I see the Germans want to ensure there is a campaign in Italy proper even if there are now Allied troops there. That totally definately won't have any possible negative consequences at all for the Germans absolutely. Looking forward to the wheat being seperated from the chaff in the American officer corps on Tuesday.
Munich Shuffle: 1938-1942
- Thread starter Garrison
- Start date
Garrison
Donor
Well the Germans, for which read Hitler, are extremely twitchy and not without reason as it happens. The wheat will be separated, and may avoid slapping a soldier in view of the press...
Well, the 1943 landing in France will be helped by the German need to occupy Italy, as well as the formerly Italian areas in Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia, and to (still) defend Norway, southern Italy, Sardinia, Corsica and Greece against any Allied landing.
I also wonder how Fall Blau will be affected by the events of Sicily...
I also wonder how Fall Blau will be affected by the events of Sicily...
When ZIGZAG first landed in Britain, he walked right up to the nearest bobby and turned himself in. The bobby took him to the local police station, and Special Branch sent an officer who took charge. That same bobby then asked to speak to the SB man, and said "I don't know what this man may tell you. He landed with a German parachute, but I know him - he was in my platoon in the Irish Guards."
Now who would ever accept that in fiction?
Garrison
Donor
At the moment Hitler is still adamant about it getting max priority and as Sicily is happening it still look like the Wehrmacht might win in the East, which would completely negate what the Allies are achieving in Sicily.
Things may be altered by the fact that the Barracuda is in service earlier and has a better engine than OTL but the British do prefer torpedoes for the big targets.
Or Juan Pujol just deciding to freelance as an allied agent and becoming one of the Germans most trusted sources despite knowing practically nothing about Britain.
Barracudas attacked Tirpitz in Op Tungsten using 1,600 lb (730 kg) - as well as smaller 500 pound bombs
Garrison
Donor
No, owing to the quicker development of the sea Hurricane, Sea Spitfire and Barracuda it was swiftly retired.
Garrison
Donor
And of course it will be seen as a complete waste of resources post war, not up there with the Covenanter IOTL, but definitely a 'why did they bother' design.
23rd September – 30th October 1942 – Sicily – Operation Malamute – Part III – Triumph and Humiliation
Garrison
Donor
23rd September – 30th October 1942 – Sicily – Operation Malamute – Part III – Triumph and Humiliation
Alexander’s ‘right hook’ with the landing at Catania achieved most of its objectives. With the Italian defences focused on XIII Corps, X Corps was able to isolate and take Catania within a day, aided by some of the more successful airborne operations. X Corps had also moved out to flank and cut off the 207th and 208th Coastal Divisions as XIII Corps advance frontally and the easternmost elements of XXX Corps moved to close the trap. Most of the 208th were successfully cut off, however about half of the 207th managed to retreat as the Italian rear-guard put up a determined fight to hold open the line to allow their comrades to escape. Even so the British Corps had defeated these rear guards and completed their encirclement by the 29th of September. An attempt by the remnant of 207th, supported by the 29th Infantry Regiment ‘Assietta’ and two brigades of the 17th CC.NN. Legion ‘Cremona’, to open an escape route for the trapped troops and to drive the British out of Catania was mounted on the 2nd of October. The Italians had underestimated the strength of the forces landed by X Corps and along with repeated Allied air attacks the offensive was broken up into a series of poorly co-ordinated assaults easily repulsed by the British forces. With this effort at relieving them having failed the Italian troops in the Catania pocket surrendered on the 3rd of October, a major blow to the defence of the east of Sicily [1].
The overall plan of battle called for the establishment of a solid line anchored by the landings at Licata in the west and just north of Catania in the east, taking control of everything south of that line and landing reinforcements and supplies to support a drive north towards Palermo and Messina. With I Armoured Corps having moved rapidly to fan out and seize Licata, as well as driving back the defenders east and north of the town, the western and eastern anchors of the line were secure. Indeed, the major issue Alexander faced in the west was to restrain Patton, who was eager for a rapid armoured thrust to seize Palermo, naturally with him entering the city at the head of his forces in a moment of triumph. Alexander wasn’t interested in a race to Palermo, especially as the far more serious problem he faced was with II Corps. It was supposed to be holding the line between I Armoured and the three British Corps, but it was advancing at a worryingly slow pace that threatened to delay the entire plan [2].
