30th September – 21st December 1943 – Thailand – Part II – Operation Rambler
The attack finally commenced on the 30th of September, with XXXIII Indian Corps attacking from the west of Malaya and IX Corp attacking along the east coast, with the twin thrusts taking the Japanese by surprise. Montgomery’s insistence on a meticulous approach to preparing his operations may occasionally have exasperated some of his political masters in London, and some of his subordinates, who wanted swift action, but it paid dividends as he emphasized the use of firepower to conserve manpower and the Japanese front lines found themselves facing an unprecedented weight of artillery fire and air attacks, the latter heavily supported by fighters that inflicted such heavy losses on their Japanese opponents that the British enjoyed almost total air superiority by the 2nd of October [1].
There were also significant shore bombardments by the Royal Navy in the shape of the awkwardly named MalayFor West and MalayFor East, with MalayFor West being led by
HMS Lion and MalayFor East by
HMS Hood. These were followed up on the 1st of October by an amphibious landing close to Singora carried out by the 14th Infantry Brigade. The defences at Singora were hardly any better than they had been when the Japanese had been the attackers in 1941 and given the air and naval support the 14th enjoyed it was hardly surprising that the Japanese couldn’t prevent them establishing a solid bridgehead and forcing the Japanese to abandon Singora before they were completely encircled. The defenders barely escaped the trap, and their escape came at a heavy cost to the rear-guard. The defending troops at Patani were not so fortunate. The official Japanese account of the fight for Patani states that the defenders fought to end in a determined effort to thwart the attacks by 36th Division and buy time for their comrades to reform their defensive lines. Documents that emerged after the war paint a rather less noble picture of the action at Patani, clearly suggesting that orders to withdraw in co-ordination with the troops at Singora had been issued, except that the defenders at Singora were routed by the amphibious assault and failures in communications meant that this critical information wasn’t received in Patani until it was far too late. In short, the entrenched defence at Patani was the result of a failure of co-ordination, not noble sacrifice [2].
The Japanese south of Patani fared even worse in the face of attacks by 70th Division. As they were forced to fall back British light tanks were able to punch through and flank around behind the Japanese, cutting off the lines of retreat for entire Japanese regiments. In addition to the armoured attacks airborne landings carried out by elements of Wingate’s Chindits also disrupted the Japanese lines of communication, blocking a number of roads leading to the east coast.
All these factors forced the Japanese to move west as well as north as they retreated, leaving the garrisons at several the small ports along the coast to either withdraw themselves or be cut off entirely as 70th Division pushed forward, seeking to turn the flank of the retreating forces, threatening to push them into Burma and encircling them to complete their destruction. The Japanese barely avoided this outcome on several occasions during the middle of October, with the eastern side of the Malay Peninsula completely abandoned by the Japanese by the 23rd, except for several small formations trapped along the coast. Cut off from supplies or relief the British were content to let these ‘wither on the vine’ and the advance by IX Corps was halted on the 25th just south of Thap Sakae in Thailand. The British force needed a breathing space to regroup and prepare for further operations, most likely moving further east to drive into Indochina [3].
The retreating Japanese on the other hand had no chance to rest or recover. Having broken contact with the British they were now expected to help form a new line of defence to bar any British advance north to Bangkok, meaning the Japanese troops now faced further long marches with inadequate food and a lack of clean water, hunger and disease would once again stalk the Japanese, as would the actions of Chindits and local Thai insurgents, the latter now seeing a golden opportunity to strike at their oppressors. These forces reached Bang Nong Hin around the 7th of November, where they linked up with the remnants of the forces that had escaped the British assault on the west coast, who were hardly in any better condition than their comrades.
On the West coast the Japanese had been expecting the attack and they were able to hold off the initial attacks on their lines, though not without considerable cost. On the 3rd of October a fresh attack at Padang Siding, led by ‘heavy’ British armour according to Japanese records, Valentines, and M3 Lee tanks in actuality, successfully broke through and forced the Japanese to begin falling back to pre-prepared layback positions. However, the Japanese lacked the means to mount a true defence in depth, being short of artillery and the reserves required to mount effective counterattacks. In addition, despite two years of combat against British and American tanks the Japanese still lacked any effective anti-tank weapons. A Japanese equivalent of the Panzerfaust could have inflicted significant casualties on the British tanks, especially when one of the alternatives was for Japanese troops to attempt to throw satchel charges under a tank, sometimes while still wearing them. Those in charge in Tokyo had shown a marked lack of interest in such developments, instead importing the German fascination with wonder weapons that might turn the tide of the war, though the Japanese tended to fuse these ideas with those of the Kamikaze [4].
