The USN had it's largest concentration of Submarines based in the Philippines. Hart was as stated before Hart had 26 submarines, 8 S class subs, and 23 Fleet Boats. The S boats have very functional Mk X torpedoes, while the Fleet boats have the very disfunctional MK XIV torpedoes. There are 200 Torpedoes in the Torpedo Warehouse at Cavite Naval station about 30% MK X and the remainder MK XIVs. Aboard the3 tenders are about 200 torpedoes each. Canopus and Otus have the majority of MK X reloads. By 29 December OTL Canopus the last Ship of the Asiatic Fleet in Manila had been crippled by a bomb penetrating her shaft alley, and breaking a shaft. living her unable to ever leave her berth at Mirivales.
Only 4 S boats were on patrol stations off Lingayen and Sarosogon Bay, Luzon. If Hart had been able to deploy to Formosa Straight and toward the Marianas Perhaps the S boats at least would have had a chance at the invasion convoys
Unfortunately USN submarine doctrine was crippling in the early part of the pacific war.

Commanders kept their boats submerged during daylight hours (reducing the horizon significantly) and were still labouring under the pre war fear that IJN asdic was as good as there own (which was not as good as they thought) so would conduct attacks from long distance and or without periscope using hydrophones only

Also the ‘estate’ of submarine captains labouring under these restrictions had become risk adverse ( not all certainly) and it would take some time so shake off the above.

So they might have had some luck but at that stage of the war I fear their impact would have been negligible regardless of the torpedo carried.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Excellent little bit in one of John Masters' books. In a bad situation on one of the Chindit campaigns, a Gurkha NCO comments to him "If they were Pathans instead of Japanese we'd be in real trouble now"
Hi AlanL, would that be from his book, The Road Past Mandalay?. I've ordered a few books of his from the Library, I need to read a bit more on Indian Army ops. I'll be writing about them in battle and historical detail really helps. I've also ordered Quartered Safe Out Here, by George MacDonald Fraser, I think that's going to be helpful too
 
Hi AlanL, would that be from his book, The Road Past Mandalay?. I've ordered a few books of his from the Library, I need to read a bit more on Indian Army ops. I'll be writing about them in battle and historical detail really helps. I've also ordered Quartered Safe Out Here, by George MacDonald Fraser, I think that's going to be helpful too
I believe so. I only have a paper copy so can't look up the exact quote.

The first volume, Bugles and a Tiger, is worthwhile too. As is Unofficial History, Slim's "prequel" to Defeat Into Victory

Masters mentions that throughout 1941-2 there were 20+ battalions of experienced, battle hardened British and Indian regulars on the North West Frontier, who were kept rather busy and not available for redeployment not matter how useful they could have been elsewhere. Perhaps a less competent German consul in Kabul could be a POD for shipping a couple of them to Malaya?
 
Hi AlanL, would that be from his book, The Road Past Mandalay?. I've ordered a few books of his from the Library, I need to read a bit more on Indian Army ops. I'll be writing about them in battle and historical detail really helps. I've also ordered Quartered Safe Out Here, by George MacDonald Fraser, I think that's going to be helpful too
Quartered Safe Out Here is one of the best biographies. It deals with Fraser's later war experiences in Burma. It wasn't a fun period but it was to prove the British had the toughest and best Army in the world.
 

Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
American, British, Dutch and Japanese submarine commanders, ITTL based on their performance IOTL. All four of the respective submarine commanders had gone through extensive training pre war, but only the British had wartime experience, which did give the an advantage over the others. The added advantage for the British was that they having used their torpedoes in action, had realised the fault was the magnet detonator, and depth maintenance, and had taken some steps to rectify the problems. The Japanese commanders laboured under a faulty doctrine, with its emphasis on only attacking merchant ships, if there was no chance of tackling a far more valuable military target. The Americans also laboured under a number of disadvantages, they had very poor intelligence on the capabilities of the Japanese surface and submarine forces, they had a attitude problem, in that they had an exaggerated belief in their own superiority to all others. Especially the slant eyed buck toothed nips, thanks to an over reliance on Hollywoods portrayal of other nationalities. And when you add in the failure of the navy establishment to conduct thorough trials on all of there equipment prior to the war, and the pork barrel involved in purchasing, they for all their training suffered under a number of disadvantages. The Dutch thanks to excellent pre war training, and their close involvement with the German submarine builders in the inter war years. Holland was used by the Germans as a way to get around the Versailles restrictions, by being able to build submarines in a neutral nation. Were to show themselves IOTL as am sure that they will ITTL, as to be exceptional submarine commanders, with well designed equipment, which they used well. The British submarine commanders are very well trained, experienced and just one step down from some of the most aggressive ship handles in the world, British destroyer and coastal motorboat commanders. While there are only at this time just four submarines in theatre, with two posted to covering Hong Kong, they are boats designed for the theatre and carry a large number of tornadoes. There is no question that even this four submarines driven by their experienced commanders, could cause serious damage to the Japanese, given that a full spread of ten torpedoes from any one of them, is virtually guaranteed to sink any ship that they encounter. If the British are able to supplement these four T-class, with ether additional T’s or a few of the smaller U class, the Japanese will have entered a world of hurt.

