the Royal Navy. If the Greeks had been angry and disappointed at the failure of the British Army, they could have no complaints about the Royal Navy who had already been earmarking shipping and drawing up plans in the event, yet another evacuation was needed and had begun mobilizing as early as the 18th. The retreating Greek troops were greeted by Royal Navy shore parties deployed to engage in traffic control and to try and ensure that at least some of the small arms belonging to the Greek troops were gathered up for future use. Such considerations were not high on the agenda of Greek troops looking to escape the clutches of the Wehrmacht, and yet a surprising number of rifles and ammunition did end up on the evacuation ships, to the alarm of their crews who crates containing loaded rifles and grenades stuffed in wherever there was room for them [3].

The retreat and the evacuation of the was assisted not only by the desperate rear-guard actions of 1st Army, but also by the fact that the Wehrmacht was already looking to wind down their involvement in the Balkans. With the Greeks routed and no British intervention on the ground, barring the aforementioned shore parties, the priority of Hitler and thus that of the Wehrmacht, had shifted fully back to Barbarossa. Luftwaffe units, particularly Ju 87 dive bombers who had once again proven useful in the close support role, were withdrawn. Motorized and mechanized units of the army were ordered to halt and regroup as a prelude to also being ordered to pull out, with only relatively modest forces given free rein to continue the pursuit. The Greeks were thus harried all the way to the Peloponnese, but not overrun. There was little protest from the German Generals over this decision. Greece was finished, the possible evacuation of a few thousand, second rate, troops was irrelevant since their country was already being occupied and many of the Generals were every bit as eager as Hitler to crush the Bolshevik menace, whatever they may have claimed in their memoirs [4].

The Greek and Yugoslav governments, again along with their national treasuries were flown out on the 21st, with the last RAF personnel being evacuated by air and sea the following day. As the fall of Athens became inevitable there was increasing disorder amongst the Greek troops waiting to embark on the evacuation ships. More than once troops scheduled for embarkation had a change of heart and chose not to depart, others fought with over access to the ships. Despite these complications some 30,000 Greek troops were taken off in the official evacuation, and several thousand more escaped by dint of their own efforts over the next couple of weeks. Most of the escapees soon found themselves on Crete, with the British and the Greek government in exile facing the herculean task of restoring them as an effective fighting force. This would take months to complete, with about 8,000 men choosing to return to Greece over time. Some though were eager to fight the Axis once more and some were ready for action in time to take part in the fighting during Operation Mercury. The surrender of Greece formally took place on the 25th of April [5].

Nazi propaganda was swift to play up the lack of intervention in Greece and the retreat from the border in Egypt as signs of the fundamental weakness of the British and how they were inevitably doomed and should see sense and ask for peace terms. Phrases such as ‘a toothless lion’ and ‘perfidious Albion’ peppered the speeches made by Goebbels and even William Joyce, Lord Haw-Haw, was rolled out to make broadcasts. It seems that the only people convinced by German propaganda were the Wehrmacht as it is hard to explain the conduct of the attack on Crete in any other way. As for the Italians despite the best efforts of their own propaganda the end of the campaign in the Balkans was treated with relief rather than a sense of triumph among the general populace. The reality was that it had been won largely by German intervention. Still the Italians would largely be left in control of Greece and much of the Yugoslav coast so Mussolini could point to territorial gains, though how exactly any of these gains would bolster the Italian cause was unclear [6].

Possibly the greatest danger to the British came from Isolationists in the USA seizing on the failure of the British to support Greece with troops on the ground as proof that Lend-Lease was simply pouting US money and equipment down the drain as Britain was clearly incapable of defending either their allies or even their own Imperial possessions. This narrative of British weakness combined with calls for more arms to be retained for use by US forces could have had serious implications, if some of the loudest voices hadn’t not adopted a slightly hysterical tone, claiming that the British had betrayed the Greeks and were no better than the Germans when it came to keeping their word. That there had been no such word given was all but irrelevant in the narrative that took root in certain isolationist circles and rather than trying to refute it point by point it was far simpler for the British propaganda machine in the USA to spin such attacks as being less isolationist and far more pro-Nazi. Divisions even opened in Isolationist ranks as some were deeply uncomfortable at such comparisons. Overall, the British weathered the storm and with in a few weeks events elsewhere would make the disaster in Greece into yesterday’s news, much to the relief of Churchill and his military chiefs [7].

At sea the Regia Marina had continued to suffer when it was forced to engage the Royal Navy. An effort to intercept a large British convoy intended to deliver supplies and equipment to Crete and Greece had resulted in a one-sided battle off Cape Matapan with further heavy Italian losses, and as far as East Africa was concerned the Italians could do nothing to provide support as they were bottled up in the Mediterranean so long as the British controlled the Suez Canal. Even protecting the convoys trying to support 10th Army was now a major challenge for the battered Italian fleet. The situation on land in East Africa was no better. Despite assurances that a counterattack was imminent the Italian situation continued to deteriorate. The situation in Egypt was the only bright spot, which wasn’t to last as Wavell and O’Connor were already preparing Operation Compass and they would shortly prove that the British lion was anything but toothless [8].

[1] So OTL the 19th was largely equipped with tankettes, here they are a little better of equipment wise, which unfortunately won’t help them much in the fighting.

[2] This still better than OTL for 1st Army where practically the entire army was surrounded and captured before they could fall back to the Aliakamon Line.

[3] So the quicker withdrawal won’t save Greece, but it will save a lot of Greek troops.

[4] The reason for so much complaining about the decision to limit the pursuit is basically blame shifting over the next battle after the Greek mainland is occupied.

[5] And the battle the German Generals are so bitter about is of course Crete.

[6] So it’s a victory, it’s a pyrrhic one for the Italians and the Germans don’t gain much of any use and Yugoslavia will in due course become another sink for men and materiel.

[7] So yes Greece doesn’t go down well with some in the US, but the Isolationists overplay their hand.

[8] So Compass is coming soon, but there will be one more bit of shuffling of the deck as far as commanders go before we get there.

 

[Garrison]

1st April – 31st August 1941 – Iraq, Syria, and Iran – Part I​

The fighting in the Balkans, followed by the actions in Crete, Ethiopia and Egypt tend to overshadow everything that happened in the Middle East during 1941. The reality was that securing the British position in the region required multiple interventions, a series of actions that flatly contradicted the prevalent attitude in Rome and Berlin that the British were overextended and lacked the means to fight back. They would be too distracted by events in the Balkans and Egypt to understand how wrong they were until disaster fell on them directly and those in the region who looked to the Axis for support would be disappointed and find themselves left to face the wrath of the British alone [1].

The government of Iraq in early 1941 was nominally pro-British, with though a significant element of anti-British and pro-German cabinet ministers and senior army officers. Rashid Ali al-Gaylani had served as Prime Minister twice between 1940 and 1941, being forced to step down in the aftermath of Operation Judgement owing to his pro-German leanings, inspired by his strong desire for Iraqi independence and the hope that this might be achieved with German support. Out of power once again he began to co-operate with the so called ‘Golden Square’ a cabal of virulently anti-British military officers who also looked to Berlin and Rome for support. The Axis powers were happy to encourage the plotters, though the practical support they could offer amounted to a few Luftwaffe fighters and bombers, unconvincingly repainted in Iraqi colours, and some Regia Aeronautica aircraft that were obsolete even by Italian standards. Some of these aircraft would be staged through Vichy French territory, including bases in Syria. These aircraft only arrived after the coup had had taken place and had no impact on the outcome of the battle. Besides offering proof that the leaders of the coup were collaborating with the Axis the major effect of this intervention was to create problems for Vichy as the British resolved to deal with this blatantly violation of Vichy’s alleged neutrality, once the the situation in Iraq had been dealt with [2].

The British were well aware of the volatile situation in Iraq and while they didn’t want to intervene unless they had to, they did put contingencies in place. This was why General William ‘Bill’ Slim who had been wounded in the fighting in East Africa and was still recuperating found himself temporarily assigned to General Staff at GHQ in Delhi in March, where he played a major role in preparing the plans for a British response to the threat to British control in Iraq and would in due course find himself in the vanguard of those very same plans. Rashid Ali al-Gaylani and the plotters remained oblivious to this and pressed ahead with their plans, egged on by the Axis and convinced the British would have no choice but to negotiate for full Iraqi independence rather than face a costly battle for control of the country. They were hardly the only one to entertain such sentiments in the Middle East and the fate of the plotters would provide an object lesson in the folly of such beliefs. The coup was launched on the 1st of April and given the support of the military the Iraqi government had little choice except to capitulate and Rashid Ali al-Gaylani was restored to the office of Prime Minister. With this done attention moved to RAF Habanera, which was at this time the only significant British military presence in Iraq. The airbase had not been given a high priority for modernisation either in terms of its ground defences or its air group. The aircraft based at Habbaniya consisted of some one hundred and five aircraft, most either purpose-built trainers or obsolete fighters converted to serve as trainers. The one exception was the nine Hurricanes that had been deployed from Palestine a few days before the coup was launched. To protect the base itself there was one battalion from the King's Own Royal Regiment (Lancaster), well short of its establishment strength, several companies of Assyrian Levies and of course men drawn from amongst the RAF personnel. This came to around two thousand troops, backed up by eighteen armoured cars.

The Iraqi force dispatched to Habbaniya was far more powerful, with a full infantry brigade and an artillery brigade, plus armoured cars, tanks, and support from the Royal Iraqi Air Force, which possessed many modern aircraft, including some British models. When they arrived on the plain above Habbaniya the Iraqis issued demands that neither aircraft nor troops should leave or enter RAF Habbaniya. The reaction from the British was to set out their own demands, namely that the Iraqis should immediately withdraw from the area. The British forces went so far as to issue an ultimatum to the Iraqis and when this expired on the 2nd of May they launched air attacks against the Iraqi troops. The training aircraft may have been only lightly armed, but they proved more than a match for the Iraqi air force, who were not able to even prevent the arrival of a quartet of Blenheim bombers on the 3rd of May. When the Hurricanes joined the battle, they inflicted such severe losses that the RIAF didn’t just withdraw from the fighting around Habbaniya, they effectively abandoned the coup altogether [3].

Even before the climax of events at Habbaniya British forces were on the move to crush the coup, though these plans were almost undone when the Italians launched their invasion of Egypt only a few days after the coup. It would be wrong to say that Wavell panicked, he simply saw Iraq as a pointless diversion and one that now threatened far more vital strategic considerations, he event went so far as to suggest a withdrawal from Palestine, which given the political situation there might well have led to another anti-British coup. Churchill and Brooke in London saw things rather differently. Wavell had been given plenty of time and resources to prepare for the Italian attack and General O’Connor as field commander of the Western Desert Force seemed confident of being able to hold them, a confidence vindicated as the Italian advance rapidly ran out of steam. Far from agreeing to scale back on operations in Iraq Wavell’s superiors in London insisted that he commit the needed resources to deal with the coup as swiftly as possible precisely so efforts could be concentrated in Egypt. This proved somewhat optimistic as we shall see, but Wavell did his level best to comply. Confidence in Wavell had declined sharply in the wake of this, and it appears Churchill discussed with Brooke the question of replacing Wavell as early as the 20th of April, with both General Claude Auchinleck and General Harold Alexander being suggested as possible candidates [4].

