23rd October – 29th October 1941– Libya – The Axis Counteroffensive – Part I – Vaunting Ambition
From the moment he set foot In Tripoli Sepp Dietrich began throwing his weight around, insisting on the Afrika Korps being given priority for food, fuel, and water. He also began a campaign of intimidation against the locals, particularly the local dock workers whom he regarded as feckless and looking for any opportunity to steal supplies. More ominously he suggested that there were Jews amongst the ranks of the locals, and the brutality of the SS troops towards anyone suspected of ‘sabotage’ soon earned them an evil reputation in Tripoli. Graziani did little to protest these actions, unwilling to risk angering Dietrich’s patrons in Berlin. The few diary entries Graziani made expressing dismay at the behaviour of the LSSAH all seem to have been added retroactively, he certainly did not dismiss the idea floated by Dietrich that the einsatzgruppen should be let loose in Libya to root out all undesirables, especially ‘secret Jews’. That such units would have to be deployed once Palestine had been conquered was practically a given for Dietrich, an idea that was fanciful and horrifying in equal measure [1].
Fulfilling such grandiose ambitions was not going to be achieved by waiting for the British to regroup and launch a new attack. Dietrich wanted the Axis forces to go on to the offensive while the British were still overextended and exhausted, naturally with the Afrika Korps taking the lead. Apell was far more ambivalent. He understood the merits of seizing the initiative but believed it would be necessary to wait until the 22nd, the LSSAH and the 90th were at full strength. Apell was also unhappy with the low priority the 22nd was receiving for shipments of new men and equipment. During September the LSSAH had received fresh tanks and vehicles to bring it closer to full strength, including two full platoons of the new Panzer IV Ausf G, the first model to be fitted with the long barreled75mm gun on the production line. The HQ of the 90th had also arrived as well as the first elements of the 347th Infantry Regiment. The 22nd Panzer on the other hand had received little more than a few ‘second hand’ Panzer 38(t) and Panzer II. Most of these tanks had been surplus after other units had replaced them with newer models and many of them need extensive work by the mechanics attached to the 22nd to get them working and some ended up being cannibalized to provide a supply of spares for the rest of the division.
Apell was hardly alone in being cautious, Marshal Graziani was pleased that he was finally receiving meaningful reinforcements and supplies. He was however aware that his battered forces needed time to recover and make themselves ready for fresh offensive actions. He was acutely aware of how Marshal Balbo’s offensive had left the Italian forces exposed to the British counteroffensive. Any attack on the British position at Sirte would have to be aimed at encircling the forces of what had now been renamed from Western Desert Command to 8th Army. The British had to be pinned in place and destroyed, which would require meticulous planning and the element of surprise.
Unfortunately for Apell and Graziani neither Mussolini nor Hitler was interested in such considerations. Mussolini had been demanding action practically since the British had come to a halt at Sirte. His only caveat was that while he certainly wanted to see the Afrika Korps involved in such an attack they would have to be subordinated to Italian command. Given the relative numbers of troops in Libya this made sense, but Mussolini’s primary concern was to ensure that any victory would be seen as an Italian one. He wanted something to restore battered Italian pride and to stop the whispers about his leadership that were already circulating in Rome.
For Hitler the change of strategy from shoring up the Italians to launching a full-scale offensive had nothing to do with prestige and everything to do with the developing military situation in the USSR. In August when the Afrika Korps had been dispatched it had seemed that victory in the east was imminent. In September that optimism was vanishing. The drive through the Ukraine had been a success but Moscow remained out of reach, and it seemed no matter how many Soviet divisions were destroyed more appeared to replace them. The Wehrmacht was now preparing for a fresh attempt to take the city in the shape of Operation Typhoon. This required a major shift in plans as the original, highly optimistic, intention was for resources to be shifted to the war in the west in the Autumn after the defeat of the USSR, with the Luftwaffe receiving high priority to build up its strength in the face of an anticipated ‘Anglo-American bomber fleet’. This was not the only reason to be concerned about the actions of the USA. The United States Navy’s actions in the Atlantic were those of a nation at war as far as Hitler was concerned and the fact that the best efforts of the U-Boats to sever the Atlantic supply line had failed just compounded matters. It now seemed likely that even the defeat of the USSR wouldn’t make the British see sense, they would have to be attacked directly and if the home islands were out of reach, then their Imperial possessions were the obvious target [2].
On the other side of the line at Sirte the British were certainly not exhausted or overextended at this point. They may have been reaching their limits during the last days of Operation Compass, however by the end of September things had improved considerably. The 2nd New Zealand and 50th Northumbrian Division had come up to relieve the Australian and Indian forces to allow them to be pulled back and refitted. On the 28th of August the 8th Army had been down to barely 90 running tanks. Courtesy of REME approximately another 60 had been restored to service and in addition to the tanks delivered by Convoy Lion a further smaller convoy codenamed Stag had delivered 33 Crusader IB and II. Among the Infantry Tanks delivered by Lion were 41 Valentine III models, also equipped with the 6pdr gun. These tanks should have been available before the similarly armed Crusaders, but for once the decision had been taken to iron out all the bugs in the vehicle before they entered full production and this desire for perfection had gotten somewhat out of hand. It fell to Alan Brooke, now a Field Marshal and CIGS, to point out that the tanks were needed, ‘in 1941, not 1951’ [3].
The Valentine III was a significant step up from previous versions, despite later claims to the contrary it was not a ‘universal tank’. It was very much still an infantry tank, lacking the proper balance of speed, protection and firepower to really be able to cover both the Infantry and Cruiser roles, that honour probably belongs to the successor to the Crusader, the Centaur [4].
Regardless by the end of September the British had almost 300 operational tanks with about 60% being Infantry tanks and the position at Sirte was being fortified with minefields and mutually supporting ‘brigade boxes’, the anglicized version of the Hedgehog system. This defensive posture caused some anxiety in London, with some seeing echoes of the stalemate on the Escault Line and Churchill was almost as eager for an offensive as Hitler or Mussolini, he however had three factors restraining him. Firstly, the dramatic success wrought by Alexander and O’Connor meant they could hardly be accused of lacking drive or aggression, thus their insistence that they needed time to prepare carried a lot of weight. Secondly, Alexander and O’Connor had the full support of Alan Brooke, doing a sterling job of fending off some of Churchill’s more outrageous ideas. Thirdly was the fact that Bletchley Park was becoming increasingly effective at penetrating the Enigma code. The arrival of the Afrika Korps and the volume of traffic between Tripoli, Berlin and Rome prompted by Dietrich’s ambitions allowed them to form a picture of German and Italian intentions, bolstered by other intelligence sources.
The British Generals agreed that if the enemy was willing to come out of their defences, they would be far easier to destroy, so long as they could be persuaded to attack where it suited the British. Thus, even as Berlin and Rome were planning their assault on Sirte the British were preparing to receive it [5].
[1] Dietrich actions are as a much a power play versus Graziani as it is genuine ideological commitment.
[2] Mussolini wants to restore his wounded pride and Hitler is still trying to find a solution to the puzzle of how to force the British to make peace.
[3] A reaction to issue with previous new models, which simply got out of hand.
[4] With the A24 Churchill and the A27 Centaur the line between cruiser and infantry is getting blurred and the British will in time shift to the medium and heavy designations, before MBT is adopted.
[5] So the British are well prepared for the defence, with no demands to send troops elsewhere while on the other side a mixture of ego and bad strategy is driving the Axis towards an impetuous counterattack.
