Munich Shuffle: 1938-1942
- Thread starter Garrison
- Start date
30th September – 21st December 1943 – Thailand – Part III – The Drive to Bangkok
Garrison
Donor
30th September – 21st December 1943 – Thailand – Part III – The Drive to Bangkok
The renewed British assault was launched on the 17th of November, codenamed Operation Pavilion, and this time it was Slim’s forces that struck first, looking to catch the Japanese off balance as they tried to allocate their resources between the two axes of attack. In this the plan worked as intended, and by the 20th of November the reinforced 10th Indian Infantry punched a hole through the thin layers of the Japanese lines at Ban Phaet allowing follow up units, including light armour from 1st Cavalry, to push through and attack the Japanese rear. What followed was days of increasingly confused fighting ranging from small scale skirmishes to pitched battles against isolated Japanese positions. By the 29th of November the Japanese had managed to disengage, at least temporarily and again this was not because of any tactical successes on their part, but the difficulties of resupplying the leading elements of the advancing British forces. If the Japanese expected Slim to call another extended halt to regroup, they were sorely disappointed. The British advance halted only long enough for reserve formations to pass through and take up the task of leading the attack, and they resumed their advance on the 2nd of December [1].
The fresh attack from the south began on the 20th of November and despite the Japanese putting the bulk of what fresh reserves and equipment they had facing the British on this front, concentrated at Bang Nong Hin they fared every bit as badly as those who had been facing Slim’s forces moving from the north. The Japanese had in a typically unrealistic fashion assembled a force intended to carry out a counterattack. This was technically of division strength, in practice it consisted of several infantry regiment brought up to strength by disbanding several other units, supported by a small armoured force. This consisted of less than twenty vehicles, including two M3 Stuarts and a Cruiser IV in their ranks. The exact circumstances in which the British tanks were captured is uncertain, but the best estimate is that some enthusiastic tanks crews pushed too far forward and were unable to find their way back to British lines before they ran out of fuel. Regardless of their provenance the use of the captured tanks was hampered by Japanese crews who had little time to familiarize themselves with their operation, and they were subject to the same chronic fuel shortages hampering all Japanese operations. This meant the Japanese armour was sent into battle with their fuel tanks barely half full, so barring a miraculous victory this would be a one-way trip and no such miracle was forthcoming. The counterattack on the 22nd of November swiftly broke down, with the tanks becoming detached from the supporting infantry and breaking up into several smaller groups that were either dispatched by the British or were left marooned and abandoned when they ran out of fuel. Such was the failure of this effort that it was only courtesy of intelligence information gathered after the battle that British realized that this had been intended as co-ordinated counteroffensive rather than a series of small-scale local skirmishes [2].
Even as the Japanese ‘forlorn hope’ was being carried out the leading elements of IX Corps, with the Canadian Brigade now in support rapidly broke through towards the western flank of the Japanese position and on the 24th XXXIII Indian repeated this to the east, exposing the Japanese forces to the risk of encirclement. It was here that that the Japanese reserves might have proven useful in holding open the line of retreat, even if only for a few more hours. As it was the Japanese units in the front line faced a choice between a retreat bordering on a rout or digging in and fighting to the bitter end. The fact that so many chose to retreat was a sign of how poor morale was among the Japanese was. Exhortations to fight and die in the name of the emperor sounded increasingly hollow, especially when so many of the officers issuing these demands were far from the frontlines, for the time being at least [3].
The truth was that whatever sacrifices the Japanese troops were, or were not, prepared to make the British advance towards Bangkok was inexorable and it was obvious to everyone in the Japanese high command that an assault on the city was simply a matter of time. Colonel Tsuji had returned to Bangkok to stiffen the spirit of the troops charged with the defence of Thailand; his patrons having obtained him this opportunity to return to the front in an effort to rehabilitate his reputation and he taken the opportunity eagerly, still being certain that the moral superiority of the Japanese could overcome British numbers, especially as the British were so dependent on ‘sepoys’ to do their fighting for them. He now called for a street by street, house by house defence, bleeding the British forces for every inch of ground they took, and if this defence could not hold the city, then the enemy would be left in possession of a ruin that would be nothing but a burden to them. It was a bleak plan, but one that met with little opposition in Japanese ranks, unsurprisingly the Thais were a different matter [4].
