Munich Shuffle: 1938-1942
- Thread starter Garrison
- Start date
That 10-80-10 is an interesting statistic. I think it is also used in criminology.
Garrison
Donor
It is based off the idea of the M-4X, a reworked version that used elements intended for the M6. Wanted to give a name other than Sherman and after some discussion I settled on Thomas, after yet another Union General.
Thanks for the reply, Garrison. Doing a quick search on this forum I found these drawings of the M-4X tank by marathag. Which I'll link to here if you're OK with that.
Improved M4 made before D-Day
an offshoot of the T-34 award winning US Tank thread In July 1943, the Ordnance Department requested the T23E3 and the T20E3 be standardized as the M27 and M27B1 . However, was rejected by AGF. McNair strikes again, despite General Devers pushing hard for the T23E3. Even getting the T23...
www.alternatehistory.com
18th – December 1943 - 27th January 1943 – Ardennes – Part III – Stretched to the Limit
Garrison
Donor
18th – December 1943 - 27th January 1943 – Ardennes – Part III – Stretched to the Limit
Patton’s ‘I told you so’ attitude might have grated with his superiors, but they could hardly fault the speed of his efforts to reorient his forces and prepare a drive to the north, assisted considerably by the fact that he had already been issuing the necessary orders before he received approval from his superiors. As determined as Patton was to move quickly he was not about to dispatch his forces piecemeal, even when some of his subordinates were seemingly even more determined to launch the counterattack than Patton was and not inclined to wait as the Germans advanced ever closer to Antwerp. This was not as reckless as it might have seemed at the time. 12th Armoured had been reformed and could have been sent towards Bastogne once more, potentially preventing the Germans from digging in their defences, but Patton was determined not simply to force a retreat by the Germans, he wanted to encircle and destroy them, striking a decisive blow and opening the way for when the Allies launched their drive to the Rhine. To this end Patton planned to launch his forces both east and west of Bastogne to completely cut the German lines of communications. This plan provoked some anxiety at SHAEF, Patton however was confident that the German flanks were overextended and there was simply not enough time for anyone to veto Patton as thanks to his pre-emptive actions US forces were already moving to their jumping off points. It was very much a case of Patton deciding that it was easier to seek forgiveness than permission, not that he expected to require forgiveness. However it might have seemed at SHAEF Patton was not taking a gamble with his plan [1].
Aggressive patrolling by Patton’s forces had confirmed that the 7th Army was badly stretched and suffering from the qualitative decline that had afflicted much of the Wehrmacht. The 7th and 15th Armies had also not received the priority for replacements that the Panzer Armies had, and the rapid advance of the Panzers had left the 7th strung out, struggling to cover their flanks and protect the lines of supply. Moving men and supplies was proving a challenge as the 7th was still overwhelmingly dependent on supplies being moved by horse and cart while the infantry marched into battle, exactly as they had in 1940. OKW had decided that it would take the Allies anything up to a fortnight to respond to Winter Watch, an optimistic assessment that had more to do with appeasing Hitler’s demands for the offensive to go ahead rather than an assessment based on any intelligence information. Given this it was hardly surprising that Patton was supremely confident his forces could drive the Germans back and cut off the Panzer spearheads from any possibility of withdrawing. His confidence was vindicated when he launched his counterattack on the 24th of December and both the spearhead aimed at the east of Bastogne, led by 12th Armoured, and that aimed west of the city, led by the 6th and 7th Armoured, made rapid progress and soon threatened to completely isolate the city [2].
