Don't forget about the Air-Mine-Induced collapse of the Japanese food distribution network. (Was heavily canal-based. Canals are mineable.)
Munich Shuffle: 1938-1942
- Thread starter Garrison
- Start date
Garrison
Donor
Also a point to remember, especially as the end of the war against Japan is still being written.
Regardless of the changes with OTL, the basic strategic position hasn't changed, which means one (or a combination) of three options:
- Invasion
- Blockade
- Ripley Doctrine
I say we take off and nuke the site from orbit. It's the only way to be sure.
16th September – 19th October – Hitler’s Return – Part I – Taking Back the Reins
Garrison
Donor
16th September – 19th October – Hitler’s Return – Part I – Taking Back the Reins
On the morning of September 16th the German airwaves were full of announcements informing both the civilian population and the military that all should be by their radios at 7pm that day for a very important broadcast, and that all should ensure that their family, friends, neighbours, and comrades in arms were aware of it and listening, with a not so subtly implied ‘or else’ in the phrasing of the broadcast.], barring those fighting on the frontlines every Germans were expected to drop everything and be by the radio. At 7pm precisely that evening every radio in Germany blasted out stirring patriotic music, followed by an excited announcer revealing that the Fuhrer himself was to address the nation. Even for those who must have guessed, or been given advanced warning of what was coming, hearing Hitler’s voice, full of passion and fury, must have stirred the hearts of those who still clung to the Nazi regime, while at the same time provoking terror among those who opposed it. The speech pulled no punches. Those who had tried to strike him down were enemies of the German people and anyone remaining who had colluded in the plan would be swiftly brought to justice and put to death for treason. Germany’s enemies could expect an equally swift response and whatever minor successes they might have achieved would soon be reversed, with Germany raining destruction down on them with terrible new weapons that would force them to either bend to the will of the Reich or perish utterly. The speech lasted for nearly an hour, punctuated by thunderous applause and cries of ‘seig heil’ and heil Hitler’. Following its completion a series of fresh laws and commands were announced, marking a harsh crackdown on production of anything classed as luxury goods, with luxury taking on a remarkably broad definition that drew in a variety of foodstuffs and household items, most of which were already in short supply. There would also be a series of ruthless new regulations for the workers in German industry, who would soon find themselves little better off than the slave labour they increasingly found themselves working besides [1].
The speech was far from the bravura performance it appeared to be, instead it was a carefully crafted piece of propaganda, one of Goebel’s finest efforts. Hitler’s part of the speech had been recorded in a studio setup at the Berchtesgaden where the Fuhrer was recuperating. Hitler was forced to use a wheelchair much of the time as he was still far from fully recovered from his injuries, which explains why anyone in the vicinity of Berchtesgaden found with a camera could expect to receive the full attention of the Gestapo and any attempt to actually photograph the Fuhrer would have been a suicidal act. Regardless of these dire threats a handful of photographs were somehow taken in secret showing the condition of Hitler, but none of them surfaced until after the war by which time multiple parties were eager to claim credit for taking them. The sounds of the crowd that punctuated the recorded speech not only created a false narrative of adoring masses still hanging on the Fuhrer’s every word, but they also made a convenient excuse to insert pauses in the speech to cover the multiple points where Hitler’s energy gave out and he either forgot where he was in the text or collapsed into a coughing fit. Those who knew the truth about the speech were also subject to close scrutiny for many months after the recording, with several of the technicians finding themselves assigned to posts in the most isolated corners of the Reich to ensure they remained silent and military personnel dispatched to the eastern front [2].