After II Corps had landed it had initially advanced much as the British Corps had to their east, however by the 28th of September their advance had slowed to a crawl, showing reasonable caution as Fredendall’s defenders would have it, or ‘plodding and timid’ as General Leese characterized it. Far from driving forward as his compatriot Patton was inclined to do Fredendall seemed almost pathologically concerned about a possible counterattack. This was exemplified by the amount of attention Fredendall put into the construction of his forward headquarters, though it was not very far forward by the standards of the other Corps and whereas the likes of Patton or Leese set up what were clearly temporary facilities Fredendall’s HQ seemed to be intended as a permanent residence, so heavily built up with air and ground defences that it was soon referred as ‘Fort Fredendall’, surrounded by barbed wire, sandbagged gunnery positions tank traps and trenches. Fredendall’s distraction with his HQ meant that he had lost focus on developments at the front. He had initially insisted on a dispersed broad front advance, with every potential enemy strongpoint to be reduced methodically, even if the enemy consisted of nothing more than a couple of platoons of infantry that could easily have been isolated and bypassed in the same way as those on the flanks of II Corps [3].
This stuttering advance was intensely frustrating for Alexander, and yet he could hardly protest Fredendall’s insistence that he was proceeding cautiously in the interests of minimizing casualties amongst his still inexperienced troops. Nonetheless Alexander did his best to prod Fredendall into stepping up the pace, while passing his concerns up the chain of command in the hope that someone in Washington might be persuaded to apply pressure. Patton was far less diplomatic in his views of the sluggish advance. He visited Fredendall’s HQ on the 1st of October, and his low opinion of the commander of II Corps was not improved by the site of his ‘bunker’. Details of the meeting have proven hard to come by even with the release of masses of documents on the Sicilian campaign, suffice to say though that Patton left in a foul mood and informed one aide that Fredendall was ‘going to get us all thrown back into the sea’. As was his wont Patton took practical action to prevent this possibility, ordering units to prepare for action to the east rather than the north. He started these preparations well before Alexander’s HQ sent a message advising Patton that he should act to protect the flanks of his position, without directly mentioning any concerns over Fredendall. The same advice was issued to XXX Corps [4].
Some, particularly those who have attempted to defend Fredendall have chosen to interpret this advice as a deliberate plan to use II Corps as the bait in a trap for the Axis forces, and XIV Panzer Corp in particular. This requires one to believe that Fredendall was deliberately put in a bad position, as if his compatriots and superior officers were willing to hazard two US Divisions in such a huge gamble. The facts support the interpretation that Alexander and Patton were simply responding to the developing situation as best they could, given that it was not possible to relieve Fredendall at that time. There is also the fact that deliberately using II Corps as bait risked the lives of far too many American soldiers for Alexander to have contemplated such a scheme. Instead, Alexander kept trying to encourage Fredendall to push forward and align II Corps with the forces to the west and east of it. Even as he did so the Axis forces, and General der Panzertruppe Hans-Valentin Hube, commander of XIV Panzer Corps in particular, had already noted the crawling progress of II Corps and saw an opportunity to drive through this ‘second rate’ enemy force and split open the junction between the British and American Corps [5].
Hube’s low opinion of the Americans was only partly informed by the desultory performance of II Corps. There was also some influence from Hitler’s view of the Americans as decadent and weak, as well as Hube’s own memories of the steep learning curve faced by the US army in the battles of 1918. Regardless of its origin this view of the US forces persuaded Hube that the best, indeed only, chance for victory on Sicily lay in breaking through II Corps and sending it back to the coast, while at the same pinning I Armoured in place with an attack to its front before having the forces that broke through II Corps pivot to attack I Armoured in the rear and unhinge the entire western flank of the invasion. It was a plan fuelled as much by the need to do something after the losses in the east and the British seizure of Catania.
