November 15th 1940 – January 1st 1941 – Germany – Challenges for the Wehrmacht – Part II – The Luftwaffe
If the Panzer General’s had rather exaggerated the problems they had encountered in 1940 in the interests of getting higher priority and additional resources, Hermann Goering was remarkably complacent about the far more serious issues encountered by the Luftwaffe. He was not alone in this, certainly others were aware of the issues, but they also knew that new types were being developed that would address these issues. As the year came to a close it would become clear that the issues were not going to be resolved anytime soon and indeed were likely to grow worse rather than better.
What led to this situation was the unpleasant fact that some of the new models the Luftwaffe were pinning their hopes on were bedevilled with serious, even potentially fatal, issues. The He 177 ‘Greif’ was a four-engine bomber intended for the strategic role, filing a gap in the Luftwaffe’s arsenal that had become all too apparent during the bombing campaign against Britain. Rather than having four engines in separate nacelles like the British Lancaster or the American B-17 designs the Germans had adopted a more sophisticated approach, or more accurately a needlessly complicated one. To reduce the drag created by aircraft propellers the design mounted two DB 601 engines in a single nacelle driving contra-rotating propellers. Whatever advantages this arrangement theoretically conferred on paper the reality was repeated engine fires during testing that made the development process painfully slow. This would have been serious enough, but Goering insisted on the addition of dive brakes to the He 177 to enable dive bombing raised the complexity of the development process by an order of magnitude and still further delayed the aircrafts entry in to service. Even given Goering’s track record of poor decision making this one must be ranked quite high, how he envisioned an aircraft with a wingspan slightly larger than the Avro Lancaster successfully dive bombing defies comprehension [1].
If the He 177 illustrated the Luftwaffe’s tendency to embrace overly complicated solutions to straightforward problems the Me 210 program highlighted another issue, the constant desire to have new aircraft enter service long before they were ready to do so. The Me 210 was intended as the successor to the Bf 110, which had already proven wholly inadequate as an escort fighter over Britain, and the Me 210 making its first flight in 1939 should have meant that they could expect it to enter service sometime in early 1941 if not sooner. Unfortunately for the Luftwaffe this progress had been achieved by shortening the development cycle of the Me 210 from the more usual four years to three, drastically foreshortening the iterative process of testing and refinement so important in making the transition from prototype to production aircraft. This resulted in defects in the tailplane assembly that were not caught and corrected, which made the aircraft that rolled off the production line unstable and all but unflyable, resulting in large numbers of unusable airframes sitting in the factories waiting for time consuming remedial work and even when this was done the performance of the Me 210 was disappointing compared to its predecessor. This was not an unknown issue for the Allies either, the example of the Curtiss Helldiver versus the older Dauntless SBD is relatively well known, however the Allies had the resources to absorb such issues without seriously affecting their combat capabilities, the Luftwaffe of 1940 did not. The Me 210 had a very short production run because of these problems and the Luftwaffe had to fall back on the Bf 110 as its main twin engine fighter. That the Bf 110 proved effective in the night fighter role where speed and agility were less important was little comfort to the bomber crews forced to rely on the short-ranged Bf 109 for fighter support during daylight operations [2].
Naturally all the major aircraft companies were only too happy offer new designs to replace or supplement existing designs that were becoming obsolete, and even those that weren’t. Few of these manufacturers were prepared to take no for an answer and the Luftwaffe was plagued by lobbying from Heinkel and Messerschmitt, as well as infighting between the RLM and Goering over each other’s pet projects. This meant that multiple programs often went forward in parallel, or cancelled projects were revived on the whim of someone in Berlin. Again, the allies were not entirely immune to such issues, but they could afford the luxury of pursuing multiple lines of development. The De Havilland Mosquito for example was an aircraft developed entirely independently of RAF requirements, indeed the RAF regarded it as a waste of time and resources until they grasped its capabilities and adopted it into service, without meaningfully disrupting production of other models. This ironically meant that the RAF would have the very ‘schnellbomber’ that the Luftwaffe had sought for so many years with little success and indeed the Luftwaffe would eventually try to produce its own version of the Mosquito, even down to using the same name for the Ta 154, alas for the Luftwaffe the aircraft failed to match the stellar performance of its RAF counterpart and few were built, making it just another wasteful dead end. All too often for the Luftwaffe ‘cutting edge’ designs were allowed to continue consuming limited resources even when what the Luftwaffe needed was solid, capable, aircraft that were easy to produce and easy to maintain to counter the rising tide of improved British and US models [3].