Inside the Wehrmacht the return of Hitler to full control of the Reich, or at least the appearance of doing so, crushed whatever aspirations the surviving supporters of the Valhalla plot might have nurtured. Far from provoking some further desperate effort to assassinate Hitler the survivors doubled down on displays of loyalty. If Hitler’s regime was going to be overthrown, it would fall to the armed forces of the Western Allies and the USSR to do the job with no help from within the Reich. One man who faced the resurgence of the Fuhrer with remarkably fear was Hermann Goering. He might have been a disaster as the head of the Luftwaffe and the Four-Year economic plan, but when it came to ensuring his personal survival and position, he was a master. Ever since the assassination attempt he had, with the collusion of the General Staff and those elements in the Waffen SS desperate to save their own skins, woven a narrative of his own loyal efforts to thwart the Reich’s enemies, who had been led by a twisted cadres of occultist madmen that had grown up around Himmler [3].
That Adolf Hitler had little use for Himmler’s occult obsessions outside of their use in forging his own fantastical history of the Aryan race was no great secret. Goering had the inspired idea to latch on to this to sell the story that Himmler was responsible for the bombing, not as an act of betrayal in his own eyes but in an attempt to bring certain mystical forces to bear on behalf of the Reich by offering the greatest sacrifice they could imagine, the life of the Fuhrer himself. That making this sacrifice would also give Himmler complete power over Germany was obviously just a happy coincidence. The sheer outrageousness of this story was part of what helped to sell it to Hitler, portraying this as the act of small group within the upper echelons of the SS while absolving the Waffen SS officers of any blame. It was hardly surprising the Waffen SS were willing to latch on to this fiction when it became clear that Goering had won the battle to control Germany in Hitler’s absence. That Hitler seems to have been willing to accept this outlandish story perhaps speaks more to his state of mind than to the ability of Goering to weave a narrative. It is even possible that some remaining political instincts nudged him to accept this version of events rather than risk shattering the Nazi regime if the Wehrmacht and the SS turned on one another. If Hitler did consciously choose to compromise on this matter it was the only one he was willing to make [4].
The death of Himmler and the incapacitation brought some small mercy to Jews awaiting deportation to the death camps and those precariously hanging on in the Warsaw Ghetto, for whom the bombing was the latest in series of desperate reprieves from final dissolution. This was not the product of any moral qualms on the part Goering or anyone else in charge of the Nazi state. It was simply a result of the fact that the rolling stock that Himmler had adamantly insisted be assigned to transporting victims to the death camps was redirected to moving men and supplies at the behest of the Wehrmacht and senior figures in the armaments industry. This diversion of resources carried on through most of October as Hitler’s attention was drawn to the military situation in the east and west, only finally coming to an end when Speer, who had also demonstrated his survival skills in the aftermath of the bombing, broached the subject of using Jews to provide additional slave labour rather than simply disposing of them, with the letters and discussions held on the topic doing much to contribute to Speer’s post war execution for crimes against humanity. All Speer’s intervention achieved was to alert Hitler to the fact that the Holocaust had slowed down and he demanded that transport be reallocated and the efforts to liquidate the Jews be redoubled. While the Wehrmacht did not dispute the importance of the task they did their best to retain the overstretched rail capacity for their own needs, however the rate of destruction in the death camps steadily rose from the end of October into the early part of 1944, when events in Eastern Europe superseded the Reich’s extermination plans [5].
By this point in the war Hitler interfering in military strategy was a given, even so the orders issued after his return were greeted with dismay by the Wehrmacht as a whole. He once again insisted on shifting production priorities, just as the Heer and the Luftwaffe were desperately struggling to recover from the battering they had received over the summer and trying to counter the new weapons being deployed by the Western Allies and the USSR. Hitler was especially keen to see the so-called Mark VIS ‘Tiger-Special’ put into service as soon as possible, even while the factories were still working to streamline the production process for the existing Tiger. While the Tiger and the Panther had proven effective, after their many teething problems were resolved, the General staff were of the opinion that what they really needed more of were assault guns, late model Panzer IV and the Panzer III/IV Chimera. The latter had been regarded with some scepticism when it first entered service, but it had become increasingly popular with the Panzer Divisions as it proved reliable and easy to operate, requiring minimal retraining for crews or maintenance personnel. Certainly, the A24 Churchill, M4A5 Thomas and T34-85M had eroded the superiority that the Tiger and Panther had enjoyed for a brief time, but even in the Panzer Divisions the idea that superior German quality could overcome the Allies numerical advantage was becoming discredited. Hitler would have none of it and such arguments only encouraged him to demand even more grandiose designs, with the likes of Henschel and Porsche being asked to put forward designs for a truly gargantuan Panzer VII [6].
