A Day in July: An Early 20th Century Timeline
- Thread starter Zulfurium
- Start date
Long is either going to end up a president or a murder victim.
Another great chapter.
Another great chapter.
It is honestly a bit annoying that Americascrew TLs have lost some of their fun with Trump demonstrating that they are very much a real possibility. Not to say this is an Americascrew necessarily, but I find it really fascinating how many times things broke the right way for the Americans during the 20th century and want to explore some of the darker elements of that history. There is only so long you can go with an electoral system in crisis before the need for change becomes all-consuming, but for now people still view the situation as unfortunate but legitimate.
All three of you are basically getting into the same topic, so I am combining the responses.
Huey Long is a figure who has really fascinated me ever since I first learned about him. A man who, while holding an at times quite appealing ideological position, has some really really big red flags. The rise of the Klan and subsequent reaction to that development are really allowing him to rise to prominence and it will be his fight against the Klan which come to characterise his career at least in these years.
@Unknown definitely not wrong that you like him, that is at least partly what I am going for. He is the epitome of the loveable scoundrel whose means might leave you questioning but with a purpose you can get behind.
I had honestly forgotten about D.C. Stephenson's closet full of skeletons (literally and figuratively), but that will definitely have to be something I get back to at some point. Already have a lot of ideas running through my mind.
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That seems to be the natural lesson to draw. On the other hand, OTL has forcibly taught us that people with different backgrounds, interests, and aims, usually draw radically different lessons from the very same events. American domestic political culture, ironically, has often demonstrated that very clearly OTL...
Story-wise, the two are perfect foils for each other too, if perhaps not literally. Then again, this TL has a habit of employing historical figures with very large personalities, very effectively.
@Zulfurium and @Ombra: I wanted to ask a question about your approach to alternate history writing. At the risk of sounding condescending (which I promise is not the case), how much would you say ADiJ is "what I think would most likely happen given the POD" and how much is "what I would like to see happen"?
It is very much a mix of the two. I started with a very clear PoD (which I view as the most important part of Alt-History) and just started mapping out butterflies to start with. Just asking what would the ramifications be for topic x, y and z, which is how I ended up with having the first order of divergences on the Eastern Front. Now granted, it was at that time I decided that I wanted to see what happened if the situation tipped over in Italy and Romania, but I wouldn't have gone through with it if it didn't seem plausible to me. The divergence of the German Offensives with Operation GEORGE ITTL came about because I was wondering what sort of divergences might happen in the region and came across the fact that there were a variety of plans - finding the one I felt might have had the greatest impact.
I think the best way of looking at it is me asking what might have happened here? Then what do I want to have happen here? and finally is it plausible for that to happen in this instance?
It also differs quite a bit depending on how I get to the course of the divergences - is it a clear butterfly from a previous event? If so then plausibility - what I think might happen - takes front and centre. If it is a new divergence then it usually comes out of what I would like to see happen, although plausibility will always be a very important factor.
I have some pretty out there ideas at times which need a good deal of finessing to make plausible, but I really put a high premium on it being plausible - I would rather sink an interesting idea than include it if I can't make it come about plausibly.
Hope that answers your question, if not then I am happy to clarify.
Are there any ideological differences between the two Klans, or it just bad blood between their leaders?
And it seems something like the great depression is on the horizon, just a few years later than OTL. With how divided the country is ITTL, I wonder how the US is going to get through such a crisis. As things are going, we might see Weimar-like conditions in the US, with political violence, instability and economic calamity.
And it seems something like the great depression is on the horizon, just a few years later than OTL. With how divided the country is ITTL, I wonder how the US is going to get through such a crisis. As things are going, we might see Weimar-like conditions in the US, with political violence, instability and economic calamity.
Thank you for the question! Before I answer, let me preface that I haven't actually written any timeline of my own yet. While that is very much something I intend to do long-term, when it comes to ADiJ my primary job when writing anything is to make it fit the "canon" established by @Zulfurium. That takes a different sort of speculative thinking compared to actually coming up with a POD and exploring the butterflies all by yourself. With that out of the way, I share Zulfurium's own view (hardly surprising, since I basically consider myself his apprentice!), and the appeal of the genre for me is precisely its speculative "hardness". When I want to write something because I'm primarily concerned with what I want on the screen, I scratch the itch by writing short stories and novels. And even on these fora we have sections for ASB, fan fiction, writers etc, where works without a premium on plausibility can be explored more freely. Alternate historyfor me, though, is primarily a Socratic exercise of exploring a "what if" by steering as close to plausibility as possible.