On the 17th of April several hundred troops were airlifted into RAF Shaibah, near Basra, with a seaborne landing at Basra the following day, supported by a Royal Naval force including the carrier HMS Glorious, bringing in several more battalions and effectively securing the vital hub at Basra. In a highly optimistic move Rashid Ali, the head of state in the government installed by the coup, called for the British to deploy no more troops to Basra until those already there had marched out of the country. This request was passed through diplomatic channels to London, where it was naturally rejected as the troops were there to help secure British control in Iraq, though this information was not shared with Rashid Ali. The purpose of the rapidly building troops strength in Basra was made clear anyway in its designation as Iraq Force. The operations out of Basra suffered a small set back when the commander of the Indian 10th Infantry Division, Major-General Fraser, fell ill. Fortunately, General Slim had been dispatched to take up a staff position and he was now given command of the 10th Indian. This was the beginning of a long relationship between the General division. He not only led them throughout much of the rest of 1941, but also when they were transferred to Burma in 1942 and continued to serve there after Slim assumed overall command of operations in Burma until the conclusion of the Burma campaign in 1943. Slim would establish a reputation as one of Britain’s most capable Generals during his time in Burma, though he never quite reached the level of fame of his more PR friendly counterpart in Malaya [5].

Basra was not the only direction from which forces were dispatched. General Wavell in overall command of forces in the Middle East had initially been concerned about the prospect of dispatching a force from Palestine, but with intelligence providing reassurance that the Italian advance in Egypt was unlikely to resume he did formulate a plan to dispatch two formations into Iraq. The first was a column of the Arab Legion dispatched towards the fort at Rutbah. This had been seized by elements of the Iraqi Desert police who had opened fire on British workers in Rutbah itself. The Arab Legion column was supported by No. 2 Armoured Car Company RAF, dispatched ahead of the main British column and a trio of Cruiser Mk II tanks. The exact origin of these tanks is still something of a mystery, but a number of these older models were in Palestine for internal security and this trio seems to have simply been scooped up by some local officer and dispatched to Iraq without any formal orders to do so being issued. They were nonetheless highly useful as the Arab Legion column halted near the fort on the 8th of May and waited for the RAF to bomb it. This attempt was less than successful but it did rattle the defenders and a probing attack with the tanks in the lead, backed by No. 2 Armoured Car, was simply too much for the defenders of the fort who concluded that the armoured car force was in fact comprised of tanks and surrender before dusk on the 8th. A column of some forty machine gun armed trucks intended to reinforce the Iraqi defenders of the fort arrived after nightfall and being unaware that the fort had surrendered found themselves in a confused action where both sides suffered friendly fire casualties, though the truck force came off worst and barely a dozen survived to withdraw [6].

The second and much more powerful force dispatched from Palestine was called Habforce, short for Habbaniya Force as one its major objectives was the relief of the RAF base. Habforce was, with some small additions and subtractions the 1st Cavalry Division, which was indeed cavalry, not an armoured formation. Its operations would effectively be the last cavalry action undertaken by the British. Some criticism was levelled at Wavell for not using it to form a mobile column earlier, however the divisions attached artillery and mechanized transport had been constantly earmarked for detachment to other operations and by the time it was clear that these plans had been abandoned it was all rather late in the day for creating such a formation. Nonetheless the 1st Cavalry Division was at full strength when it entered Iraq on the 10th of May, and it had been given some modern cavalry equivalents to aid it in the form of four troops of Mk VI B Light Tanks. Like the cruiser tanks these had been dispatched to Palestine for security duties, for which they were far better equipped than they had been for combat operations in France. Neither the machines nor their crews were the best the British had to offer; against the limited resources of the Iraqi Army they would prove quite adequate. Major-General George Clark, commanding the 1st soon decided to take advantage of the more mechanized elements available to him by creating a ‘flying column’ called Kingcol after its commander, Brigadier James Kingstone. This force contained some cavalry units as well as all the tanks and most of the armoured cars available to General Clark. With word of the surrender Kingcol was ordered to bypass it and catch up with the Arab Legion column and reach Habbaniya as soon as possible. Linking up with the Arab Legion forces proved more difficult than expected and the two forces did not join up until Kingcol reached Habbaniya on the 15th of May. Discovering that the siege had already been lifted and that troops of the 1st battalion The Essex Regiment were already being airlifted in Kingcol swiftly moved on [7].

There were several battles fought by British, Arab legion and Indian troops over the next several weeks in and around Fallujah, and Basra. The outcome of the fighting was never in doubt by this point. Even where the Iraqis had a numerical advantage on the ground the speed of the British advance and the dominance of the RAF in the air kept them off balance and sapped their morale. The attack on Baghdad began on the night of the 25th of May and although progress was hampered by destroyed bridges and flooding cause by further sabotage. Nonetheless the National Defence Government collapsed and fled to Persia on the 27th, though some members perish in a strafing attack by RAF Hurricanes, before travelling on to take refuge in Germany. On the 28th the Mayor of Baghdad arranged the surrender of the city and by the end of May a pro-British government was back in control of Iraq. This may have been the end of the fighting in Iraq, many of the British forces involved would however soon find themselves deployed to deal with the Vichy regimes in the Levant and working with the Red Army to occupy Iran [8].

[1] These battles really tend to get lost in the shuffle when compared to what was happening elsewhere. These updates are intended to redress the balance, and there will be an impact on future events courtesy of the Alt version of these battles.

[2] Hardly the only nationalists to think the Nazis would be an upgrade over the British Empire, I guess distance did lend a certain charm.

[3] So OTL the Iraqi Air Force did lose to the training aircraft, but there were no Hurricanes so they sort of stayed in the fight as best they could. Facing first line modern fighters is their breaking point here.

[4] Again OTL Wavell suggested making a deal with the coup plotters anyway. Here his suggestion of getting out of Palestine means confidence in him declines far faster than OTL, where at least he could count on the success of Compass and the diversion in Greece as a justification for his caution.

[5] So the beginning of Slim’s rise to prominence and I decided at the last moment not to include the name of the General who makes his name in Malaya.

[6] OTL the armoured cars only joined up later and there were no tanks, the fight with the armed trucks wasn’t quite the rout depicted here.

[7] And 1st Cavalry did take part in the fighting as described, with the differences that its artillery and mechanized transport ended up joining the piles of equipment abandoned in Greece, and they had no supporting armour. Despite this they acquitted themselves well in the fighting. Also, the fighting dragged on a little longer at Rutbah in OTL, so Kingcol didn’t bypass it.

[8] Overall the fighting wraps up a few days earlier than OTL, and Wavell is hanging on to his position by a thread at this point.

 

[Garrison]

1st April – 31st August 1941 – Iraq, Syria, and Iran – Part II​

The planes dispatched by the Luftwaffe to support the Iraqi had achieved nothing militarily. Even as a token gesture of support they had no impact as the morale of the Iraqi Air force collapsed in the first days of the fighting and left them to engage in an unequal struggle with the RAF. Likewise painting them in Iraqi colours and ordering crews to remove all identifying papers proved to be a waste of effort. Efforts to ‘sanitize’ the aircraft were haphazard and identification documents and other items found in the wreckage of those aircraft that were shot down provided all the proof needed that these were Luftwaffe airplanes manned by Luftwaffe crews.

The only thing of significance this intervention did achieve was to convince the British that the Vichy holdings in Syria and Lebanon were a threat to British security in the region that could not be tolerated. Even if Syria had not been used to stage the Luftwaffe planes to Iraq its potential as a jumping off point for attacks into British possessions would have marked it out for invasion sooner or later, the clear violation of its neutral status meant that sooner was the chosen option. Wavell was hardly enthusiastic, even with the Italian attack having come to a halt and preparations for Operation Compass largely complete Wavell argued hard against an intervention. Once again floating the idea of a diplomatic solution, or simply handing the operation off to the Free French. The Free French were certainly willing to try and win over Vichy Syria to their cause, they were far less enthusiastic to discover that Wavell intended to offer literally no British support for the operation, which prompted bitter complaints from de Gaulle directly to Churchill. Wavell had lost the confidence of Churchill after his wavering over the Iraq coup, this was seen as the final straw. [1]

Faced with the fact that London was not about to postpone or abandon their demands for action Wavell decided it would be best to strike quickly and get it over with. This decision received wholehearted support from London, with a strong undertone that this is what Wavell should have done in the first place. Many of the units that had taken part in the fighting in Iraq were swiftly redeployed for action in Syria. The 1st Cavalry Division and the Indian 10th Indian Infantry Division would lead the attacks from along the Iraqi front while further columns attacked from Palestine and the main British targets were Damascus and Beirut. The Free French had continued to negotiate with the Syrians, however their assurances that the Vichy forces would quickly capitulate were taken with a pinch of salt and the British were not going to pull any punches in the hopes of a quick surrender. The British would also enjoy an advantage in the air as the RAF squadrons were now being reinforced by Royal Australian Air Force Tomahawk fighters, a version of the American P40 fighter. In addition the RAF has also deployed elements of RAF 32 squadron, which had been training with the Hurribomber variant of the Hurricane II and had been dispatched to support the British operations in Iraq and provide a field test of the aircraft. They arrived too late to assist in suppressing the coup, they did however prove valuable in Syria [2].

The Vichy forces in Syria were not short of airpower themselves, they possessed a somewhat stronger air force than the British were able to deploy at the beginning of the Syrian campaign. The Vichy French Air Force in Syria deployed mostly French built aircraft such as the Dewoitine D.520 fighter as well as several imported types, with the Martin 167 ‘Maryland’ light bomber being the most common such model deployed to Syria. What the Vichy air force in the region lacked was any sort of integrated air defence system, which combined with a shortage of anti-aircraft guns made the Vichy aircraft extremely vulnerable to being caught on the ground, a fact the British ruthlessly exploited when they opened their attack on the Vichy holdings by striking at all the main Vichy air force bases, with the base at Homs taking the brunt of the first wave of attacks. These attacks were carried out primarily with Blenheim light bombers, but the Hurribombers were also blooded in these attacks and would prove highly useful since they could be used to support conventional light bombers in the attack, but if enemy fighters were encountered they could jettison their bomb load and engage as fighters, with unfortunate results for the Vichy French aircraft as they had been equipped with 20mm cannon, partly to make them more effective in the ground attack role. The RAAF Tomahawks also proved a match for the French fighters. The deployment of the Hurricane meant that large numbers of P40s purchased from the USA, some courtesy of French orders placed before July 1940, had instead been sent to Australia and other ‘colonial’ air forces and thus had been available in numbers to reinforce the British position in North and East Africa when the more powerful British fighters had been prioritized for the defence of the British mainland. Vichy sent further air reinforcements as the fighting went on, achieving little more than depleting their reserves as the British never lost the air superiority they had gained in these first attacks [3].