The German forces at Bastogne could have been saved despite the speed of Patton’s advance if they had ordered to withdraw and help reinforce the defensive perimeter that had to be held if the Panzer Armies were to have any hope of avoiding the trap they were falling into. Doing so however have required Hitler to be willing to listen to reason and that was a forlorn hope since he could only see that the leading elements of the 6th SS Panzer Army were almost in reach of Antwerp, at least if one simply looked at the lines on the map ad ignored such trivia as logistics and the narrowing front the panzers were being forced to advance on. Hitler would brook no talk of retreat or redeployment, attempting to argue for any such ideas was to invite accusations of cowardice and treason, with the inevitable consequences for the hapless voice of reason. Hitler inevitably insisted that the troops in at Bastogne dig in and hold on until the Panzers achieved victory. They could be relieved once the Allies had been divided and forced into a retreat and ultimately a peace negotiated on Hitler’s terms. This decision took the troops in Bastogne completely out of the battle. Not only were they unable to assist in shoring up the narrowing flank of the corridor the Panzer advance had created, but Patton had no intention of becoming bogged down in a siege. As far as he was concerned the troops in Bastogne, who would find themselves completely isolated as Patton’s armour pushed north and west, were already POWs to all practical purposes and the formalities could be taken care of once the battle was over. Patton’s eye was on the far larger prize of 5th Panzer Army and 6th SS Panzer Army, he had no intention of letting them make good their escape, and in this goal, he had the wholehearted agreement of General O’Connor [3].
The greater complexity of organizing British and US forces under his command delayed O’Connor’s own counterattack, but US VII Corps attacked from Stavelot and British XXX Corps from Marche on Christmas Day, and they achieved the same sort of swift advance as Patton’s troops attacking from the south. To make matters worse for the Germans on the 26th the weather lifted once more and this time it was no temporary improvement, Allied weather forecasters predicted at least a full week of clear skies, or at least conditions in which Allied fighter-bombers could operate unhindered. They returned to the task of harrying the Germans with all the enthusiasm one might expect of crews frustrated by days spent trapped on the ground and what was left of the supply lines to the Panzer spearheads was swiftly destroyed. As the supply lines had already almost ground to a halt before this the immediate impact on the Panzers was not noticeable, it simply added to the list of worries concerning General Hans-Jürgen von Arnim, in command of 5th Panzer Army, and General Fritz Kraemer commanding the 6th SS Panzer [4]. Kraemer had served under Sepp Dietrich, but had not accompanied Dietrich when the Afrika Korps was formed and given his close association with Dietrich his rise to command the 6th SS Panzer had been almost inevitable. He was every bit the diehard Dietrich had been and the 6th SS Panzer was responsible for the worst of the atrocities committed by the German forces during Winter Watch [5].
6th SS Panzer had captured some additional fuel after overrunning Dinant, which had not been shared with 5th Panzer and Kraemer was still looking to one final drive on Antwerp as the ultimate solution to the Panzer’s supply problem, seeing a Field Marshall’s baton in the future for the man who delivered Hitler the victory he wanted. Kraemer may not have been entirely motivated by his ego and his desire for victory, some sources suggest he had already concluded that retreat was impossible and thus it made sense to expend the available resources on one last effort to seize the final objective. With the 5th Panzer Army decidedly shorter on fuel and ammunition von Arnim saw things rather differently and despite efforts by Kraemer and others to minimize them he was deeply concerned by the reports of Allied counterattacks along the flanks of the German position [6].
Von Arnim didn’t see any chance of salvation in trying to press on to Antwerp, he wanted to try and secure their lines of communication, ostensibly to allow further reinforcements and supplies to come forward, though it is doubtful anyone was fooled by this excuse. What allowed von Arnim to make his preparations for withdrawal was the agreement of Kraemer to the plan. According to von Arnim’s account of events Kraemer was all for concentrating the available resources on the 6th SS to allow them to make the final push towards Antwerp, meaning that the plaudits for the victory would all be his. Accounts from some of Kraemer’s subordinates on the other hand suggest he was not as gung-ho about attacking Antwerp as it seemed to von Arnim, instead he was motivated by fatalism, having already concluded that there was little chance of the Panzers withdrawing back to their jumping off points without more fuel and there was real choice except to go forward and hope that they might yet achieve a victory [7].