[1] Basically even those who previously enjoyed some protection in Germany are now being targeted by a fresh round of repression.
[2] Hitler is physically and mentally in worse condition than after the OTL bombing.
[3] Goering has decided his best chance to secure his position is to embrace the big lie.
[4] Who can say what balance of insanity and pragmatism influenced Hitler, as long as someone got to dangle from a piano wire noose he was relatively content.
[5] What events in Eastern Europe you may wonder? That is for a later update.
[6] For the sake of post war online tank games there has to be a Maus.
That may be a tad optimistic if we includr the '... from orbit...' bit.
Garrison
Donor
Yeah that would probably postpone the end of the war until the 1950s, even if we allow a little bit of license and assume a suborbital trajectory.
16th September – 19th October – Hitler’s Return – Part II – Scorched Earth
Garrison
Donor
16th September – 19th October – Hitler’s Return – Part II – Scorched Earth
Hitler’s interference with production issues paled beside his strategic demands for the conduct of the war in the east, west, and south. The Ostheer got off the lightest in terms of the problems Hitler was able to create as the commanders in the east had taken full advantage of Hitler’s absence to adopt a rational response to the Soviet offensives that had finally been launched in the aftermath of Operation Citadel. While Army Group Centre was battered and exhausted it at least still existed despite the best efforts of the Red Army to encircle and destroy it, which was as close to a victory as the Ostheer could now hope for. Hitler naturally issued orders demanding that the Ostheer fight for every inch of ground and that no retreats would be countenanced. He also wanted to see the plans being formulated for fresh offensives, something that was now beyond the Ostheer. They were spared dealing with the immediate consequences of these commands as the Red Army was as exhausted as the Ostheer, at least temporarily, and the onset of the Autumn weather meant that it would be some time before the Germans had to face any fresh attacks, and of course the weather provided an excuse to demur launching any further operations of their own, alongside the need to regroup and resupply. Hitler was far from happy with this, but fortunately for the Ostheer most of his rage was directed elsewhere [1].
That Paris had been taken almost intact by the Allies was a particular point of grievance for Hitler, now consumed it seems by apocalyptic visions of the end of everything he was determined the Allies should capture nothing but rubble and ashes as they advanced, while at the same time insisting that army in the west must prepare a counteroffensive, contradictory demands that the Wehrmacht in France was no better equipped to meet than the Ostheer. The destruction of so many units during Cobra and Dragoon had left the Heer struggling to mount a defence. They were arguably in a worse position than the Ostheer owing to the constant changes in leadership inflicted on them after the assassination attempt and now they faced the prospect of the reserves they desperately needed to shore up their defensive lines being diverted to a counteroffensive that no one besides Hitler himself thought had any chance of doing more than delaying the inevitable, and that was the most optimistic view. If there was anyone else who was remotely happen with this turn of events it was possibly Erich von Manstein, now restored to his command in France and finally able to impose some order on the conduct of the battle, though he still had to deal with the effects of a fresh round of dismissals and arrests. These unfortunates were not targeted because of suspicions of being involved with Valhalla, Hitler having chosen to accept the version of event that absolved the Heer of any culpability, but because they were perceived to have failed in their duties. In particular anyone associated with the surrender of Paris who was not fortunate enough to be an Allied POW would soon find themselves facing the tender mercies of the Gestapo as Hitler eschewed such niceties as military court-martials [2].