Hube was under no illusions about the chances of driving the Allies back into the sea, regardless of the demands from Berlin and Rome. Even if I Armoured proved as hesitant as II Corps in responding to the attack on its frontage there was little prospect that the three British Corps would simply stand around doing nothing while the Germans decisively defeated the Americans. The best hope was that any British attempt to pivot could be blocked by follow up forces advancing behind the Axis spearhead, which was mostly composed of XIV Panzer, with two Italian divisions in support [6].
As risky as the plan might be it still seemed more attractive than the alternate of trying to simply establish a defensive perimeter and slow the Allied advance, especially with it becoming clear that there would be no landing in Greece or Sardinia and that Sicily would be the main allied effort in the Autumn of 1942. This meant that all available Allied reinforcements and supplies could be expected to be directed to Sicily, while the defenders could expect to receive the undivided attention of Allied air and naval units in the Mediterranean. In light of this it was inevitable that Hube’s counterattack was supported by the Italian commander on the island Generale d'Armata Alfredo Guzzoni, even if it did relegate Italian forces to little more than a supporting role, and the counterattack was set for the 4th of October. When it was launched the counteroffensive certainly provoked alarm bordering on panic for the Allies at times but unfortunately for XIV Panzer Generals Patton and Leese were made of sterner stuff than Fredendall and responded with far more energy and decisiveness than Hube had anticipated [7].
[1] Again the Italian troops are every bit as capable as any other nations, they just lack decent leadership and equipment.
[2] As was all but inevitable.
[3] The problem is that Fredendall was a ‘golden boy’ in Washington, bound to get a major field command, and equally bound to make a mess of it.
[4] The only good news here is that at least Patton and Alexander aren’t going to be taken by surprise by Fredendall’s failures.
[5] Hube doesn’t really have a lot of good choices, since any chance of relief or major reinforcement is out of the question as Stalingrad is becoming the focus of Wehrmacht plans.
[6] It’s a long shot but the other option is to wait while the Allies pour in reinforcements and supplies, not to mention building forward airbases to boost their air superiority.
[7] And the fate of Hube’s operation will be discussed in the next update.
Which leaves us to wonder how he ended up as a "golden boy" in the first place.
Garrison
Donor
Like a lot of pre war Generals he was a good organizer and on paper seemed to have all the right credentials, as well as knowing how to get on his superiors good side. I'm sure we have all worked with someone who somehow seemed to always come out ahead despite their questionable skills.
23rd September – 30th October 1942 – Sicily – Operation Malamute – Part IV – Hube’s Counterattack & the Drive for Palermo
Garrison
Donor
23rd September – 30th October 1942 – Sicily – Operation Malamute – Part IV – Hube’s Counterattack & the Drive for Palermo
On the 4th and 5th of October Hube’s offensive matched his most optimistic hopes and seemed to confirm his poor opinion of the US Army. As Hube would soon learn the failures of II Corps had little to do with the fighting ability of US soldiers and everything to do with poor leadership. Despite warnings that XIV Panzer was concentrating on his front Fredendall he had done nothing to prepare for a counterattack, other than slowing the already plodding advance of II Corps. This abundance of caution achieved little as forward elements of II Corps hit by strong German attack were in many places overrun or sent reeling in head long retreat. Still, even at the height of this success there were those units that held their ground and gave Hube’s forces a bloody nose. Junior officers commanding at the platoon and company level successfully rallied their troops to dig in and hold, offering up fierce resistance that forced the Axis troops to either reduce their positions or try and bypass them to maintain their momentum, which was not always possible and even where it was led to overcrowding and traffic jams on side roads that were not suited to military traffic, which opened the Axis forces up to the threat of air strikes. Despite desperate pleas for support these holdouts were largely left to their own resources, meaning they had to either evacuate, or in some cases surrender when their ammunition ran out, though not all of those who chose to lay down their arms were taken as POWs and the discovery of these local massacres enraged the US troops who retook the ground later [1].
