Here's what the front of the sloped Tiger looks like.
Sloped Tiger I. hull.png

I couldn't do the turret justice so I left it off but will try again in the the not too distant future.

EDIT: Just posted a better pic.
 
Last edited:
The Alt-Tiger looks good.
An earlier Panzer IV F2 could work against the Heer in 1941. OTL, they dealt with huge numbers of older Soviet tanks that were vulnerable to 37mm and short 50mm guns. Here the Soviet tanks are the same, but the shells are much bigger, so ammunition loads are smaller, tanks are heavier, fuel demands greater, and delivering shells to the front is more difficult.
This will be partly countered by slightly lower ammo usage against heavy targets and slightly less damage to the German tanks because they can engage at longer ranges (assuming they can hit at longer ranges).
Edit: An early Hetzer sounds OK, but didn't it have a terrible and cramped layout? It also uses more resources than the many Marders.
 
Last edited:
The Alt-Tiger looks good.
An earlier Panzer IV F2 could work against the Heer in 1941. OTL, they dealt with huge numbers of older Soviet tanks that were vulnerable to 37mm and short 50mm guns. Here the Soviet tanks are the same, but the shells are much bigger, so ammunition loads are smaller, tanks are heavier, fuel demands greater, and delivering shells to the front is more difficult.
This will be partly countered by slightly lower ammo usage against heavy targets and slightly less damage to the German tanks because they can engage at longer ranges (assuming they can hit at longer ranges).
Edit: An early Hetzer sounds OK, but didn't it have a terrible and cramped layout? It also uses more resources than the many Marders.
Thanks and I just Edited the pic of the front view of the sloped Tiger, lower portion of the hull looks more correct now.

Yes the Hetzer was very cramped and all around view for the gunner and driver were not great either and they both had to rely on the commander for instructions.
The Hetzer was however one of the more mechanically reliable German AFV's and gave good service in the defense and ambush role because it was small and easy to conceal.
 

Garrison

Donor
Good update, one small critique, the StuG III was already in service in 1940 and saw action in the invasion of France.
Getting the long barreled Pz.IV and Stu-III into action a year earlier won't turn the tide of battle for Germany but it will send a lot more Allied (East & West) tank crewmen to Valhalla than OTL.
Getting the Hetzer into action three years earlier will also increase Allied tank crew losses but again, not enough to turn the tide IMO.
Okay I will have to look at that and figure out how to amend that, probably more along the lines of Hitler insisting the STuGs get a higher priority than OTL. The German armour will be a bit more effective in 1941, if it isn't frozen in place for some reason... 1942 onwards things will be a lot better for the Heer in terms of tanks at least. The Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine have no similar good fortune as will be explained on Saturday and Tuesday.
 

Garrison

Donor
Over in the alt AFV thread I've posted a summary image of the tanks of Munich Shuffle to date, any comments or suggestions welcome.
 
So courtesy of @cortz#9 here is the alt Tiger and its very late in the war upgrade the Tiger Special:
View attachment 710556
Full details on the specification are here:


I should point out this is not evidence of some sudden rush of insight on the part of Hitler, just him wanting German tanks to be the bestest and coolest. Though I think with this design Cortz#9 has produced something that would give the Panther serious competition for the best looking WWII tank prize. :)
Reminds me of the Lowe
 
Reminds me of the Lowe
The Löwe's turret was the inspiration but I used a turret from a tank that post war Germany designed for India but was never put into production.
The Indian Panzer had a smaller turret than the Löwe but could house a 90mm gun so I thought it made for a good fit but I did alter the turret design a bit from the original.
 
Seems overall the short-term result is much the same as OTL, just a little faster. Is the internal bickering about tanks and dumb ideas like an 88mm panzer III based on OTL? I'm curious what sources one uses to read up on such things.
[1] So no I don’t adhere to any notion that the Heer was some sort of ultra-modern army full of tactical geniuses only held back by ‘crazy Hitler’.
I myself saw it as perhaps slightly above average at best overall, with most of its (early) success coming from being lucky enough to figure out early how to properly use tanks and facing opponents that took time to catch on.
Getting the long barreled Pz.IV and Stu-III into action a year earlier won't turn the tide of battle for Germany but it will send a lot more Allied (East & West) tank crewmen to Valhalla than OTL.
The east, sure. And even if it won't make a strategic difference in Barbarossa, it will sadly remove those legendary meme moments where a single T-34 or KV-2 manage to hold back an entire panzer corp for a day in front of a bridge or such. The west though? I thought by the time the west was seriously engaged with German tanks, they already had the long gun.

