Munich Shuffle: 1938-1942
- Thread starter Garrison
- Start date
Been watching this timeline from the beginning and have not been disappointed. I was a little shocked to see a much earlier occupation of Italy and that raises a question. How will this impact the Communist Party of Italy? They were one of the main resistance groups in the country and they became the second biggest party in Italy after the war in part because of their resistance and nearly won control of the government. I can see them becoming even more popular with a sustained campaign against a foreign invader and the fact that the Germans mainly are occupying the industrial north, which were their strongholds.
Garrison
Donor
Things are going to get messy in Italy, especially when the Germans have to draw down forces to face West and East and when, certain other events take place in the Reich. The post war map of Europe is going to be somewhat different from OTL naturally.
Garrison
Donor
Deleted now thanks, the perils of flicking back and forth between pages.You might've posted in the wrong thread....
Although the post was in the wrong thread that isn't entirely out of the question for 1943-44...
marathag
Banned
Most of their crew thought the chain reaction was self moderating, and put no real work into Control Rods for their reactor.
Compare to Fermi with the Chicago Pile, that was only a few Watts in power, and the several safety systems in place.
He feared a runaway. The Germans had no clue that could happen, and really did have a plan, beyond 'toss chucks of cadmium into the cauldron' in event of an emergency.
With the allies being stronger is there a possibility you'd get more of a pro-democracy guerilla movement in Italy (and potentially Yugoslavia, Greece, etc.) than a communist guerilla movement?
Garrison
Donor
They will be doing their best and they might well have more success in Greece especially with Crete as a base of operations.
12th November – 28th December – Burma & Malaya – Operation Buttermere – Part I – Taking the Initiative
Garrison
Donor
12th November – 28th December – Burma & Malaya – Operation Buttermere – Part I – Taking the Initiative
After Operation Yari had been decisively beaten back and the naval victories at Singapore and Wake Island had helped secure the sea routes to Burma and Malaya the initiative in the Pacific and Indian ocean had definitively passed to the Allies. Whilst Europe still remained the highest priority for men and material the Pacific theatre of operations was not starved of resources, regardless of what some advocates for a greater emphasis on fighting the Japanese liked to claim. The Americans in fact were able to take to the offensive first with the launch Operation Watchtower on August 4th. The Japanese had been reinforcing the island and building an airfield that the Americans were keen to seize and put to their own use. The battle for Guadalcanal would become the main focus for the US Navy in the Pacific for the rest of the year, as it soon became clear that despite its heavy losses the IJN was not simply going to sit in port and do nothing in the face of Allied attacks [1].
There was some anxiety in Lo ndon that the USA had launched an offensive while the British forces in Burma and Malaya appeared to be doing nothing, but Auchinleck and his subordinates in Burma and Malaya were not inclined to launch any precipitate offensives, they were determined that when they struck it would be decisive and that they would be able to sustain a high operational tempo throughout the battle. There was also the not so small matter of the Monsoon season to be considered. Usually running from June to September it was prudent not to plan for any major offensives in the region before the latter part of October. As plans were being prepared General Orde Wingate was called upon to contribute his ideas about guerrilla warfare. The success of the irregulars and the desert patrol groups in North Africa had shown the value of having forces operating behind enemy lines. Targeting installations in the Japanese rear, especially airfields, would disrupt their ability to resist future British advances out of Malaya and Burma. If airfields could be seized, even temporarily, then these ‘Chindits’ as they would commonly be referred to, could be resupplied, or withdrawn if need be. The hope was that these forces would be able to link up with advancing troops and speed the progress of the offensive [2].
One critical objective for operations in Malaya was the relief of Penang. This small island had been garrisoned as far back as November 1941. The elements of the British Indian Army 3rd Corps and 3rd Battalion Penang and Province Wellesley Volunteer Corps dispatched to defend Penang were intended to prevent the Japanese using it as jumping off point for amphibious attacks and to delay the Japanese advance into Malaya. What was supposed to be a temporary holding action had instead turned into a siege as the British were able to keep resupplying it from the sea and while the Japanese did try to take the island on several occasions, they never committed the kind of manpower necessary to overcome the British and Indian troops who were unwilling to abandon the position after having taken so many losses holding it. Despite their stubborn resistance the troops at Penang were increasingly exhausted and in need of either being evacuated or relieved, the British had decided on the latter. If this push was successful and the Japanese were forced to abandon their positions, then Montgomery had contingencies in place to extend the drive and push the Japanese all the way back into Thailand [3].