The Japanese had ruthlessly repressed the small-scale insurrections in the aftermath of Operation Buttermere, but this success had left them somewhat complacent, seeing this through the lens of their own sense of racial superiority and convincing themselves that they had crushed the spirit of the Thais once and for all, Tsuji certainly wasn’t interested in hearing any contrary opinions. The truth was that many eager to resist the Japanese had correctly judged that the time had not been right for an uprising and had continued to plan and prepare quietly, while maintaining the same appearance of collaboration in public that allowed them to gather intelligence about the Japanese and prepare acts of sabotage that would undermine the defence of the city when the time came. This meant that the resistance was fully aware of Japanese plans and whatever divisions might have existed among the different groups they were all determined that the Japanese had to be prevented from destroying the city if it were humanly possible [5].
Some might still have harboured grudges over the fact that the British had not taken Thailand in 1942 when the Japanese were ‘on their knees’, but most of them had been persuaded of the value of establishing contact with the British, especially if they wanted to acquire weapons of their own with which to fight the Japanese. On the 8th of December the first acts of sabotage took place, along with attacks on Japanese troops in the city. Official Thai histories suggest this date was deliberately chosen as it marked the anniversary of the Japanese invasion, but it seems more likely that tensions simply boiled over and those looking to conduct an organized resistance had little choice but to follow. Thus, before the Japanese could respond to the trickle of attacks on the 8th they were inundated on the 9th as the city erupted. Communications were shutdown, barricades raised, bombs thrown and assassinations carried out, temporarily paralysing the Japanese response and effectively disrupting the flow of information to and from the hastily assembled lines of defence set up to slow the British drive on the city, meaning they were unaware that at dawn that day both Slim and Montgomery had unleashed their forces in a final drive to breakthrough to the city and by the 10th those lines of defence had collapsed entirely, with Japanese units trying to execute their orders to withdraw towards the city, only to find their movements blocked by Thai partisans and Chindits who had penetrated behind their lines [6].
Also on the 10th rioter threw open the gates main prison in Bangkok were thrown open, allowing the political prisoners held there to escape, alongside criminals of every type, creating a major headache for the British who had to round them up later. Some of these political prisoners were evacuated to public buildings now held by the rebels and those who had previously served in governing the city and the country were now pressganged into forming an interim administration, an ambitious undertaking given there was gunfire echoing through the streets and plumes of smoke rising from whichever buildings had caught fire in the last few hours. The city was in chaos, which at least ensured that that Japanese could not carry out their scorched earth policy, though this came at a considerable cost in Thai lives.
By the 13th the resistance in the city was running low on ammunition for its small arms and the Japanese were finally beginning to impose some semblance of a strategy for dealing with them, looking to isolate one district of the city at a time and clear it of resistance. However, just before nightfall a small group of tanks pushed into the suburbs Bangkok. A Japanese platoon preparing to attack a resistance strongpoint moved out to meet them, failing to recognize the pennants flying from the vehicles in the gloom of twilight until it was far too late, and they were almost completely wiped out before they realized their error. These tanks were the vanguard of 1st Cavalry, and their probe was swiftly reinforced. The lead elements of 70th Infantry Division entered the city early on the 14th and further elements of IX Corps and XXXIII Indian Corps soon followed, steadily pinning the Japanese between their own advance and the Thai resistance, swiftly reducing the Japanese defenders to a handful of isolated pockets, contained and unable to carry out their planned devastation of the city. There had certainly been many casualties among the Thais and parts of the city had been badly damaged, but it fell far short of Tsuji’s demand for only ashes and rubble to remain. Tsuji himself paid the ultimate price for his failure, assassinated by a Thai insurgent while trying to flee the city [7].