This advantage was invaluable to the offensive as the idea that the Vichy troops defending the Levant would swiftly capitulate and throw in their lot with the Free French proved wide of the mark. A few defections did take place, but the bulk of the Vichy forces stood their ground and fought hard. This prompted some on the British side to bitterly comment that if they had fought this hard in 1940 they wouldn’t have lost to the Germans and some went so far as to suggest they were out and out fascists. This was an unfair characterization of most of the Vichy forces. As far as they were concerned the British were invaders and the Free French were traitors who were jeopardising the survival of France by prolonging the war and many had families back in France who were vulnerable to retaliation if they were seen to simply give up. Whatever the motivations of the Vichy troops they did their best to repel the invasion, even while they were outgunned and outmanoeuvred. There was heavy fighting as the 10th Indian Division under Slim advanced towards Aleppo and the major formations attacking from Palestine, 5th Indian Brigade Group, 1st Free French Division, and 7th Australian Division encountered fierce resistance as they drove towards Beirut and Damascus.

Even as British forces were steadily advancing Wavell’s time ran out. There had been some arguments that replacing him might derail operations in the Middle east, however with things running relatively smoothly in terms of the advance in the Levant and preparations for Compass now all but complete the decision was finally made and Wavell was replaced by General Harold Alexander on the 18th of June. Alexander himself was sympathetic to Wavell’s position, still he was perhaps a little more aggressive than Wavell, which made him well suited to deal with the situation in Egypt and Libya as the scope of Operation Compass rapidly expanded [4].

This high-level reorganization did nothing to change the grim situation for the Vichy troops in Syria or Lebanon. With their available armour and artillery largely either destroyed or abandoned in the face of the advancing British Empire and Free French forces and under near constant air attack by RAF and RAAF aircraft it was clear by the beginning of July that they faced little choice but to lay down their arms. The formal surrender took place on the 6th of July. This came as a great relief to the British, now determined to focus all their efforts towards capitalizing on the stunning success of Operation Compass. This was not to be as it became necessary to intervene in Iran to secure a crucial route for the supply of Lend-Lease to the Soviets, and the operation would be carried out in conjunction with the Red Army

General Alexander may well have had reason to baulk at yet another operation being mounted after Iraq and Syria, especially with the rapidly developing situation in Libya. The operation against Iran would prove to be little more than a minor bump in the road as far as Operation Compass was concerned. Iran was a concern to the British because of its oil reserves and its notably pro-German leanings. This was another case of leaders assuming that ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’, without really comprehending the nature of Nazi Germany. Hitler might have been willing to mouth a few warm words about the Muslim faith while the British held much of the Middle East but given that both Vichy France and Italy had substantial holdings in Africa and the Middle East, he had no interest in any nationalist movements in the region beyond their ability to create trouble for the British or give Germany access to vital resources. Had the Nazi regime gained control over these countries they would have found themselves as ruthlessly exploited as any other German conquest.

Iran had also acted as a haven for leading elements of the Iraqi coup before they moved on to more permanent residence in Germany. With the Wehrmacht steadily advancing east the USSR was interested in securing the Trans-Iranian Railway and the so-called Persian Corridor, the aforementioned vital route for shipping Lend-Lease. The British attacked on the 25th of August with forces advancing overland from India and Iraq and an amphibious assault from Kuwait. The Soviets attacked from the North in a two-pronged attack, one headed towards Tabriz and the other towards Bandar Shah. In the face of such overwhelming force the Iranians could do little and the limiting factor on the rate of advance was the speed of the British and Soviet forces, with the operation being successfully concluded by the 31st of August.

With the seizure of Iran any last hopes the Axis forces might have entertained to stir rebellion against the British ended. Those hostile to British rule in Egypt certainly took the lesson to heart and largely rebuffed German efforts to draw them into any schemes akin to the coup in Iraq and instead chose to bide their time. The largest impact of Axis efforts in Egypt was the capture and turning of several German agents who were used to funnel disinformation, which was of great help to the Western Desert Force as Operation Compass advanced [5].

[1] So yes Wavell is on his way out as a far as the Middle East goes, he really did rather dither OTL over these other operations and as was usually the case when Churchill lost faith in a senior General that General was going to have to go.

[2] This is a significant improvement over OTL as the Vichy forces in Syria enjoyed air superiority for much of the fighting. Obviously no Hurribombers IOTL.

[3] The British weren’t in a position OTL to be so proactive in the air as they are here.

[4] So Wavell departs about the same time he did OTL but owing to a minor butterfly his replacement is Alexander not Auchinleck, Alexander was one of the options for the job OTL.

[5] Iran just had to be covered since joint operations between the British Army and Red Army in WWII were hardly common. All three of these actions really do tend to get overlooked, rather unfairly.

 

[Garrison]

11th April 1941 – The Battle of the Denmark Strait​

The Kriegsmarine decision to send the battleship Bismarck and the Heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen on a raiding mission into the Atlantic had been under discussion for some months, however Admiral Günther Lütjens, in overall command aboard the Bismarck, wanted to wait for reinforcements, specifically he wanted to wait until the Bismarck’s sister ship Tirpitz was ready for operations. Lütjens plans were thwarted by a series of British air raids on the battlecruiser Gneisenau, which was in drydock at Brest undergoing repairs after a previous operation in the Atlantic. The first raid on the night of 30th march did no real damage, during the second however a 500lb armour piercing bomb penetrated the deck, cause heavy damage to the ships machinery and dislodging the rear turret from its mounting. Further attacks over the next several days exacerbated the damage and despite various repair efforts constant British attention meant it never saw service again during the war [1].

The damage to the Gneisenau provoked much dismay in Berlin and Admiral Raeder was now worried that if he delayed dispatching Bismarck and Prinz Eugen the British might catch them in port and take matters out of his hands. He now ordered Lütjens to make ready and depart no later than the 9th of April. Lütjens was unhappy with this order, feeling it was unnecessarily rushed and that his force was out of reach of the RAF or the FAA. His protests were dismissed so Lütjens had no choice but to obey and prepare, hoping his ships could slip through the Denmark Straits and into the Atlantic before the Royal Navy could react, in this as so much else his hopes were frustrated. Between coast watchers, radio traffic, and other intelligence assets the British were fully aware of the intended breakout the German ships were coming and prepared a reception accordingly.

Several groups of Royal navy warships were hunting for the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen, the ‘honour’ of engaging them would fall to the battleship HMS Prince of Wales and the battlecruiser HMS Hood, supported by the cruisers HM Suffolk and HMS Norfolk and half a dozen destroyers. Prince of Wales was the newest battleship in Royal Navy service, having commissioned in September of 1940. Hood on the other hand had been commissioned in 1920 and was regarded as one of the most prestigious ships in the fleet, which was part of the reason she had been sent for a major refit in 1939 that among other things increased her deck armour to a full six inches, which would prove of considerable importance in the coming battle. She had returned to service in October 1940 and had engaged in a couple of patrols before being called on to assist in stopping the Bismarck. The force was commanded by Vice Admiral Lancelot Ernest Holland aboard the Hood [2].

Suffolk and Norfolk were sent out to scout for the German ships and at 23:30 hours on the 10th Norfolk spotted both ships and doggedly maintained contact for the next several hours waiting for Prince of Wales and Hood to close. Importantly Norfolk confirmed to Holland that the ‘cruiser’, actually Prinz Eugen, was leading the way with Bismarck behind her, the opposite of what the Admiral had assumed. This led to him placing Prince of Wales at the vanguard of the formation and ordering the supporting destroyers to concentrate on the lead ship along with Suffolk and Norfolk. The flow of information also allowed Holland to make a fast head on approach towards the German vessels, looking to catch them broadside silhouetted against the horizon, giving him the maximum advantage [3].

Lütjens was not oblivious to the fact his force was being shadowed, he did however face the dilemma of how to respond and finally decided on turn to the west at about 01:30 hours, hoping to shake off the shadowing Norfolk and evade any approaching Royal navy capital ship. This manoeuvre did provoke a brief panic when Norfolk did lose contact, fortunately she reacquired the German ships at 0210 hours. The shift in course did somewhat throw off Holland’s plans and as his ships closed, he would have to settle for a far less optimal approach than he had hoped for, with his ships having to turn sharply as they engaged to bring their firepower to bear. This would also put the Hood in a temporarily exposed position. Holland stuck to his plan, detaching the destroyers to support Norfolk, targeting Prinz Eugen while Prince of Wales and Hood focused on the Bismarck.

The engagement began just after 0525 hours, with the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen being faintly illuminated against the horizon and it was Bismarck that fired the first salvo and as result created a controversy that has raged for years. One shell in the salvo scored a direct hit on the deck of the Hood, gouging a long scar in the 6in armour. After the war some analysis suggested that if it had not been for the enhanced deck armour the shell would have penetrated a magazine, with potentially catastrophic results. Others have argued that this a rather melodramatic interpretation and it would have taken a one in a million shot for the Bismarck to have destroyed the Hood in this manner [4]. There have been no such arguments about the effects of the salvo Hood delivered in return. One shell struck Bismarck’s second forward turret, jamming it and preventing it being rotated, it would take the ship’s crew nearly forty-five minutes to restore the mechanism, and even then, it turned with an appalling sound of metal grinding on metal that did not bode well for the long-term functionality.

This damage reduced the weight of fire Bismarck was able put out as the Royal Navy capital ships manoeuvred and while the Prinz Eugen only received a few minor hits at this point in the battle it was unable to offer much in the way of fire support as it was sparring with Norfolk and the destroyers. Sea conditions were less than optimal for the smaller ships, however the number of rounds they put out meant that some hit home and while they did little damage, they did rattle the crew of the Prinz Eugen, especially as they were afraid the destroyers might launch torpedo attacks. Things grew worse for the Bismarck at 06:10, when a round from Prince of Wales struck just below the bridge. Metal splinters and shards of glass wounded many of the crew. Although Lütjens escaped with no more than a few cuts he seemed for want of a better word shellshocked and was apparently unable to comprehend that the shell hit had disrupted communications between the bridge and the rest of the ship, leaving Bismarck sailing the same straight and steady course for fifteen crucial minutes. Holland took full advantage as with this sudden simplification of the issue of aiming Hood and Prince of Wales poured salvoes into the Bismarck inflicting serious damage, with several shells penetrating her machinery rooms and forcing the ship to reduce speed, making it even harder for Bismarck to fight the battle.

By 07:00 Lütjens apparently had regained his full faculties, aided by a powerful stimulant according to some sources, and may well wish he hadn’t given the dire situation his ship faced. The jammed turret was working by this point, however the forward and rear most turrets had been destroyed and at 07:10 the second forward turret jammed once more, followed within a matter of minutes by Suffolk finally rejoining the rest of the force, which Lütjens interpreted as being the vanguard of further British reinforcements. To add to his problems this was the point in the battle at which Norfolk and the destroyers finally inflicted major damage on Prinz Eugen. The forward turret took a direct hit, almost certainly from Norfolk, and the turret was wracked by a huge explosion, caused by ammunition that had been hastily brought up as the ship tried to sustain the highest possible rate of fire.

For Holland this was the moment when he sensed blood in the water and ordered his ships to close and finish the German ships. Hood and Prince of Wales had not gotten off unscathed in the exchange with Bismarck. Hood had a turret out of action, but with the drastically reduced volume of fire from Bismarck and Prinz Eugen crippled Holland was determined that neither ship should escape. On the Bismarck Lütjens was faced with the grim truth that his command could not escape the Royal Navy and that the battle could only end with his ship sunk or worse, being taken as a prize by the Royal navy. At 07:40 Bismarck’s last turret was put out of action and despite the sea conditions the destroyers managed to put a torpedo into the bows of Prinz Eugen. With his ship being pounded to pieces Lütjens gave the order at about 07:55 to abandon ship and scuttle the Bismarck.