That said, as Zulfurium says, entirely separating the two elements is impossible. Since we can never be certain of a counterfactual, there are often multiple directions events could plausibly go after any one butterfly. Moreover, while we tend to be very conservative here because we aim for solid plausibility, reality has no such concerns, and is often completely bonkers. Anyone writing the military events of June 1940 on the Western Front in a world where that never happened would be laughed out of the room, and that's just one example out of many. So at the end of the day for me there is always an element of, "out of all these more or less equally plausible developments, which one has the most potential for the rest of the timeline? How will the audience react?". We are all here to entertain and be entertained, so that always becomes a factor.
Hope that answers your question satisfactorily!
The Indiana Klan back the Republicans but are firmly in the most radical part of the isolationist and conservative (anti-government) wing of the party, while the Old Klan is entirely Democratic nativist (big government) in outlook. That said, those ideological differences are minor and the real impetus of the struggle is between a weak national Klan and a powerful state Klan with the charismatic and (despite how much bad shit he has done) capable leader in D.C. Stephenson wanting to make his organization more powerful at the cost of other parts of the Klan. As mentioned there is an Ohio Klan - as well as a variety of other state-based Old Klan-affiliated Klans, who have a considerable amount of leeway and independence, they just haven't become large and important enough to address. This weakness on the part of the Old Klan has seen its national leadership try to strengthen their grip on the state-based Klans. While that has been relatively successful in the South, and the organization there is a relatively cohesive and united force in that region, they have very little control over Klans outside of that region - which are rarely all that large anyway.
There is definitely a crisis brewing in the distance, but I can mention already now that it will take more than half a decade to start to really hit the US for the most part.
Zulfurium;
I'm only about 20 pages into the time-line and greatly enjoying the journey but I have to point something out that I'd noted even though it's likely addressed later on.
In you 'vignette' of Anastasia... You gave her an "Origin Story" you realize this correct? The only element missing was which "spirit of vengeance" she will assume to strike dread fear in the hearts of the revolutionaries before their inevitable (and gruesome) end... She is the embodiment of Vengeance which strikes from the Shadows, that which has no mercy, no compassion, no fear... I mean come ON you have to use her now that you've written the "origin" story
Loving it!
Randy
I'm only about 20 pages into the time-line and greatly enjoying the journey but I have to point something out that I'd noted even though it's likely addressed later on.
In you 'vignette' of Anastasia... You gave her an "Origin Story" you realize this correct? The only element missing was which "spirit of vengeance" she will assume to strike dread fear in the hearts of the revolutionaries before their inevitable (and gruesome) end... She is the embodiment of Vengeance which strikes from the Shadows, that which has no mercy, no compassion, no fear... I mean come ON you have to use her now that you've written the "origin" story
Loving it!
Randy
Zulfurium;
I'm only about 20 pages into the time-line and greatly enjoying the journey but I have to point something out that I'd noted even though it's likely addressed later on.
In you 'vignette' of Anastasia... You gave her an "Origin Story" you realize this correct? The only element missing was which "spirit of vengeance" she will assume to strike dread fear in the hearts of the revolutionaries before their inevitable (and gruesome) end... She is the embodiment of Vengeance which strikes from the Shadows, that which has no mercy, no compassion, no fear... I mean come ON you have to use her now that you've written the "origin" story
Loving it!
Randy
I am super happy to hear you are enjoying things, and all I will say for now is that this is far from the last you have seen of Anastasia.
Really hope to hear what you think of the entire thing when you get caught up!
Update Thirty (Pt. 2): The Gathering Storm Clouds
The Gathering Storm Clouds
Zewditu of Ethoipia, Empress Regnant of the Ethiopian Empire
Colonia Africana
Zewditu of Ethoipia, Empress Regnant of the Ethiopian Empire
Colonia Africana
The most impactful development of the 1920s on British Africa would prove to be the establishment of a trade deal with the United States which opened up the empire to American exports. Already producing vastly above demand and with European markets largely hostile to their efforts at market entry, American agricultural exports soon began to stream into British Africa, serving as an outlet for American agricultural overcapacity. Of high quality and dirt cheap, the impact on the nascent agricultural industrial sectors of British Africa could not have been greater. In the span of five years, from when the trade deal was first agreed upon in 1925, almost every commercial agricultural initiative in the British African colonies was wiped out. Out of work and unable to find farms on which to work, these agricultural workers sought refuge in the towns and cities where economic opportunities might present themselves, resulting in a significant swelling of British Africa's previously minuscule urban landscape as migrants settled into massive slums in search of opportunity, fighting against disease, overcrowding and horrendous work conditions.