That alt-Tiger looks like someone combined the best parts of a Tiger and a Panther- except for the bit where they kept the shot trap turret. Is that late-war "Tiger special" armed with the OTL Tiger II's extra-long 88? The million dollar question though: how much of a powder keg is the final drive?
 
The east, sure. And even if it won't make a strategic difference in Barbarossa, it will sadly remove those legendary meme moments where a single T-34 or KV-2 manage to hold back an entire panzer corp for a day in front of a bridge or such. The west though? I thought by the time the west was seriously engaged with German tanks, they already had the long gun.
North Africa , depending on if the Afrika Korps gets sent , would see a difference as the initial tanks sent OTL had issues with Matilda II's.
 

Garrison

Donor
North Africa , depending on if the Afrika Korps gets sent , would see a difference as the initial tanks sent OTL had issues with Matilda II's.
Well there will be an Afrika Corps but owing to the changes in timing and leadership it will be rather different from its OTL counterpart.
 
ITTL the Germans won against Matilda 1, Matilda2, Char B1, Somua S35 and Covenanter. All were difficult opponents but were overcome by good enough tanks [1,2,3] and some big guns that happenened to be in the right place at the right time.
Given this success (even against the awesome Covenanter), would they send their prestige big gunned tanks to a sideshow to help the Italians instead of spearheading Barbarossa [4]?
OTL the mix of 37 and short 50 on the tanks plus long 50 AT guns did the job in Libya against Valentines and Matilda 2, so it's lkely a few tanks with long 50mm or long 75 will provide a useful advantage if anyone can deliver the right mix of ammo.
Note 1. The cooling (?) system designers really did put the oven in C-oven-anter!
Note 2. Plus of course, Destiny, Willpower, Aryan supremacy, Infallible Leadership etc, etc. Better radios, training and tactics aren't glamorous, so can't have contributed.
Note 3. Aided by poor allied command and coordination, notably on the French side.
Note 4. Well, maybe the Nazi leaders would.
 
Nice update. A few corrections required though:

Hitler’s grip on reality had begun to deteriorate notably by the end of 1941,
Whilst true, given the context do you mean 1940?
In the end it was only Hitler’s decision that the solution to all Germany’s strategic woes that prevented von Kleist going the same way as Halder.
Seems like something is missing after "woes"
it was not though some act of foresight on Hitler’s part
though, or through?
 
To add to the discussion on German armor:

The 75mm PaK 40 could have got greater priority yes, in anticipation of more heavily armored British tanks since OTL they will have faced far more of them and it will be known the UK has ramped up production compared to OTL. The order to develop a tank gun version of it was only given in November of 1941, but it's not guaranteed that the Germans would go for that option immediately.
Prior to that, Rheinmetall-Borsig had been ordered to design a L33 version of the 75mm L24 in March 1941, or a L34.5, probably to limit barrel overhang. Krupp worked on a L40 which was tested in the StuG. It is possible that the former will be developped in late 1940 and installed if the Germans still consider ergonomics in the Pz IV turret to be a priority. One could imagine a scheme similar to the Pz III where the short gun is adopted for some time before it is decided to commit to a less convenient but more powerful long gun.

Regardless, the VK 3001(H) would be dead since it couldn't carry something better than the 75 L24, so the idea of an earlier and different Tiger is not implausible.

It is quite likely that with greater firepower requirements (long 5cm or intermediate 75mm at least), a greater British tank force and an earlier deployment of a 6 pounder, the Germans will reevaluate the existing requirements of the VK 20.01 program in late 1940. In particular upping the armor beyond 50mm (70-80mm, or early slopes as flat armor yields diminishing returns), and increasing the turret diameter and size to carry the bigger guns. The increase in the weight budget will also force them to opt for more potent engines, in the 350-450hp class instead of a mere 300.

Those revised VK 20.01s may enter service this time, out of inertia as they are closer to introduction to meet the new threat, and because they would not be obsolete unlike the OTL versions.


 

Garrison

Donor
Okay so I have revised the latest update to reflect the situation with the STuG III and push the Hetzer a little further back than the original version implied, while still being ahead of OTL:
...Hitler seized on these ideas with enthusiasm, the General Staff was exasperated and irritated.

Guderian’s ideas about the utility of assault guns in the infantry support role was not simply a matter of theory. The Sturmgeschütz (StuG) III had seen service in France, where it seems to have impressed Guderian. The lack of enthusiasm on the part of the General staff was based on two issues, besides resenting being bypassed yet again by a subordinate. The first was that the StuG III was based on the Panzer III, so producing more StuG III would come at the expense of the tank the Heer still saw as its main combat tank and more were urgently needed to replace the likes of the Panzer II and Panzer 38(t), indeed the General Staff suggested that the latter two would be a preferable alternative as a basis for future assault guns. The other objection tended to play into the narrative of the General Staff as hidebound as they were insistent that the ideal infantry support vehicle needed a turret, even though combat experience suggested the performance differential was marginal and hardly justified the additional cost and complexity imposed by having a turreted design. Even if the objections of the General Staff had been sound, they were futile. Hitler had endorsed Guderian’s vision and that was that the StuG III would be prioritized.

