I grew up using the jungle carbine, as dad had purchased one for hunting purposes at some point. He thinks it was never used in anger though. Brother hass used it a bit in recent years for hunting but now has moved on to something more modern/lighter.
Malaya What If
- Thread starter Fatboy Coxy
- Start date
When I visited India in 1990, the railway police came with a .303 SMLE attached to their wrist, One was happy to allow me to handle his rifle. I surprised him by carrying out a correct safety inspection and then the drill of arms for it. I then explained I was a soldier in the Australian Army. Between him and later a Colonel from the Armoured Corps on another train, it was an interesting trip indeed.
Into the early 90s at least, although they’d been made inoperative by having the firing pins cut off by then. It was funny - we were doing SLR drill with 303s when the NZ Army was using Steyrs.
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
OK Guys thanks for keeping the thread alive while I dither about, worrying if I've lined up my ducks correctly. Fact is I probably haven't somewhere, but this is as good as its going to get, otherwise I'll never get back to posting. So obviously there's going to be a number of changes to the historical as the shooting starts, and knowing you can't please all of the people all of the time, no doubt I will stretch too far on some points for some of you, but hey, its my story, if you don't like it, write your own. Wow, steady Fatboy, no ones complained yet, feeling the pressure are you!
OK here we go, dim the lights, mobile's off, and keep the noise of opening wrappers, munching popcorn and swigging fizzy drinks down to a minimum, curtain pulls back, music starts and away we go into never never land.
OK here we go, dim the lights, mobile's off, and keep the noise of opening wrappers, munching popcorn and swigging fizzy drinks down to a minimum, curtain pulls back, music starts and away we go into never never land.
MWI 41120515 Churchill Wrestles With Matador
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
1941, Friday 05 December;
“Mr President, I’m afraid I must speak again regarding the developing situation in the South China Sea. Our shared intelligence strongly suggests the Japanese have assembled an invasion force, which as we speak is sailing south, hugging the Indo-China coast. Our defence would be immeasurably improved if we were to pre-empt that by occupying Southern Thailand. Should Japan attack us and us alone, we would very much hope that the United States would provide armed support.”
“Prime Minister, Winston, if I may, should you find yourselves alone, at war with Japan, you can rest assured that I would do everything in my power to provide you with armed military support, but should you occupy part of neutral Thailand, and Japan not attack you, it would do significant harm to our united cause, and just maintaining what we have already achieved may be all we could do, even if Japan later attacked you alone.” And so, the Trans-Atlantic call had ended, but the conundrum it presented remained.
Churchill was later to write, never did I go to bed filled with more trepidation, than that night following the decision we had made in giving Gort and Phillips the authority to launch Bullring. Picador wasn’t so worrying, but Matador, well, the enormity of what we had invested into Gort’s care, was far more than any one man should be given, but the distance and time between us, meant any decision had to be made in theatre.
The concerns we had that Roosevelt wouldn’t be able to keep his spoken word, in supporting us, when the USA wasn’t even at war, the message that might go to the American public that we had attacked neutral, little Thailand, that we were war mongering colonialists worried me immensely. The idea that the Japanese were possibly playing us, with a mock invasion, was also very unsettling.
But on the other hand, to hand the initiative to the Japanese, and let them gain a firm foothold right at the opening of hostilities, placing us on an immensely bad footing, and potentially costing us, not just the loss of Malaya, but Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies, was a situation we couldn’t countenance. It had been made clear to me by the Chiefs of Staff, that despite our best efforts, commitments in active theatres meant we couldn’t be anywhere near as strong in the Far East as we would have liked.
The latest assessment from the JIC was very clear
Most Secret
1. Japan’s traditional step-by-step policy has now placed her with two naval bases in Southern Indo-China and two good aerodromes, with six others within some 350 miles of Northern Malaya. She is also favourably placed to take the next logical step: the establishment of similar bases in Thailand, which would threaten the security of Malaya even more severely.
2. They now have aircraft established in Southern Indo-China adequately supplied with fuel and bombs together with services and accommodation. They are now able to offer shore-based air support for any sea-borne expedition against Northern Malaya.
3. If the Japanese are permitted to occupy bases in Southern Thailand without military counter-measures, it has been estimated that they could build up a force of some four Divisions in the Songkhla – Pattani – Hat Yai areas within a few weeks. It has also been estimated that they have sufficient landing craft to put a maximum of three Divisions ashore at once.
4. If, on the other hand, we are able to forestall them in Southern Thailand, it is estimated that only one Division could be moved and maintained down the railway in face of air and sabotage attack. The three Divisions at sea would remain a threat.
Joint Intelligence Committee
Furthermore, special information, derived from the FECB code breakers, reading the Japanese diplomatic and consular messages, gave many clear indications of Japan’s intention, preparing them for a coming war with Britain. Whether the Americans would be attacked or not, they couldn’t say, but Britain would be.
I was comforted by the fact that Gort had the RAF and Army working well, in tandem, and that Phillips, and his Force Z fully understood the predicament, and that with Operation Picador, he would provide as much support as he could, such that, if we could provide Gort with such an advantage as Matador offered, at the opening of hostilities, that events might follow in our favour.