Slim had now been given command of the forces operating out of Burma and those forces were not going to be excluded from the plan to attack the Japanese. Their objective would be Mae Sot, the original jumping off point for the Japanese 55th Division during Operation Yari. This would provide a base from which to harass Japanese lines of communication and potentially pave the way for an attack in the direction of Bangkok, which in fact the British had no interest in pursuing in the short term, the Japanese though would have no choice but to deploy forces to protect the Thai capital. The fact was that if Burma and Malay could be finally secured then the next objective for the British was going to be the DEI. A collection of Australian, British, Canadian and Dutch troops, commonly known as ABCD for obvious reasons, had been clinging on to a foothold in the island for months, demonstrating the same stubborn determination as those at Penang, and the British recognized that cutting Japanese lines of supply and retaking the islands would be a huge blow to the Japanese, removing the only potential source of oil open to them [4].
There were also political considerations behind the drive into Thailand. Indian troops had proven invaluable to the fighting not only in Burma and Malaya but in the Middle East as well and if the British were to continue their campaign in South East Asia it was inevitable that many more Indian troops would be needed. Some in India were openly opposed to this, some even voiced the opinion that a Japanese victory might be a preferable outcome. These voices had been quieted by the military successes of the British but not silenced. It was hoped that the securing of the lines of communication and commerce that ran through Rangoon into India would help appease the Indian nationalists, as well as maintaining a vital route for the shipment of Lend-Lease supplies to China. Whether the offensive did anything to dissuade the more ardent Indian Nationalists is debatable, it did however contribute to alleviating the Bengal famine of 1943 as large quantities of rice were shipped from Burma [5].
From a practical point of view both Slim and Montgomery’s forces had been quite generously provided with equipment and manpower, a large part of the former being of American make. Montgomery had been glad to accept as many of the M3 Stuart tanks as London was willing to pass along and he was more than happy to receive the new M3 Lee mediums as well. This tank might be viewed as obsolescent in a European context, but it would prove to be a leviathan in South East Asia. Its powerful 75mm gun was invaluable and given the limitations of Japanese armour and anti-tank weapons there was little to stop it making full use of its capabilities [6].
The RAF and RAAF units had also been reinforced with additional bomber and fighter squadrons, even finally receiving Spitfire squadrons, armed with 20mm cannons which did not have to contend with the technical issues that had taken some time to resolve in cooler climates. Another boost to the forces in Malaya was the arrival of HMS Prince of Wales in Singapore harbour on the 3rd of July. Royal Navy warships and submarines had been operating out of Singapore in increasing numbers since the destruction of the Japanese carrier force in April, but this marked the formal redeployment of the HQ of the British Indian Ocean Fleet from Ceylon to Singapore. Montgomery was there along with various local dignitaries to greet Admiral Cunningham as he came ashore. Cunningham was in full agreement with the plan to cut off the DEI and clear it of Japanese forces. If these efforts drew out the remaining capital ships of the IJN, then so much the better in Cunningham’s view [7].
The British, Australian, and Indian troops who had been regarded as green and of dubious quality in December 1941 had been transformed by months of hard fighting and hard training into confident effective units, now with the supporting arms needed to mount an offensive against the Japanese. Using terms like eager can be misleading, but the British forces were ready and willing to fight, believing in their commanders and expecting to win through despite the setbacks that were inevitable in any battle. The same confidence was markedly lacking in their opponents [8].
[1] Guadalcanal is not going to be a focus of the TL, but it is going on in the background. It kicked off a little earlier than OTL and it will end sooner as well.
[2] Wingate is going to put the rather haphazard operation of the irregulars on a far stronger footing.
[3] So yes Penang has been holding for months, a sort of Malayan Tobruk.
[4] ABCD will have to wait until the Spring of 1943 for their relief.
[5] So the famine is averted and there will be more progress on the political front in 1943.
[6] So the Lee/Grant is not going to see a lot of use in Europe, and most will end up in the Pacific.
[7] And Cunningham will get his wish, off Borneo, next year.
[8] So a lot of notes about 1943, but that is when the payoff for a lot of developments will come.
12th November – 28th December – Burma and Malaya – Operation Buttermere – Part II – The Drive to Penang and the Thai Border
Garrison
Donor
12th November – 28th December – Burma and Malaya – Operation Buttermere – Part II – The Drive to Penang and the Thai Border
The opening moves of Operation Buttermere began on the 12th of November with the dispatch of detachments of what Wingate’s Chindits. Some were dispatched by glider, though the majority made their way through the central mountain ranges of Malaya, with native guides directing them down narrow tracks to bypass Japanese positions and conduct raids in their rear areas. The effectiveness of these operations was mixed, those carried out by glider borne troops in particular suffered badly, landing off course and frequently being unable to locate their targets. Overall though the Chindits did achieve their objective of sowing chaos in the Japanese rear area and did destroy about twenty Japanese aircraft on the ground [1].