In a distinctly pyrrhic victory the General Staff’s idea about producing an assault gun based on the Panzer 38(t) would be pursued and would see service as the Jagdpanzer 38, colloquially knowns as the Hetzer. The Herzer’s development would be rather stop-start as the Heer’s priorities changed multiple times and it did not see service until the beginning of 1943. When it did enter service, it proved its worth in the defensive battles the Heer was forced to fight as the tide of war turned against them...


Tomorrow we will see how the Luftwaffe are doing at the end of 1940 and then the situation with the Kriegsmarine. After that there will be a post on the state of play with the US and Britain and then it will be time for alt Operation Judgment.
 
November 15th 1940 – January 1st 1941 – Germany – Challenges for the Wehrmacht – Part II – The Luftwaffe

Garrison

Donor
November 15th 1940 – January 1st 1941 – Germany – Challenges for the Wehrmacht – Part II – The Luftwaffe

If the Panzer General’s had rather exaggerated the problems they had encountered in 1940 in the interests of getting higher priority and additional resources, Hermann Goering was remarkably complacent about the far more serious issues encountered by the Luftwaffe. He was not alone in this, certainly others were aware of the issues, but they also knew that new types were being developed that would address these issues. As the year came to a close it would become clear that the issues were not going to be resolved anytime soon and indeed were likely to grow worse rather than better.

What led to this situation was the unpleasant fact that some of the new models the Luftwaffe were pinning their hopes on were bedevilled with serious, even potentially fatal, issues. The He 177 ‘Greif’ was a four-engine bomber intended for the strategic role, filing a gap in the Luftwaffe’s arsenal that had become all too apparent during the bombing campaign against Britain. Rather than having four engines in separate nacelles like the British Lancaster or the American B-17 designs the Germans had adopted a more sophisticated approach, or more accurately a needlessly complicated one. To reduce the drag created by aircraft propellers the design mounted two DB 601 engines in a single nacelle driving contra-rotating propellers. Whatever advantages this arrangement theoretically conferred on paper the reality was repeated engine fires during testing that made the development process painfully slow. This would have been serious enough, but Goering insisted on the addition of dive brakes to the He 177 to enable dive bombing raised the complexity of the development process by an order of magnitude and still further delayed the aircrafts entry in to service. Even given Goering’s track record of poor decision making this one must be ranked quite high, how he envisioned an aircraft with a wingspan slightly larger than the Avro Lancaster successfully dive bombing defies comprehension [1].

If the He 177 illustrated the Luftwaffe’s tendency to embrace overly complicated solutions to straightforward problems the Me 210 program highlighted another issue, the constant desire to have new aircraft enter service long before they were ready to do so. The Me 210 was intended as the successor to the Bf 110, which had already proven wholly inadequate as an escort fighter over Britain, and the Me 210 making its first flight in 1939 should have meant that they could expect it to enter service sometime in early 1941 if not sooner. Unfortunately for the Luftwaffe this progress had been achieved by shortening the development cycle of the Me 210 from the more usual four years to three, drastically foreshortening the iterative process of testing and refinement so important in making the transition from prototype to production aircraft. This resulted in defects in the tailplane assembly that were not caught and corrected, which made the aircraft that rolled off the production line unstable and all but unflyable, resulting in large numbers of unusable airframes sitting in the factories waiting for time consuming remedial work and even when this was done the performance of the Me 210 was disappointing compared to its predecessor. This was not an unknown issue for the Allies either, the example of the Curtiss Helldiver versus the older Dauntless SBD is relatively well known, however the Allies had the resources to absorb such issues without seriously affecting their combat capabilities, the Luftwaffe of 1940 did not. The Me 210 had a very short production run because of these problems and the Luftwaffe had to fall back on the Bf 110 as its main twin engine fighter. That the Bf 110 proved effective in the night fighter role where speed and agility were less important was little comfort to the bomber crews forced to rely on the short-ranged Bf 109 for fighter support during daylight operations [2].