The desperately wounded Prinz Eugen did not receive news of this order, she carried on fighting until Prince of Wales joined the attack and Prinz Eugen began to sink at 08:40 when her pumps failed, and she could no longer fight the flow of water through her damaged hull. By 09:30 both German ships were gone, and the Royal Navy forces focused their attention on trying to rescue the crews from the water, this was tragically cut short by false reports of U-Boat sightings that forced Holland to withdraw Hood and Prince of Wales while the destroyers were tasked with searching for the non-existent U-Boats. By the time the search for survivors resumed most of those men in the water had perished and Admiral Lütjens was among those who perished. There are contradictory reports as to whether he chose to go down with his ship or whether he joined the evacuation and ended up in the water. Since his body was never recovered it remains a mystery.

What was also a mystery in some respects is that Admiral Raeder held on to his post even given this latest disaster. Hitler’s anger over the loss of the two ships was muted compared with his reaction to other events, suggesting that at this point he had already lost faith in the Kriegsmarine. This may explain why he was willing to accept the idea of simply having a ‘fleet in being’, that is the Kriegsmarine ships would tie down British resources even if they didn’t venture forth to engage the Royal Navy. This was not a recipe to encourage the allocation of greater resources to the Kriegsmarine and Doenitz complained bitterly that Raeder’s decision not only cost two warships but twenty U-Boats as plans to accelerate production were once again set back [5].

For the Royal Navy the battle was a notable victory, it was also the last major surface action they would fight against the Kriegsmarine. Both Hood and Prince of Wales would be released from the Atlantic to bolster the Royal Navy presence in the Pacific after their battle damage had been repaired. Being sent to what at the time seemed a relatively unimportant assignment may have rankled with the crews of both ships; they would however see considerable action in the aftermath of the opening of the Japanese offensive in South East Asia [6].

[1] IOTL The Gneisenau was damaged by a near miss but was eventually patched up despite further air attacks.

[2] ITTL the Prince of Wales has had time to fully work up since being commissioned and Hood got the refit it was supposed to get in 1939 that was postponed. So they are a much more effective duo here.

[3] So a small butterfly in that Norfolk spots the German ships rather than Suffolk, a larger one in that Suffolk crucially lost contact for 90 minutes while shadowing them.

[4] Obviously I couldn’t let this pass without mention and as I think I explained when I started this TL where there is a singular piece of British misfortune/German good luck I will probably reverse it, and the Bismarck’s hit on Hood is almost the most ridiculous bit of luck imaginable.

[5] With such a radically different version of the battle not so much in the way of historical notes here and apologies if I have made any egregious naval warfare errors. Raeder hanging on to his job is really a case of Hitler deciding the entire Kriegsmarine is basically useless, and the U-Boats are doing worse than OTL as well, so Doenitz isn’t seen as a better replacement.

[6] So no this isn’t the last time the PoW or Hood will turn up in the TL and indeed since I decided to expand out the TL to the end of 1942 their final fate is still undecided.

 

[Garrison]

15th April – 7th June 1941 – Crete – Part I - British and German Planning​

If they had been apprised of the situation it would certainly have aggrieved the Greeks to know that the bulk of the forces originally intended to reinforce them were not in fact retained for the defence of Egypt, but instead dispatched to Crete. This turn of events came about for several reasons. Firstly, and perhaps the most important, was the rapid end of the Italian invasion of Egypt, Operation E. Secondly Wavell was intent on meticulously preparing his counteroffensive. Operation Compass would most likely be launched at the end of June or the beginning of July. Thirdly in the face of the rapid collapse of the Yugoslav and Greek forces it was feared the Axis might try to take Crete ‘on the bounce’.

The initial proposal to reinforce Crete were relatively modest. One brigade from 2nd New Zealand Division, one squadron of light tanks and one of infantry tanks. This escalated alongside the anxiety levels and by late April the reinforcements were finalized as the whole of 2nd New Zealand and 6th Australian Infantry Divisions, with General Freyberg of the New Zealand Division in overall command, to the chagrin of the Australians. They were supported by; 3rd The King’s Own Hussars, a cavalry regiment equipped with the Mk VI B barring one squadron equipped with Cruiser IV. B Squadron of the 7th RTR deploying four Matilda II’s and about a dozen more Mk VI B’s deployed independently after being diverted from those being shipped to Greece. The crews of these later tanks were also something of a mixed bag as some were drawn from the artillery and other sources not formally trained in tank operations. Anti-aircraft support would fall to the 106th (Lancashire Yeomanry) Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment. These forces would be joining the British 14th Infantry Brigade and the 7th Medium Artillery Regiment which had been dispatched to the Island at the beginning of April [1]. There were also 6-8,000 Greek troops who had been successfully reequipped with at least rifles and grenades. There were doubts about how resolute these troops might be in the face of a German attack, no such doubts existed about the local Cretan population. They may largely have been armed with knives and farming implements but in the years after the war tourists with a strong stomach who chose to inquire about such things would be regaled of tales about what happened to German troops whose sidearm jammed or was lost and were cornered by a band of locals. On battlefields all over Europe and German soldiers eventually came together in the decades after the war to commemorate their fallen comrades, it has been claimed that no German paratrooper ever set foot on Crete to visit the war memorial built near Maleme airfield [2].

On the German side there had been some resistance from the General Staff to the idea of an attack on Crete. From their perspective Operation Marita had been an unwelcome diversion from the preparations for Operation Barbarossa and they were eager to wind down operations in the Balkan theatre as soon as Yugoslavia and Greece were secured. Hitler was for once inclined to agree with von Kleist and the Staff, Barbarossa was after all the fulfilment of his grand ideological vision and he was determined to see it carried through to success, which from von Kleist’s perspective meant incessant meddling with strategic and tactical details that he should have left to professionals. They were thus relieved at achieving this small victory for common sense, until the Luftwaffe decided to intervene, meaning of course Hermann Goering.

The Luftwaffe was eager to mount an airborne operation against Crete and knew how to exploit Hitler’s other great concern besides Barbarossa, the security of the Romanian oilfields at Ploesti. These were already vital to maintaining the mobility of the Wehrmacht and would become even more so once the flow of oil from the USSR ceased after the Wehrmacht launched Barbarossa. The Luftwaffe was aware the British were building and improving airfields on Crete, and these could be in theory be used to attack Ploesti. RAF bombing of Ploesti was certainly a concern, but it’s questionable how serious this concern was. The distance from airbases in Crete to Ploesti was almost half as long again as for RAF bombers flying from southern England to Berlin for example and n 1941 it’s unlikely the RAF could have done more than mount pinprick attacks on the oilfields. It seems that wounded pride may have played a larger role in Luftwaffe motivations than strategic concerns [3].

Whatever grand pronouncements Goering might make in public there was concern in the senior circles of the Luftwaffe that they had not been having a ‘good war’ to date. Certainly, they had performed admirably in the close support role throughout the campaigns in Europe and the Balkans, but all the glory had gone to the army. When the Luftwaffe was thrust front and centre at Dunkirk it had failed to stop the evacuation of the BEF, an event many in Berlin blamed for British intransigence. Explaining that this had always been beyond the capacity of the Luftwaffe to achieve was not something Goering would ever be prepared to admit and doing so would have hardly improved the standing of the Luftwaffe. The Eagle Days over southern England had not gone any better, with heavy causalities taken by the bombers while again failing to deliver on Goering’s promise to finish off the RAF, indeed based on the casualties and relative strengths of the two forces at the end of the battle it came closer to crushing the Luftwaffe than the RAF. The Blitz had certainly done damage to British infrastructure, while providing the British with a propaganda weapon they used, assisted by some friendly American journalism, to frame a narrative of stoic British resistance against Nazi aggression that helped shift US public opinion and smooth the path for further US assistance. None of this in short was providing Goering with the triumph he wanted to enhance his influence with Hitler [4].

General Kurt Student had been a keen advocate of airborne forces. Originally an army officer he had transferred to the Luftwaffe and by 1941 he was the commander of all airborne forces, including the 7th Air Division, Germany’s first division of paratroopers, or Fallschirmjägers as they were called in German. Student was every bit as eager for a chance to shine as Goering, the dramatic success of the capture of Eben Emael had drawn attention away from difficulties encountered in Norway and the disaster that was the drop on the Hague, where heavy losses had been taken without securing the Fallschirmjägers objectives. Even the victory at Eben Emael owed as much to the fact that no one had anticipated anyone landing on the roof of the fort as an avenue of attack as the derring do of the German troops. There had been further opportunities for a large-scale airborne assault since the Fall of France and while this had allowed the 7th Air Division to replenish its losses and engage in vigorous training it also meant there had been no chance to answer the questions about the best use of airborne troops that some had asked after Norway and the Netherlands. Student certainly wasn’t inclined to listen to any voices of caution and to him Crete seemed the ideal spot for a swift airborne assault that would seize the vital airfields and allow the rapid reinforcement of the German position on the island. Goering had happily embraced the plan and whatever other areas the head of the Luftwaffe may have been lacking in persuading Hitler to believe in his plans was one of his strengths. Thus, Operation Mercury was created and scheduled to take place no later than the 31st of May, allowing for the launch of the Italian invasion of Egypt, which would divert British attention and prevent them trying to relieve the island [5].

The above of the politicking inside the Luftwaffe is important as it explains why the Goering and Student were so eager to accept the extremely optimistic estimates of British presence on Crete provided by the Abwehr, essentially believing that there was only one understrength, ‘colonial’ division defending Crete and ignoring any information that suggested otherwise. Operation Mercury was based on faulty assumptions, underestimating British strength was only the first of them. Overestimating the ability of the Fallschirmjägers to seize and hold objectives with only the weapons that had been dropped with them was every bit as problematic, meaning that unless the glider troops seized the airfields the rest of the 7th couldn’t be deployed, nor could any heavy weapons be delivered. There was a plan for seaborne support, often ignored in discussions of the battle, but this would depend on co-ordination with the Italians to provide troops, transports, and a naval escort. There was every likelihood that this force would have to contend with the attentions of the Royal Navy meaning that unless the escort was powerful enough to drive the Royal Navy off, a questionable assumption given the losses incurred by the Regia Marina. The other option was that Luftwaffe could sink enough of warships in the area and force the Royal Navy to abandon the defence of Crete. This may have been the most egregious assumption of them all. As Admiral Cunningham succinctly put it, ‘It takes the Navy three years to build a ship. It will take three hundred years to build a new tradition’ [6]. The Royal Navy and the RAF had achieved some considerable successes against their Wehrmacht counterparts, Crete was where the British army aimed to draw the line, albeit that the bulk of the troops engaged in the fighting were from New Zealand and Australia. Mercury was the name of the winged messenger of the gods and the British were determined to send a message to the Third Reich, the retreat stops here [7].