The most awkward moment in the liberation of Bangkok arose from the question of who was in charge of the city. There was more than one group claiming to represent the people and some of those groups were not supporters of the previous government of Thailand. The need to focus on clearing out the last of the Japanese forces persuaded the Thai factions to accept a temporary military governor taking charge, postponing the arguments among the Thais over running the city, and the country, until after the new year, though in fact the British found themselves running the city until the middle of March 1944. Bangkok was finally declared secure on the 18th of December and Operation Pavilion ended three days later.
The fall of Bangkok was huge blow to the Japanese. Not only had they suffered irreplaceable losses but the British advance up the Malayan Peninsula also exposed Indochina to attack from land and sea, a situation that the French were eager to exploit, though the British were content to follow a more methodical approach and would not support a fresh offensive until the spring of 1944. The Japanese position in South East Asia and the Pacific had taken a massive turn for the worse in the latter half of 1943 and there was no prospect of the situation improving in the following year, the Japanese Home Islands would find themselves on the frontlines of the war soon enough [8].
[1] The Japanese are having to cover too much ground with too few troops, an issue they face OTL as well, but obviously things are going from bad to worse much sooner here.
[2] This won’t stop the Japanese presenting this debacle as a heroic act of self-sacrifice to their own forces.
[3] Tired and hungry soldiers who’ve been in the lines without relief for months on end are proving increasingly immune to calls to patriotism.
[4] It’s a lesson some many occupying armies fail to learn, when you threaten to destroy everything the people you are oppressing have nothing to lose by fighting back.
[5] If the Japanese had every been remotely serious about ‘Asia for the Asians’ the colonial powers would have been in a lot of trouble, as it is the British are the beneficiaries, whatever the Thais might think of them.
[6] The Japanese are facing what the Germans did in Paris and will again, in a city to be discussed later.
[7] A more appropriate fate for Tsuji than OTL where he got off scot free for his actions during the war.
[8] We will be heading for completely new territory in Asia in 1944, including Indochina and Hong Kong.
Bit different and less likely as the Thai's knew British did not want to take control of Thailand whilst the Vietnamese know the French will want Indochina back.
Garrison
Donor
Yeah the French are not exactly going to be subtle in their efforts to re-establish control in Indochina.
Due to the British conducting a stunning war effort TTL that appears to bring WW2 to a close a full year earlier than OTL, a lot fewer people will die* especially Jews in Europe and South / Southeast Asians and the exploits of the British Army will be revered by the public for generations. Somewhat ironically however, there will almost certainly be more British military casualties than OTL because of their Asian Theater campaigns.
*if there ends up a full invasion of Japan, then the overall global cost in lives may equal out unfortunately.
*if there ends up a full invasion of Japan, then the overall global cost in lives may equal out unfortunately.
Garrison
Donor
As far as casualties goes for the British you have to factor in the numbers who died in captivity in South East Asia, and of course how large a percentage of those British forces are actually Indian, who of course won't show up in post war casualty counts put together by historians and etched in stone in British towns. As for an invasion of Japan, well that would be a massive spoiler for how things end.
9th December 1943 – Auschwitz – A Fresh Hell
Garrison
Donor
9th December 1943 – Auschwitz – A Fresh Hell
In terms of generating post war conspiracy theories and wild stories the Nazi nuclear program comfortably competes with the likes of Mussolini’s assassination and Hess’ flight to Scotland in both volume and absurdity. Matters were not helped by post war accounts from surviving scientists and engineers who worked at the Auschwitz Special Projects site, many of which were full of melodramatic details designed to increase sales of their memoirs rather than convey an accurate picture of the work undertaken there. In the simplest terms the scientists at Auschwitz SP were not building a bomb as so many have claimed, they were working on a nuclear reactor, paralleling the work carried out in Chicago by Edward Teller, though with critical difference. The work in Chicago was proof of concept research, demonstrating that it was possible to create a chain reaction, and just as importantly as far as this early research was concerned, control it before it could create a runaway event. The successful conclusion of this work was announced by the exchange of cryptic messages, ‘The Italian navigator has landed in the New World’ ‘How were the natives?’ ‘Very friendly’. The successful conclusion of the research in Chicago still left several years of work to be completed to produce a working atomic bomb, something that the proponents of ‘Nazi Bomb’ theories tend to ignore, as well as the rather obvious fact that the work at Auschwitz SP was proceeding down a blind alley that led to disaster [1].
