Malaya What If

[Fatboy Coxy]

Hi Cryhavoc101, spot on, thank you! Robert Shaw was such a versatile actor, my three favourite films that he's in are Battle Of Britain, To Russia With Love and Jaws!

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

Another lesson-learned from the BoB

Hi Driftless, Having Park, and all he knows really helps develop this timeline, along with the decision to give them Hurricanes, and will be a major factor in any successful holding of Malaya.. I didn't think AVM Conway Pulford did a bad job historically, despite being so handicapped by equipment and events. Unfortunalty I know so very little of Pulford before he took command of the RAF in the Far East, his roles are less than impressive, and was clearly sent to a backwater, to build a fledgling force, see https://www.rafweb.org/Biographies/Pulford.htm

 

[Ramp-Rat]

With the number of fighters aircraft now present in Malaya and Singapore, even though they are not the most modern, but are being commanded by very experienced leaders. The chance of the Japanese enjoying the same success that they did IOTL, are virtually nil. While they are being taught the basics of modern air combat, ie finger four formations instead of vic threes. And thus will be devastating to unescorted bombers, who attempt to attack Singapore, until they switch to night attacks. Unless they receive accurate information regarding the Japanese naval fighter the Zero, they will find it at first a bit of a handful, and it will take time to develop the tactics for dealing with it. More importantly in some ways, is the fact that the troops in contact with the Japanese forces, will not feel abandoned and left to fight on their own, subjected to constant attacks by the Japanese airforce. And unless the Japanese can preform some spectacular moral destroying successes , such as the IOTL, sinking of the POW and Repulse. Given the much improved command structure and the limited improvements made in training and equipment, there is little to no chance of a collapse among the ground forces. While there is no question that the airforces will suffer significant losses, especially those in the frontline. Here the major British advantage will come into play, in that any British aircrew that are shot down, stand a very good chance of being recovered and returned to service. Where as any Japanese aircrew shot down, unless close to their base, are going to be dead or out of action. A Japanese shot down over the jungle even close to the frontline, stands a good chance of being captured or killed by British special forces or the native assistants, operating close to the frontline. The biggest threat to Singapore is night raids, which given how poor the night fighter provision is at present, will be hard to defend against. Yes the various improvements to civil defence and anti aircraft provisions, will to some extent reduce the affect of these raids. But Singapore is not a European city, and has the problem of a comparatively high water table, so can not build extensive underground shelters. It also has a number of extensive shanties, poorly constructed mostly of wood, that if subjected to an incendiary attack will tend to burn uncontrollably, despite the best that the civil defence organisation can do. It should be noted that the plan IOTL was to construct huts away from the city, and move the civilian population away from the major areas of potential danger. The first few weeks of any Japanese invasion will undoubtedly be rough, as both the civilian and military population, get used to being in a hot war. But after that it is the Japanese who are basically up a brown creak without a paddle, and the resent improvements to the fighter force, will be a significant reason why.

RR.

 

[Driftless]

^^^ To key off of Ramp-Rats comments: how good was Japanese Army (or Navy) bomber forces at night navigation? As we read here often, even experienced RAF bomber pilots night navigation was pretty terrible in the early days of the war. Singapore itself is a large target bounded by (light reflective) water, so I'd get hitting the city on the macro level should be easy enough. How well would they do at night trying to hit specific targets, such as the dockyards?

How true would it be upcountry to hit even general targets, let alone specific tactical ones?

 

[Ramp-Rat]

^^^ To key off of Ramp-Rats comments: how good was Japanese Army (or Navy) bomber forces at night navigation? As we read here often, even experienced RAF bomber pilots night navigation was pretty terrible in the early days of the war. Singapore itself is a large target bounded by (light reflective) water, so I'd get hitting the city on the macro level should be easy enough. How well would they do at night trying to hit specific targets, such as the dockyards?

How true would it be upcountry to hit even general targets, let alone specific tactical ones?