[1] A different set of circumstances leads to most of the same units being on Crete, except they haven’t been beaten up in Greece and lost their equipment and as has become a theme of this TL, they have more tanks available.

[2] Not really a spoiler that the German troops on Crete are going to have an experience on Crete that ranges from bad to nightmarish flashbacks for decades to come and the details of the latter will be left to the imagination of the reader if you want to imagine such things.

[3] This is more or less the attitude OTL, there wasn’t seen as any great need to attack Crete, until Goering and Student got involved.

[4] Kind of a summary to remind everyone that the Luftwaffe is struggling a lot more than OTL.

[5] It’s risky and overambitious and really should never have succeeded in OTL.

[6] This may be an alt version of Crete, but Cunningham still gets to make his legendary statement.

[7] Bombastic I grant you, but this really is a battle the British could, maybe even should have won. Next update we will see how the Fallschirmjägers fare and after that the focus is on the largely ignored Italian naval operation.

 

[Garrison]

15th April – 7th June 1941 – Crete – Part II - Operation Mercury​

Operation Mercury opened on the 20th of May with the dropping of large numbers of paratroopers, indeed Mercury was the largest single deployment of Fallschirmjägers in the war. The critical target was the Maleme airfield, control of which would allow reinforcements and heavy weapons to be deployed. The drop went badly wrong from the start, in no small part because the British knew that an attack was coming and prepared accordingly. Many troops missed their drop zones and those that did land suffered badly, especially around the vital Maleme airfield. III Battalion of the 1st Assault Regiment saw four hundred and forty-three out of six hundred men killed [1].

The troops following in gliders fared little better. Many of the gliders came under fire from mortars and guns of the 7th Medium Artillery. The latter was an especially unpleasant surprise for the Fallschirmjägers as they had been assured that there was no artillery on the island. Likewise, the men on the gliders and transport planes hit by 106th Anti-Aircraft would have equally unhappy, assuming they survived the experience. Some have chosen to interpret the deeply flawed intelligence about British strength on the island as a deliberate act on the part of Admiral Canaris, head of the Abwehr, who opposed the Nazi Regime. It is equally possible that this was a case of telling Goering what he wanted to hear. These questions of internal politics were of no consequence to the troops who survived this firestorm, they had little choice except to regroup and try to drive out the defenders at Maleme, seizing and neutralizing the anti-aircraft and artillery positions was their only hope of relief.

The defences at the airfield were concentrated on Hill 107 and the Germans knew they had to drive 22nd New Zealand Infantry Brigade off the high ground. There were also detachments of Cretan police, Greek Cadets and ordinary civilians who harassed and attacked detachments of paratroopers, breaking them up and inflicting significant losses.

The attack on Hill 107 went badly from the start, 7th medium laid down fire again, not only causing casualties but disrupting the co-ordination of the attack into the bargain. The defenders also received support from C Squadron of the 3rd Hussars, fielding half a dozen Mk VI Bs. These tanks had fared badly against Panzers and anti-tank guns in France. Engaging lightly armed infantry in the field was however what they had been built for and as one tank commander put it, ‘we had a fine time strafing Jerry and sending them running’.

By mid-afternoon the attack had petered out and the Fallschirmjägers had no choice but to withdraw and regroup. After night fall supplies and ammunition were brought up to Hill 107 and the commander of the 22nd, Colonel Leslie Andrew, sent a request to the 23rd Brigade for reinforcements. This was greeted with the response that they would be dispatched ‘when possible’. Despite this vague response the lines of communication of the 22nd were secure and they did their best to consolidate their position, while preparing for a possible night attack [2].

The Germans would certainly have liked to conduct such an attack, but they had taken serious losses among the officers in command during the initial attack and trying to round up stragglers from the original landings proved time consuming, especially with armed locals roaming about and only too willing to pounce on any luckless German they found. Matters were made worse by the fact that much of the Fallschirmjägers equipment was dropped in separate canisters, some of which fell into the hands of the locals, meaning the Fallschirmjägers had to worry about being shot at with their own weapons. The determined resistance of the Cretans was another blow to German hopes, they had had hoped that the locals would not simply refuse to fight but might revolt against the British and treat the Fallschirmjägers as liberators, undermining the defence of the island. The German high command had it seems learned nothing from the Italian experience in Greece. Such wishful thinking was hardly exclusive to the Axis, as Alanbrooke and Zhukov could attest, but the Axis had less ability to recover from such costly mistakes, as Crete demonstrated.

The second German attack was put in at 0739 hours on 21st. Initially it seemed to go better than the previous day. C Squadron, down to four tanks after breakdowns, had withdrawn to refuel and rearm and a failure in communications meant the 7th Medium Artillery didn’t initially engage the attackers. Around 10:30 Hours the Germans had severed the lines of communications between the Western and Eastern companies of the 22nd and Colonel Andrew was considering pulling back. Fortunately for the fate of Crete one company from the 23rd arrived at this time and a second came up about 11:15 Hours, allowing the defenders to hold and repel the attack, re-establishing the lines of communication by 13:00 Hours [3].

This was to be the best chance the Germans had to seize Maleme as General Freyberg had finally realized the criticality of the position and was dispatching substantial reinforcements. Luftwaffe bombing attacks made this more difficult but after nightfall C Squadron had returned with a pair of Matildas from the 7th RTR squadron following on behind them. The 28th Māori Battalion of the 5th New Zealand Brigade also arrived, followed by the 20th Battalion of the 4th Brigade. Support was also provided by the 1st and 2nd Greek Regiment (Provisional). The Luftwaffe put in multiple air attacks on the 22nd of May in support of another attack, but this was far weaker than that of the 21st and it was unable to dislodge the defenders and by this point the Fallschirmjägers were running low on ammunition, as well as having taken heavy casualties. Any further attacks would depend on reinforcements being landed by sea or success elsewhere by the Fallschirmjägers forcing the defenders to withdraw. Neither of these things came to pass.

Maleme was not the only target of Fallschirmjäger landings, indeed dispersing their efforts is arguably the most important mistake the Germans made in planning their assault on Crete. The smaller airfields Rethymno and Heraklion had also been the sites of paratrooper and glider attacks, and these had suffered at least as high a rate of casualties as the Maleme landing. They also had no more luck in defeating the defending troops than their comrades at Maleme. Far from being able to alleviate the precarious situation at Maleme the Fallschirmjägers fighting at Rethymno, and Heraklion were now looking to reinforcements landed at the airfield to relieve them, unaware at this point of how bad the tactical situation really was as communications between the various landing sites had completely broken down.

At Sea the Luftwaffe could claim some successes against the Royal Navy, damaging and sinking a number of ships and hampering efforts to run supplies to the troops. Despite this the Royal Navy was able to get some cargo ships through and at the same time interdict attempts to support the German forces by sea, despite the best efforts of the Regia Marina to get them through, which would prove to be a thankless task. A landing attempt was made near Maleme on the 21st/22nd escorted by the Regia Marina torpedo boat Lupo, hoping that they could turn the tide and seize the airfield. More than half the 20 fishing boats used for transport were sunk by the Royal Navy’s force D, commanded by Rear-Admiral Irvine Glennie. Despite being heavily outgunned the Lupo managed to save more than half of the German troops, with about 300 being lost. Despite his courageous efforts to save German lives the commander of the Lupo, Captain Francesco Mabelle, would get no credit for his efforts from Goering, who would soon be blaming the Regia Marina for the Failure of Operation Mercury. A small number of troops did make it through to try a landing, but they were forced to retreat after coming under fire from shore as they approached [4].

It was the losses inflicted by the Luftwaffe that prompted suggestions the Royal Navy should pull back or scale down their operations or around Crete, Which Admiral Cunningham responded to with his famous quote and the Royal Navy did it’s best to support the troops on Crete. Neither the Germans nor the Italians were prepared to concede defeat yet and even as the Fallschirmjägers grimly clung on one more attempt would be made to relieve them by sea, leading to the largest single engagement with the Regia Marina during the battle on the 28th of May off Sitla [5].

[1] I have tweaked the numbers upwards a bit here, but overall, this is what happened on the day. The Fallschirmjägers in the initial landings took catastrophic losses. The 7th and the 106th were on Crete OTL but were pressed into service as infantry as their equipment was left behind in Greece. And the number of tanks the British had was fairly pathetic OTL.

[2] Because of the increased firepower and tank support the lines of communication remain secure and this is the pivotal moment of the battle. OTL communications broke down, the 22nd withdrew, the Fallschirmjägers took over the defensive positions and were soon able to bring in reinforcements.

[3] These battles obviously are fictious, but most of the units were involved in the failed attempts to retake Maleme.

[4] The attempt to run the troop convoy through did happen OTL and about 100 troops were landed, out of the 2000 involved. Here that group is repelled as the defenders are that bit stronger.

[5] Overall the OTL Battle of Crete is one that the Germans should have lost, far too much was asked of the paratroopers and but for unnecessary decision to withdraw from Maleme the first night the attack was doomed. Facing a better equipped and stronger defence, this is going to end very badly for the 7th Air Division.

 

[Garrison]

15th April – 7th June 1941 – Crete – Part III - Battle of Sitla and the end for the Fallschirmjägers​

Given the dire situation of the German troops Hitler requested that the Italians dispatch troop by sea to relieve the situation. The Italians had in fact already offered support, but this had taken a long time to work its way up the German chain of command and Goering had simply ignored the offer, affecting a disdain for the Italians greater even than that expressed by the most cynical British politicians. Having to backtrack did not sit well with Goering and he responded in his usual manner, shifting the blame for the situation in Crete onto everyone else except Kurt Student. On the 27th of May the 50th Regina Infantry Division departed from Rhodes; a force composed of about three thousand men with some tankettes for support. This was a substantial contribution and if a landing had been successfully made on the night of the 21st/22nd it might have made a difference to the outcome. By the 28th it was simply a matter of reinforcing failure [1].

The troops and their supplies were packed aboard two steamers, one river boat and a selection of fishing boats, reefers, tugs, and tankers. This motley flotilla was escorted by a modest force of Regia Marina ships, all the increasing depleted Italian navy could scrape up. The escort force was led by the destroyer Francesco Crispi, supported by three torpedo boats and two MAS boats, MAS being short for Motoscafo armato silurante, torpedo boats equivalent to the Kriegsmarine E-Boat or Royal Navy MTB. Assuming the worst-case scenario that they would be detected and that the the Royal Navy would try and intercept the transports the Italian commander aboard Francesco Crispi [2] ordered the slowest of the transports to be towed by one of the torpedo boats. He estimated that the Royal Navy would intercept around 1700 Hours and hoped to reach Sitla by then, he missed his target by some twenty minutes.

The force that intercepted the convoy consisted of the Destroyers HMAS Nizam, HMS Decoy, and HMS Imperial. Decoy’s radar had failed after a near miss from a Luftwaffe bomber two days earlier and was still unrepaired. This partly accounts for the decision of the three destroyers to charge in and engage the enemy at close range, though there was also probably an expectation that this would scatter the Italian convoy. The sight of three rapidly closing Royal Navy destroyers rapidly closing certainly panicked the transports, the Francesco Crispi and the other escorts turned into engage. The ensuing battle was short but intense. The Decoy bore the brunt of the Italian fire, she was heavily damaged and beached overnight, before being finished off by prowling Luftwaffe dive-bombers the following morning. Nizam and Imperial got off with only minor damage.