In the simplest terms Chicago design used block of Uranium with graphite used as a moderator, the same basic elements to be found in most post-war reactor design. The reactor at Auschwitz SP was a very different design, partly because of some mathematical errors that skewed the German perception of what was required for a successful Uranium chain reaction, but also due to some practical constraints. Germany was unable to produce Graphite of the purity required in the quantities needed for a nuclear reactor, though a breakthrough was made in this area it came far too late for the German nuclear program [2]. The German reactor was instead depending on heavy water as a moderator, which was also in limited supply as the Allies had made disrupting the operations of the main producer, Norsk Hydro in Norway a high priority. The German design would thus have looked rather incongruous to the scientists working on the Manhattan Project, as it consisted of a series of chains with cubes of Uranium attached along their length. The chains were attached to a circular plate that was lowered into a chamber that contained heavy water. In the event that a chain reaction threatened to run away the plan was to drop Cadmium into the chamber. This would absorb the subatomic particles release by the fission process and stop any chain reaction, in theory at least [3].
One of the few people in any position to give any insight into what actually happened at Auschwitz SP during the final weeks was Werner Heisenberg, who had the good fortune to be summoned to Berlin to address what he described after the war as, ‘Hitler’s delusions about the potential of our project’. This was dangerous in itself as Hitler’s temper had become increasingly mercurial since his return to full control of the Reich and to make matters worse he was now prone to fits that were related to head injuries received during the bombing. This made interviews with the Fuhrer an unpredictable affair and more than one unfortunate functionary delivering some routine report had found themselves in the hands of the Gestapo facing vague accusations of defeatism or treason. Heisenberg himself is not necessarily the most reliable of witnesses as much of what he told Allied interrogators later was designed to paint himself in the best light possible and avoid being labelled as the man who tried to give the Nazis the bomb. In particular his claims that he was aware of flaws in the design and construction of the Auschwitz reactor but kept this knowledge to himself in a deliberate act of sabotage, have to be treated with considerable scepticism. With those provisos in mind his story of the conduct of the scientists and engineers working at Auschwitz SP does at least make some sense in the context of what we know was going on with other wonder weapon projects. It was a depressingly familiar tale of the scientists working at Auschwitz facing dire threats if they did not produce concrete results immediately, leading to many corners being cut in getting the reactor operational, most critically the supply of Cadmium needed for the emergency system fell far short of what had been specified, but with the pressure from above they chose to press on regardless and on the 9th of December 1943 they ran what was intended as the first full scale trial of the reactor. It was tremendous gamble and at 1045 hours it went horribly wrong [4].
Investigations of the site after the war dismissed any idea that the event had been a nuclear explosion or a full-scale meltdown, which did nothing to quash the books and pseudo-documentaries that have continued to make such claims over the years. The best estimate of what went wrong is that there was a Hydrogen explosion that shattered the reactor vessel and led to the Uranium catching fire. The explosion and ensuing fire destroyed the reactor building and led to a large quantity of nuclear material being dispersed over the surrounding area. In a small mercy the fallout didn’t not fall on the Auschwitz death camp, which again has not stopped Nazi apologists claiming that the death toll at the camp was caused by fallout rather than the gas chambers. Hitler even denied the requests that inmates of the camp be used to help in the clear up, paranoid that they would somehow pass knowledge of the project to the Western Allies or the Soviets. Instead, the task of clean-up and recovery fell to the Wehrmacht and German civilian labour shipped in specifically for the task. They would be among the first to discover the impact of fallout and radiation sickness as they worked through the badly contaminated debris. The workers at the nearby Auschwitz Monowitz industrial complex were also exposed, not only resulting in the deaths of many the slave workers but also rendered the site inoperative, including the expensively built chemical plant that ceased production and was only restored to operational use after the war [5].