Chaos was also created by the Royal Navy’s contribution to the battle. Two battlegroups, one led by HMS Prince of Wales and the other by the recently commissioned HMS Lion, proceeded from Singapore on the 13th of November and over the following ten days bombarded coastal targets in Thailand and the Dutch East Indies. Both groups were supported by carriers that carried out a series of strikes against the Japanese airfields in Thailand and Borneo. These attacks supported Buttermere and provided cover for a substantial convoy heading for Java. The convoy brought supplies and fresh troops for the ABCD forces and evacuated most of the wounded. Over the next two months the Royal Navy conducted several more bombardments missions and more small convoys made their way to Java. These were largely made up of fast destroyers in what were referred to as ‘whippet runs’ and greatly bolstered the ABCD position in Java. Conversely the Japanese position in the DEI was badly weakened as not only were shore facilities attacked but convoys trying to bring supplies to the Japanese troops were intercepted and many of the transports sunk. The losses were severe enough that the Japanese command were forced to suspend further supply runs until they could replace the transports and arrange for much stronger escorts, a task that would take several months given the demands of engaging the US Navy off Guadalcanal, and essentially end any remaining Japanese hopes of securing the DEI. If the naval actions off Java and Borneo had been the whole of the achievements of Operation Buttermere then it would still have been regarded as a success, these however were simply the prelude to the attacks in Malaya and Burma [2].
Slim’s forces, once again with 10th Indian Division and the 1st Cavalry in the vanguard, began their advance in the Thailand on the 18th of November, retracing the path taken by the retreating Japanese 55th Division in April, though in far better circumstances, being well supplied and able to take advantage of motorized transport where the terrain allowed. 1st Cavalry had also been making the acquaintance of the M3 Stuart tank and if it didn’t quite take the place of the horse in the hearts of its soldiers it came close, proving every bit as valuable in Thailand as it did in Malaya. The Japanese forces facing Slim’s advance on the other hand were in only slightly better shape than they had been after the disastrous retreat in April. Still short on food and ammunition they faced an opponent who had an abundance of both and Slim was more than happy to expend as much of that ammunition as it took to break down the defences before committing his men to the attack, a strategy that made Slim popular with those who served under him [3].
The idea that martial spirit could overcome material superiority was once again exposed as a fantasy as Slim’s divisions pressed forward, destroying every attempt to counterattack or establish a fresh line of defence. They reached Mae Sot on the 9th of December and despite bitter resistance from the remnants of the Japanese forces who made their stand there it fell three days later, marking the final destruction of the partially reconstituted 55th Division, as well as the remnants of several other regiments foolishly committed to bolster the defence. The rest of the forces the Japanese could muster were now deployed to the south, intended to block any advance on Bangkok. This was precisely the conclusion the British had hoped the Japanese would draw and forces that could have been used to bolster Malaya instead sat at the end of overstretched supply lines while Slim’s troops rested and reorganized at Mae Sot. One unfortunate consequence of Slim’s successful attack was that the Thai’s, also unaware of his true intentions, launched a sporadic series of uprisings in Thai towns and cities in the expectation that the Japanese were on the brink of being expelled from their country. These acts of resistance were brutally supressed by the Japanese and caused some later bitterness on the part of the Thais towards the British, though ultimately they did co-operate when the British did turn their attention to the liberation of their country [4].
In Malaya Montgomery had an even larger hammer with which to strike the Japanese, his advance was carried out with four divisions, including the Australian 7th Division and 8th British Indian Army Infantry Division, and was well supported by armour, artillery, and air power. The opening action in Malaya on the 20th of November was a series of raids by the RAF and RAAF on Japanese airfields. Lacking radar and with too few fighters to mount proper combat air patrols lost between 60 and 80 aircraft on the ground. Combined with the actions of the Chindits these losses tipped the balance of air superiority over Malaya firmly in favour of the British and helped pave the way for the ground advance that kicked off on the 21st.