The failure to aid to these forward units’ rests entirely with Fredendall. His response to the counterattack can only be described as panic mixed with a sort of mental paralysis, in terms of the ‘fight or flight’ response to a critical situation Fredendall embraced flight. Some have tried to characterize his actions as nothing more than an attempt to shorten lines and regroup his forces, however this is an extremely generous interpretation and accounts from some of his staff point to a man more worried about his prestige than the men serving under him. Fredendall basically endorsed those units who had fled and, on the 6th, issued orders for a wholesale withdrawal to what he had arbitrarily decided would be II Corps main defensive line, which did indeed seem to be nothing more than a line arbitrarily drawn on a map with little to recommend it over other further forward positions.
This plan provoked what amounted to a mutiny among the divisional and regimental commanders of II Corps, who were being asked to give up ground that had yet to be attacked by the Axis and expose their infantry to potential attacks on their rear from fast moving Panzer units. Brigadier General Troy H. Middleton, commanding the 45th Infantry Division found himself leading the resistance and arguing fiercely for a more organized series of much shorter withdrawals. Whether Fredendall would have reconsidered in the face of the almost universal opposition from his subordinates will never be known as news reached Fredendall that Patton and I Armoured Corps had intervened in the matter, with units of 2nd Armoured division attacking the flanks of the axis advance around 14:30 hours on the 6th [2].
By the 7th of October II Corps actions had escalated into a full-blown counterattack of their own, limited only by the need to hold off the Italian attacks by the 28th Infantry Division ‘Aosta’ that were supposed to pin down the Corps reserves. Confident in the resolution of his frontline troops, and in receipt of substantial air support, Patton did not hesitate to enact his contingency plans and turn his forces east, intent on breaking through and encircling the advancing Panzers. Hube’s initial response to these attacks was dismissive, believing that the Italians covering the western flank of his advance were overreacting to small scale local efforts by isolated units of II Corps. He had also weighted his screening force heavily in favour of covering against an attack from XXX Corps, with grave consequences for his forces. It was not until the 8th when German infantry had been committed to support the Italians, and reports were received from them of the scale of the actions by I Armoured Corps that he realized the gravity of the situation, reinforced by the fact that the British 51st (Highland) Infantry Division of XXX Corps was now also probing from the east. With the Axis forces now facing heavy air attacks and Fredendall having finally amended his orders so that the advance elements were now facing a far stiffer defence by II Corps Hube had to accept that there was no longer any hope of a breakthrough and that in fact his entire Corps was in danger [3].
Elements of the 1st Fallschirmjäger Division intended to reinforce the advance of XIV Panzer were now hastily redirected to halt the advance of I Armoured while what had been the vanguard of the advance against II Corps suddenly found themselves in the position of acting as a rear-guard, ordered to hold off any frontal attacks at all cost. In this respect Hube needn’t have worried, II Corps and its commander were in no condition to attack the Axis positions, despite Alexander calling on Fredendall to commit his reserves and increase the pressure on XIV Panzer, since there was now the clear opportunity to turn the tables and destroy the cream of the Axis forces on Sicily. In the end while Patton’s troops demonstrated considerable energy, they were still inexperienced, and the Wehrmacht troops were able to take advantage of this to blunt their attacks. They were also more than willing to abandon Italian forces in order to make good their escape, which did nothing to improve relations between the two Allies. There was also some friction between the British and Americans, which was not entirely caused by Fredendall’s actions. Patton was probably guilty of a lack of co-ordination with Leese and XXX Corps, seeking to make the battle an American victory rather than Allied one, though Patton saw things rather differently, claiming it was the slow response of XXX Corps that allowed the Axis formations to escape before they could be encircled. A more accurate assessment would be that XIV Panzer had to sacrifice the bulk of its strength to save the rest. Between the fighting on the flanks, the fact that the forward most units were cut off and forced to surrender before they could disengage, and the constant air attacks by the RAF and USAAF, XIV Corps had been reduced to barely a third of its starting strength, with especially heavy losses to its armoured units, limiting its mobility for the rest of the fighting in Sicily [4].