Prior to the bombing the Luftwaffe had been insulated to a degree from the worst of Hitler’s fantastical plans and one would have imagined that Goering would have extended this protection, such had not been the case. While he was acting in the role of Fuhrer, Goering had driven the Luftwaffe to destroy the Allies on the ground and in the air, desperate to prove his service could win the war from the air. This was hardly exclusive to Goering, even at this stage of the war the same pipe dream still being pursued by some in the RAF and USAAF. If the Luftwaffe could deliver on the demands made of them Goering promised a substantial increase in resources, naturally coming at the expense of the Heer and the Kriegsmarine, or what was left of it. Even if Goering had been able to make good on his promises it would have taken months for any increase to make an impact on the frontlines and with Hitler’s return these promises evaporated, except for the jet and rocket projects which pressed on regardless. By October the Luftwaffe was exhausted, both in terms of material resources and its crews. Morale had plummeted in the west as squadrons were scattered to dispersal fields, with the commanding officers sometimes struggling to locate their aircraft, pilots, and ground crews for days or even weeks. The appearance of RAF jet fighters spread despondency out of all proportion to their numbers. The Luftwaffe personnel, especially the fighter pilots, had always believed that they represented the finest air force in the world and while events since 1940 had dented that confidence it had still survived. Now though the Comet had appeared as the clearest possible symbol that they had lost that superiority and they knew it would be months before they could expect to see any jets of their own, despite the pressure put on the German aircraft industry by Goering and Hitler. The Luftwaffe would nonetheless be expected to take part in the grand plan for a fresh offensive in the west, mounting a massive series of strikes against Allied airfields as a prelude to the ground offensive, with the airfields occupied by the RAF’s jets getting a high priority [3].
In France the Wehrmacht pursued Hitler’s scorched earth policy in the most desultory fashion possible, with many officers having one eye on the potential personal consequences if they committed what the Western Allies considered to be war crimes, reflecting the lack of belief that Hitler’s grand offensive would do anything to prevent the Allies advancing to the Rhine, or the Elbe for that matter. Von Manstein might have talked bullishly about driving the Allies back to the coast when talking with his staff, in private he was far less enthusiastic. If the Germans were circumspect about the destruction wrought during their retreat in France, they were anything but cautious in Italy. Wehrmacht officers did their best after the war to point the finger at the SS for the many atrocities committed there, but there was plenty of evidence that clearly showed the Wehrmacht had actively colluded in, and indeed initiated, acts of revenge against Italian civilians. They willingly bought into Hitler’s rhetoric of ‘betrayal’ and ‘back-stabbing’ as the Fuhrer made it clear that any considerations of exploiting Italian resources were now secondary to punishing them for turning against Germany. Historians of certain bent have tried to claim that the blurring of the lines between civilians, partisans, and soldiers in some way excused the brutality of the German forces in Italy, this however ignores the fact that the Germans showed no inclination to try and make such distinctions in the first place and the wholesale executions of hostages, including children, were carried out at almost at the whim of local SS and Wehrmacht commanders. Towns and villages with no strategic value were bombed mercilessly by the Luftwaffe simply to prevent them harbouring enemy forces, even when the Italian army did their best to avoid such places to spare them from retaliation [4].
The Germans did not have things all their own way of course, the same Italian troops the Wehrmacht had regarded with derision when they floundered trying to advance Mussolini’s plans for a new Roman empire now fought tenaciously, fighting for their homes and families was a very different proposition from fighting for someone else’s dreams of conquest, a lesson the Wehrmacht would learn for itself as the Allies advanced on the Rhine. What had been comfortable billets for German troops offered no relief as there were no clear battlelines in the Italian fighting and the Allies weren’t ignoring the situation. Plans for a landing in Italy to cut the Germans lines of communication were being re-examined, though they remained unlikely to be acted upon in 1943. The Allied air forces based in Sicily and North Africa were a different matter and they conducted a vigorous campaign against the Germans, attacking their supply lines and pulling the Luftwaffe into another contest it could ill afford. Italy was another self-inflicted wound for the Germans and one where they couldn’t staunch the bleeding however brutally they conducted their campaign [5].