The Japanese forces in Malaya were in better shape than their counterparts in Thailand, though this is not to say they were well prepared to receive an attack of the magnitude that Montgomery delivered, especially with their senior commanders in Thailand constantly looking towards Slim’s advance. They might have fared better had they been willing to contemplate simply going over to the defensive in Malaya, instead they insisted, under strong pressure from Tokyo, that the focus remain on a future offensive that would destroy the British, which did not mean that the resources for such an offensive were being provided. What it did mean was that any plans for building a solid defence in depth of their positions in Western Malaya were rejected out of hand, relying instead on attempting to shore up what were officially the outposts of a temporary holding action [5].
Stretched in so many directions the Japanese were doling out reinforcements in a piecemeal fashion, often reflecting the latest apparent threat to their defence perimeter or simply the whims of the leadership in Tokyo. This meant the forces that were supposed to be guarding the approaches to Penang were poorly dug in and had no counter as they were faced by an attack with M3 Lee tanks taking on the role of infantry support and proving far more effective in that role than the purpose-built tanks the British had favoured. The 75mm gun was devastating against the light defensive positions of the Japanese and they had little choice but to fall back or fight to the death. That so few chose the latter option speaks to the declining morale of the Japanese troops and the retreat soon took on the character of a rout, inflicting such humiliation on the Japanese officer corps in Malaya that the practice of Seppuku had to be prohibited order of the high command [6].
The official relief of Penang took place on the 19th of December. The pictures taken a few days later of Montgomery being cheered by troops when he visited the island did not have to be staged on this occasion. If Montgomery was not loved by his troops, he was certainly respected and the successful relief of Penang combined with the disintegration of the Japanese defensive line spurred the British forces on to what had always been Montgomery’s ultimate objective, the eviction of the Japanese from Malaya altogether.
As the British pressed forward the Japanese were reduced to human wave attacks to slow them, though some on the British side referred to them as ‘human ripples’ owing to limited manpower available. By this point the British forces were familiar with the tactic of the Banzai charge and even sought to take advantage of it, baiting Japanese troops into launching a charge only to find themselves drawn into a killing ground filled with machine gun and mortar fire. These desperate attacks only served to further deplete Japanese ranks and they were forced to fall back time and again until even the most die-hard fanatics in Tokyo were forced to accept the reality that the remaining forces had to be withdrawn into Thailand, though of course only temporarily. This was justified by the frontline commanders with the ostensible reason being the necessity of repulsing the apparent threat of a thrust towards Bangkok, though how much the bedraggled survivors of the Malaya forces could have contributed to that defence if Slim’s force did launch an assault was highly questionable.
The official end of Operation Buttermere, and of the fighting in Malaya as a whole, was declared on the 28th of December, with the British frontline crossing into Thailand in some areas. It was a clear triumph for Montgomery, Slim, and Admiral Cunningham and although it would take some months before they were ready, they would in due course turn their attentions to the defeat of the Japanese in the Dutch East Indies [7].
[1] So not as successful as might have been hoped but lessons will be learned for the future.
[2] The Royal Navy is basically softening up the Japanese in the DEI and keeping them from focusing all their attention on Malaya and Thailand.
[3] Slim is building up a highly respectable profile, Monty even finds him tolerable…
[4] The Thai’s have jumped the gun, but they will have to be realistic when it comes to kicking out the Japanese.
[5] The Japanese haven’t quite grasped that they are losing the war yet, either having been denied information about the big picture or choosing to ignore it.
[6] The order itself was a bit hysterical and any officer who felt their dishonour was irredeemable could go out fighting instead, with the British forces happy to oblige any Japanese who chose death rather than surrender.
[7] No dramatic set piece battles because the Japanese just don’t have the manpower for it or anywhere to solidly anchor their defences. They are after facing fighting in Thailand, Java, Guadalcanal and China, not to mention insurgencies in Indochina.
David Flin
Gone Fishin'
Wingate? Not operating haphazardly and on what appears (to the outside observer) to be a whim?
A controversial commander at the best of times, and his OTL performance has been much debated.
Garrison
Donor
He has been brought into the tent ITTL and Monty isn't about to let anyone else act on a whim.
Well, Monty appreciates competence. And proper use of artillery (which latter I am given to understand, was partly why he liked Brooke as a Chief of the Imperial General Staff.)
Anyway, thanks for all the work on this timeline. It's a nice contrast to some of the Axis fan work floating around and being pushed at the moment. (Which latter arguably has a place as a reminder how lucky we were in the original timeline that the United Nations took them (The Axis) down hard, but I find rather depressing and stress inducing.)