One aircraft that did meet these criteria was the Fw 190. It’s designer Kurt Tank envisioned it from the start as a rugged aircraft that could be operated from rough terrain and be maintained by ground crews with limited expertise. It also possessed excellent performance in the air and would prove a formidable foe for the Allied air forces when it entered service. Logic might have dictated that the Fw 190 would become the dominant fighter of the Luftwaffe given the advantages it offered over the Me 109, this logic was thwarted by the reluctance to accept the disruption caused retooling production and the fearsome political connections Willi Messerschmitt possessed. Messerschmitt had no intention of seeing his aircraft eclipsed and this led to proposals for both new models, in the shape of the Me 209, and further updates to the Bf 109. The latter solution was problematic because the Bf 109 had reached the pinnacle of its development with the F or ‘Fritz’ model introduced in 1940. Thereafter efforts to revise or update the Bf 109 were essentially a nil sum game, adding a more powerful engine to improve top speed came at the expense of manoeuvrability and range, what had been an agile aircraft became leaden and more difficult to fly. Despite this the Bf 109 would see the G and K models introduced without producing any noticeable improvement in overall performance, and it would continue to dominate the Luftwaffe’s fighter forces for the rest of the war even as it lagged ever further behind the latest generations of Allied aircraft [4].
Added to the woes the Luftwaffe experienced during the Eagle Days these development problems meant that most of the senior leadership approached 1941 in a gloomy mood, with the inevitable exception of Goering. To make matters that bit worse by the end of 1940 the squadrons who found themselves engaging the RAF in daylight operations were beginning to suspect that the British had substantially increased the firepower of their fighters. These concerns were initially dismissed by Goering as another excuse for the failure of his aircrews to press the attack against Britain with sufficient vigour. It wouldn’t be until March 2nd 1941 that the crash-landing of a Spitfire during an operation against Luftwaffe airfields in France finally forced the Luftwaffe’s commanders to accept that Fighter Command was deploying 20mm cannon as its new primary air to air weapon [5].
The Luftwaffe entered 1941 facing a litany of issues and with no clear solutions in sight, this had severe consequences as combat took an increasing toll on experienced air crews and the Luftwaffe struggled to replace them even as the RAF, and later other Allied air forces, learned their craft and became increasingly capable and tactically astute. This was not a recipe for the long-term survival of the Luftwaffe as an effective fighting force [6].
[1] To be clear I did not invent that part, the He 177 was required to have dive brakes so it could dive bomb. Oddly Bomber Command and the 8th Airforce never felt the need for this capability in their strategic bombers.
[2] The Me 210 project was a disaster area and Messerschmitt was punished by being allowed to design yet another new aircraft to replace the Bf 110, the Me 410. This was basically a reworked Me 210with all the bugs worked out and proved quite effective when it finally entered service in 1943.
[3] the Ta 154 was not a carbon copy of the Mosquito more of an homage to the British aircraft and was afflicted with engine problems and a choice of glue that attacked the wood the airframe was built from owing to the RAF destroying the plant that made the original adhesive.
[4] I know there are arguments to be made regarding making best use of the existing aeroengines and not wanting to disrupt production, but the Luftwaffe really needed a new airframe with more room for development rather than continually trying to torture more performance out of the Bf 109.
[5] bear in mind it partly took a long time for the truth to sink in because Luftwaffe aircraft that engaged cannon armed RAF fighters didn’t often survive to limp home.
[6] Still as we shall see they are in a better position than the Kriegsmarine…