While subsistence farmers were less impacted, they still saw the worth of their small surpluses of crops lose considerable value and the gradual loss of economic activity fuelled by roaming merchants who would ordinarily have bought this surplus to sell in the towns and cities. The collapse of native agricultural production beyond subsistence farming would have a profound impact on native cultures and societies, as traditional ties of kinship and authority frayed in response to economic hardships and mass migration while others exploited the sudden availability dirt-cheap produce to embark on commercial adventures fundamentally reliant of the availability of cheap produce. Furthermore, this collapse in agricultural business opportunities in Africa would result in a dramatic shift in colonial settlement and economics, as plantations were re-tasked towards the production of cash crops and settlement efforts turned towards the extraction of mineral wealth rather than agriculture.
These hardships, and the slow collapse of traditional societies which followed, were to see the development of growing nationalist sentiments in places as far removed as Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa, with Nigerian nationalism marked by a pluralistic Pan-Africanism and South Africa marked by European settler domination while in East Africa the live-stock dependent tribal economy went into overdrive on the back of cheap animal fodder. At this time, European interpretations of Christianity had in some cases refused to allow the incorporation of local customs and practices, although the various mission denominations interpreted Christianity in different ways and tended to overlook their own differences when they surprised by the development of native denominations independent of European control. Political opposition to colonial rule now came to assume a religious dimension, as independent Christian churches took up leadership in the cause of decolonisation and independence, an effort in which they were soon joined by a variety of associations, such as professional and business associations, which not only connected native populations across their ethnic and religious divides but also presented an opportunity to connect with each other, soon beginning to develop leadership skills in these organisations, as well as form broad social networks with which to promote the cause of independence.
However, the inauguration of the next decade soon saw the impact of the drought in America upon British Africa as food exports began to shrink, leaving an overgrown urban population and a devastated native agricultural sector behind while sending British authorities scrambling for solutions to what was increasingly clear would be a devastating famine (11).
French Africa in the 1920s and early 30s was marked by the realisation in the Metropole that their state had become reliant upon the population of their colonial empire in Africa. The result was a turn from direct economic exploitation and neglect towards a colonial policy firmly anchored in the assimilation and association of their colonial populace with France. Based on the assumed superiority of French culture, in practice this assimilation policy meant the extension of French language, institutions, laws, and customs to the colonies and the gradual erasure of traditional culture and society. The policy of association affirmed the superiority of the French in the colonies, but it entailed different institutions and systems of laws for the colonizer and the colonized. Under this policy, Africans were allowed to preserve their own customs insofar as they were compatible with French interests, such as the recent abolition of the slave trade but saw the forced end to traditions felt to be incompatible with French values.
To serve as mediators between the French and African populace, the colonial government trained an elite indigenous group which was slowly granted citizenship as they came to adhere to French culture. Most Africans, however, were classified as French subjects and were governed under the principle of association. As subjects of France, natives outside the above-mentioned civilised elite had no political rights and were drafted for work in mines, on plantations, as porters, and on public projects as part of their tax responsibility. They were expected to serve in the military and were subject to the indigénat, a separate system of law which had first been introduced in Algeria as an expansion and modernisation of the Code Noir in 1865 and had since spread to most of French Africa.
This period further saw massive French investments in the expansion of the Congo, with major transportation infrastructure works coming under way, while waves of French settlers descended on the formerly Belgian colony in search of riches. While the colonial government focused on tying together the region, these private settlers focused their efforts on the development of extractive industries. Mining boomed as diamonds in Kasai and gold in Ituri were unearthed while so-called vacant lands - land not currently in use by the local populace - were handed over for exploitation by French companies. In this way an extensive plantation economy was developed from palm-oil and tropical fruits to rubber, coffee and cocoa.
A key development during this period was the French acceptance of League of Nations resources in the development of their colonies, which would see the opening of schools, development of famine relief systems, a constant issue in French Sudan and Niger regions, and the dispatch of doctors and healthcare workers to clinics opened in various towns and cities across the vast French colonial domains in Africa.
While inequalities between citizens and subjects were vast, with forced labor and second-class rights imposed upon the latter, on the whole the quality of life improved across much of French Africa during this period and an avenue to upward social mobility emerged by way of the League school system which extended scholarships to the most talented students for study in Europe. French culture and social norms also made significant headway during this period, often taking on syncretic elements of local traditions as they were adopted, and in the process caused a slowly growing cultural unity in the colonies which crossed religious and ethnic lines. Even as the agricultural sector in British Africa was collapsing and widespread famine began to threaten, France saw itself in ascendancy and closer unity with its colonial possessions (12).