31st December 1942 – Germany - Black Christmas
Garrison
Donor
31st December 1942 – Germany - Black Christmas
On Christmas day 1942 a radio broadcast went out to the whole of Germany, with voices from all over the Reich and the occupied territories. It was intended to remind the people of the scale of the Wehrmacht success and that so long as they remained resolute victory would come, even if it was taking rather longer than had been promised in 1940 and 1941. One highlight of this roll call of the Reich was when the announcer called out ‘Stalingrad’ and received a stirring reply from the 6th Army, still holding off all that the Red Army could throw at them. This was a piece of pure fiction; 6Th Army had no means to make such a broadcast and if they did, they would doubtless have been calling for supplies and/or relief. They were not a bastion of the Wehrmacht’s advances in the east, they were instead a trapped and desperate army for who relief would not come as Hitler had explicitly ordered that they hold the city at all costs and refused to countenance any operation intended to allow them to breakout and evacuate the city [1].
Case Blue had been an unmitigated disaster for the Heer, falling far short of its goals despite how many losses it had inflicted on the Red Army and the territory it had seized. However high the cost for the Soviets it had been worse for the Wehrmacht. The best of their weapons had been thrown into the fight in the east. The earliest versions of the Panzer VI Tiger had faced the inevitable teething problems when it was deployed but those had gradually been worked out and the tank had proven formidable. Likewise, the latest models of the Panzer IV had proven itself a match for the T-34 one-on-one, except it rarely found itself operating on such equal terms, instead often having to face odds of two and three to one, or worse as the Soviet Union appeared to possess an infinite capacity to churn out tanks and soldiers. The same story went for the rest of the Wehrmacht arsenal, much of it was superior to its Soviet counterparts, but they had lost the production war and that margin of superiority, both in machinery and the quality of the men manning them, was being rapidly eroded [2].
Compared to the fighting on the Eastern Front Dieppe and Sicily might have seemed little more than pinpricks. Dieppe however was the clear harbinger of worse to come in North-western Europe. Everywhere from Narvik to Rome had to be defended against the threat of Allied invasion and any suggestion of consolidation or withdrawal in the west was no more acceptable to Hitler than abandoning Stalingrad. The Channel Islands for example had been extensively fortified and reinforced, even though many in the General Staff agreed with the British assessment in 1940, that the islands lacked strategic value and were almost indefensible. The Reich did its best to find the manpower and resources for all these garrisons, but they inevitably fell short and whatever Hitler’s views some unofficial prioritization was put in place. This may have reduced the strain a little, but the Heer faced a basic and arguably insurmountable problem, they had to be everywhere, the Allies could choose to concentrate their forces and overwhelm even if the Reich could have delivered on the massive lines of fortifications that Hitler demanded [3].
While the Heer was contemplating the prospect of war on two fronts the Luftwaffe was facing the reality of it. The arrival of the USAAF in Europe was increasing the load on the fighter squadrons in the west, even as the Luftwaffe was also expected to continue the fight in the east. The arrival of four engine strategic bombers in the arsenals of Bomber Command and the US 8th Air Force meant that they would soon be able to drop a weight of bombs on targets in Germany that dwarfed anything the Luftwaffe of 1940 had been capable of. The Luftwaffe had finally received its own strategic bomber the He 177 Greif, but only 130 had been produced in the whole of 1942 and its handling characteristics were poor and it was still plagued with technical issues that limited its operational use. This meant that the Soviet factories that had been relocated beyond the Urals could work unimpeded by the Luftwaffe [4].
This along with other failures of 1942 had done little to bolster the reputation of the Luftwaffe, or Hermann Goering. Despite best efforts to place the blame for what happened on Malta on the Italians the grave losses among the Fallschirmjägers, and the propaganda the Allies milked from images of captured troops and wrecked Me 321 gliders, mean that Goering couldn’t escape some of the fallout. Combined with the failure to resupply 6th Army from the air at Stalingrad the reputation of the Luftwaffe was at a low ebb, just at the moment when it desperately needed more resources and more investment in new models of aircraft to replace those that were starting to look long in the tooth. The failure to replace certain models sooner had placed the Luftwaffe in a serious dilemma as the need to maximize the number of airframes available mandated in favour of freezing designs as they were to reap the benefits of long series production, while the inadequacies of these models meant that losses would be higher for the crews operating them. Replacing these aircraft would mean a sharp drop in production while factories retooled and learned how to streamline the manufacturing process for the new designs, which would mean potentially weakening the air defence of the occupied territories and the Reich itself. The harsh truth was that what had been the world’s premier air force in 1939 and 1940 was becoming an also ran, outclassed by its enemies on all fronts [5].