When they received recordings and transcriptions of the speech it was the reference to ‘terrible new weapons’ that exercised the minds of Allied politicians and military leaders, who could only take this as a reference to the atomic bomb. This led to a fresh flurry of activity aimed at undermining the German nuclear program, which was increasingly difficult as it was concentrated at the Auschwitz site, putting the scientists out of reach of assassination and a stretch for strategic bombers to attack. There were those in the intelligence community with access to some of the work being done by the Allies own nuclear programs who suspected that the Germans were heading down the wrong path in their research. There was nonetheless pressure to accelerate Allied nuclear research once again, but this was easier said than done given that many of the finest minds in physics were already involved and there were already huge material resources being put into the Manhattan Project. It did provide some encouragement for those who wanted the British to pursue research programs in parallel to their work with the Americans under the Manhattan project and it made life harder for those in the US who wanted to keep full control of the research program. Even with the absolute maximum effort no one could see a working bomb being produced by either side before the beginning of 1945 barring some massive breakthrough on a par with the original discovery of nuclear fission. The best counter available to the Allies then was to win the war as quickly as possible, which was also the best hopes for the surviving Jewish population of Europe and the people of Italy [6].
[1] So yes Army Group Centre has survived, sort of. About 1/3 of it got out of the trap post Kursk as opposed to complete annihilation OTL. It’s desperately short of equipment, but it still exists.
[2] In effect Hitler is still punishing the army for Valhalla, without openly admitting that’s why they are being punished.
[3] Operation Bodenplatte went badly IOTL, its equivalent won’t go any better here.
[4] Italy has become the place where the Germans vent all their anger and frustration.
[5] What Spain was for Napoleon Italy is becoming for Hitler.
[6] In other words the sooner the Allies reach Berlin the better.
I presume there's some amount of SOE/Commando etc. Support to the Italians? I mean, a few Forward Air Controllers (or whatever they're called in the timeframe) would probably go a long way.
I could see SOE and OSS being very active in Italy. "Wold" Bill Donovan would think he'd died and gone to heaven.
Unfortunately, I could see it being a graveyard for the operatives sent in, you'd have inter group rivalries which would get very bloody indeed, political machinations between the resistance groups, the army, the government and government in exile which would also get bloody and this is before the Americans use the Mafia to get a foothold giving then a bit of a resurgence in power.
And all this while the Germans are throwing the baby out with the bath water with their reprisals.
One of the butterflies from this, if it is as messy as I suspect it would be, is that it might cut down the amount of interfering that SIS and CIA get up to post war if they get a little gun shy after the Italian campaign.
Another butterfly: The Italian Job might end up being a very different film...
Funny you should say that cause I'm pretty sure this sums up the Germans in this timeline so far.
Garrison
Donor
That will be the focus of several updates when we reach 1944.
Italy is a confused mess, and the SOE and OSS are doing their best to keep the pot bubbling. The Communists are about the most trustworthy of the local factions...
And I enjoyed your take on the film.
I'm now just imagining the Allies dropping crates of dynamite over Italy, because odds are, whatever happens next will benefit the Allies.
30th September – 21st November 1943 – Thailand – Part I - Competing Visions
Garrison
Donor
30th September – 21st November 1943 – Thailand – Part I - Competing Visions
With the last mopping up operations in the Dutch East Indies completed it was natural for attention of Montgomery to turn to planning the next moves against the Japanese, and the British faced a range of conflicting ideas and objectives that had to be navigated by the politicians and military leaders in South East Asia and in London. One major issue was the reluctance of the Australian government to see its troops deployed for any further offensives. With the trade and supply routes to Australia secure and the threat of Japanese attacks on Australia lifted the argument from Canberra was that Australia had ‘done its part’ and others should take up their fair share of the burden. Part of the reason for this was the somewhat frosty relations between the American forces staging through the country and their Australian counterparts. The Australians had come to see the Americans as ‘arrogant’ and ‘high-handed’, and that their troops had plenty of money to throw around when on leave did nothing to endear them to the local population, at least not the male population. There was also the tendency of the US media to ignore the contributions of their Allies to the ongoing advance across the Pacific [1].