The most notable development in Portuguese Africa under the Sidonist regime was the strengthening of control over their colonies. At the start of the century, the Portuguese state had devolved much of their administration to large private companies controlled by primarily British interests which, alongside the Portuguese, established railroad lines to neighboring colonies and sought to foster economic development. While slavery had been legally abolished in most if not all Portuguese colonies at the end of the 19th century, these chartered companies relied heavily on cheap and plentiful forced labour to man their mines and plantations, not only in Portuguese holdings but also in nearby parts of the British empire, particularly South Africa drawing heavily from Portuguese Africa. The Zambezia Company, the most profitable of these chartered company, took over a number of smaller prazeiro holdings, colonial estates, and requested Portuguese military outposts to protect its properties. The chartered companies and the Portuguese administration built roads and ports to bring their goods to market including a railroad linking Rhodesia with the Mozambican port of Beira.
However, the development's administration gradually started to pass directly from the trading companies to the Portuguese government itself as the Sidonists took an ever firmer grip on the course of events. Similarly to the French, the Portuguese government would undertake major assimilation efforts, at times even exceeding the efforts of the French, as they sought to turn the African colonies into an extension of Portugal. During this process they gradually began to abandon the conception of an innate inferiority amongst Africans, instead setting as a goal the development of a multiethnic society in Portuguese Africa. The establishment of a dual, racialized civil society was formally recognised in Estatuto do Indigenato, The Statute of Indigenous Populations, adopted in 1924, which was based on a stark division between civilisation and tribalism. In the colonial administration's view, the goal of this Estatuto was to gradually turn Portugal's colonies from tribalism to civilization through a period of Europeanization and a reformation of native cultures to align with Portuguese norms and social structures. The Estatuto established a distinction between the colonial citizens, subject to the Portuguese laws and entitled to all citizenship rights and duties effective in the metropole, and the native indígenas, subjected to colonial legislation and customary African laws. Between the two groups there was a third small group, the assimilados, comprising native blacks, mulatos, Asians, and mixed-race people, who had at least some formal education and were not subjected to paid forced labor. They were entitled to some citizenship rights, and held a special identification card, used to control the movements of forced labor.
The indígenas were subject to the traditional authorities, who were gradually integrated into the colonial administration and charged with solving disputes, managing the access to land, and guaranteeing the flows of workforce and the payment of taxes. In effect, the Indigenato regime was a political system that subordinated the immense majority of Africans to local authorities entrusted with governing, in collaboration with the lowest echelon of the colonial administration, their native communities described as tribes under the assumption of them having a common ancestry, language, and culture. The colonial use of traditional law and structures of power was thus an integral part of the process of colonial domination. Ultimately, the goal was to slowly turn the indigenas into assimilados while gradually expanding their rights, improving their access to modern education, healthcare and science, in time creating a full extension of Portugal on the African continent in which race did not matter. Only culture and civilization (13).
Germany's efforts in Africa would undergo a transformative development in the years following the end of the Great War. By concentrating their colonial ambitions on the Kamerun, German East Africa and German Somalia, and extending the term of the talented colonial administrator Wilhelm Heinrich Solf as Colonial Secretary, the Germans would prove themselves one of the most successful colonial power in Africa during the 20s and 30s.
A liberal, detailed, culturally sensitive and capable administrator, Solf had originally distinguished himself as the first Governor of German Samoa, which he had turned into a model colony by including native traditions in his government programs and encouraging the development of a self-sufficient colony through education, economic development and the construction and expansion of a healthcare system staffed by trained natives. Appointed as Secretary of the German Colonial Office in 1911, Solf had gradually proven that he could take his small-scale Samoan experiment and expand it to a continent-wide endeavor. While Solf had been forced to focus his attentions elsewhere for the duration of the Great War, its end had allowed him to resume his duties and even expand them significantly.
The Treaty of Copenhagen, and the colonial readjustments which resulted thereof, had allowed Solf to secure a greater share of the state finances and thereby expand the Colonial Office and its administrative apparatus in the colonies considerably. Having personally selected the governors in all three African colonies, Solf had turned an already strong grip on African affairs into an iron hand. Under his direction, the development of plantations and mines took on a fervent pace while rail tracks were laid down like never before and the recently conquered province of Katanga in western East Africa saw its immense mineral wealth rapidly exploited, swiftly growing into one of the greatest copper mining regions in the world.
Throughout these efforts, the Germans would eschew the use of forced labor and instead sought to draw in native tribes as shareholders in the nearby economic developments, a particularly sharp departure from former practices in Kamerun, which had relied heavily on forced labor on their plantations and would require nearly a decade to fully wean itself off it. Schools were established on a wide basis and, in East Africa, the language of Swahili, which was spoken across numerous ethnic groups as a lingua franca, was included as a language of government alongside German.