For the Kriegsmarine December of 1942 proved to be the darkest month in a bitter winter. Through a combination of high-grade ULTRA intercepts, aggressive escorts and a certain amount of good fortune the Allied navies had achieved their highest number of U-Boat kills in any month since the start of the war, with the loss of some 22 U-Boats. In one particularly fierce engagement between convoy HX211 and a wolfpack of eight U-Boats the Kriegsmarine ships sank three transports and damaged an escort vessel, in exchange for the loss of four U-Boats and another damaged by a patrolling Liberator after withdrawing from the fight. These results were a cause for celebration in London and Washington given the pressure to build up the manpower and materials to meet the requirements for Operation Millennium, and this increased security of the Atlantic sea-lanes also meant that those trying to pry free more men and equipment for the Pacific theatre were able to achieve some modest successes. This meant the Allies could plan for operations in the Dutch East Indies in the spring of 1943 even as the preparations for D-Day accelerate [6].
In Berlin this setback left Doenitz in a state of shock, and he felt a desperate need to do something about this situation. His response took the form of both efforts to exhort greater efforts from his already hard-pressed U-Boat crews and to press even harder for technical fixes to their problems, the latter being driven by the belief that the December losses must reflect some new technical improvement on the part of the Allies rather than intelligence failures or bad luck. When it came to his crews Doenitz took a carrot and stick approach, showering commendations, decorations and promotions on those of the new generation of U-Boat commanders Doenitz felt had distinguished themselves, while issue dire warnings to those who did not meet these high standards of the consequences if they did not show the proper aggressive spirit. The problem was that the dividing line between the successful and the unsuccessful U-Boats all too often came down to being in the right place at the right time and Doenitz’s efforts to drive his crews on generated more resentment than anything else. Even those crews lavished with rewards regarded it as a cynical exercise, keenly aware that their luck could run out and they would return empty handed from a patrol, or not return at all as seemed increasingly likely [7].
The technical solutions ranged from continued work on the Type XXI U-Boat to acoustic homing torpedoes and anechoic tiles, the latter a rubber coating that reduced or eliminated the sonar returns from a U-Boats hull, though turning this into something that could be used on an operational U-Boat would be a slow, painful process. Conspicuously absent from the list was the issue of signals security. The Kriegsmarine still placed great faith in Enigma and while the system did receive periodic upgrades no one chose to question the underlying integrity of the coding system used. This was a huge failing on the part of the Kriegsmarine and the rest of the Wehrmacht as by the end of 1942 Bletchley Park and its American colleagues were turning breaking Enigma codes from an art into a science, with pen and paper being replaced by machines that could grind through the processing of finding the right key to decipher a message at a speed no human could match. There was little point to giving the U-Boats new abilities to evade detection if the Allies knew exactly where they were. The U-Boats at the end of 1942 were apt to run into strategically placed mines, hunting groups, or patrol aircraft, at which point how well equipped the U-Boat was or the skills of its crew were rendered moot [8].
Few in Berlin would say it out loud, but the sense was growing in some quarter that even the hopes for some sort of stalemate and a negotiated peace had gone. The Allies were beginning to talk in terms of unconditional surrender by the Reich, and it no longer seemed far-fetched that they could impose such terms. Some saw this as a reason to fight even harder, convinced that they would not survive if the Nazi regime fell. Others were beginning to wonder if the removal of Hitler himself might open the way to a more lenient peace from the Allies, or at the very least secure their own personal survival. Such thoughts were a long way from being turned into concrete plans, however. It would take more setbacks and military disaster in 1943 before the desire for self-preservation lead to a serious effort to overthrow Adolf Hitler [9].
[1] That is thing that happened in OTL, the fake message from Stalingrad was just the most obvious lie in a pure propaganda exercise.
[2] The Heer of 1942-43 is starting to scrape the bottom of the barrel for replacement manpower. Already starting to take younger and older men into their ranks and steadily losing experience Officers and NCOs.
[3] The Pas De Calais is one of the priority areas, Normandy is not.
[4] The Allied bombing campaign will really start to take off in 1943.
[5] Goering is going to survive, though his standing is rather diminished. He is still utterly loyal to Hitler, which counts for more than competence.
[6] So this very bad month for the U-Boats is happening now rather than in the spring of 1943, and part of it is just luck and some particularly aggressive escorts getting kills.
[7] And most of them will not be coming back sooner or later.
[8] Technical fixes just are not going to cut it for the Kriegsmarine, they need far more U-Boats, and they are not going to get them.
[9] Yeah they are not going to try and overthrow Hitler out of any noble motives.