Another factor to take into consideration in regards to the ability of the Japanese aircrew to navigate at night, both army and navy. Is their starting point, which will have a major effect on the accuracy of the bombers, and their ability to find Singapore. Setting out from the south of FIC, they have two basic options, fly directly to Malaya then follow the coast until they get to Singapore. Our try flying directly to Singapore with a long overwater leg that has few if any navigation points. While this would be the preferred option, as it is a more direct flight, which decreases the fuel requirement, and increases the bomb load. It requires excellent navigation skills, and get it wrong and you could be heading for the DEI, without ever seeing Singapore. However while the first option is much easier, it has the problem that the British will receive a much longer warning, and thus be far better prepared.

RR.

 

[El Pip]

How well would they do at night trying to hit specific targets, such as the dockyards?

How true would it be upcountry to hit even general targets, let alone specific tactical ones?

From limited reading Japanese Navy bombers had trained on dusk torpedo attacks, trying to come in from the dark side with the target silhouetted against the setting sun. They carried out quite a few during the war and they were succesfull until the USN could get it's own night-fighters operational. I've not see the dive or level bombers having any specific night tactics.

The Japanese army seems to have limited it's night bombing efforts over China to moon-lit nights, but then it (generally) had such aerial superiority that daylight bombing was viable almost everywhere. Hence they don't appear to have put any real effort into developing accuracy at night as it wasn't required.

There are reports of a lot of 'nuisance' night bombing during the Pacific War, small groups or even single bombers sent out just to harass the enemy, stop them sleeping and keep them on edge. But all you need for those tactics is to be somewhere near the enemy not precise targetting.

Overall I think night level bombing was not something any Japanese air arm had in their doctrine. Consequently I suspect their navigation and accuracy would be quite poor initially as the crews wouldn't have trained for it and the aircraft would lack any night navigational or bombing aids.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

sinking of the POW and Repulse.
RR.

Hi Ramp Rat, just between you and me, I have been informed by the Admiralty that following the false alert of the German heavy cruiser, Admiral Scheer breaking out into the North Atlantic on another German raid on our convoys, HMS Prince of Wales is currently conducting exercises out of Scapa Flow, with the intention of deploying to Gibraltar later in the month, for service in Mediterranean waters, but keep it under your hat old chap, careless talk and all that you know!

Here the major British advantage will come into play, in that any British aircrew that are shot down, stand a very good chance of being recovered and returned to service. Where as any Japanese aircrew shot down, unless close to their base, are going to be dead or out of action. A Japanese shot down over the jungle even close to the frontline, stands a good chance of being captured or killed by British special forces or the native assistants, operating close to the frontline.
RR.

Undoubtedly fighting on home territory does offer a good return of recovering parachuting pilots, however, over virgin jungle their odds must be diminished. I don't have much info on pilots landing in jungle over New Guinea or Burma, and your right, some specialist squads are going to be needed to rescue them, along with sizeable rewards for natives aiding pilots.

The biggest threat to Singapore is night raids, which given how poor the night fighter provision is at present, will be hard to defend against. Yes the various improvements to civil defence and anti aircraft provisions, will to some extent reduce the affect of these raids. But Singapore is not a European city, and has the problem of a comparatively high water table, so can not build extensive underground shelters. It also has a number of extensive shanties, poorly constructed mostly of wood, that if subjected to an incendiary attack will tend to burn uncontrollably, despite the best that the civil defence organisation can do. It should be noted that the plan IOTL was to construct huts away from the city, and move the civilian population away from the major areas of potential danger.
RR.

Nice summary of Singapore's frailties regarding air attack

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

From limited reading Japanese Navy bombers had trained on dusk torpedo attacks, trying to come in from the dark side with the target silhouetted against the setting sun. They carried out quite a few during the war and they were succesfull until the USN could get it's own night-fighters operational. I've not see the dive or level bombers having any specific night tactics.

The Japanese army seems to have limited it's night bombing efforts over China to moon-lit nights, but then it (generally) had such aerial superiority that daylight bombing was viable almost everywhere. Hence they don't appear to have put any real effort into developing accuracy at night as it wasn't required.

There are reports of a lot of 'nuisance' night bombing during the Pacific War, small groups or even single bombers sent out just to harass the enemy, stop them sleeping and keep them on edge. But all you need for those tactics is to be somewhere near the enemy not precise targetting.