This was mirrored in German Somalia, where Somali was adopted as a second language of government, even as the administrative language shifted from Italian to German, while effective government control was steadily extended inland from the coast as the Somali Dervish movement collapsed in on itself in the post-Great War period. This resulted from the death of Mullah Mohammed Abdullah Hassan, the political, military and ideological leader of the movement, and a resultant struggle between his lieutenants - of which the one to emerge victorious in German Somalia, Haji Sudi, negotiated a settlement with the Germans using Ottoman intermediaries which saw the Dervishes allowed to follow their radical Sufi Islamism under German auspices.
In contrast to the French, the Germans would closely monitor and control the use of League of Nations funding and administration within their colonies, ensuring that they buttressed Germany's own goals without usurping control of the administrative apparatus, although this resulted in a significantly lower level of investment by the League. The German investment in Africa would come to be known for its inclusive, collaborative and ultimately productive nature, following the Solf Doctrine of colonial administration. Ultimately, Solf's good work would see him pushed on to other things, with his appointment to Minister of Foreign Affairs under Karl Jarres, but the framework laid down by Solf and his handpicked successors would stand Germany in good stead in the decades to follow (14).
As the sole uncolonized African state in the early 20th century, Ethiopia was a state ever balanced on the edge of catastrophe. A country deeply divided between feuding factions of the royal Solomonic dynasty as well as between conservatives and modernisers, it had already experienced several recent and rapid changes in rulership by the start of the 1920s, the most recent of which had seen the suspected Muslim Emperor Lij Iyasu removed from power by conservative Christian nobles in favor of his aunt, who crowned the 40-year old Zewditu Empress in his place in 1916. However, the prospect of handing over actual governing power to Zewditu proved unacceptable to many of these nobles, with the result that Zewditu's young second cousin Ras Tafari Makonnen was appointed to serve as regent in her place while her father's, former Emperor Menelik, and Iyasu's grandfather, favourite general Hapte Giorgis Dinagde was named Commander-in-Chief of the Army.
While the conservative Ethiopian aristocracy was generally supportive of Zewditu, they were less than enthusiastic about many of her relatives. Zewditu's stepmother and the aunt of her husband Ras Gugsa Welle, Dowager Empress Taytu Betul, had withdrawn from the capital after Menelik's death, but was still distrusted somewhat due to the favoritism she had practiced towards her family during the reign of her late husband. There was even some speculation that she had been planning to secure the throne for Gugsa Welle over Iyasu when her husband died. In an attempt to limit the Dowager Empress' influence, the aristocracy arranged for Gugsa Welle to be appointed to a remote governorship, removing him from court and sought to nullify his marriage. This move, while intended as a strike against Taytu rather than against Zewditu, upset the Empress greatly for she dearly loved her husband. This, coupled with the total collapse of her relations to Iyasu, who she was fond of despite his mistreatment of her during his reign, resulted in a growing depression for the Empress which saw her increasingly withdrawn from public affairs over the course of the 1920s.
The early period of Zewditu's reign was marked by a war against Iyasu, who had escaped captivity soon after Zewditu's ascension. Backed by his father, Negus Mikael of Wollo, a powerful northern nobleman, Iyasu attempted to regain the throne. However, the father-son duo failed to effectively coordinate their efforts and, after some initial victories for the rebels, Iyasu's father was eventually defeated and captured at the Battle of Segale. The Negus was paraded through the streets of Addis Ababa in chains, carrying a rock of repentance upon his shoulders, before entering the throne room and kissing the Empress' shoes to beg for her mercy. Upon hearing of his father's defeat and humiliation, Iyasu himself fled for foreign lands, but was caught in the attempt by Ras Gugsa Araya Selassie, the son of Zewditu's first husband by another woman. From there, Gugsa Araya Selassie transferred Iyasu to Tafari Makonnen's lands in direct opposition to Zewditu's wishes, who had wanted to keep Iyasu in the palace where he could receive religious counsel and hopefully recover from his fall into heathenry.
As Empress Zewditu's reign progressed, the difference in outlook gradually widened between her and her appointed heir. Tafari Makonnen was a modernizer, believing that Ethiopia needed to open itself to the world in a cautious but intelligent manner in order to survive in the modern world, and on that basis built up a significant backing amongst many younger nobles. By contrast, Zewditu was a conservative, believing in the preservation of Ethiopian tradition and had the strong backing of the church in this belief. However, as Zewditu slowly withdrew from active politics, leaving more and more power to Tafari, the modernists grew ever more powerful. Under Tafari's direction, Ethiopia entered the League of Nations, dispatched fact-finding missions to Europe, introduced westernized education on a limited basis and abolished slavery while Zewditu busied herself with religious activities - sponsoring the construction of a number of significant churches as she grew ever more distant from secular affairs. The death of Commander-in-Chief Hapte Giorgis Dinagde in 1926 removed the last major conservative figure capable of challenging Tafari Makonnen, in the process lighting a fuse which was to finally explode in 1928 (15).