The good news for the Germans here is if the Allied bombing 'accuracy' is measured in terms of 'miles'. Or at least the good news for the actual German industries and military facilities being targeted.
Although I guess the Ruhr may still be in for some short-term pain if Barnes Wallace still manages to sell the Air Ministry on his bouncing bomb concept...
Garrison
Donor
Well I tend to use 'Wages of Destruction# as a source and that certainly puts forward the idea that the Ruhr campaign was actually fairly effective, it was shifting the focus to Berlin that was a mistake. Also ITTL part of the focus is on persuading the Luftwaffe to move more its resources to the defence of the Reich rather than France, and having concrete, steel, etc. concentrated on anti-aircraft defences rather than beach defences. 617 Squadron will have its moment to shine, questionable codeword not included.
31st December 1942 – Britain - The End of the Beginning
Garrison
Donor
31st December 1942 – Britain - The End of the Beginning
The war that consumed all of Britain’s energies had taken a very different course from that which anyone in September of 1938 had envisioned. Those who thought it could be avoided had naturally been the most bitterly disappointed of all, but by and large they had recognized the necessity of opposing a Nazi regime that had proven itself brutal and untrustworthy in equal measures. Those among the opponents of war who had been motivated by some sympathy towards the goals of the Nazis had seen their farfetched schemes to remove Britain from ‘The wrong war’ fizzle out in the face of determined opposition and their fundamental misunderstanding of the attitudes of the great mass of the British people. Among those who had believed war was inevitable the pessimists had been proven wrong in their belief that the bomber would get through and that the country would be in ruins in mere weeks. They were though correct in their assessment that only the outside powers, the USA and the USSR, would benefit from another war. The optimists, if one could call those who expected a major war to break war out optimists, had anticipated something akin to the Western Front of World War I and been shocked by the Fall of France. This single stunning blow meant the war had become an existential crisis for Britain, a matter of survival rather than such abstruse matters as the balance of power, and it had finally, shockingly, expanded to a truly global conflict as Italy and then Japan had joined the war. It was hardly surprising the some in the dark days of 1940 had felt Britain had little choice except to make peace, even if meant negotiating with Adolf Hitler. Fortunately for Britain and the world those defeatists had been soundly rebuffed by more determined souls. The price of such resolution had been high, but it was one that the country had proven willing to pay in ‘blood, sweat, and tears’ [1].
By the end of 1942 Britain was no longer exercised by the question of whether the country could survive. The focus had shifted to the question of how victory over the Axis was to be achieved and if/when it was then who would dictate the terms of peace? Would the USSR hold the upper hand, something which seemed unlikely but possible at the end of 1942, or would it be the Western Allies? And if it were the Western Allies would Britain help set those terms as an equal partner or would the USA be able to impose its own vision for a post-war world? The United States was an ally every bit as determined to destroy Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan as Britain was, Roosevelt was not however an admirer of the British Empire, and neither were the captains of US industry. The Empire closed off markets and resources that the USA wanted to access, and it was expected that it would use it massive contribution to the British war effort as leverage in opening the Empire to American commerce, something that Churchill and even many of his political opponents were determined to resist [2].
Some in Britain were more concerned with the shape of British society post-war than the shape of Europe or the Empire. The Labour Party had fully committed itself to the war and its representatives in cabinet had proven themselves quite able to govern, despite much pre-war scepticism. They were however still committed to making sweeping changes to the status quo ante that had existed before the war and in this they were finding increasing support from the British public. Whether on the frontlines or the Homefront the ordinary citizens of Britain had made tremendous sacrifices for the war effort, and they expected that would be reflected in the post war settlement, they would not accept the ‘land fit for heroes’ promised after World War I being tossed aside once more when it proved inconvenient a second time. Sacrifices had also been made by the people of the British Empire and they too expected some reward for their efforts, especially in India, where Nationalists and representatives of the British administration would have to thrash out some modus vivendi to move forward [3].
That Britain had the luxury of concerning itself with such matters could be traced back to the decisions taken by Neville Chamberlain after his near-death experience at Hendon. The question that has vexed historians ever since the war is, in the crudest terms, just how much credit does Chamberlain deserve? There is a school of thought that what more sympathetic historians referred to as the Chamberlain Mandate constituted the bare minimum that could have been done and that Chamberlain was forced into even these inadequate measures by circumstances beyond his control, contributed to by a clinical depression brought on by his physical injuries after the crash, as well as the undiagnosed cancer that took his life in 1940. In this interpretation it was only after Chamberlain’s departure that the improvements wrought in the British military were finally put to good use, leading to the victories in Crete, Libya, and Malaya. This is usually referred to as the ‘Churchillian’ interpretation of events, with Churchill’s own history of the war being far from flattering to Chamberlain and his rearmament efforts.