Overall I think night level bombing was not something any Japanese air arm had in their doctrine. Consequently I suspect their navigation and accuracy would be quite poor initially as the crews wouldn't have trained for it and the aircraft would lack any night navigational or bombing aids.

Hi El Pip, I agree with you, but I would point out, at this stage of WW2, no one was doing any better. Both the Luftwaffe and the RAF were also having problems with navigation at night, and I would put the Japanese aircrews at this time in the war up there with the best. Given the instruments they all had, having to take the wind into consideration, along with their own aircrafts performance, finding the city on a clear night was about all they could expect. To improve on this, there was the technical war of using radio signals going on in Europe, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Beams#Y-Gerät, but I don't know if the Japanese ever did this. What I do know is their radio industry, and research was way behind Germany and the Western Allies.

 

[Ramp-Rat]

Hi Ramp Rat, just between you and me, I have been informed by the Admiralty that following the false alert of the German heavy cruiser, Admiral Scheer breaking out into the North Atlantic on another German raid on our convoys, HMS Prince of Wales is currently conducting exercises out of Scapa Flow, with the intention of deploying to Gibraltar later in the month, for service in Mediterranean waters, but keep it under your hat old chap, careless talk and all that you know.

Dear boy, I won’t say anything if you don’t, however just between you and me, the major problem as I see it is. The old drunk in charge of the British Admiralty at the start of the war, along with the majority of the fossilised Sea Lords, had a fixation with big guns. I believe that they wanted to build a battleship with 20 inch guns, not that they had any, but what the hell, they were sure that they could build them. They wasted much time, effort and money on constantly trying to build a battleship with bigger guns and more armour, instead of building bigger and better aircraft carriers. I am off the opinion that once they were released from the constraints of the various inter war naval treaties, the major effort should have gone into designing a 45, 000 tons plus aircraft carrier. Imagine the position Britain would have been if by the end of the war, she had had 6 Malta class carriers. As for the big guns, if instead of developing the 14 inch, a fixation of Vickers, they had instead developed the 15 inch 50. Which would have reduced the supply problems, enable the Queen Elizabeth’s to be refitted with better guns, and would have made the KG5’S if fitted with the same in three three gun turrets, not only better but cheaper to produce.

RR😉

 

[El Pip]

Hi El Pip, I agree with you, but I would point out, at this stage of WW2, no one was doing any better.

I think you are failing to distinguish degrees of bad here. The RAF and Luftwaffe at least were training crews in night flying and had some equipment for it, yet were struggling to get anywhere near the target.

The Japanese air arms did not even have that, why would they when their doctrine didn't call for it, so are starting from a weaker positoin. Just because everyone else is doing badly doesn't mean the Japanese can't do even worse.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

Imagine the position Britain would have been if by the end of the war, she had had 6 Malta class carriers.
RR😉

Hi Ramp Rat, that would have required a major increase in production of the Fairey Swordfish, Blackburn Skua and Roc's

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

I think you are failing to distinguish degrees of bad here. The RAF and Luftwaffe at least were training crews in night flying and had some equipment for it, yet were struggling to get anywhere near the target.

The Japanese air arms did not even have that, why would they when their doctrine didn't call for it, so are starting from a weaker positoin. Just because everyone else is doing badly doesn't mean the Japanese can't do even worse.

Hi El Pip, I think we need to break this down a bit.

The Japanese Army Air Force, has, I believe, no night attack capability, and doesn't train to conduct one. the best they might achieve is single flight nuisance attacks on clear moonlight nights.

The Japanese Navy Air Force is a different matter. A major part of the Japanese Navy doctrine called for night fighting, it was something they invested in with exceptionally good optics, and worked hard on developing tactics. Belisarius II post 1,500, gave us

Then anyone. The British demonstrated they were better than the Italians, who had no real training at night fighting. The Japanese had the best night optical devices made in WWII and had the most intensive crew training of any navy in night operations. They hadn't yet demonstrated such skills because China didn't have a major navy. The IJN's war games were said to be more intense than actually combat. In the night actions in the Solomon Islands Japanese optics, training, torpedoes, and tactics proved superior to those of the Allies, including the Australians, and New Zealanders. It was only as the Allies became more adept with radar, and with improved tactics that the odds changed. Even then victory usually depended on who sighted the other side first. Even with the radar advantage victory in a night battle against the Japanese was never assured.