One example that particularly rankled with the Australians, and the British for that matter, was the film ‘Objective Java’ starring Errol Flynn. It was sarcastically suggested that ‘Alone on Java’ would have been a more appropriate title as the film showed only US troops involved, even down to the amphibious assault that marked the relief of Java and the climax of the film. The British government had little choice but to acquiesce to the Australian demands to repatriate their troop, which mean that future operations would be even more dependent on Indian troops, especially given that British reserves were not endless either and had to be focused on Operation Millennium and possible future operations in the Mediterranean and the Aegean, with the Balkans being back on the agenda after the success of Operation Jasper. More Indian troops inevitably meant more pressure to conclude a political settlement for the future of India, which some in London were happy enough to embrace even if Churchill was increasingly uneasy. Not everyone in Australia was happy about this policy either, believing that it was a retrograde step and risked sacrificing Australia’s influence in the empire [2].
The Americans had of course already set their own plans in motion and even if there had been any resources to spare, they were unwilling to release them in support of operations to restore colonial rule on behalf of the British, Dutch, and French. This attitude was only reinforced by the behaviour of the Dutch towards to the freedom fighters who had conducted a guerrilla campaign against the Japanese in the Dutch East Indies, only to be treated as dangerous revolutionaries to be suppressed as the Dutch sought reimpose the old order in their territories. The American position was regarded with deep cynicism among the British and Free French, where it was seen as simply reflecting the US desire to pry open the colonial empires for the benefit of their own commerce and industry. Roosevelt and Churchill did their best to downplay this divergence in views, De Gaulle on the other hand was quite vocal about ‘American imperialism’, which further soured relations with Washington [3].
However much some in Whitehall might have sympathised with De Gaulle’s views in private they were not inclined to embrace his ‘bold’ strategy for the progression of the war in South East Asia. De Gaulle advocated bypassing the Japanese forces in Thailand and launching a new amphibious assault, this one aimed at the coast of Vietnam. The French obsession with liberating their possessions in Indochina had only grown stronger after the victory in the DEI, and the way the British had supported the Greeks in the liberation of Rhodes also rankled. On the British side there were quiet mutterings about French egos and ingratitude. After all, while De Gaulle was pressing for action over Indochina the Allies were preparing for Millennium and even the most cautious former outposts of Vichy had declared for the Free French, almost entirely as a result of the British victories in North Africa and the ensuing collapse of the Vichy regime. The limitation of the available shipping allowed the idea of an invasion of Indochina to be politely dismissed, for the time being at least, and let the British focus on the operation that Auchinleck, Slim and Montgomery had been advocating all along, an invasion of Thailand, specifically a drive up the Malayan peninsula towards Pattani, ultimately aimed at Bangkok, with a parallel advance from Slim’s forward base at Mae Sot towards the Thai capital. Once these two spearheads linked up then a drive along the coast into Indochina would be the next step, but only once the position was secure and the flanks of the British drive were solidly held. What amphibious resources were available would be used to conduct a series of modest landings designed to flank any Japanese defensive lines. This plan would have seemed very familiar to the Japanese, the differences being the direction of the advance and the fact that the British had the resources to make it work [4].