At the opposite end of the spectrum are those who argue that the mandate made all the difference in Britain’s survival in the early years of the war. In this interpretation without the rearmament and training efforts made in 1938 and 1939 the critical men and equipment that reinforced the BEF in 1940 would not have been available, thus France would probably have fallen sooner, and with the Wehrmacht on the French coast in June or July the chances of a German invasion increased exponentially. The threat alone would have immeasurably strengthened the hand of those who wanted to seek terms from Germany and likely would have forced the government to make peace, with grave consequences for the USSR and probably leaving the USA isolated in a world dominated by the Third Reich and its Axis partners [4].
What both these interpretations miss is that Britain enjoyed a considerable amount of good fortune in the progression of the war between 1939 and 1942, however absurd that might have seemed to those in Britain who lived through the setbacks of those years. Had the Germans embraced the Manstein Sweep in May rather than July and achieved the same level of success it did, something which most Churchillian historians deny is possible, then Britain would at the very least have had to commit far more resources to the defence of the British mainland, which would in turn have encouraged the Italians and the Japanese to act [5].
It is possible to go round and round in circles arguing the merits of the different scenarios, and it is best to focus on the practical situation the British faced at the end of 1942. The government still had to balance the needs of pushing the Japanese back to their home islands against what was still the key priority, the defeat of Nazi Germany. The arguments over the best strategy to achieve the latter had finally coalesced into Operation Millennium, the overarching plan for the invasion of Normandy. Everything would now build to the D-Day landings in the Summer of 1943, though not without a few diversions along the way.
As Operation Jubilee had amply demonstrate improved tactics and weapons would be needed to take and hold a bridgehead in Normandy. The A24 Churchill and the A27 Centaur would provide the armoured spearhead and the Gloster Comet would usher in the jet age, but the key to victory would lie in the less glamourous needs of logistics and transportation. A vast flotilla of landing craft would have to be built, and a mass of supplies and equipment to be carried aboard them would have to be stockpiled. At the end of 1942 these existed mostly on paper, but as the new year opened those plans would be translated into steel, oil and flesh as a great army was assembled in Southern England and aimed at the beaches of Normandy [6].
The Japanese threat would not be ignored as this build-up went ahead. Any invasion of Japan lay far over the horizon at the end of 1942, so the objective for 1943 was to strangle their war machine, cutting it off from the resources of the territories it had conquered in 1941 and destroying its merchant marine, essentially the same plan that Germany had sought to carry out against Britain, but it would be executed out on a scale that Doenitz and his U-Boats had never come close to achieving in the Atlantic. US Navy and Royal Navy submarines would prowl the Pacific in ever greater numbers as the USA pressed on with its island-hopping campaign and the British would push the IJA ever further back in South East Asia, establishing bases from which Allied strategic bomber could reach out and deliver on the warning delivered by the Doolittle Raid, that the cities of Japan were not beyond the reach of the Allies [7].
All of this would come at a great cost, both in resources and lives, but there was no turning back now for the British and their allies, they would see the war through to a victorious end, in the east and the west [8].
[1] So this is the finale of Munich Shuffle, and an overview of where Britain stands, and where its going in 1943 and 1944.
[2] So yes Anglo-American politics is going to get a little rougher in 1943, not a falling out as much as an attempt by the British to secure a larger say in the way the peace is made. Much will of course depend on just how long the war in Europe lasts and where the armies from the East and West meet…
[3] So yes Labour is still making gains politically even if they won’t appear at the ballot box for some time and as for India, well things will be different.
[4] So Chamberlain either did nearly nothing or he saved Britain, anyone suggesting something like OTL would be laughed at by serious historians.
[5] There have been more than a few butterflies ITTL, however I have tried to limit them to small singular events impacting individuals and the larger changes I have tried to make plausible as the consequences of earlier decisions, how well I have succeeded is up to the reader to decide.
[6] And no surprise that much of the emphasis in the 1943 parts of Millennium Shuffle will be on the build-up, execution, and aftermath of D-Day.
[7] The Dutch East Indies and Thailand will also have their own series of updates, and the former already exists in draft form in fact.
[8] And with that we come to the conclusion of what has easily been the largest project I’ve undertaken on AH.com to date, though of course there is much more to come.