Now the Japanese carrier aircraft didn't undertake night flying as far as I know, but the twin engine G3M Nell and G4M Betty formations did.
Belisarius II post 1,505 gave us (I've put the relevant bit in bold type)

True, the RN had that first, but that's really not what we're talking about. The RN night torpedo bomber attack capability against ships at sea was possible because of radar. USN radar equipped TBF Avengers could do the same thing, and even the Japanese had some limited capability late in the war. From late 1942 USN PBY Catalina flying boats in what were called Blackcat squadrons would launch radar assisted torpedo attacks. Without radar it was very hard to find, or attack ships at night. What Japanese aircraft were trained to do was spot the wakes of ships at night and drop flairs behind them so surface ships could target them. They had a good deal of success in doing that.

On the opening of hostilities, December 8th (its still the 7th for Pearl Harbour, on the other side of the dateline) Nell bombers of the Mihoro air group attacked Singapore at night, successfully locating the city, and causing heavy casualties and damage, although the Naval Base was untouched.

The night of December 9/10, while searching for Force Z, a formation of Nell's and Betty's nearly attacked the IJN heavy cruiser Chokai.
A Japanese reconnaissance aircraft searching for Force Z mistakes CHOKAI for one of the British ships and makes a sighting report. Fifty-three bombers arrive soon and begin positioning for attack. The reconnaissance plane drops a flare to illuminate the target. At the last moment, the ship is recognized as friendly and the attack is broken off. Aboard the flagship, Ozawa signals CHOKAI's identity to Saigon. All aircraft are recalled and the search is postponed until daylight.
Taken from http://www.combinedfleet.com/chokai_t.htm

So they were capable, but limited, lacking the technical equipment the Europeans were developing.

Now, while we are dealing with night flying, what about the British in my timeline. OK, we have two recently formed FAA Swordfish Torpedo sqns practicing night flying off carriers, and undertaking a night attack on Singapore exercise. We also have two squadrons of Vickers Vildebeest which had trained for torpedo strikes on shipping at night. Note, neither of these enjoy radar guidance, and so are doing something similar to the Japanese Nell and Betty formations, with air dropped flares illuminating their targets.

And lastly, RAF 27 Sqn, with only four Blenheim IF aircraft equipped with a underslung gun pack and airborne radar, are conducting night-time interception exercises, with little success. The RAF Blenheim, Battles and Hudson crews have no training in night-time operations, so unlike Europe, the RAF cannot conduct any nigh time bombing operations. Does that sound about right guys?

 

[Ramp-Rat]

Strategic bombing and the failure of all the participating nations in WWII, to prepare for the reality of what this required, despite the lessons of the Great War.

During the inter war years, a number of theorists in air warfare arose, and all of them satiated that strategic bombing would be the decisive factor in any coming war. And that as was often said “the bomber will always get through.” This ignored the experience of the Great War, were both the Germans and British found that they had had to switch their efforts in strategic bombing from daylight to night bombing. Because the defender could make the cost of daylight bombing to expensive, for the attackers to continue. The Germans in what meany considered to be the first strategic bombing campaign against the United Kingdom, quickly switched their Zeppelin attacks to night time, before discontinuing them and switching to heavier than air aircraft. These aircraft initially attacked London in daylight, but soon switched to night time, as the British defences became better, and made daylight attacks too costly. The British tried a few daylight attacks against the Germans, but by the time they had formed the Independent Airforce, later RAF, the decision had been made to attack only at night, unless a fighter escort was available.