Slim was now commanding what had been designated as I Burma Corps. This retained 10th Indian Division and 1st Cavalry. The latter was in the process of becoming a mechanized division, much to the chagrin of many of its old hands. It did still retain a large part of its horse cavalry, though now supplemented by armoured forces that leant heavily on light and cruiser tanks, with the M3 Stuart being predominant and winning over many of those who had to give up their horses. I Burma had also gained 4th Indian Infantry division and both the 4th and the 10th had acquired motorized transport better suited to the terrain they had to fight through, largely consisting of Universal Carriers that had undergone a significant degree of ‘localization’ at the hands of mechanics who had learned the hard way what it took to keep motorized vehicles running in the Burmese jungle. Slim was also acutely aware that his force was essentially an Indian Corps and he sought to identify and promote Indian officers to more senior roles in the Corps. This was an astute move as it helped to not only bolster the morale of the troops serving under him but helped to address the criticisms being voiced by some of the hard-line elements in the Indian National Congress [5].
Montgomery’s force in Malaya was decidedly more Anglo, with the 36th and 70th British Divisions, and 2nd New Zealand, in theatre now to replace 7th Australian Division. There were Indian divisions operating as part of his force in the shape of the 7th and 8th British Indian Army Infantry Divisions. 3rd Armoured brigade was also part of the forces in Malaya, operating as part of IX Corps alongside the British Divisions while the Indians and New Zealanders were formed up, slightly incongruously, as XXXIII Indian Corps. 3rd Armoured had been strengthened by the arrival of some seventy Valentine tanks attached to provide close support for the infantry in addition to the ubiquitous M3 Stuart and M3 Lee. The British 2nd Infantry Division was retained as an operational reserve alongside a Canadian brigade. Both the forces in Burma and Malaya could now count on extensive air and naval support, with the Royal Navy having almost complete free reign after the defeats inflicted on the IJN and the RAF and RAAF, the latter remaining in the theatre of operations, had received additional squadrons and new aircraft. This meant that the British could expect to have total air superiority during the offensive [6].
The battle plan developed by Montgomery and Slim was approved by London in late July, codenamed Operation Rambler, but it would not be launched until the end of September or the beginning of October depending on the vagaries of the Monsoon season. In the end the date for the beginning of operations in Malaya would be set for the 28th of September. The basic plan was thrusts along the east and west coasts of the peninsula that would ideally squeeze the Japanese forces into a narrower front with the more mountainous terrain of Burma barring any movement further to the west and allowing British spearheads to encircle them. More realistically the expectation was that the attack would force the Japanese to withdraw to the north and soften them up for final breakthrough towards central Thailand and Bangkok [7].
The supply situation of the Japanese forces in Thailand was somewhat better than that of the defenders of the DEI, which was not to say their position was good. Their lines of communication hand not yet been as thoroughly interdicted as those of the troops on Borneo in the first half of 1943, but as the summer wore on the sea routes to the ports along the Thai coast were attracting the attention of an increasing number of Allied submarines operating out of Singapore and harbours such as Pattani were subjected to repeated bombing raids. Attempts by the IJAAF to carry out their own attacks on British targets were far less successful and far more costly as by this time the radar network in Malaya provided effective coverage and was integrated with the fighter control system, meaning that the Japanese had no possibility of surprise and were all but guaranteed to be intercepted. The obvious alternative of bombing by night was attempted by the IJAAF, but they lacked the sophisticated navigation devices being deployed by the combatants in the European theatre of operations and they were achieving an even lower level of accuracy than Bomber Command had managed back in 1940-41, with the added hazard that the RAF had rather better night fighting tactics than Fighter Command of that period in the war, though dedicated night fighters were still a rarity in South East Asia [8].
As far as naval support went there were still Japanese submarines braving the waters around Singapore and Rangoon, but anti-submarine warfare was another area where the British had refined their tactics and technology in the hard battles of the Atlantic. Lacking snorkel devices, the Japanese submarines were highly vulnerable to patrolling aircraft and the doctrine that saw the IJN submarines operating individually and focusing on trying to target warships rather than merchant ships made matters worse. Their very occasional successes were heavily outweighed by the losses taken to achieve them and with the loss of the DEI the Imperial Japanese navy was acutely aware of its perilous fuel situation and began to restrict ‘peripheral’ operations to retain fuel stocks. Although it was not publicly admitted this measure was aimed at ensuring that the IJN could intervene when the Allies inevitably began to attack the inner defence perimeter around the Home Islands [9].