By the 11th Of October the Axis forces were back where they had been on the 4th, indeed they were worse off as X Corps and XIII Corps had launched an attack towards Messina on the 10th that had forced the Italians to rapidly give ground. With the situation stabilized for the Allies the question of who to blame for this near disaster loomed large, though there was never any real doubt as to who was going to be held accountable. Fredendall was relieved of his command on the 12th of October and replaced by General Omar Bradley, though even now Fredendall was not in disgrace, at least not in the eyes of his supporters in Washington. Bradley proved to be a far superior soldier to Fredendall and from this point on the fighting in Sicily was a series of Allied advances that the ever more depleted defenders could do little to prevent, reinforcements were non-existent as the Germans were now completely focused on Stalingrad and the Italians were plunged into chaos by events on the mainland after the 19th of October [5].
One area of controversy that arose after the battle was that while the Italians were unable to reinforce Sicily, they were able to evacuate a large part of the surviving defenders despite the looming presence of the Royal Navy and the Allied air forces. The most reasonable explanation for this is that Alexander had no interest in cornering the Axis troops and forcing them to fight to the bitter end. Giving them a bolt hole spared Allied casualties and if the remains of XIV Corp were withdrawn to Italy, then that suited the Allies larger strategic plans, though there was a considerable reluctance to commit such thoughts to any written records either at the time or after the war. The numerous memoirs of the battle either gloss over the Axis evacuation or point accusing fingers at Alexander, Patton, Bradley during his command of II Corps, or the Royal Navy [6].
Patton do get his triumph and entered Palermo on the 22nd of October. Given the hard fight that I Armoured Corps had endured it was an honour they were surely entitled to, though this is not to say that political considerations did not rear their ugly head. Fredendall still had friends in Washington and allowing I Armoured its moment in the sun largely allowed Fredendall’s failures to be ignored. He returned to the USA without any overt action being taken against him, he was instead assigned to a training command and was even promoted a few months later, however he never returned to a combat command [7].
Patton on the other hand saw his stock rise considerably, and he would soon move front and centre in the preparations for Operation Millennium, even though he still rubbed some people in the US High Command up the wrong way. The British commanders also reinforced their already solid reputations and many of them would also find themselves commanding forces on D-Day. The experiences in Sicily would add to those from Dieppe and helped to shape plans for future operations. Possession of Sicily put the Allied air forces in easy range of targets in Italy and southern France, creating fresh headaches for the Luftwaffe’s already heavily committed fighter squadrons.
On the Axis side Sicily was another failure the Wehrmacht could blame on the Italians and one they were keen to put behind them as they now had to worry about where the Western Allies might turn next, as well as the looming prospect of a far worse military disaster in the East. For the Italians, well they had other issues to concern themselves with. Those issues were also why any idea that victory in Sicily might be used to leverage the Americans into an invasion of the Italian mainland despite it being rejected previously were swiftly abandoned. The ‘soft underbelly’ had turned into a ‘tough old gut’ [8].
[1] The Wehrmacht is indulging in petty vengeance, deciding that troop who fought to the last round don’t deserve to simply put their hands up.
[2] Fredendall is not making any friends here and an odd little detail about 45th Infantry, prior to the 1930s their emblem was a yellow swastika on a red background:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/45th_...of_the_45th_Infantry_Division_(1924-1939).svg
[3] Fredendall may be destroying his reputation, Patton is making his and putting down a claim for a substantial role in another amphibious assault.
[4] Hube gambled, and he lost. The fact that there was little else he could have done will cut no ice in Berlin.
[5] Those events will be the subject of the next two updates.
[6] The Allies see no reason to take losses against battered divisions that are just going to sit in Italy waiting for an invasion that isn’t coming.
[7] He probably winds up with an office next to MacArthur’s.
[8] If Ciano and co. thought things were bad already they are about to get much worse.
Garrison
Donor
Italy because things are taking a turn for the worse. The Guadalcanal campaign will be shorter and less bloody for the USA but not as different as Wake Island for example.
I still suspect it's only a matter of time before Patton finds himself on the carpet for dissing PTSD cases and/or commanding a series of red herring operations.
Garrison
Donor
Oh yes, not that the US press was apparently aware there was such a place on Sicily.
Well he avoided the OTL incident and given the compressed timeframe the plan is for him to make it to D-Day and someone else will find themselves playing decoy.