And with a likely Japanese invasion fleet at sea, we had to make a decision now, or not at all. The plans for Bullring were sound, the forces we could commit, the bare minimum, but the advantages were considerable. Militarily, the alternative was extremely poor, ceding the initiative, with incomplete defences, lengthen the odds against us holding Malaya. All three Chiefs of Staff supported both the Picador and Matador options from a military point of view. Furthermore, the Prime Minister of Australia, John Curtin, whose troops made up the lion’s share of our Matador force, had been very vocal about the need to have no ambiguity about the decision-making process, a further pressure I didn’t need.
But the political view, opposed this, we had a non-aggression treaty with Thailand, and it didn’t sit well to break that, and even more so, would we be endangering the greatest prize of all, the USA joining us in the war. I had called the President earlier that day, perhaps in the hope that he might move a little on his stance, but the message was the same as had been said for a couple of months now.
And so, on that fateful day, Friday 5th December, 1941, at 11pm, in a late evening meeting with my Chiefs of Staff, at great risk to our relations with the USA, but firmly committed to the defence of Malaya and Singapore, we agreed to give them the authority to launch Bullring, with Gort, ultimately left with deciding Matador, provided he was sure Japan was going to attack us. The decision was coded and sent, and was in their hands by 3.30pm Singapore time. Needless to say I slept badly.
“Mr President, I’m afraid I must speak again regarding the developing situation in the South China Sea. Our shared intelligence strongly suggests the Japanese have assembled an invasion force, which as we speak is sailing south, hugging the Indo-China coast. Our defence would be immeasurably improved if we were to pre-empt that by occupying Southern Thailand. Should Japan attack us and us alone, we would very much hope that the United States would provide armed support.”
“Prime Minister, Winston, if I may, should you find yourselves alone, at war with Japan, you can rest assured that I would do everything in my power to provide you with armed military support, but should you occupy part of neutral Thailand, and Japan not attack you, it would do significant harm to our united cause, and just maintaining what we have already achieved may be all we could do, even if Japan later attacked you alone.” And so, the Trans-Atlantic call had ended, but the conundrum it presented remained.
Churchill was later to write, never did I go to bed filled with more trepidation, than that night following the decision we had made in giving Gort and Phillips the authority to launch Bullring. Picador wasn’t so worrying, but Matador, well, the enormity of what we had invested into Gort’s care, was far more than any one man should be given, but the distance and time between us, meant any decision had to be made in theatre.
The concerns we had that Roosevelt wouldn’t be able to keep his spoken word, in supporting us, when the USA wasn’t even at war, the message that might go to the American public that we had attacked neutral, little Thailand, that we were war mongering colonialists worried me immensely. The idea that the Japanese were possibly playing us, with a mock invasion, was also very unsettling.
But on the other hand, to hand the initiative to the Japanese, and let them gain a firm foothold right at the opening of hostilities, placing us on an immensely bad footing, and potentially costing us, not just the loss of Malaya, but Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies, was a situation we couldn’t countenance. It had been made clear to me by the Chiefs of Staff, that despite our best efforts, commitments in active theatres meant we couldn’t be anywhere near as strong in the Far East as we would have liked.
The latest assessment from the JIC was very clear
Most Secret
1. Japan’s traditional step-by-step policy has now placed her with two naval bases in Southern Indo-China and two good aerodromes, with six others within some 350 miles of Northern Malaya. She is also favourably placed to take the next logical step: the establishment of similar bases in Thailand, which would threaten the security of Malaya even more severely.
2. They now have aircraft established in Southern Indo-China adequately supplied with fuel and bombs together with services and accommodation. They are now able to offer shore-based air support for any sea-borne expedition against Northern Malaya.
3. If the Japanese are permitted to occupy bases in Southern Thailand without military counter-measures, it has been estimated that they could build up a force of some four Divisions in the Songkhla – Pattani – Hat Yai areas within a few weeks. It has also been estimated that they have sufficient landing craft to put a maximum of three Divisions ashore at once.
4. If, on the other hand, we are able to forestall them in Southern Thailand, it is estimated that only one Division could be moved and maintained down the railway in face of air and sabotage attack. The three Divisions at sea would remain a threat.
Joint Intelligence Committee
Furthermore, special information, derived from the FECB code breakers, reading the Japanese diplomatic and consular messages, gave many clear indications of Japan’s intention, preparing them for a coming war with Britain. Whether the Americans would be attacked or not, they couldn’t say, but Britain would be.
I was comforted by the fact that Gort had the RAF and Army working well, in tandem, and that Phillips, and his Force Z fully understood the predicament, and that with Operation Picador, he would provide as much support as he could, such that, if we could provide Gort with such an advantage as Matador offered, at the opening of hostilities, that events might follow in our favour.