The issues facing the IJAAF and IJN meant that they did little to disrupt the preparations of the British forces and the Japanese forces in Thailand were facing an uphill battle to create a defensive strategy that would stop a British advance out of Malaya or even slow it down. They were acutely aware of the threat of amphibious assaults along the peninsula but finding the men and equipment to prevent such landings was a struggle. Adequately defending the coastline would leave the forces facing any assault out of Malaya dangerously thin, a problem compounded by the likelihood of an attack from the direction of Mae Sot by Slim’s Corps. The only practical solution would be the creation of a mobile reserve designed to counterattack any amphibious assaults. There was the equivalent of a short regiment of Japanese armour available in Thailand and the overall commander had ordered that they be concentrated into a single formation, with priority for the available fuel to ensure that they could act as a reaction force, in theory.
The Japanese tanks of 1943 were the same mix of models as they had been in 1941. Newer designs either existed only as prototypes or had been assigned elsewhere. Still while these tanks were ineffective against any Allied armour, they would encounter in 1943 they were capable of creating havoc for lightly armed infantry coming ashore in an amphibious assault. The real issues the Japanese tanks faced were down to serviceability and the fact that the Allied control of the sea allowed them to conduct landings on either coast of the Malayan peninsula while the road infrastructure would not allow for the swift redeployment of armoured vehicles. The serviceability issue was down to a shortage of spare parts and the mechanic needed to maintain the tanks in less-than-ideal conditions. Where the British, Germans, and Americans had created dedicated organisations to maintain and repair their armoured vehicles the Japanese approach was still an ad hoc affair and because of this at least a third of the tanks in Thailand were inoperable at the time of Operation Rambler, with many of the others having to be essentially abandoned when they broke down because the IJA lacked any means to retrieve them [10].
Given all the problems faced in defending the Malayan Peninsula there was an argument to be made for a strategic withdrawal to a line of defence that could not be flanked, and this was indeed raised, only to be swiftly and harshly rejected as lacking in fighting spirit. For all the bombast the truth was that the senior officers feared that if the British were allowed to seize the peninsula with only a few rear-guard actions to slow them down they might well be able to isolate Bangkok and advance along the coast into Indochina almost unimpeded, which was indeed part of the British plan. There were no solutions available to the Japanese for a successful defence of Thailand other than massive reinforcement and resupply, which were not forthcoming for Thailand, or any other corner of Japan’s increasingly ragged defensive perimeter. The strategy that the Japanese followed was one the Allies were becoming all too familiar with, a stubborn insistence on fighting to inevitable defeat while taking as many Allied soldiers down with them as possible [11].
[1] Relations between the Australians and the Americans were not great OTL, they are worse here.
[2] And this policy will be revisited in due course.
[3] ‘How to Win Friends and Influence People by Charles De Gaulle’ would be a very short book.
[4] It is a version of what the Japanese did in Malaya OTL but reversed and carried out with superior logistics.
[5] Strategy and politics are becoming ever more entangled as the war progresses.
[6] The British forces in SEA may not be getting everything they want, but they are no longer an afterthought when it comes to equipment and supplies.
[7] At this point I am just having to use some historical campaigns as inspiration and invent these operations from scratch.
[8] The Japanese are running out of merchant vessels as well as warships, which is even worse for places like Okinawa and Formosa that it is for Thailand.
[9] No one in Tokyo is quite ready to admit the war is coming to Japan, and some would regard planning for it as defeatist.
[10] So no massive tank battles in SEA I’m afraid.
[11] A policy that is encouraging the Allies to look at alternate means of defeating Japan.
One of the main things I have learned about from Munich Shuffle is the “universal carrier” and I love them. They’re such an interesting intermediate step in the evolution of other military vehicles. And I feel that in any zombie fiction set in the early 1940s, they would be extremely effective…