Heisenberg’s account of events becomes rather vague when it comes to the aftermath of the accident, focusing largely on how he barely escaped the clutches of the Gestapo and his dramatic escape to the west in the spring of 1944. What other sources suggest is that to save themselves from the possibility of being denounced as saboteurs some of the remaining scientists and engineers put forward the idea of a radiological weapon, what would now be called a dirty bomb. The deadly consequences of exposure to fallout were becoming appallingly clear and the persistence of the fallout meant that it offered the possibility of an unrivalled area denial weapon. To Hitler’s mind this seemed akin to ‘salting the ground’ and the idea of rendering territory unfit for their enemies to ever inhabit seemed fitting in his current mood. The scientists doubtless played up the effectiveness of these weapons, but at the same time the potential damage of such a device could not be ignored, Hitler endorsed the plan and the remainder of the German nuclear program found itself dedicated to the creation of radiological weapons rather than the atomic bomb, a fact that was greeted with a mixture of relief and alarm when it reached the Allies [6].
[1] The Manhattan Project is preceding at about its OTL pace, given the scale of the program and the resources committed hard to see how to speed it up significantly.
[2] This breakthrough essentially found out there was in fact a fairly simply way to produce Graphite of the required standard, all far too late for the OTL project.
[3] This was the plan in OTL as well, and its just as well it was never tested.
[4] A reactor without proper damping getting out of control, luckily this is much smaller than OTL Chernobyl.
[5] So it’s bad, but not quite as bad as it might have been with a full-scale nuclear explosion.
[6] A dirty bomb is a lesser threat than a nuclear weapon, but it’s also easier to create.
Well... hopefully this serves as a lesson on proper nuclear reactor safety for people more willing to learn from mistakes than the Nazis.
Garrison
Donor
Against which you could get the the attitude, 'our reactors are totally different, couldn't possibly happen to us'.
"Oh, our safety procedures? Simple but effective. We've made sure none of the staff are Nazis. It's worked well so far."
I am sorry it's not 3.6 roentgen it's 15000 roentgen. General Pikalov say so.
Garrison
Donor
There will be a Paperclip, albeit somewhat different from OTL. And yes that means some of the staff will quite likely be Nazis.
And it would have a grain of truth, as while nuclear power is never risk-free (and there can be fuckups, neglect and sheer incompetence even in the most advanced nations), the Nazi program was really the next level of stupidity (mostly because Hitler wanted instantaneous results on a technology that was only half-understood at the time while in the middle of a world war, and scientists failing to provide them were at personal risk of death...).
11th – 16th December 1943 - The Tehran Conference
Garrison
Donor
11th – 16th December 1943 - The Tehran Conference
Teheran had been chosen as the venue for the second summit because Iran was a place where the Soviets and the British had worked together to achieve a mutual objective and thus served as reminder of the value of co-operation between the putative Allies, at least that was what the all the press releases said. In practice Stalin was being difficult about travelling by sea and air and since the Soviets had a presence in Iran it was seen as a reasonable place to hold the next round of talks. If there were any hopes That Iran would remind everyone of the value of working together and smooth over some of the disagreements that had emerged between the Americans, the British and the Soviets, they were soon dashed. Even before the conference began there was some tension when the British and put forward the idea of rotating the discussions between the Soviet embassy in Tehran and that of the British, a suggestion that the Soviets only reluctantly agreed to, as they had been planning to eavesdrop on the British and American delegations to acquire insights into their negotiating strategy. The reasons for the British making a stand on this point are opaque even at this remove in history, thanks to various documents pertaining to the conference not due to be declassified until 2043. Everything from the uncovering of the Katyn massacre to suspicions about Soviet spies in London has been offered up as an explanation. The most likely explanation is that is was nothing more than the British wanting to emphasize that they were not content to play second fiddle to Stalin or Roosevelt [1].