However this hard won knowledge was effectively forgotten during the inter war years, as various airforces were able to conduct bombing campaigns in daylight without opposition. The RAF’s air policing against tribesmen on the edges of the Empire, and Italian operations against various African nations, were all conducted in daylight without opposition. While the Japanese in China and Germans in Spain did face limited opposition, it was coordinated or enough to make them question the advisability of daylight raids. And so the principal nations entered WWII, with their airforces and most politicians convinced that mass bombing of civilians would quickly end the war. And that there was nothing they could do to prevent it from happening, and the only option was to build a mass bomber force of their own, and rain down destruction on their enemy. The British for a number of reasons, decided that they were going to develop an integrated defence system against mass bombing, and thanks to some luck succeeded. While the Germans convinced that they were always going to be the aggressor, and with their experience in Spain along with the opening year of WWII, though that they had the answer, and didn’t need to develop such a system. Both the British and the Germans fell into the trap of believing that unescorted bombers could operate in hostile territory at little risk. And thus failed to develop long range fighters to provide escorts to their bombers. The Westland Whirlwind had great potential, but the money and resources were never spent on its engines in particular to make the best of it. And the head of the RAF along with most of his contemporaries had decided that a long range single seat single engine fighter was impossible, so prevented all research, into such an aircraft. This Germans developed the ME110, which while it had its uses, wasn’t an escort fighter, and itself needed an escort on long range missions.
The British had during the first few months of the war discovered that unescorted bombers were easy prey for fighters, and switched to night time operations. And thus started the long expensive battle to develop both the technology, equipment and tactics, to pursue this strategy. The Germans who up until the tried a real strategic attack against Britain, had been able to get away with flying in daylight. Quickly found that against a nation that had an integrated air defence system, daylight operations were too costly, and switched to night time missions. However they didn’t persist and develop the technology or aircraft needed. And once they decided to attack the Soviet Union, quickly switched back to daylight operations. The Japanese who had a number of observers in Europe, failed to take notice of what was happening, and thus didn’t advise their superiors in Japan, to start to prepare their bomber force for night raids. While at the same time developing the various aids that were going to be needed. While there is no question that the Japanese can institute a night attack on Singapore on the 8th as they did IOTL, it should be remembered that it totally failed in its primary mission, in that it didn’t damage the naval base. And the success it enjoyed against the city will be very much reduced, as the numerous measures taken to date to mitigate the effects of an air attack, both military and civilian, will be somewhat effective. The authorities will have begun implementing the major preparations sooner and with more determination.

The ongoing efforts to improve the air defence, will pay major dividends, as while the first few raids will be a major shock, the better preparations will prevent the panic that issued IOTL. By November it will become obvious to all but the most stupid that the possibility of a conflict with the Japanese is unavoidable. And it is time to place Singapore under Fortress Rule thus increasing the power of the Governor tremendously. Those infamous to historians members of a golf club who prevented the emplacement of a number of AA Guns IOTL, stand a very good chance of being arrested and possibly even expelled from the colony. The new Governor will see this as an opportunity to stamp his authority on the situation, and reenforce the fact that he has the final word. By the end of November beginning of December, all relevant HQ’s and subordinate military and civilian forces, will be working on a 24/7 roster, and a primitive but effective early warning system in place. With a combination of radio monitoring, and a simple constant check with Hong Kong, every 15 minutes the transmission of a simple 5 letter code to and from Hong Kong, via the imperial cable network, serving to say that no hostile action has taken place. Should the message fail to be received, or should the code for we are under attack be received, then all relevant stations will receive the war order, and proceed to inform their relevant subordinate commands, and initiate their war plans. Any Japanese air assault against Singapore will be detected by the ever improving radar network, long before it is in range of Singapore, and with a least half a hours warning, more like an hour. The Singapore defences both military and civilian will be fully alert by the time the raid comes in. The combination of better preparation will now show, fully manned and prepared Anti Aircraft Guns, will exact a toll on the raiders, while the night fighters should be able to down some Japanese bombers. On the ground the combination of a better Blackout, better Civil Defence and trained military support to the civil power, should reduce casualties and prevent panic. This initial raid which was so damaging to morale IOTL, while coming as a major shock, will not destroy the ability of the city to maintain its support to the government and military during the conflict. While any following raids especially daylight will become increasingly costly for the Japanese, I would expect that within days the Japanese will find that the cost of a daylight raid far exceeds any possible damage it could cause.