Decoy had been lost, but she had gone down fighting and the three destroyers fulfilled Admiral Cunningham’s commitment to supporting the army ashore. The Francesco Crispi suffered a complete loss of power and was left adrift, with its crew eventually scuttling her around 19:00 hours. The torpedo boat Lince had been shot pieces while still trying to release the transport it was towing, which instead of making a run for Sitla had to try and take survivors off the burning torpedo boat. Both MAS boats were not so much sunk as cut to pieces by gunfire, with heavy loss of life on both. More importantly from a strategic point of view Nizam and Imperial wrought havoc on the transports. Both steamers succumbed to torpedo attacks along with one of the tankers and several others were left as burning hulks. Most of the remainder turned and fled as they came under fire, with the last remnants of the escort covering them [3].

Two fishing boats with remarkably determined captains somehow evaded the battle and managed to deposit some three hundred Italian soldiers. The reward for this display of bravery was that both would be forced to surrender by HMAS Nizam when trying to leave the harbour after nightfall. As for the soldiers put ashore, they soon encountered hostile locals as well as a force of hastily assembled Greek troops, some of the locals by this point were in possession of German weapons and faced with what appeared to be an overwhelming defensive force the Italian troops surrendered by dusk at about 20:20. They would soon find themselves interned in the same temporary POW camps as the Fallschirmjägers, where some of the goalers expressed the opinion that they were far keener on fighting with one another than they had been the British. The bad blood in the camps led the British to hastily arrange to separate the Italian and German prisoners. This ill-feeling would soon make itself felt all the way up the chain of command in Berlin and Rome [4].

Of the three thousand men aboard the transport about eight hundred made it back to Rhodes and in a further indignity for the retreating forces the torpedo boat Lira was bombed by the Luftwaffe and suffered such heavy damage that she had to be abandoned. Of the Italian soldiers who did not make it back to Rhodes the Royal Navy only recorded recovering one hundred and ninety-six from the water. This left about fifteen hundred soldiers either killed aboard the transports or drowned off Sitla. Adding the losses among the crews of the escorts vessels it had been a black day for the Italians, and the efforts of the Francesco Crispi and the rest of the escorts to fight their way through went unrecognized, at least by the Regia Marina. The Royal ensured they provide full military honours for the wounded Italian sailors who perished after being rescued.

For the remaining Fallschirmjägers on Crete the failure of the Sitla landing meant the last hope of relief was gone, though they were not advised of the attempt let alone its failure. General Student, unwilling to accept the idea of writing off so many of his men, proposed a plan to use whatever gliders were available to deploy as many troops as possible and load even more on the tow planes, which of course would mean a one-way trip for the transport aircraft assuming they could even reach Crete. He even advocated crashlanding anywhere between twenty and fifty Ju 52s or Luftwaffe bombers onto the island to deliver supplies if an airfield could not be secured. Even Goering baulked at these suggestions, especially as with Operation Barbarossa looming large transport aircraft were now at a premium. Student took this news badly, and far from being abashed by the failure on Crete schemed for a way to rehabilitate what he saw as the tarnished reputation of the Fallschirmjägers [5].

What the German forces on Crete got instead of supplies or reinforcements was an admonition from Hitler to ‘show the spirit of the German race’ and ‘fight until the end, either victory or death!’. Needless to say, most of the Fallschirmjägers, short on ammunition, food, and water, and subjecting to sniping and nuisance attacks by Cretan forces, decided that the end had come. By the 6th of June the last of the Fallschirmjägers had surrendered. The Luftwaffe kept up attacks on the island and the waters around it for a few more days, until the demands of the imminent Operation Barbarossa led Goering to shut down operations, leaving Crete to the attentions of the Regia Marina and Regia Aeronautica, who also soon had other matters to worry about.

For the troops and civilians on Crete their condition waxed and waned in the following months, depending on how much effort the Italian forces were willing to exert, occasionally assisted by the Luftwaffe. Overall though Crete was never seriously threatened again and would go on to be a thorn in the side of the occupation forces in Yugoslavia and Greece [6].

[1] The Italians did indeed dispatch this force to Sitla OTL and of course its contribution was ignored in a blizzard of propaganda that credited the victory to the paratroopers. This was pretty common for the Italians, when they did well it was ignored, when things went badly everyone heard about it.

[2] This is where I would usually insert the name of the captain of the Francesco Crispi, but I cannot find any source that names him.

[3] This battle obviously didn’t take place, the Royal Navy and Royal Australian Navy ships listed here were involved in the evacuation with some of the being lost in the effort. No evacuation means they are available for rather more proactive tasks.

[4] This is going to make things awkward if, for example, the Italians got in to trouble in a different combat theatre.

[5] Student will be looking for an opportunity to double down on airborne operations, which will lead to a battle causes the 7th Airborne to be compared with the 7th Cavalry.

[6] Thus Crete is held, which is terrible news for the troops who will be facing a rising tide of partisan activity in Greece and Yugoslavia.

 

[Garrison]

11th April – 28th August 1941 – North Africa – Part I – Operazione E and the British Response​

The Italian invasion of Egypt, Operation E, was subject to a series of conflicting objectives. Mussolini swung from seeing it as a distraction from other theatres to grand visions of seizing the Suez Canal and the operational orders were amended accordingly. Marshal Badoglio saw it as the key to unlocking the entire British position in Africa, while Marshal Balbo was more concerned with preserving his army as a fighting force rather than gambling on an offensive that seemed far too ambitious for his taste. Balbo’s attitude to the invasion of Egypt opened him up to accusations of ineptitude, even cowardice and his overestimation of the strength of the British, coupled with constant demands for reinforcements do lend themselves to such an interpretation. It can also equally be interpreted as Balbo being a realist, a man who understood the limitations of the troops under his command and the logistics that supported them. Whatever his motivations the outcome of the attack, Operazione E, made it clear that Balbo’s caution was well founded [1].

Operating in the desert multiplied the problems that had afflicted the forces in North-West Europe. Sand got into everything and increased the issue of mechanical breakdowns, a fact that seemed to surprise some senior military officers charged with conducting operations in this environment. Water became a critical item of supply even more so than the provision of rations; men could go without food far longer than they could without water. The British struggled with transporting water owing to some poorly designed containers. This issue was ultimately resolved by the capture of examples of what became known as ‘Jerry cans’ from the German troops. Balbo’s issues were compounded by the fact that his supply lines ran across the Mediterranean with Malta, and by extension the RAF and the Royal Navy, sat across them.

The Regia Aeronautica, Regia Marina and the Luftwaffe all attacked the island, trying their best to force the British to abandon the Island. An airborne assault was even contemplated, but Mussolini was far more interested in attacking Egypt and unwilling to provide the necessary amphibious support. The failure of the airborne attack on Crete and the Wehrmacht’s focus on the preparations for Operation Barbarossa cooled any enthusiasm for the idea in Germany, at least for the time being [2]. Even setting aside losses to enemy action there was only so much shipping available and only so much port capacity in Libya to handle cargo. As if all of this didn’t pose enough problems for Marshal Balbo, he faced the same issue that had afflicted the invasion of Greece, promised supplies and equipment were never shipped, indeed in some cases they never existed to begin with. At one point in January 1941 10th Army was promised the delivery of thirty L6/40 Light Tanks, the best available to the Italians at the time and roughly on a par with the Panzer II. After several delays what was eventually shipped to Libya was eighteen L3/35 Tankettes. Production bottlenecks badly affected the availability of the L6/40 and those that were produced were in high demand, Balbo himself suspected the tanks had been deliberately diverted elsewhere by a rival in Rome [3].

None of these problems cut any ice with Mussolini and Badoglio, the date for the invasion of Egypt was set for the 11th of April and Balbo could either comply or his successor would. Balbo chose the former option, though the grand long-awaited thrust into Egypt lasted only three days before it ran out of steam, barely managing to provoke the retreat of the relatively light forces at Sollum and advanced around 30km before coming to a complete halt. the 10th Army force now elected to fort up and wait for supplies and reinforcements to arrive before advancing further, even the Saar offensive of 1939 had been conducted with more vigour. The battle that had been supposed to unhinge the entire defensive position of the British in the Middle East achieved nothing except the seizure of a modest amount of ground of ne real strategic value, while at the same time leaving 10th Army in a highly exposed position. The offensive did not stop the British intervening in Iraq, it did affect any lingering possibility of sending troops to Greece, though that arguably backfired as the troops earmarked for Greece were instead dispatched to Crete. It also had no impact on the progress of events in East Africa [4].

On the opposite side General Wavell was aware of his genuine disadvantage in numbers, which could hardly be ignored regardless of the low opinion many British officers were forming of the qualities of the Italian forces. The arguments over deployments to Crete had also informed a cautious approach, pulling back to shorten the Western Desert Force’s (WDF) supply lines while extending those of the Italians. After the dispatch of the Divisions to Crete the WDF could deploy around 35,000 men and 220 tanks. Also, unlike the Italians the British forces were abundantly supplied with motorized transport. Trucks, universal carriers, Dingoes, and motorbikes, along with the petrol needed to keep them running, meant the force under O’Connor were far more mobile than their opponents [5].

A boost for the WDF came in mid-May when first contingent of Crusader tanks arrived in Egypt. These were MK 1Bs, and their creation had resulted in unwanted delays in production of the tank. Barely had the first Crusaders rolled out of the factory before testing with captured German weapons resulted in the addition of further armour being mandated. The Mark IA was produced with thickened plates, only for further modifications to be required as the 6pdr gun was finally available in quantity. This upgrade had been anticipated in the design of the Crusader, it was simply that the timing was unfortunate The Mark IB was the version with the thickened armour and the 6pdr, the improved Mark II fitted with the 6pdr from the start would soon follow, though it would rapidly give way to the Mark III, incorporating changes largely based on the experience with the tank in North Africa [6].

Preparations for Operation Compass were given a further boost at the end of May as the Axis offensive in Crete and the withdrawal of the Luftwaffe in anticipation of Barbarossa eased the pressure on supply lines across the Mediterranean and Aegean. Wavell’s preparations for Compass were largely complete by the beginning of June, though of course he would not be in charge when they were put into effect. The initial intention was for a five-day raid taking advantage of the fact that the Italian forts were too far apart to provide mutual support and thus vulnerable to being isolated and attacked by the full weight of the WDF, negating the overall numerical advantage of the Italian forces. There were contingencies in the plan to exploit any opportunities the raid threw up, but not Even the ever-aggressive O’Connor could envision how rapidly the scope of Compass would expand.

Wavell’s replacement by Alexander appeared to cause some delay in executing the plan, this though was not the case, Churchill and Alanbrooke had an ulterior motive for the delay, one that the replacement of Wavell provided cover for. British intelligence efforts hadn’t gleaned the exact date of Barbarossa, they did know by June that it was imminent. Churchill had continually tried to warn the USSR of the hammer blow about to fall on them, to no avail. They didn’t place any more credence in the reports from Kim Philby, the infamous Soviet spy inside MI5 (who had the unenviable distinction of being the last man to be hung for treason by the British in 1951) [7]. London wanted to launch Compass with the Germans completely focused on the east, thus when Barbarossa was launched on the 22nd the word went out to Alexander to execute Operation Compass. The WDF launched their counterattack on the 25th, with spectacular results [8].