This last thrust towards the port was doomed to fail as by the 27th the roads past Dinant were heavily defended and 6th SS Panzer, despite demonstrating their usual ruthlessness, were simply unable to breakthrough in the face of stubborn Allied resistance. By the 29th even Kraemer was forced to concede that there was now no choice but to withdraw, assuming this was still possible. To everyone barring Adolf Hitler it was clear that for all the ground that had been taken and the seizure of Bastogne and Dinant the offensive had achieved nothing beyond a temporary derailment of the Allied plans for crossing the Rhine, and they were poised to strike back and inflict losses on the Panzer forces that would more than offset the disruption caused as O’Connor and Patton’s forces relentless drove to link up and put both Panzer Armies ‘in the bag’ [8].
[1] Much Like OTL Patton is moving quickly, but here he is concerned with cutting off Bastogne, not relieving it.
[2] This is where the ‘better’ German advance is coming back to bite them, and it will only get worse.
[3] Patton isn’t going to repeat the OTL mistake of trying to take Bastogne, he’s happy to leave the Germans trapped there.
[4] Kraemer has risen to command the 6th after Sepp Dietrich died in North Africa.
[5] IOTL Kraemer was sentenced to 10 years for the Malmedy Massacre by the troops under his command, he is not an improvement on Dietrich.
[6] Von Arnim can see the writing on the wall, but there isn’t much he can do about it.
[7] They are in so deep that Kraemer just see no choice but to keep digging.
[8] And the end of the road for Winter Watch will conclude this version of the Battle of the Bulge.
I wonder which will be the consequences of the WAllies pushing the occupation lines further East ITTL. For once, Stalin will be left with a smaller part of Germany, which means he might not be able to create a viable East German state with the OTL Oder-Neiße. That might lead to Poland gaining less territory so that Stalin can have his own Germany.
Czechia might also be liberated by the West, and that’s also a pretty big change.
Czechia might also be liberated by the West, and that’s also a pretty big change.
18th – December 1943 - 27th January 1944 – Ardennes – Part IV – The Last Stand
Garrison
Donor
18th – December 1943 - 27th January 1943 – Ardennes – Part IV – The Last Stand
When 6th SS Panzer finally gave up their attempt to break through to Antwerp the chances of they and 5th Panzer Army making a successful withdrawal were already slim. The fuel they had scavenged from the Allies was largely exhausted and their ammunition supplies were running critically low, with no prospect of further resupply as Allied fighter bombers constantly harassed their lines of communication as well as conducting attacks on any exposed units. One solution was for units to only move by night, but under pressure from Allied ground forces this was not always possible, especially as it inevitably slowed the rate of movement of the units involved. A ruthless form of triage was applied, any vehicle that was damaged or broke down was stripped of fuel and ammunition and left for the enemy to salvage. The civilian population who had not been able to flee ahead of the advance of the Panzers now suffered further brutalities as the Germans retreated and sought to seize any food or fuel that might have been hidden from them during their earlier ‘foraging’ [1].
The 7th and 15th Armies were if anything facing even greater struggles trying to hold open the flanks of the position and Bastogne was finally completely surrounded on the 2nd of January, though Patton only detached a few units to cover the main routes in and out of the city to discourage any attempts at a German breakout. This was not a serious possibility as in accordance with Hitler’s orders none was being contemplated and the Wehrmacht troops remained dug in, ready to repel an assault that never came and effectively played no further part in the battle. Even if they had been inclined to try and break out they were hardly any better off for ammunition and supplies than their comrades in the Panzer armies and the effort would have been in vain. The main focus of the Allied counteroffensive now shifted well to the west of Bastogne, aiming to close the jaws of the trap around the Panzers as they struggled to disengage from Antwerp and Dinant [2].