This explanation makes perfect sense when one considers that the second meeting between the three great war leaders was taking place under very different circumstances than its predecessor. The second front that Stalin had long demanded was now a reality and the Western Allies might not have progressed as fast some of the more optimistic projections circulating before the Normandy landings, but they were advancing, and the Germans were, as far as the Western Allies were concerned, still reeling from the setbacks suffered during Dragoon and Cobra. The war in Europe might not be over by Christmas but Germany might be defeated by the Spring of 1944, though these hopes would suffer a serious setback after events in the Ardennes [2]. These military successes had somewhat eased the tensions between Britain and the USA, aided in no small part by Stalin’s less the enthusiastic response to the massive commitment in men and equipment that the Western Allies had made during the drive through France and Belgium and the damage they had wrought on Germany’s ability to wage war, both on the ground and in the air as the strategic bombing campaign targeting the Ruhr and Germany’s synthetic oil facilities was ramped up as the need for the heavy bombers to be committed in support of the advance on the ground diminished. The stiff resistance put up by the Ostheer, and the frustrating fact that Army Group Centre had escaped destruction after Operation Citadel, if only just, left Stalin to pronounce that the Germans had left only a ‘second rate’ army in France and that the British and Americans should be driving much harder. By this logic it would be far better for more trucks, tanks and other materiel to be shipped to the USSR where it could be put to use fighting the main forces of the Wehrmacht [3].
While there was certainly some truth to Stalin’s views in terms of the balance of forces in the east and the west, it was a mistake to bring them up in public and doing so provided ammunition for those in London and Washington concerned that Stalin’s agenda extended far beyond simply defeating Germany. The closer British and American troops got to the Rhine the less credible any threat of the Soviets making a separate peace or even agreeing a ceasefire became. Since surviving the bombing Hitler’s public rhetoric, what there was of it, made it clear that the destruction of the ‘Slavic hordes’ and the conquest of the east was a sacred duty for Germany and no quarter or compromise could be offered, it was a war of racial survival and the loser could expect nothing less than annihilation. Reports from intelligence sources and neutral governments strongly suggested that any hints that some in the Nazi leadership might take a more pragmatic stance were largely irrelevant. Unless Hitler was removed, which seemed unlikely at the end of 1943, Germany would neither offer nor entertain any sort of peace deal in the east. Thus, the USSR had no choice except to fight, and indeed given Stalin’s anxieties about the shape of post-war Europe he had little choice but to push the Red Army to its limit for fear the Allies would sweep into Berlin and simply impose their own terms. On this basis the Western Allies were prepared to ensure that whatever division of responsibilities for the occupation of Germany and its Axis partners was agreed it did not betray the principles for which the Allies had gone to war in the first place, even if that did mean antagonizing Stalin and the most tangible expression of this resolution was the discussions over the fate of Poland [4].
The German invasion of Poland was the reason that Britain had gone to war in 1939 and if they had been unable to save the Poles then there was now some determination to ensure that if the Soviets did at some point push the Germans out of Ukraine and Byelorussia they didn’t just carry on rolling into Poland, with the Soviet role in dismembering the country no longer being ignored in the name of a united front against the Nazis. The British were also concerned about the Balkans, and Greece in particular. There was a general agreement reached at the conference to increase support for partisan activities in the region, there were nonetheless concerns voiced inside the American and British camps about the strength of the Communists in the region, particularly among the Yugoslav partisans. The Western Allies appreciated that the communist partisans had been effective at tying down Axis troops, but when it came to Greece in particular they were not intending to simply let the Communists take control by default. So, at the same time as they sought to increase aid to the Partisans they agreed, with Stalin’s grudging assent, to increase aid to the Free Greek forces for further actions in the Peloponnese and eventually the Greek mainland [5].