[1] Shockingly this will go far worse than OTL for the Italians.

[2] So Operation Herkules is not necessarily completely off the table…

[3] The L6/40 was a pretty decent design for 1940/41. There were never nearly enough of them and the same problem afflicted other highly capable Italian tanks, meaning the tankettes kept soldiering on into 1943/44.

[4] This is basically the same as OTL, because the various changes haven’t really affected the Italian ability build up the kind of supplies the 10th Army would need for a real offensive, and the British are being cautious, not stacking their forces in the frontlines.

[5] So O’Connor’s forces are a bit larger in terms of manpower, but much better supported and equipped than OTL.

[6] Yes, the WDF has tanks that can fire a useful HE round, I’m sure the Italians will be thrilled.

[7] Let’s just say that I once attended a training course where I heard the story of the luckless individual who found Philby late one evening with some papers he shouldn’t have had, but Philby berated them and suitably chastened the individual didn’t report him, here they did, and things snowballed from there.

[8] So a stronger WDF and the Germans are going to be a bit busy when the Italians start screaming for help, we shall see how that turns out.

 

[Garrison]

11th April – 28th August 1941 – North Africa Part II – Operation Compass​

Compass opened at 0500 hours on the 25th of June with a diversionary artillery bombardment aimed at the fortified Italian camp at Nibeiwa. By 0830 hours a combined attack by Indian infantry and British armour had taken the fort. This swift success was a clear signpost for the course of the rest of the battle. The primary goal of this phase of Compass was to retake Sidi Barrani by sweeping in behind the line of Italian forts, attacking them from the west rather than the east where their defences were heaviest. 7th RTR and 4th Indian Infantry Division, transferred from East Africa in response to the crisis in Egypt at the behest of Wavell before his removal from command, struck towards Sidi Barrani and attacked the Tummar East and Tummar West forts. Another spearhead moving along the coast would attack the fort at Maktila, before also joining the attack on Sidi Barrani. The Royal Navy supported the attacks by conducting bombardments of Sidi Barrani and Maktila, with the Desert Air Force attacking multiple ground targets [1].

7th Armoured Division headed for Buq-Buq on the coast to the West of Sidi Barrani, cutting the road that was the main artery of supply for the troops forted up at Sidi Barrani as well as their route of retreat. These attacks left the forts further south at Sofafi and Rabia isolated and exposed to attack from all sides. The Italian 63rd Division Cirene based at Sofafi and Rabia tried to withdraw towards Halfaya, but they were cut off by 4th Armoured Brigade west of Sofafi and surrendered after a few sporadic firefights. A few scattered groups did escape and found their way to Halfaya, however there were barely enough of them to form a single company, the Cirene division had ceased to exist to all intents and purposes. Sidi Barrani fell on the 27th and with the losses at Sofafi more than 45,000 Italian troops had been taken prisoner with thousands more killed or wounded. The successes of the first few days of Compass caused a delay in exploiting the opportunity created because of the issues involved in dealing with so many POWs [2].

By the 1st of July the pursuit of the retreating Italian forces was underway once more with a new and far more ambitious goal in mind, the seizure of the port of Tobruk. Capturing the port would ease the pressure on British supply lines and facilitate a drive further west towards Tripoli, the capital of Italian Libya and the primary hub for resupplying the Italian forces. If Tripoli fell the campaign in North Africa would be effectively over. The capture of Tobruk would be a critical step towards this goal. As the British pressed forward the Crusader IBs proved their worth primarily in filling the infantry tank role, finally demonstrating to any doubters that the 6pdr gun with high explosive rounds was far more useful for infantry support than the 2pdr of the Matilda IIs and Valentines. Some HE rounds had been belatedly produced for the 2pdr guns, but the explosive charge was so small as to render them all but useless [3].

Largely driving utterly obsolete tankettes the Italian armoured forces could barely engage infantry let alone any of the British tanks they might encounter. Many of the Italian tanks didn’t even make it to combat, succumbing to mechanical breakdowns after months of inadequate maintenance. Mechanical breakdowns also affected the British, but with control of the battlefield they were able to retrieve their losses and dispatch them to depots run by soldiers of the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (REME) who worked tirelessly to recondition and repair broken down equipment, and find fixes for the teething problems encountered with the Crusader as it was exposed to the harsh desert conditions. The contribution of REME in maintaining the mobility advantage the of the British forces was crucial, but often overlooked.

As the British advance continued into July with no sign of running out steam, or of being halted by the defending Italians, Mussolini was increasingly enraged. It seemed that German predictions that they would ‘kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will fall down’ were coming true in the USSR while Mussolini’s own forces were in retreat everywhere. When Marshal Balbo was shot down by the DAF while conducting a personal aerial survey of the defences near Tobruk on the 9th of July Mussolini had so little confidence in his senior officers that he proposed taking direct control of 10th Army from Rome. Communication issues between Rome and Tripoli, almost certainly manufactured by Marshal Badoglio and other members of the Italian staff, delayed this and Mussolini was persuaded to appoint a new theatre commander on the 13th in the shape of Marshal Rodolfo Graziani. Given that it took Graziani three days to assume command and establish the disposition of his forces this meant that 10th Army were rudderless for five days, helping to sow further confusion in their ranks [4].

There were high quality divisions available to the Italians filled with professional, disciplined, well equipped soldiers, well equipped by Italian standards at least. That such soldiers existed is easily forgotten in the catastrophe that was unfolding Libya and their efforts were undermined by the disorganization in the 10th Army. The 132nd Armoured Division Ariete was one such and its experience during Operation Compass illustrates the issues facing even the most determined Italian soldiers. Four of its battalions were dispatched to North Africa whilst the rest remained in Italy and rather than being maintained as a mobile force its I Battalion found most of its tanks being used for static defence and the guns of their M11/39 tanks were ineffectual against British Matilda IIs and Valentines. The II, III, and IV Battalions were just as poorly deployed and also suffered ruinous losses before the rest of the Ariete was finally dispatched to Libya in the middle of August, deploying the entire division would not appreciably improve their fortunes [5].

Matters were made more complicated for Marshal Graziani as Mussolini had not stopped interfering with the operation of 10th Army. He was now starting to issue ominous instructions to Graziani such as insisting that 10th Army ‘take not one more step back’ and demanding that they carry out a counteroffensive. To this end he promised Marshal Graziani reinforcements and on the 12th of July Mussolini informed the Marshal of the dispatch of German troops to Libya. Even though Mussolini sought to paint this as his idea, given the timing of the German response it was obvious they had already been preparing to dispatch their ‘blocking force’ before Mussolini ever broached the subject with Berlin [6].

Regardless of the best, and worst, efforts of Mussolini the British forces continued their push westward. On the 16th of July Bardia was taken and by this point in Compass the ability to deliver supplies to the frontline troops was a greater obstacle to the British advance than Italian resistance. All manner of expedients were used to try and increase the volumes being shipped, but at the end of the day the bulk of the logistics for what was now called Western Desert Command (WDC) still had to be carried by road in the back of workhorse trucks like the Bedford MW. Tobruk, despite all these difficulties of supply Tobruk fell on the 5th of August. In the aftermath of this blow the Italians abandoned Derna on the 10th, and it was taken by the British the following day. Even with Tobruk taken the British advance continued and Barce and Benghazi swiftly fell, Beda Fomm was taken on the 16th and the British reached El Agheila on the 18th of August.

At this point Alexander faced a major decision. The British supply lines were not simply overstretched but approaching breaking point, fatigue was setting in amongst the troops, coupled with the whittling down of the available armoured strength this meant the WDC was running out of momentum. Against this Alexander had to weigh the fact that nine Italian divisions had been destroyed and there was at this moment no organized resistance facing his forces, any delay to regroup might make further advances later costly. Churchill was certainly keen to see the advance continue, and this desire had been backed up with action. The last elements of 2nd New Zealand Division were arriving from Crete, having been relieved by garrison troops from the UK. One brigade of 6th Australian Division was due to follow shortly, along with the 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division dispatched from Britain.

As far as the supply and armour situation went Convoy Lion was due to arrive on the 29th bringing large quantities of fresh supplies, as well as 118 tanks. This shipment was primarily composed of Infantry Tanks, with more Valentines than Matilda IIs being dispatched on this occasion. The decision was taken at the last minute to split the convoy. The primary convoy still designated Lion would proceed to Alexandria to offload the heavy equipment, while what was now designated as Lynx would make for Tobruk to deliver supplies and a contingent of trucks. This simple plan was somewhat undermined by a mix up over cargo manifests which meant that very few trucks were sent to Tobruk, and a number of universal carriers arrived instead, useful but hardly effective cargo carriers [7].

This issue lay in the future for Alexander, on the 20th he decided to make one last push along the coast and the leading elements of the WDC reached the town of Sirte, around 300 miles from Tripoli, on the 28th. It was here that Alexander finally called a halt, deciding his forces had reached their utmost limit and that resupply and reorganization were the order of the day. Defensive positions were to be prepared around Sirte and heavy artillery moved up to support them while fresh supply dumps were built up. Courtesy of intelligence intercepts Alexander was well aware that substantial reinforcements were arriving in Tripoli, including several German divisions, he had no intention of seeing all the gains the WDC had made being undone by the Wehrmacht [8].

[1] Some of this will follow the same rhythm as OTL with the same units, but you can assume they are better supplied and supported, meaning fewer casualties and more momentum as they advance.

[2] the Cirene takes a lot more casualties than OTL and the overall number of prisoners taken is higher.

[3] And the ability to suppress defensive positions with HE is of course a big help in sustaining the advance and keeping the losses down.

[4] And Balbo dies at a very awkward moment for the Italians, and it takes days to talk Mussolini out of his latest bad idea.

[5] In OTL the Ariete avoided heavy losses and when the rest of it was dispatched to Libya it joined up with the Afrika Korps.

[6] There will be an Afrika Korps, just not one that anyone will expect.

[7] Neither Lion nor Lynx existed OTL, the mix up in what was sent where is simply a small recognition that even in a Britwank it isn’t only the enemy that makes mistakes.

[8] So the British have advanced that bit further and there’s no Greece to distract the British from preparing to meet any Axis counteroffensive. But who will command the Afrika Korps in this TL?

 

[Garrison]

22nd June – 23rd August – Germany – Operation Barbarossa and the Afrika Korps​

Operation Barbarossa was the greatest clash of arms in human history and in the first few weeks the offensive seemed about to fulfil all of Hitler’s dreams, helped in no small part by Stalin’s failure to respond to the build-up on the borders of the USSR and his refusal to sanction the withdrawal of the Red Army forces in the face of overwhelming German assault. In the wake of these military successes for the Wehrmacht came horror and mass murder. Not only did the Einsatzgruppen begin their campaign of terror against Jews and other ‘undesirables’ but Soviet POWs were herded into camps with little in the way of food, shelter, sanitation, or medicine. Hunger and disease were weaponized as the Wehrmacht demonstrated a supreme indifference to the rules on the treatment of POWs and eventually millions of Soviet soldiers would die either in these POW camps or being marched to them. This only stopped when it was finally decided it would be more ‘efficient’ to work them to death as slave labour. As horrifying as this brutality was it merely served as the prelude to the systematised mass murder of the Holocaust [1].