RR.
 
The Dutch thanks to excellent pre war training, and their close involvement with the German submarine builders in the inter war years. Holland was used by the Germans as a way to get around the Versailles restrictions, by being able to build submarines in a neutral nation. Were to show themselves IOTL as am sure that they will ITTL, as to be exceptional submarine commanders, with well designed equipment, which they used well.
Dear Ramp-Rat,

You are correct about the Dutch submarines and their commanders. However, the sad story is they could do so much more than in our time, if the top brass of the Royal Netherlands Navy did not change their tactics and strategy at very last moment

The Dutch submarine tactics, and required equipment, who were developed and trained during the interbellum and probably well in to 1940 was far ahead of its time and not well understood by the British or other navies.
The submarine tactics original developed by the Dutch depended on a close cooperation between scout planes who indirect contact with the submarine division commander who commanded from his own submarine two to three other submarines in the division. This was whitout intervention or intermidiation of shore command. After detecting the enemy the divison commander organised by wireless ( which could be used underwater) the attack of all the submarines of the division. A wolfpack attack avant la letre.

The British, although having excellent equipment and commanders used their submarine very passive and more as scouts for the surface units. This was a common use of submarines by nearly all the navies.

Another large difference was the target of the Dutch submarines compared to the British and essential all submarines of other navies.
The target of the Dutch submarines were transport ships of an invasion fleet. The target of British submarines were enemy war ships. Hence the difference in the number of torpedo tubes. The British submarines had up to six tubes in the bow while the Dutch had only four and two at the heck and some types two axial. It also need ot be said that the Dutch submarine tactic was very dangerous and could risk the boat and her crew, although this was a known risk.

Please have a look at the link below, it are free down loads and the last part is a summary in English.



 
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Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
Dear Ramp-Rat,

You are correct about the Dutch submarines and their commanders. However, the sad story is they could do so much more than in our time, if the top brass of the Royal Netherlands Navy did not change their tactics and strategy at very last moment

The Dutch submarine tactics, and required equipment, who were developed and trained during the interbellum and probably well in to 1940 was far ahead of its time and not well understood by the British or other navies.
The submarine tactics original developed by the Dutch depended on a close cooperation between scout planes who indirect contact with the submarine division commander who commanded from his own submarine two to three other submarines in the division. This was whitout intervention or intermidiation of shore command. After detecting the enemy the divison commander organised by wireless ( which could be used underwater) the attack of all the submarines of the division. A wolfpack attack avant la letre.

The British, although having excellent equipment and commanders used their submarine very passive and more as scouts for the surface units. This was a common use of submarines by nearly all the navies.

Another large difference was the target of the Dutch submarines compared to the British and essential all submarines of other navies.
The target of the Dutch submarines were transport ships of an invasion fleet. The target of British submarines were enemy war ships. Hence the difference in the number of torpedo tubes. The British submarines had up to six tubes in the bow while the Dutch had only four and two at the heck and some types two axial. It also need ot be said that the Dutch submarine tactic was very dangerous and could risk the boat and her crew, although this was a known risk.

Please have a look at the link below, it are free down loads and the last part is a summary in English.




Sir you are correct that I have very little understanding of the Dutch submarine service and its capabilities and tactics. However you are wrong about the capabilities of the British submariners ITTL, serving out of Singapore and Hong Kong. While you are right in that they had six reloadable torpedo tubes in their bow, the T-class had in addition a further four forward firing torpedoes, in externally tubes, two above the bow and two amidships, which gave them a possible maximum of ten forward firing torpedoes. And yes this was primarily designed for attacks against enemy capital ships, it being considered that such a spread was guaranteed to sink any capital ship that they met. And yes the primary purpose of submarines was pre war scouting, as in the majority of navies. However given that all of the submarines now in the Far Eastern waters, are commanded by officers with extensive experience in the Mediterranean, they will have adopted the tactics that applied their. Which were far more aggressive than those used in the North Sea, and had as in the North Sea, become more focused on sinking merchant vessels, given just how few enemy naval ships were available to target. I would expect that the target list for the area would start with what was regarded as the greatest threat, troop transports, then via capital ships, step down until you get to at the bottom local sailing ships. I know that IOTL, British submarines operating in the region, made a habit of sinking junks ether by gunfire or demolition charges, so as to save expensive torpedoes for bigger targets.