And with a likely Japanese invasion fleet at sea, we had to make a decision now, or not at all. The plans for Bullring were sound, the forces we could commit, the bare minimum, but the advantages were considerable. Militarily, the alternative was extremely poor, ceding the initiative, with incomplete defences, lengthen the odds against us holding Malaya. All three Chiefs of Staff supported both the Picador and Matador options from a military point of view. Furthermore, the Prime Minister of Australia, John Curtin, whose troops made up the lion’s share of our Matador force, had been very vocal about the need to have no ambiguity about the decision-making process, a further pressure I didn’t need.
But the political view, opposed this, we had a non-aggression treaty with Thailand, and it didn’t sit well to break that, and even more so, would we be endangering the greatest prize of all, the USA joining us in the war. I had called the President earlier that day, perhaps in the hope that he might move a little on his stance, but the message was the same as had been said for a couple of months now.
And so, on that fateful day, Friday 5th December, 1941, at 11pm, in a late evening meeting with my Chiefs of Staff, at great risk to our relations with the USA, but firmly committed to the defence of Malaya and Singapore, we agreed to give them the authority to launch Bullring, with Gort, ultimately left with deciding Matador, provided he was sure Japan was going to attack us. The decision was coded and sent, and was in their hands by 3.30pm Singapore time. Needless to say I slept badly.
Any chance that the IJN is not landing in southern Thailand? Rather, they were headed to Bangkok instead!?!
This sounds like it's going to be a gambit pileup--regardless, though, the Japanese plans for Malaya are not going to go as well as OTL and, even if they did, they're going to take more casualties (at a minimum) than in OTL...
That being said, looking forward to what happens next...
That being said, looking forward to what happens next...
Errolwi
Monthly Donor
The starting pistol has been cocked...
So I think 11pm UT (not sure what London was on in 1941 +1 maybe?) is 7am Singapore. That seems a long process for even a top-level enciphered message.
Too much of a risk anyway, if the Japanese secure the Thai government via a putsh, the whole Bulring operation become much more uncertain. So no matter if the fleet goes to Bangkok of the Kra isthmus, the British have to act before Japanese/Thai troops are ready.
Who would lead the Thai government there and to what degree would the Japanese have outside Bangkok. Is it a situation where the Thai have to obey or the Japanese will kill their king? A Japan that doesn't have Thailand as at least a somewhat willing Ally, I don't think would even consider attacking Burma.
The UK ran Summer Time / Double Summer Time from 1941 to 1945, hence in November 1941 London was on GMT+1 (the same as most of Europe), seven hours behind Singapore. So the 11 pm referred to by Churchill would have been 6 am in Singapore. If the meeting lasted a while (an hour or two), then the decision would have been coded some time after midnight. Transmitting from one station to another would be quite quick, but iirc coded messages needed to be double checked for accuracy at each stage (not decoded, but each transmitted word/letter/etc checked); I guess they might even have been send twice to help with this (maybe someone else knows more about this and can confirm or deny my guess). If SW (HF) radio was used, as I'd expect it to have been, then the message could have been transmitted directly but atmospheric conditions at the time would affect how good the signal was, which might have introduced a delay due to missed sections or necessitated going via intermediate stations (maybe Egypt / India). Decoding at the Singapore end would then have taken some time. I agree that 3:30 seems a bit late, but it's not implausible. If the 11pm meeting ran for three or four hours (which Churchill's meetings sometimes did...) then the time seems realistic.
Just my two-penny-worth.
I look forward to reading what Gort decides. If the Japanese attack starts as in OTL, then justifying Matador might be difficult, but there are just enough changes now, particularly including increased chances of maritime and/or air early warning, that he could be 'sure' earlier than the leadership was OTL.
Ramp-Rat
Monthly Donor
I have little knowledge of coding processes in use at the time, however I doubt that a message between London and Singapore would have been transmitted over the airwaves. Britain had built up from the mid nineteenth century, an extensive network of undersea telegraph cables, and one of the nodes on the network was Singapore. Cables went from there to the DEI, and Australia, and China via Hong Kong and Shanghai. Thus any message from London would have travelled over the extensive cable network, which basically made it impossible to intersept, and not by wireless in Morse, which all could listen into.
RR.
Wolf of Badenoch
Donor
Fatboy Coxy wrote:
"The concerns we had that Roosevelt wouldn’t be able to keep his spoken word, in supporting us, when the USA wasn’t even at war, the message that might go to the American public that we had attacked neutral, little Thailand, that we were war mongering colonialists worried me immensely. "
Goddam right! Next thing, these damn Limeys will be invading the Phillipines, Guam, Samoa, the Marianas, Guataemala, Honduras, Panama, Nicuragua, Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands.
"The concerns we had that Roosevelt wouldn’t be able to keep his spoken word, in supporting us, when the USA wasn’t even at war, the message that might go to the American public that we had attacked neutral, little Thailand, that we were war mongering colonialists worried me immensely. "
Goddam right! Next thing, these damn Limeys will be invading the Phillipines, Guam, Samoa, the Marianas, Guataemala, Honduras, Panama, Nicuragua, Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands.
Ramp-Rat
Monthly Donor
As part of their double secret plan to make Fyffes the largest tropical fruit producer, of especially Bananas, in the world. And remove the United Fruit Company from its position at the top of the pack. 😉
RR.