These issues go a long way to explaining why the Japanese troops found themselves unable to stabilize any defensive line for very long. Where they were able to hold this was primarily due to the British and Indian refusal to expose themselves to the often-suicidal resistance of the Japanese forces, preferring to reduce any strongpoints with artillery and air attacks before sending in ground forces to mop up, and the casualties taken in these final attacks proved the wisdom of this approach. The advance in the west was not as quick as that in the east but bit by bit the Japanese were forced back and their ability to resist was steadily eroded by the constant pressure as Montgomery used his reserves to maintain the pressure. As previously mentioned, these troops eventually linked up with those from the east coast, having suffered similar deprivations during their retreat. Like IX Corps XXXIII Indian Corps now took time to reorganize, but even as they halted their commanders were confident that once they had regrouped, they would be able to overwhelm the much-depleted Japanese forces and sweep towards Bangkok and then Indochina. This however did not mark an end to the fighting, Slim’s forces attacking from Mae Sot were driving every bit as hard from the north as Montgomery’s had from the south, and it was this blow that truly crumbled the Japanese defence of Thailand [5].
The Japanese defending western Thailand might not have had to worry about amphibious assaults or shore bombardment, but they did have to cover a far wider swathe of front than on the Malayan Peninsula. Slim’s forces couldn’t simply cut out cross country if they wished to maintain their supply lines, but the Japanese were well aware that the region was full of paths and tracks that could sustain an advance, for a limited time at least. The British and Indian troops had spent the time since Operation Buttermere learning the lay of the land, infiltrating past the Japanese positions to build up adetailed picture of where the weak points might be and potential routes for troops and supplies to advance along. They had also worked hard to build trust with Thai partisans who had eyed the British with suspicion since Buttermere stopped far short of the liberation of their country. By the end of September, they had established some basic co-ordination and the Thais working with British troops were able to carry out diversionary attacks that kept the Japanese guessing where the attack would be, as their own intelligence efforts had fallen far short of establishing if and when a British attack would come. This gave Slim’s forces a crucial advantage and the Japanese were depending on their reserves to move up and block any British breakthrough, which put a lot of weight on units that had only been partially rebuilt since the conclusion of Operation Buttermere [6].
When the British attacked at Ban Don Chai on the 1st of October it succeeded in line with the most optimistic projections, punching through the layers of Japanese defences and breaking into their rear area by the 3rd. As the main spearhead pressed forward some formations peeled off on the flanks, turning to attack the rear of the remaining, badly exposed, Japanese positions that had left it far too late to try and pull out.
Any hope of retrieving the situation now rested with the Japanese reserves and they were badly handled from the start, with contradictory orders received within the space of a few hours that left their advance ragged and their objectives unclear. Initially they had been directed to engage and block the advance of the main British column before this was changed to an order to attack the eastern flank of the force and cut off the spearhead units. This latter order was based on flawed information about the axis of advance of the British and led to the Japanese forces running into the strongest part of the column, including some of the light armour belonging to 1st Cavalry. With infantry in support Stuart tanks effectively destroyed one Japanese regiment as a fighting force, leaving its neighbouring formation badly exposed as it tried to mount its attack against the British spearhead, where it too was brushed aside. The Japanese counterattack was a complete failure, with the surviving Japanese forces pushed north and away from their lines of communication, leaving them critically short of ammunition and supplies and robbing them of the ability to mount anything more than nuisance attacks on the advancing British. By the 16th of October it was obvious that any thought of driving the British back had to be abandoned and that a new defensive line would have to be established far closer to Bangkok than anyone in the Japanese ranks was comfortable with. It was at least obvious to most that this would have to be done, but there were still heated discussions of this plan, fuelled by the fact that to mount this defence meant largely abandoning any hopes of reinforcing the troops facing Montgomery in the south. The orders were finally issued on the 20th of October and this hastily assembled defence centred on Ban Phaet seemed to succeed as Slim’s advance halted on the 25th only a few miles away. The reality was that like the forces attacking from Malaya Slim’s troops needed a break to bring up supplies and reinforcements before launching further attacks. They also needed to co-ordinate with Montgomery’s fresh assault from the south. The British were intent on making this the final push to Bangkok and the Thais were equally determined to oust the Japanese from their capital city [7].
[1] Montgomery hadn’t been afflicted by any Market Garden style ambitions here.
[2] Of course they could have surrendered but that is still a step too far for Japanese troops.
[3] The British will get drawn into Indochina in due course.
[4] A near suicidal anti-tank would have been an improvement, just not one that appealed to the Japanese.
[5] The Japanese simply don’t have the manpower to cover all the possible lines of attack. They were hoping that the British would have to concentrate on one line of advance, and they were wrong.
[6] Slim’s attack is the main British punch, coming after the Japanese had to respond to the attacks out of Malaya.
[7] And the last stand of the Japanese will be next.