RR.
 
Sir you are correct that I have very little understanding of the Dutch submarine service and its capabilities and tactics. However you are wrong about the capabilities of the British submariners ITTL, serving out of Singapore and Hong Kong. While you are right in that they had six reloadable torpedo tubes in their bow, the T-class had in addition a further four forward firing torpedoes, in externally tubes, two above the bow and two amidships, which gave them a possible maximum of ten forward firing torpedoes. And yes this was primarily designed for attacks against enemy capital ships, it being considered that such a spread was guaranteed to sink any capital ship that they met. And yes the primary purpose of submarines was pre war scouting, as in the majority of navies. However given that all of the submarines now in the Far Eastern waters, are commanded by officers with extensive experience in the Mediterranean, they will have adopted the tactics that applied their. Which were far more aggressive than those used in the North Sea, and had as in the North Sea, become more focused on sinking merchant vessels, given just how few enemy naval ships were available to target. I would expect that the target list for the area would start with what was regarded as the greatest threat, troop transports, then via capital ships, step down until you get to at the bottom local sailing ships. I know that IOTL, British submarines operating in the region, made a habit of sinking junks ether by gunfire or demolition charges, so as to save expensive torpedoes for bigger targets.
Dear Ramp-Rat,
Thank you for this information. My knowledge of the heavy torpedo armed British submarines and their use was based on pre-war accounts in the North Sea ignoring, the war experience, apologies for this. And I did forgot the other torpedo tubes which made them very heavy armed boats.

My comment was not focused on the excellent British boats and crew but more the missed opportunity by the Dutch in OTL, due to the change of views by several Royal Netherlands Navy officers at very critical positions. Although this change of views might have made some sense at that time.
My humble and probably with hindsight knowledge biased opinion is that; if the Dutch did not changed, at the very last moment, their well developed and trained submarine tactic and strategy, the Japanese advance in to Indonesia would be seriously compromised. This in turn would have a significant effect on the other places of the Japanese attack. And again my humble opinion is that the Dutch submarine strategy could be well incorporated or used as a suplement with other Allied tactics and strategies.
 
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The British submarines had ‘all the torpedo tubes’ because they like the USN believed pre war that their ASDIC made it suicidal for a submarine to attack ships equipped with or escorted by ship equipped with this technology.

They assumed that because they had it the ‘enemy’ had it.

Therefore it was expected that any attack would have to be made submerged without periscope and at longer ranges.

Therefore a 10 fish spread was required to increase the chances of such an attack.

As it turned out the axis version of ASDIC was not as good as the British system which itself was not as good as they thought it was with aggressive Uboat captains able to conduct multiple attacks on escorted ships during the early stages of WW2.

So by late 1941 British Submarine commanders themselves having become very aggressive during the Med campaign and having a great deal of operational experience would no longer be reliant on its pre war doctrine.

We also see British submarines built from mid war having fewer tubes.

As for ‘scouting’, geography and the Axis merchant fleets being swept from the worlds oceans in the opening weeks of ww2 as well as the smaller sizes of the German and Italian navies meant that there were fewer opportunities for British and USN subs to act in the same way as the Uboats did in the North Atlantic.

This meant that they were used differently and yes scouting became more of a main role
 

Mark1878

Donor
This meant that they were used differently and yes scouting became more of a main role
Note I know very little on submarine warfare compared to the comments above. but ....

Doesn't scouting imply that there is a main body to report to that can do things. Now the British, Japanese and US had many destroyers and capital ships to follow up a scounting report. However the Dutch and the Germans post Bismark did not so they would not be scouting.
 
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Doesn't scouting imply that there is a main body to report to that can do things. Now the British, Japanese and US had many destroyers and capital ships to follow up a scounting report.
That is correct. Pre-war submarine doctrine (this is a genaralisation), for the British and American was that the submarines were the scouts. They scout for enemy war ships, and when detected reported to the shore command so that surface units could directed to the enemy location and engage the enemy.
Of course, the doctrine gave room to attack the enemy with the submarine, especially when this was a capital ship. This is the main reason why the British submarines have up to eight tunes in the bow. It was not only to spread the change of hit but it could require more torpedoes to destroy an armored war ship than an unarmored transport/merchant ship.