Hitler had gotten his way as far as the armoured spearhead of the invasion went, more less. Many Panzer IIIs had been refitted with additional armour and 5cm guns, and there were platoons of Panzer IV with 7.5 cm KwK 40 L/43 guns attached to the leading elements of the first Panzer Divisions to cross into the USSR. Overall though the vast majority of Panzer IV were still equipped with the short 75mm howitzer, and fully half of the Panzer III were armed with the 37mm gun, despite the best efforts of German industry. There also not nearly enough Panzer III and IV available, many unit were still deploying large numbers of Panzer II as well as Panzer 35(t) and 38(t). The opening phases of Barbarossa however gave the Generals at OKH little reason to be concerned about this. Such was the dismal performance of Soviet armour that von Kleist and his staff remained convinced them that Hitler’s demands for upgunning and mass production of StuG vehicles was an overreaction to events in France and felt to further prioritize the re-equipping of the Panzer divisions in light of other demands on resources. That this was a mistake would not become clear until the first large scale encounters with the T-34 and the heavy KV tanks [2].

The only thing that caused Hitler some annoyance during those heady summer months was the developing situation in the Middle East, where it seemed British forces were advancing into Libya almost as rapidly as the Panzer Divisions in the Ukraine. The possibility of the collapse of the Italian Fascist regime in the wake of further military setbacks, and its replacement by one hostile to the Reich, was still an important strategic consideration. Unlike the spring when Hitler had been willing to divert large numbers of men and equipment to aid the Italians in the Balkans there was now a distinct shortage of formations, especially Panzer Divisions, that could be sent to shore up their floundering army in the Middle East. Hitler’s insistence on seizing the entirety of the Ukraine flew in the face of the belief held by many of the Generals that the key to defeating the USSR was taking Moscow and they were not happy with the dispersal of the Wehrmacht’s strength to pursue multiple objectives, though their protests were never as vehement as some claimed later. The consensus in OKH was that given the multiple objectives dictated by the Fuhrer’s strategy and the absolute requirement to advance with all possible speed to destroy the Soviet forces before they could retreat behind the Dnieper, which also not coincidentally constituted the limit of the Wehrmacht’s logistical reach, the diversion of any forces from Barbarossa to Libya could not be supported. In the view of the General Staff once the USSR was defeated then the entire strategic picture would be changed and British actions in the Middle East would be irrelevant, any threat to Mussolini’s regime would be academic.

These arguments, couched in terms of Hitler’s grand ambition, were vigorously supported by Goering, tying the Libyan situation into his effort to rewrite the history of Operation Mercury. Objectively the failure to seize Crete could be explained by underestimating the strength of the British defences and the resistance of the local population whilst overestimating the combat capability of the Fallschirmjägers. This analysis would place most of the blame for the failure on the Luftwaffe and the plan he had endorsed, and Goering was not going to allow that to happen. In his new version of events Italian support had always factored into the plan and the Italians had failed to live up their promises. When Italian aid finally dispatched it had repeatedly fled at the first sight of the Royal Navy. Goering seems to have begun to believe his own propaganda and made it clear to Hitler that supporting the Italians in the Middle East would be a waste of men and materiel that could be put to better use [3].

In the end Hitler essentially accepted the argument of the Generals, no forces would be withdrawn from the Eastern Front, instead what became the Afrika Korps would primarily have to be assembled from other theatres, though the leading element would be one that had been held in reserve during the initial offensive and one that was not strictly speak under the command of OKH, 1st SS Panzer Division Liebstandarte SS Adolf Hitler (LSSAH) commanded by General Sepp Dietrich. The LSSAH had started life as Hitler’s personal bodyguard during the early days of his rise to power before being transformed into a combat unit under Himmler’s drive to create a military arm for the SS. It had been a reinforced brigade during Operation Marita and was seen as having performed well so Himmler ordered its expansion to a full Panzer Division. This was no easy task given the needs of preparing for Barbarossa and refitting tanks with larger guns and the formation was still far from ready when the invasion began and ow it was to be the spearhead of the Afrika Korps. The decision to send it was as much political as practical, the dispatch of such a high-profile unit was meant to show Mussolini that Hitler was serious about supporting Italy in Libya, even if the numbers of troops and equipment dispatched might suggest otherwise.

OKH did not protest the loss of the LSSAH, indeed they were only too happy to see the back of Dietrich, a personal favourite of Hitler’s with a tendency to ignore the chain of command if he saw a chance for glory. There was also little protest when it was decided the 22nd Panzer Division, commanded by General Willhelm Apell, would join the LSSAH in Libya. This Division had been assembling in France and had not originally been intended to be activated until September, it was almost the antithesis of the LSSAH. Where Dietrich’s Division was given priority for new equipment the 22nd was being assembled from French tanks seized after the Armistice alongside the Czech Pz 35(t) and 38(t) models, increasingly considered obsolete, and German Panzer I and Panzer II, also entering obsolescence. Almost the only thing in common between the two was that both were understrength and despite hasty efforts to complete their outfitting they would both depart for Libya at about 80% strength [4].

The two commanding officers did not enjoy a happy working relationship. Apell resented Dietrich being given overall command, regarding Dietrich as a man promoted far beyond his level of competence solely based on his currying favour with Hitler. To Dietrich Apell was exactly the kind of officer he resented most. Dietrich had never risen above the rank of Sergeant in World War I whereas as Apell had attended staff college and remained in the much-reduced Reichsheer during the Weimar period. To Dietrich he was one of those old school hidebound officers the Fuhrer himself often railed against. This antagonism caused serious arguments over the best strategy for deploying the division in Libya.

These strategic choices would initially be constrained by the Afrika Korps having little in the way of infantry support. Orders had been issued for the creation of the 90th Light Infantry Division early in 1941, but by the time the Afrika Korps departed it was still assembling its HQ. The staff wouldn’t depart for Libya until mid-September with the first combat elements arriving at the end of that month. The 90th would never operate at full strength since the last regiment due to join the division was never dispatched to the Middle East. The LSSAH and the 22nd departed on the 31st of July, with Dietrich already thinking in terms of conducting something far more ambitious than the holding action his orders called for [5].

[1] A small reminder of the nightmare the Wehrmacht helped visit on the luckless citizens of the USSR.

[2] So some of the Panzers are better armed and better protected, though at this point it doesn’t really make a difference and is in fact going to further complicate the supply situation.

[3] Some of the arguments here parallel the ones the British had over Greece.

[4] So no Rommel and not exactly an armoured juggernaut there is still an Afrika Korps.

[5] It took me some time to come up with a couple of units that could plausibly be used. The 22nd was a relatively obvious candidate, the LSSAH was a late bit of inspiration.

 

[Garrison]

1st September – 4th December 1941 – East Africa – The End in Ethiopia​

The shift in priorities for supplies and reinforcements caused by the demands of supporting Crete and the offensive in Libya certainly didn’t make life easier for General’s Platt and Cunningham, commanding the forces attacking into Ethiopia from Sudan and Kenya respectively, their position was though still substantially better than that of Duke Aosta and his troops. The flow of materiel to the Italian forces in Ethiopia had been effectively blockaded even before the seizure of Massawa, while access to the port greatly assisted the British in delivering supplies and troops being sent to the theatre. The advancing British forces had taken Addis Ababa on the 6th of April, with Emperor Haile Selassie triumphantly entering the city a few days later. This made for wonderful propaganda, however within a few months fault lines would open up among various factions in Ethiopia who had had largely been united by the desire to see the Italians kicked. They did not intend to become a British colony, and many were not happy about the return of Haile Selassie to the throne. This does not even touch on the thorny issue of the future status of Eritrea [1].

As the year wore on the vagaries of the weather in East Africa proved almost as much of an impediment to British advances as Italian resistance, though the latter should not be underestimated. By the summer pro-Italian partisans were making their presence felt in Italian Somaliland. They managed to cause some grief for the British forces, and only finally abandoned their guerrilla warfare in 1943. Overall though these actions had little impact on the military situation in Ethiopia [2].

For Duke Aosta the situation Libya during July and August may have absorbed most of the attention of the British and delayed their final assault in Ethiopia. At the same time the crumbling defence in North Africa meant that whatever hopes he might have had that his forces would be rescued by a victory in Egypt had vanished and he was thrown back on his own dwindling resources. The responses to his increasingly desperate requests for supplies and reinforcements brought nothing but promises that if his troops just held on relief would come, soon. How this would have achieved with the Regia Marina bottled up in the Mediterranean and no possibility of any merchant shipping reaching Ethiopia is an excellent question. The British were naturally only too happy to broadcast their successes in the Middle East to undermine Italian morale, trumpeting the victories at Tobruk, Benghazi, etc. for all they were worth, with the RAF unhappily pressed into service dropping leaflets [3].

Even without the propaganda effort few Italian soldiers could have doubted how dire their predicament was. Italian morale declined sharply but it didn’t completely collapse, in places dug in Italian troops still put up a bitter fight against the inevitable. Aosta’s problem was that these strongpoints faced almost inevitable defeat once British forces cut their lines of communications and the British didn’t need to get bogged down trying to overrun them when they could be left to ‘wither on the vine’. Without any hope of breaking out or being relieved these troops were lost to Aosta and as painful as the casualties they inflicted might have been the British kept pressing forward.

By November the Italian defenders had been compressed into a few small pockets and once Gondar was surrounded Aosta had no choice, the Italian forces in East Africa surrendered on the 27th of November 1941. For the British this was another significant victory. The Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea approaches to the Suez Canal were now completely secure and free to be used to move supplies to Egypt, including supplies from the USA as they had officially declared the route no longer a warzone.

For the Italians the entire campaign had been ill conceived. Their position in East Africa was a weak one. If they had executed their original plan, they might well have taken British Somaliland, which would still have left them extremely vulnerable to counterattacks from the British as the Italian forces lacked to means to mount major offensives into Sudan or Kenya [4]. The British in East Africa were relatively strong and once they got organized the Italian effort had little hope of success, which became something of a recurring theme in Italian operations. The entire campaign seems to have been based on the gamble of achieving a quick victory in anticipation of Britain being forced to make peace. With the British choosing to fight on and events elsewhere going poorly for the Italians the fate of Duke Aosta and his men was all but inevitable. As for Ethiopia the British made lavish promises about the future of the country, and they did do their best to deliver on those post war, even when faced with competing visions over the shape of the country from the Ethiopians themselves [5].

[1] It’s not going to be all sunshine even with the defeat of the Italians.

[2] This is as per OTL, the pro-Italian partisans held out for a remarkably long time given their lack of external support.

[3] Obviously the timing was different OTL, here though the British have the opportunity to trumpet their successes.

[4] Which is of course what happened OTL, the whole venture was ill conceived and followed much the same pattern as Egypt, a relatively weak initial offensive soon brought to a halt and rapidly reversed.

[5] Ethiopia is the first major piece of territory liberated by the British in the war and they feel compelled to make a big deal of it, which gets them sucked into some nation-building.