Note that of the two nations that practiced true strategic bombing policies in Europe during WWII. One the British quickly switched from daylight raids to nighttime raids, and only switched back, other than for a few highly specialised raids, in the closing months of the war. While the other nation the Americans stuck to their pre war policy of precision daylight attacks, despite the high cost in men and machines. Only dropping the precision part quietly, replacing the highly trained bombarders equipped with very expensive Norden bombsights, with basic togglers, whose job it was to toggle the bomb realise when the lead bomber dropped its weapons. This also meant that the majority of American bombs were dropped on an area principal, just like the RAF. It was only the development of long range fighters and the total degradation of the German fighter force that enabled the Americans to become so destructive especially against oil and transportation targets. The lead bomber doesn’t have to hit the target, he just has to get close, and the spread of bombs from the following formation stands a good chance of some of them being on target. In the Far East only the Americans practiced true strategic bombing, the Japanese and British mostly used tactical attacks. And while just as they did in Europe, the Americans set out to conduct precision daylight raids, they after these had proved ineffective. Switch to nighttime area incendiary attacks, which resulted in what was the most costly to civilians, raid in history to date. When on the night of the 9th of March, the XXI Bomber Command of the American Army Airforce, conducted a fire bombing attack against Tokyo. Killing in excess of 90,000 people, and destroying 15+ Square Miles of the city, this was greater destruction than was suffered by either Hiroshima or Nagasaki from the Atomic Bombe attacks.

RR.

 

[Belisarius II]

Hi El Pip, I think we need to break this down a bit.

The Japanese Army Air Force, has, I believe, no night attack capability, and doesn't train to conduct one. the best they might achieve is single flight nuisance attacks on clear moonlight nights.

The Japanese Navy Air Force is a different matter. A major part of the Japanese Navy doctrine called for night fighting, it was something they invested in with exceptionally good optics, and worked hard on developing tactics. Belisarius II post 1,500, gave us


Now the Japanese carrier aircraft didn't undertake night flying as far as I know, but the twin engine G3M Nell and G4M Betty formations did.
Belisarius II post 1,505 gave us (I've put the relevant bit in bold type)


On the opening of hostilities, December 8th (its still the 7th for Pearl Harbour, on the other side of the dateline) Nell bombers of the Mihoro air group attacked Singapore at night, successfully locating the city, and causing heavy casualties and damage, although the Naval Base was untouched.

The night of December 9/10, while searching for Force Z, a formation of Nell's and Betty's nearly attacked the IJN heavy cruiser Chokai.
A Japanese reconnaissance aircraft searching for Force Z mistakes CHOKAI for one of the British ships and makes a sighting report. Fifty-three bombers arrive soon and begin positioning for attack. The reconnaissance plane drops a flare to illuminate the target. At the last moment, the ship is recognized as friendly and the attack is broken off. Aboard the flagship, Ozawa signals CHOKAI's identity to Saigon. All aircraft are recalled and the search is postponed until daylight.
Taken from http://www.combinedfleet.com/chokai_t.htm

So they were capable, but limited, lacking the technical equipment the Europeans were developing.

Now, while we are dealing with night flying, what about the British in my timeline. OK, we have two recently formed FAA Swordfish Torpedo sqns practicing night flying off carriers, and undertaking a night attack on Singapore exercise. We also have two squadrons of Vickers Vildebeest which had trained for torpedo strikes on shipping at night. Note, neither of these enjoy radar guidance, and so are doing something similar to the Japanese Nell and Betty formations, with air dropped flares illuminating their targets.

And lastly, RAF 27 Sqn, with only four Blenheim IF aircraft equipped with a underslung gun pack and airborne radar, are conducting night-time interception exercises, with little success. The RAF Blenheim, Battles and Hudson crews have no training in night-time operations, so unlike Europe, the RAF cannot conduct any nigh time bombing operations. Does that sound about right guys?

Very good sir. But don't forget that the RN made a night attack on the Italian Navy in Torrento in November 1940. With just 21 Swordfish they managed to torpedo 3 battleships.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

Very good sir. But don't forget that the RN made a night attack on the Italian Navy in Torrento in November 1940. With just 21 Swordfish they managed to torpedo 3 battleships.