The cause of this explosion, while caused on an underlying level by the increasingly power of Tafari Makonnen and his modernists, was directly linked to the signing of the German-Ethiopian Treaty of 1928. This treaty, which saw Ethiopia granted a concession in Mogadishu allowing Ethiopia access to the sea, in return for permitting the construction of a jointly-owned railroad from Mogadishu to Dodola, south of Addis Ababa, while fixing the border between German Somalia and Ethiopia slightly in German favour, was to serve as the final spark which set of the crisis which was to slowly come to consume Ethiopia whole. The treaty came about following a series of failed efforts by the French and British to negotiate similar agreements for a road between French Somaliland and Ethiopia in 1925 which so worried Tafari that he went to the League of Nations for arbitration. This resulted in a Anglo-French withdrawal from the negotiations while raising awareness to the negotiations in Europe. This was to open a path for the Germans, whose reputation in Ethiopia was not yet poisoned by past colonial intrigues, to make their successful bid to the Ethiopians (16).
Outraged by the treaty, which the conservatives saw as a modernist folly which would open a path towards colonial domination by the Germans, the conservatives began to plot a coup, believing that only by removing the cancerous Tafari Makonnen could they restore order to the country. However, before the attempt could be made, the coup planners found themselves preempted by the bellicose old general Balcha Safo who marched on Addis Ababa with a thousands-strong army to protest the treaty directly to the Empress. However, even as Balcha was meeting with the Empress and promising his support to her, Tafari Makonnen was making his countermove. Rushing to the parade grounds beyond the city, Tafari Makonnen informed Balcha's soldiers that the crisis had been resolved and that they were being rewarded for their services, paying out a considerable sum of money to secure their dispersal. Thus, when Balcha returned, it was to an empty camp and Tafari Makonnen's men, who placed him under arrest.
Worried that Balcha's failure would lead to the discovery of their plot, the coup makers went ahead and moved on Tafari barely a week after the Balcha Affair. Originally planning to capture Tafari Makonnen as he made his way to the palace, it was not long before plans went horribly awry. Having gathered a number of arms and gone in search of the Regent, they soon encountered him. However, when they ran into Tafari Makonnen they soon discovered, to their horror, that he had a company of soldiers with him who took this attempted coup against their leader rather poorly. As a result, the conspirators were forced to flee, eventually making their way onto palace grounds where they took refuge in Menelik II's mausoleum. Tafari Makonnen and his men surrounded the conspirators in the mausoleum and were planning to storm the building, when they were themselves surrounded by Zewditu's personal guard, who were shocked by the sudden intrusion of armed men into the palace. However, as more of Tafari Makonnen's men rushed to the scene in response to garbled messages dispatched by Tafari Makonnen, the situation began to turn against the conspirators and Zewditu's guards, who now found themselves surrounded in turn. With guns pointed in all directions, it only took a hothead to set off disaster. While it is unclear who fired the first shot, the result was a bloodbath which left not only most of the conspirators dead alongside Zewditu's guards, but also Ras Tafari Makonnen and many of his men.
The sudden eruption of violence and decapitation of both modernist and conservative factions would have caused utter chaos if not for Zewditu's quick mediation. Drawing on her personal gravitas, she met the surviving Tafari-aligned soldiers in full regal dress and asked them to take up the duty of guarding the palace and preventing word of the disaster from getting out until the situation could be resolved. This accomplished, she sent a secret message to her exiled husband Ras Gugsa Welle, who rushed to Addis Ababa, arriving in the city before word got out. As a result, Gugsa Welle was able to sweep in and set things up to his liking, calling up Balcha Safo to take the post of Commander-in-Chief while reaffirming his marriage to Zewditu, which had never officially been ended, and taking up the role of Regent formerly held by Tafari Makonnen.
Of course, this was not met with equanimity on anyone's part, and both conservative and progressive factions were soon set to plotting. While Zewditu was able to use her influence amongst the conservatives to calm things on their part, the modernists rallied around Ras Gugsa Araya Selassie who had captured Iyasu previously and was the legitimate son of Emperor Yohannes IV, last emperor of the Tigrean Cadet branch of the Solomonids. The rushed marriage of Tafari Makonnen's eldest daughter Romanework Tafari Makonnen to Ras Gugsa Araya Selassie's son Haile Selassie Gugsa further cemented these ties and served to set the stage for civil war. Over the course of late 1928 and all of 1929, Gugsa Welle was able to mostly keep the situation in check, but as 1930 came under way the situation drastically worsened as the Empress contracted typhoid on top of a preexisting case of diabetes - dying on the 2nd of April 1930 without any children. The will which was produced upon her death specified that her husband Gugsa Welle was to succeed her to the throne (17).