When it came to Poland the agreement reached at Tehran was essentially not to agree anything and kick that problem down the road for a final settlement of how the post-war map would shake out and this largely extended to Central Europe and Germany as well. In crude terms the shape of post-war borders would be dependent on where the respective forces of the Western Allies and the Soviet Union were by the end of the war. It was accepted in principle that Germany would be broken into zones of control, one each for the British, the Americans, and the Soviets, a French zone was not part of the plan at this point, where the lines of demarcation were marked on the map would be settled in the final battles with the Germans [6].
These rather bland compromises were essential to achieve what Roosevelt and felt was the key goal of the meeting, to put an end to the endless speculation that persisted about one side or the other seeking to make a separate peace with the Germans, an idea that as mentioned previously had exacerbated the tensions between the Western Allies and the Soviets. What Roosevelt wanted, with full support from Churchill in this instance, was a clear declaration that the only way Nazi Germany could obtain peace was by unconditional surrender. No armistice, no room to pretend that Germany had not been thoroughly defeated in battle, and of course no encouragement for anyone inside Germany who might have thought they could bargain for their survival by brokering a deal. This policy has been seen as foolhardy in some quarters, guaranteeing that Germany would have no choice except to fight to the bitter end, however the reality was that any chance of Hitler being overthrown was long gone and no one wanted to contemplate Germany gearing up for ‘round three’ in another twenty years. On this, if little else, Stalin and Roosevelt agreed. Goebbels’ propaganda liked to boast of total war, it was the Western Allies and the Soviets who would make a reality [7].
Despite the considerable advances made in Pacific in the months since the Tunis conference the Americans were still eager to obtain a commitment from the Soviets to enter the war against the Japanese. The Japanese use of suicide attacks and the casualties taken in the battles in the Philippines in particular convinced Roosevelt that having a fresh front against Japan opened by the Soviets was still highly desirable as it seemed likely the ferocity of the Japanese soldiers would only increase as the Allies drew closer to the Home Islands. There were also efforts to gear up for a major offensive by the Chinese Nationalist forces, however these preparations were taking far longer than anyone in Washington was comfortable with. To Stalin these entreaties sounded all too much like a plan to use the Red Army as cannon fodder to save the lives of American troops. Roosevelt naturally saw it rather differently. The Western Allies had delivered on the second front the Soviets had long been demanding, it was only right that they reciprocate by ending their non-aggression pact with the Japanese and entering the Pacific war. The views of the two leaders were difficult to reconcile, but there was still enough mutual interest for them to come a rather tenuous agreement that the USSR would enter the war against Japan three to four months after the end of the war in Europe [8].
The Tehran conference was frustrating for all sides, but it probably achieved as much as it could, with the commitment to demanding unconditional surrender being an important demonstration of the commitment of all sides to see the war through to the end regardless of what the Germans might yet try to break their resolve or drive a wedge between the Soviets and the Western Allies [9].
[1] So the conference is Tehran for most of the same reasons as OTL, but with the British taking a much firmer stance on the hosting arrangements.
[2] Yes there will be an Ardennes offensive, and no VE Day will not be in March or April 1944.
[3] It’s a case of being careful what you wish for. Stalin kept demanding a second front in France and now he’s got one he’s even less happy.
[4] The Allies feel like the war is close to being won and they know Stalin wants to be in at the kill so they aren’t inclined to bend over backwards to accommodate his demands. Also of course there are rumours swirling in Washington that Roosevelt might not run in 1944, and none of the potential successors are as friendly to the Soviets as he is.
[5] So no, we have seen the last action in southern Europe yet.
[6] In the crudest terms who is going to get to Warsaw and Berlin first ITTL?
[7] Given how much better the Allies are doing they were never going to settle for anything less than that.
[8] They will enter the war, to what effect is another matter.
[9] The final settlement will have to wait for the next time.