The reason why the Dutch developed the submarine hunting tactic was also born out of necessity. The Dutch navy did not have the luxury of large number of cruiser and destroyers, there for they developed the relative cheap to operate submarines as offensive weapon pre-war.

Apologies that I derail the TL with this submarine moaning
 

Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
That is correct. Pre-war submarine doctrine (this is a genaralisation), for the British and American was that the submarines were the scouts. They scout for enemy war ships, and when detected reported to the shore command so that surface units could directed to the enemy location and engage the enemy.
Of course, the doctrine gave room to attack the enemy with the submarine, especially when this was a capital ship. This is the main reason why the British submarines have up to eight tunes in the bow. It was not only to spread the change of hit but it could require more torpedoes to destroy an armored war ship than an unarmored transport/merchant ship.

The reason why the Dutch developed the submarine hunting tactic was also born out of necessity. The Dutch navy did not have the luxury of large number of cruiser and destroyers, there for they developed the relative cheap to operate submarines as offensive weapon pre-war.

Apologies that I derail the TL with this submarine moaning
Parma, there is no need to apologise, the general idea is that while we await the latest post from our author, it is perfectly fine, to debate ideas that are linked to the Time Line. And decisions about submarine tactics are very relevant, given that ITTL, as apposed to ours, the British have been able to deploy 4 T-Class submarines to Singapore. And it should be remembered that these submarines were designed for use in the Far East, and oceans, unlike the much smaller U-Class, which were optimised for the North Sea and Mediterranean. It was only necessity that forced the British to deploy the T-Class in the Mediterranean, where they proved to be capable but slightly too big.

RR.
 
A couple of comments to the excellent discussion on submarines. As with others I defer to Parma on Dutch sub tactics - this board provides a wealth of knowledge. Nonetheless

i) I agree that RN planned use of submarines was for scouting but not solely - they were also to attrite the enemy force as well. Even by this point in the war however RN subs in the Med especially were operating as hunter killers as much as scouts as the surface fleet elements had been driven away from the central med by air power. Submarine captains were therefore already displaying the level of aggression that Ramp-Rat notes. In part this cost the RN a lot of subs, especially the older boats that had been moved from the Far East.
ii) In this scenario Mr. Coxy has retained 4 boats from the original flotilla. They are not modern T class as Ramp-Rat suggested but older R boats all laid down in 1930. A bow spread of 6 tubes and 2 stern with 14 torpedoes carried along with a 4inch gun - Rover was also able to carry 18 mines although I think this was a later conversion. In OTL 3/4 were lost in the Med, 2 to mines and one to an Italian submarine. In this scenario the submarines are also bereft of a surface fleet to scout for so the scouting role becomes less important, more so as the air search element slowly ramps up. They also benefit from the muddier waters of the south china sea rather than crystal clear Med
iii) RN ASDIC was good - German submarines simply didn't follow the rules of the game and attacked on the surface against convoys making ASDIC useless. They did have some success submerged of course - ASDIC was good but not invulnerable and there had to be enough escorts
iv) RN subs had much less opportunity to go after big surface fleet elements but when they did the big spreads when used were indeed effective. Ashigara found this out the hard way when she took 5 torpedoes from the Trenchant! They will have no compunction at all about going after juicy transports and with functioning torpedoes will make a mess. There are simply not enough of them however to cover everything, nonetheless given the Japanese shoestring approach to the Malaya campaign one sinking might make all the difference
v) Dutch boats were fighting with the RN in European waters - would there have been any transfer of officers, crew or knowledge/tactics to the DEI submarines?
 
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MWI 41091400 The Errand

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
1941, Sunday 14 September;

He’d come out of a little L4 type submarine, RO-65, and had been given command of I-65, a fleet submarine, bigger, fast, deeper diving, longer endurance, just everything was better, a true promotion. He thought he’d got it through Headquarters recognising, no doubt, the due diligence he gave to detail, the devotion to duty and the recognition that he, Harada Haku, was an outstanding officer.

However, a week after taking command he was summoned to the flag office and the real reason why he got the job became apparent. Previously he’d completed a couple of sensitive missions off the Chinese coast. And now some bright spark in Naval Intelligence had suggested a similar thing, dropping of a ‘special passenger’, could be done off the eastern coast of Malaya. They obviously thought a more capable boat would be needed, and so the wheels had been put in motion, and he found himself in this situation. Perversely he thought his old RO-65 would have been a better candidate, but didn’t think that idea would be welcomed, and so he remained silent.