Footnotes:
(11) I was beginning work on what had been happening in Africa during the 1920s, when it dawned on me the sort of devastation an improperly managed trade agreement between the British and Americans might have. We have seen multiple instances of western agricultural industries dumping their cheap produce on the African market and devastating native industries in the years since decolonization was implemented, so it does not seem out of the realm of possibility to me that something similar would happen with this trade agreement. Neither the British nor the Americans really even considered that the agreement might mean disaster elsewhere when it was passed, and did nothing to protect native industries which were just getting up and running when the trade agreement was signed. While there are some mitigation efforts - mostly the shift into tropical and inedible cash crops and a refocusing of colonial settlements around mining, animal husbandry and resource extraction rather than plantation management - there really is little to mitigate the impact on Africans in the British Empire. While the continent might have been able to find a new equilibrium if trade volumes from America had remained steady, the Dust Bowl prevents this and results in a sudden drop off in the quality and quantity of produce exported to Africa - leading to sudden and massive food shortages. I am sorry to cut us off before we can deal with the crisis that follows, but I can promise a full section on how it plays out across British Africa in Update 34.
(12) A great deal of this is at least reminiscent of OTL's developments. Many of the divides from OTL, particularly the citizen/subject distinction, remain in place and flourishing, but there are some important differences. The French annexation of most of Belgian Congo opens up new avenues for colonial expansion on the part of the French, who at least somewhat follow the avenues undertaken by the Belgians in their expansion of the transportation network and development of vacant lands - although they are not quite as willing to just hand it over to various corporations as the Belgians were, and instead nationalize the lands while leasing it to companies on decades-long contracts. Additionally, we see the expansion of the League of Nations into tasks we would IOTL associate with the UN, particularly aid, education and healthcare, all under the auspices of the French state. The unique difference between the French and League school systems however are that the French cater almost exclusively to the elites while the League schools take in orphans, rural and urban poor, and various others who they hope to put through school and one day use to staff their ever expanding bureaucracies in Africa. Due to the French and, as we will later see, German support for the League's efforts, the League of Nations will in time become one of the great movers and shakers on the continent - unless something should occur which disrupts that rise. It should also be noted that the collapse of the British African agricultural sector has, at least to a lesser degree, spilled over the border into other colonial nations, with particularly the Congo and Ivory Coast plantations receiving a good deal of migrant labor from British Nigeria.
(13) Again, the developments in Portuguese Africa remain pretty close to OTL, although at a faster pace. The ascension of the Sidonist government means that much of the political chaos in Portugal of the 1920s is avoided, while many of the initiatives undertaken by the Estado Novo the decade after match up pretty well with Sidonio's ambitions. The Estatuto is passed five years earlier than IOTL while the impact and influence of the chartered companies are reduced considerably. In general, the most significant trend here is that with the Portuguese are better control of their state and colonial affairs, they are able to enact a much more comprehensive and detailed effort than IOTL. I also think it is notable to point out that while there are still some pretty hefty taboos in French and British society about mixed-race children and couples, it is much lessened in Portugal and its colonies. They view their assimilado population, primarily made up of such mixed-race children, as one of their greatest strengths in strengthening their hold on the various colonies and often employ them in the colonial administration.
(14) Wilhelm Solf never really got a chance to implement his colonial policies IOTL, despite sitting as colonial secretary from 1911 till 1918. Here he gets to push forward following his own approach, which comes to characterize German colonial policy in general. While the British largely neglect their African possessions, and the French and Portuguese try to turn them into an extension of their metropoles, the German approach becomes more about a cooptation of their native populations. They work to make them self-sufficient and profitable by making them a shareholder in their own colonial ambitions and by creating systems based on pre-existing local norms, laws and traditions. Now, this process is by no means perfect and there are plenty of examples of exploitation in German Africa, but on the whole and as colonial policy they seek to make their colonial populations invest themselves in the colonies. It is worth noting that the Dervish revolt in British Somaliland continues until the late 1920s under new leadership (not Haji Sudi) when the British finally find the time to dispatch forces to crush the rebels, most ultimately fleeing over the border to Haji Sudi, settling down in German Somalia.