Hi Belisarius II, re Taranto, see my post # 145

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

1941, Friday 12 September;

The radio message had pre-warned them, allowing Brigadier General Henry B Clagett, USAAF, commander of all Army Aircraft in the Far East, accompanied by his staff, to be present, packed in the Control Tower of Clark Field, Philippines. Nine B-17 Flying Fortresses of the 14th Bombardment Squadron, still in their shiny metal factory finish, were battling through the winds of a dying typhoon, completing the last leg of a journey from the USA. The control tower operative was on the R/T to the leading Fortress, discussing the approach, the aircraft still not in view, another gust of wind bringing lashing of rain hard against the windows. All navigation lights were on to help compensate for the dark leaden sky, while binoculars scanned the sky for a first appearance. “There she is”, an officer pointing to the far distant end of the runway, as the first aircraft, a black speck, emerged from the gloom. Already she had her wheels down, the pilot battling with the winds to keep her on a gradual descending course, aligned with the runway. The plane grew in size, and the fight to keep control more evident as she swung about, taxing the pilot’s skill. Bigger and lower she grew, until her wheels touched down briefly, the plane bunny hopping, before making a firmer contact and running along the runway, past the control tower to shouts of jubilation from all watching.

Way back in May the US had made its first attempts to try and improve the air defence of the Philippines, with the creation of the Philippine Department Air Force, mostly by sending out a number of obsolete or obsolescent aircraft, all under the command of the newly arrived Clagett. The results were disappointing, the force was poorly equipped and to compound that, Clagett, who was not in good health and had suffered two periods of sickness over the summer, had clashed badly with his subordinates, resulting in a badly run organisation. Continuing with the reinforcement plans, in July, Chief of the Army Air Force, Major General Henry H Arnold, had allocated four heavy bombardment groups, 272 aircraft with another 68 in reserve, totalling 340 heavy bombers, and two pursuit groups of 130 modern fighter planes each, the majority not yet manufactured. These planes, according to Brig Gen Carl Spaatz, Chief of the Air Staff, were not for offensive missions, but to provide a strategical defence in Asia, but given the range of the bombers, the Japanese were unlikely to view them as such.

This also necessitated the development of several airfields in the Philippines to operate the bombers, while MacArthur was asked to obtain permission from the British, to have them develop a number of airfields for US heavy bomber use, Singapore, Port Darwin, Rabaul, and Port Moresby being identified, as well as a new airfield in Northern Borneo. MacArthur was also asked to do a similar thing with the Dutch. An Air Warning Service was being formed, initially using just observation posts, reporting on airplane movements through one of, five radio, two telegraph and ten telephone networks, but there had been little training in aircraft recognition. Radar had begun to arrive, which would improve things immensely, but production times and shipping the equipment over, along with building facilities and training staff, meant only one was in operation at the outbreak of war, with a second used in a training unit.

Further P40 fighter aircraft would soon be arriving, enabling Clagett to form the 24th Pursuit Group of three squadrons. This unit was forming around a cadre of 28 pilots with some experience, the rest would be straight out of flight school, and need considerable individual training, before they could undertake unit tactical exercises. Also planned to join was a Light Bombardment Group, the 27th, equipped with three squadrons of the Army, land-based version of the Douglas Dauntless dive bomber, the A-24, which would soon be shipped out, all personnel, both air and ground crews arriving in November, the aircraft in mid-December.

Clagett wasn’t aware yet, but after conversations between MacArthur and Marshall, Arnold had met with Marshall to identify his replacement. That man would be Maj Gen Lewis H Brereton, but he wouldn’t arrive until early November. Completion of the aircraft build-up would be April 1942, MacArthur convinced he had that much time, which was just as well as things wouldn’t run smoothly.

Up to now, any aircraft sent to the Philippines had been dis-assembled, crated and shipped over, but these nine Fortresses had just successfully proven that they could be flown in along an air route across the central Pacific. Flying from Hamilton Field, near San Francisco, to Hickam Field, Hawaii, then onto Midway, Wake, Port Moresby, Darwin, and then up to the Philippines, it had taken them eight days, and over 10,000 miles, mostly over water. The leg, Wake to Port Moresby, crossed over the Japanese Caroline mandate islands, but was done at night, at high altitude. Nevertheless, this was far from ideal, and a southern Pacific air ferry route was being developed. More B-17s would follow, leaving the continental USA in October, November, and December, but for now the first B-17s had arrived successfully steered by the CO of the 14th Bombardment Group, Major Emmett O’Donnell Jr, completing a magnificent feat of navigation.