He kept them submerged, as deep as he dared without bottoming, waiting until nightfall before surfacing, and they were now lying-in wait, just north of the island of Pulau Sembilang, waiting for the arrival of the patrol ship, which should be due soon. The Royal Navy had recently increased its patrolling activities along the coast. For twenty minutes he’d privately worried about whether they had missed her, or she was just running late, when hydrophones called up, single screw bearing SSE, and five minutes later they could see her. She was a requisitioned coastal steamer, less than a thousand tons, with an old 4-inch gun mounted at the front, which looked like the Lipis. They had watched her sail by at a sedately 8 knots, navigation lights on, and had waited until hydrophones lost her, before he ordered a slow 6 knots forward towards his rendezvous.

They entered the mouth of the Endau River, guided by the stern light of a small fishing trawler they had met at the rendezvous, which led them up river towards a quay with a large corrugated metal warehouse, the lights on it advertising the owner, a Japanese Mining Company. Lt Commander Haku had the submarine swung round, facing the river mouth, before she berthed at the quayside. Men on the quayside threw down ropes to secure the boat, talking to the deckhands in Japanese. A gangway was quickly swung over onto the submarines deck, and Haku, along with his ‘special passenger’ walked across, to be greeted by a couple of Asian men in western suits. They were led away into an office inside the warehouse.

At the same time the first officer supervised the unloading of cargo from inside the submarine, a number of wooden boxes carried individually by sailors, off the boat, onto the quayside, and into the warehouse, where a foreman directed their stacking. Inside thirty minutes the unloading was complete, and then with all the crew back onboard, they waited, ready to leave at a moment’s notice, while the captain continued his discussions in the office. The wait seemed like ages, but was probably only another half an hour, before the captain emerged, a heavy briefcase in one hand, double padlocked, from the office. With little fanfare, he boarded, and they casted off, the sailors anxious to get back it to sea.

03.20am, and they signalled they’re thanks to the fishing boat, which had guided them back out of the river, and giving an easterly heading he’d had the boat up to 18 knots, to get as much distance as he could from the coast as possible before daybreak, placing them outside of the normal shipping lane, and well away from the local patrol. Once dawn came up, he reduced speed to 12 knots, and kept a good lookout for any reconnaissance aircraft. The errand was complete, but he fully expected more missions to come.
 
MV Lipis later HMS Lipis (Taken from here)

201403011432590.C%20LIPIS%201927.jpg


And I-65 later I-165 from May 1942 from here

Japanese_submarine_I-165_in_1932.jpg
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Thank you for the photos Cryhavoc101. I believe the 4 inch gun was mounted on a platform forward of the first mast, the mounting only allowed for a low angle of bearing, so she was useless for any AA role, except for any torpedo attacking aircraft. Given her operation was entirely manual, and the Malaysian gun crew had only been given basic training with it, any hits would be pure luck!. She has a couple of Lewis machine guns mounted, one either side of the bridge, but no ASDIC or depth charges fitted, and her official designation is Armed trader, meaning she still carry's cargo, useful for supplying the small Eastern coastal ports of Malaya.
 
Dear Ramp-Rat,

You are correct about the Dutch submarines and their commanders. However, the sad story is they could do so much more than in our time, if the top brass of the Royal Netherlands Navy did not change their tactics and strategy at very last moment

The Dutch submarine tactics, and required equipment, who were developed and trained during the interbellum and probably well in to 1940 was far ahead of its time and not well understood by the British or other navies.
The submarine tactics original developed by the Dutch depended on a close cooperation between scout planes who indirect contact with the submarine division commander who commanded from his own submarine two to three other submarines in the division. This was whitout intervention or intermidiation of shore command. After detecting the enemy the divison commander organised by wireless ( which could be used underwater) the attack of all the submarines of the division. A wolfpack attack avant la letre.

The British, although having excellent equipment and commanders used their submarine very passive and more as scouts for the surface units. This was a common use of submarines by nearly all the navies.

Another large difference was the target of the Dutch submarines compared to the British and essential all submarines of other navies.
The target of the Dutch submarines were transport ships of an invasion fleet. The target of British submarines were enemy war ships. Hence the difference in the number of torpedo tubes. The British submarines had up to six tubes in the bow while the Dutch had only four and two at the heck and some types two axial. It also need ot be said that the Dutch submarine tactic was very dangerous and could risk the boat and her crew, although this was a known risk.

Please have a look at the link below, it are free down loads and the last part is a summary in English.



Very interesting information on Dutch submarine tactics. Did they ever get to employ these tactics? I always had the impression that they operated as lone wolfs like the American boats did.
 
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