Naturally all the major aircraft companies were only too happy offer new designs to replace or supplement existing designs that were becoming obsolete, and even those that weren’t. Few of these manufacturers were prepared to take no for an answer and the Luftwaffe was plagued by lobbying from Heinkel and Messerschmitt, as well as infighting between the RLM and Goering over each other’s pet projects. This meant that multiple programs often went forward in parallel, or cancelled projects were revived on the whim of someone in Berlin. Again, the allies were not entirely immune to such issues, but they could afford the luxury of pursuing multiple lines of development. The De Havilland Mosquito for example was an aircraft developed entirely independently of RAF requirements, indeed the RAF regarded it as a waste of time and resources until they grasped its capabilities and adopted it into service, without meaningfully disrupting production of other models. This ironically meant that the RAF would have the very ‘schnellbomber’ that the Luftwaffe had sought for so many years with little success and indeed the Luftwaffe would eventually try to produce its own version of the Mosquito, even down to using the same name for the Ta 154, alas for the Luftwaffe the aircraft failed to match the stellar performance of its RAF counterpart and few were built, making it just another wasteful dead end. All too often for the Luftwaffe ‘cutting edge’ designs were allowed to continue consuming limited resources even when what the Luftwaffe needed was solid, capable, aircraft that were easy to produce and easy to maintain to counter the rising tide of improved British and US models [3].

One aircraft that did meet these criteria was the Fw 190. It’s designer Kurt Tank envisioned it from the start as a rugged aircraft that could be operated from rough terrain and be maintained by ground crews with limited expertise. It also possessed excellent performance in the air and would prove a formidable foe for the Allied air forces when it entered service. Logic might have dictated that the Fw 190 would become the dominant fighter of the Luftwaffe given the advantages it offered over the Me 109, this logic was thwarted by the reluctance to accept the disruption caused retooling production and the fearsome political connections Willi Messerschmitt possessed. Messerschmitt had no intention of seeing his aircraft eclipsed and this led to proposals for both new models, in the shape of the Me 209, and further updates to the Bf 109. The latter solution was problematic because the Bf 109 had reached the pinnacle of its development with the F or ‘Fritz’ model introduced in 1940. Thereafter efforts to revise or update the Bf 109 were essentially a nil sum game, adding a more powerful engine to improve top speed came at the expense of manoeuvrability and range, what had been an agile aircraft became leaden and more difficult to fly. Despite this the Bf 109 would see the G and K models introduced without producing any noticeable improvement in overall performance, and it would continue to dominate the Luftwaffe’s fighter forces for the rest of the war even as it lagged ever further behind the latest generations of Allied aircraft [4].

Added to the woes the Luftwaffe experienced during the Eagle Days these development problems meant that most of the senior leadership approached 1941 in a gloomy mood, with the inevitable exception of Goering. To make matters that bit worse by the end of 1940 the squadrons who found themselves engaging the RAF in daylight operations were beginning to suspect that the British had substantially increased the firepower of their fighters. These concerns were initially dismissed by Goering as another excuse for the failure of his aircrews to press the attack against Britain with sufficient vigour. It wouldn’t be until March 2nd 1941 that the crash-landing of a Spitfire during an operation against Luftwaffe airfields in France finally forced the Luftwaffe’s commanders to accept that Fighter Command was deploying 20mm cannon as its new primary air to air weapon [5].

The Luftwaffe entered 1941 facing a litany of issues and with no clear solutions in sight, this had severe consequences as combat took an increasing toll on experienced air crews and the Luftwaffe struggled to replace them even as the RAF, and later other Allied air forces, learned their craft and became increasingly capable and tactically astute. This was not a recipe for the long-term survival of the Luftwaffe as an effective fighting force [6].

[1] To be clear I did not invent that part, the He 177 was required to have dive brakes so it could dive bomb. Oddly Bomber Command and the 8th Airforce never felt the need for this capability in their strategic bombers.

[2] The Me 210 project was a disaster area and Messerschmitt was punished by being allowed to design yet another new aircraft to replace the Bf 110, the Me 410. This was basically a reworked Me 210with all the bugs worked out and proved quite effective when it finally entered service in 1943.

[3] the Ta 154 was not a carbon copy of the Mosquito more of an homage to the British aircraft and was afflicted with engine problems and a choice of glue that attacked the wood the airframe was built from owing to the RAF destroying the plant that made the original adhesive.

[4] I know there are arguments to be made regarding making best use of the existing aeroengines and not wanting to disrupt production, but the Luftwaffe really needed a new airframe with more room for development rather than continually trying to torture more performance out of the Bf 109.

[5] bear in mind it partly took a long time for the truth to sink in because Luftwaffe aircraft that engaged cannon armed RAF fighters didn’t often survive to limp home.

[6] Still as we shall see they are in a better position than the Kriegsmarine…
 
Top