O’Connor and Patton were both pursuing the same goal but the lack of co-ordination between the forces attacking from the north and south has attracted criticism nonetheless, though much of this has been directed at SHAEF and Eisenhower rather than the commanders in the field. These critiques have become overblown across the decades, though there is a kernel of truth in it. If there was a moment when SHAEF came close to panic, it was probably when Dinant was overrun and yet when they were first drawing up plans for their response SHAEF had explicitly intended that the stand at Dinant should be a delaying action. Somewhere between the planning and the execution however the perception of the defence of Dinant changed into a place that was going to be held at all costs and this was reflected in a genuine fear among Eisenhower and his staff that the ‘failure’ at Dinant meant that Antwerp was in real danger, despite the confidence of those charged with protecting the city that they could hold out and repulse German forces that were already showing clear signs of being badly overextended. Even after the repulse of 6th Panzer Eisenhower remained wary, seeing the flanking attacks from the north and south more in terms of diverting German resources away from mounting a fresh attack on Antwerp rather than the outright destruction of the German spearheads. Arguably the only good thing to come out of this was that if co-ordination was not all it could have been SHAEF at least didn’t try to restrain or micromanage Patton and O’Connor, eager for them to assist in ‘saving’ Antwerp. Patton expressed the situation succinctly, if bluntly, ‘for a week the brass got off my back and let me fight the war the way it was supposed to be fought’ [3].
Co-ordination was also becoming an issue for the Germans as Kraemer proved reluctant to commit to a full-scale withdrawal, talking in terms of regrouping and holding the salient they had created in the Allied lines. Von Arnim entertained no such notions, though he still had to be circumspect about expressing any defeatist sentiments even this far from Berlin. The fact that 5th Panzer Army had already been forced into a supporting role now gave it the advantage in the withdrawal, though the fact they now had a little more fuel and a slightly less tenuous line of retreat was stretching the concept of advantage to its limits. With von Arnim’s insistence on pulling back Kraemer had little choice but to fall in line or find his forces cut off, which may have been a deliberate strategy on his part, pinning the blame for failure firmly on von Arnim. Withdrawals are always a difficult proposition, requiring a series of staged movements as units pull back through one position after another, moving through their comrades still holding those positions without collapsing into disorder and rout. However much the quality of the manpower available to the Wehrmacht might have deteriorated they still managed to retain much of their old discipline. They were significantly aided at this point in the battle by the refusal of Eisenhower’s staff to accept that the threat to Antwerp was over and to release forces to pursue the retreating Germans. It was only after the Germans abandoned Dinant on the 3rd of January 1944 that a pursuit was finally ordered, and it was a hesitant affair, with the advancing troops moving cautiously, probing the German lines rather than carrying out any full-scale assault [4].
There was no hesitation about the assault on the German lines from the north and the south, aiming to break through the German lines and link up somewhere in the vicinity of the town of Houffalize, to the north of Bastogne. The German forces fought stubbornly, but these battles killed any notion among the ranks of the Wehrmacht that the Panther and Tiger were any sort of wonder weapons. The fighting in the Bulge saw the M4 Thomas and the A27 Centaur being used in frontline combat for the first time and they both acquitted themselves well. Whether they or the A24 Churchill were qualitatively superior or inferior to their German counterparts at this point was largely immaterial. Any technical advantages in combat capability that one model of tank enjoyed over another were relatively modest by this point in the war and given that the British by themselves were outproducing the German tank factories in the latter half of 1943 the Panzer Divisions would have been doomed even if their tanks had the capabilities of a modern Challenger III or M1A3 Forrester [5].
The same held true for every other aspect of the German forces, they could no longer even claim to have better trained and more capable troops than their enemies as the leading elements of Patton and O’Connor’s forces proved every bit as tactically adept as any troops the Wehrmacht could muster. By the 9th of January it was obvious to von Arnim that if 5th Panzer tried to hold the lines open while 6th SS made its painfully slow withdrawal both Panzer Armies would be trapped, and he issued what amounted to an ‘every man for himself’ order to save as much of 5th Panzer as possible. This led to the rapid collapse of the German position, with British and American troops finally linking up just west of Houffalize on the 13th. This represented a major victory for the Allies, with almost the entirety of 6th SS Panzer Army now encircled, along with almost half of 5th Panzer Army and elements of 7th and 15th Armies. Encircled 6th Panzer did its best to try and break out but its armoured units were badly weakened and ran out of fuel and ammunition in short order, with Kraemer forced into the humiliation of surrendering not only his army but the entirety of the trapped forces on the 20th of January, an act which provoked a fresh temper tantrum from Adolf Hitler as his orders to fight to the last man were ignored by the exhausted demoralized soldiers trapped at Houffalize [6].