 

[Driftless]

^^^ Between Clagett and Brereton, not exactly the USAAC's "A Team". Both were put in a difficult situation, working with the impediment of MacArthur's staff and it showed that they lacked that extra level of ability to get beyond the Sutherlands of the Army. The US could have done worse and could have done better as well.

 

[jlckansas]

Point of order, they would use the China Clipper route with the San Fransisco, Hawaii, Midway, Wake, GUAM, then onto Clark Field. B17 had the range to do it this way and it was the direct route that Pan Am had pioneered and the Army Air Corps used because of all the infrastructure including the Radio beacons were in place.

 

[Ramp-Rat]

Unfortunately the Americans are putting the cart before the horse, where they should have built up the fighter force along with the air defence network first. They have placed long range heavy bombers, that represent a serious threat to the Japanese, in the Philippines. Without them being defended against a Japanese attack, in any significant way, nor have they reached agreement with the British/Dutch to enable them to deploy their aircraft in their territories. And it should be noted that any such agreement would require the Americans to make significant provisions for the aircraft, including spares, munitions, ground crews, and communications. For example let’s do a thought experiment, General Z finding the position of the B-17’s in the Philippines has become untenable, and orders them to redeploy to Singapore. First do they have the maps and charts to enable them to make the flight, along with the radio/wireless frequencies to be able to communicate with the British, and receive landing instructions. Once on the ground in Singapore, were are the spares and mechanics to service these aircraft, I seriously doubt that you can put British spark plugs into an American engine, or British oil filters, let alone British tyres onto American aircraft. Unless there is a significant dump of American munitions, fat chance of using British 303 to fill up the ammunition trays in a B-17. And there is a serious difference between the various bomb tackles, on American and British bombs. While you might be able to strip spares from the least airworthy aircraft to make the remainder airworthy, what do you do with them then. Sadly what appears to be a significant boost to the American defence of the Philippines, is very much a total waste of resources, and once the Japanese attack will be virtually useless, and have little to no effect on the eventual outcome of any conflict in the Philippines.

RR.

 

[Belisarius II]

Unfortunately the Americans are putting the cart before the horse, where they should have built up the fighter force along with the air defence network first. They have placed long range heavy bombers, that represent a serious threat to the Japanese, in the Philippines. Without them being defended against a Japanese attack, in any significant way, nor have they reached agreement with the British/Dutch to enable them to deploy their aircraft in their territories. And it should be noted that any such agreement would require the Americans to make significant provisions for the aircraft, including spares, munitions, ground crews, and communications. For example let’s do a thought experiment, General Z finding the position of the B-17’s in the Philippines has become untenable, and orders them to redeploy to Singapore. First do they have the maps and charts to enable them to make the flight, along with the radio/wireless frequencies to be able to communicate with the British, and receive landing instructions. Once on the ground in Singapore, were are the spares and mechanics to service these aircraft, I seriously doubt that you can put British spark plugs into an American engine, or British oil filters, let alone British tyres onto American aircraft. Unless there is a significant dump of American munitions, fat chance of using British 303 to fill up the ammunition trays in a B-17. And there is a serious difference between the various bomb tackles, on American and British bombs. While you might be able to strip spares from the least airworthy aircraft to make the remainder airworthy, what do you do with them then. Sadly what appears to be a significant boost to the American defence of the Philippines, is very much a total waste of resources, and once the Japanese attack will be virtually useless, and have little to no effect on the eventual outcome of any conflict in the Philippines.

RR.

Good analysis. The best thing to do is base the B-17's in the southern Philippines. Another point is the Americans didn't think Japanese fighters could attack Clark Field from their air bases in Formosa. Allied intelligence was completely wrong footed about Japanese air capabilities. No one knew the amazing combat radius of the A6M Zero, or Ki-43 Oscar. When Clark Field was attacked the Americans figured the planes must have come from carriers.