Things were hardly any better for von Arnim and the remainder of 5th Panzer Army as the survivors faced a desperate fight to fall back to their original jumping off points, leaving a trail of abandoned equipment behind them as fuel ran out and there was no longer any means of saving them. By the time it finished its retreat on the 27th 5th Panzer Army was no longer a mechanized formation, reducing to improvised infantry and its regiments would be largely reformed as Panzergrenadier formations as replacing the lost tanks and assault guns was all but impossible. Winter Watch had disrupted the timetable of the Western Allies and delayed their assault to cross the Rhine by a few weeks, however the cost of doing so was out of all proportion to this modest achievement and provoked a fresh series of dismissals and arrests as Hitler sought to blame everyone bar himself for the failure of a plan that never had a chance of succeeding in the first place [7].
Eisenhower and SHAEF came in for a great deal of criticism about their conduct of the battle. Being taken by surprise by the initial German attack was certainly not entirely the fault of Eisenhower and his staff, but the hesitant counterattacks from the west after the final assault on Antwerp was seen as a major failure and blame attached itself to General Omar Bradley who had taken overall command of the forces around Antwerp. His reputation was permanently tarnished as he became a scapegoat for the fact that the Allies didn’t bag the whole of 5th Panzer, a deeply unfair outcome as Bradley was working under severe restrictions issued from on high. The Battle of the Bulge was a victory for the Allies overall and in ordering the Panzers on to the attack Hitler made things easier for them when it came to pushing over the Rhine [8].
The German efforts to regroup and shore up their defences in the west, while preparing to receive fresh attacks in the east from the Red Army, meant that garrison troops were drawn down in the occupied territories and more was demanded from the subsidiary members of the Axis, who were just as short of men and materiel as the Reich and were in several cases looking for a way to exit the war without facing the same fate as the Italians. The situation inside the Greater Reich and Eastern Europe was incredibly unstable and in the spring of 1943 this volatility would erupt at the worst possible time for the Reich [9].
[1] They are trying to grab the scraps of the scraps, such as they are.
[2] Bastogne is now just an impromptu POW camp.
[3] Fortunately for Patton that was only made public after the war.
[4] Of course no one at SHAEF will carry the blame for this response.
[5] Both made up model names of course, for vehicles many decades in the future.
[6] And this is significantly worse that OTL for the Germans.
[7] It’s a disaster with long term consequences for where the lines will be drawn on the map after the war.
[8] Bradley is the chosen scapegoat and will remain subordinate to Patton for the foreseeable future.
[9] Things will get worse for the Germans, and decidedly better for some other people.
Makes my birthday better to see so much of the German offensive forced to surrender. As far as Eastern Europe goes, Bulgaria isn't at war with the Soviets yet and the British presence in the Eastern Mediterranean enhanced by Greek held Crete could create some chances for shenanigans in the Balkans as the liberation of Greece is carried out. If Bulgaria can successfully flip sides to the Allies without the Soviets being able to force their preferred people into power, it could give the Western Allies, mainly the UK, a chance to have more influence over how things shake out in places like Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia. Plus the Soviets are going to have to focus on finishing the recapture of their territory and driving through Poland to stake their claim in Germany.
You mean Spring 1944, right? I noticed that the title and threadmark says December 1943 to January 1943 as well.
Garrison
Donor
Well I'm sure they would like to get over the Vistula before the war ends, but we will see if Stalin has to learn to deal with disappointment...
Lol, if the Soviets can't get over the Vistula before the War ends then Stalin will truly have a 'be careful what you wish for' lesson in regards to that second front.
Garrison
Donor
Cue a negotiator at the next big three conference pointing out that he did demand they should land in Northwestern Europe in 1943 so he really can't complain about the unintended consequences.
Then the camera cuts back to Stalin and the Larry David theme starts to play.
Why would we want to do that? 🤔And just as FYI, the Turtledove voting is now open, in case anyone felt like taking a look.