(15) This is honestly almost all OTL, I just needed to get the background in place before we could get to the divergences. Ethiopia is a fascinating country which was going through a series of formative tumults during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Just to clarify, a Ras holds a similar position to a Duke in more European settings, a Negus is the equivalent of a King and when I write Empress or Emperor it is actually a title translated as King/Queen of Kings. Zewditu is honestly a rather pitiable figure from what I have been able to read. She was married three times in her youth to various members of the Solomonic dynasty before marrying Gugsa Welle, who she seems to have come to care greatly for. Their marriage actually seems to have been quite happy, when it wasn't disrupted by others, but turned tragic when Iyasu came to power. Welle was imprisoned on charges of murder and held in horrid conditions for months while Zewditu begged her nephew for his release, which was denied, Welle only being released after the coup. In fact, Zewditu seems to have been a surprising loving and forgiving woman considering the cutthroat environment she was in, wanting to reform her nephew despite his trespasses and trying to protect her beloved husband when possible. Oh, and for those who do not know, Ras Tafari Makonnen is OTL's Emperor Haile Selassie I of Ethiopia who also gave his name to Rastafarianism.
(16) Alright, so this is a bit of a mix and match between OTL and TTL events. With the Italians out of the picture, they obviously are not part of the negotiations for access to the Ethiopian markets - instead the French, British and Germans take up that role. Like IOTL the 1925 Anglo-French/Italian efforts falter because of Tafari's suspicions of their motivations and threat of using the League (much more effective ITTL than IOTL), but while it was the Italians who made a second attempt in 1928 here it is the Germans who push forward and secure an agreement. Further, in contrast to OTL where the Italians effectively bribed Tafari to take the agreement, here it is more a matter of Tafari viewing partnership with the Germans as the best of a lot of bad options on the basis of their treatment of the Dervish movement in Somalia and general approach to African relations.
(17) The start of the coup all plays out basically like IOTL - it is worth noting that there are about two months between Balcha's appearance and the actual coup attempt (I highly recommend reading up on Balcha's failed march on Addis Ababa, he really ends up falling flat on his face), and the tragicomic nature of the coup makers apparently not having expected Tafari Makonnen to have a company of soldiers with him is all OTL. The retreat to the palace mausoleum and consecutive rings of surrounded men are also OTL (I have taken the liberty of assuming that Zewditu was unaware of the coup and that her personal guards turned up to figure out what was going on, but ultimately there is no way to know) but where things diverge is that the outer ring of Tafari forces are not anywhere as well armed as IOTL. IOTL Tafari had received a great deal of modern small arms and an outdated Fiat 3000 tank given to him by the Italians during their negotiations which proved sufficient to scare Zewditu's personal guard into surrender, here they never got those arms and as such are unable to threaten the guards into compliance with overwhelming force, resulting in a bloodbath. The death of Ras Tafari Makonnen is a defining moment in Ethiopian history ITTL and is where things really begin to diverge from OTL. Zewditu proves that she has an impressive level of gravitas by turning her one-time rival's forces to her own protection and is able to call in her husband (I am honestly uncertain of what exactly their marriage status was - I haven't seen mentions of a divorce, just that Welle was set aside) back from effective exile. Zewditu dies on schedule as I am working on the assumption that her death was by disease as believed in modern readings of events - and not poison as was originally suspected IOTL. Her death and apparent decision to select Gusga Welle as successor light the fuse. We will get back to both the British African Crisis and the Ethiopian Crisis in Update 34.
Victims of the South Mesopotamia Famine
The Two Rivers Crisis
As with so much else, the construction of major dams on the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers in the late 1920s and early 1930s were to have surprising secondary consequences. Specifically, the successful construction of major dams at Aleppo and Kut would result in the slackening of the waters in both rivers and the drying out of a few subsidiary rivers as largescale irrigation endeavors were undertaken in northern Mesopotamia. The consequences were soon felt down river when the rivers failed to bring sufficient water for the farms and plantations in western Arabistan and Kuwait. Now, while neither state was a major agricultural producer, they depended primarily on the produce of their domestic farmers to feed most of the population, and when the harvests of 1931 failed, it caused considerable worry across the region. Efforts were undertaken to purchase foodstuffs from British India and protests were lodged with the Ottoman provincial governments in northern Mesopotamia over the excessive damming efforts. Nevertheless, the two states made it through the first round of harvest failures relatively intact, if with a serious financial loss. When the spring floods of 1932 failed, the water accumulating above the Kut and Aleppo dams, for a second time it proved devastating.
Having already run up considerable debts the previous years, and having leveraged their modest rights to the oil being pumped by British companies, neither Sheikh Khaz'al of Arabistan nor Sheikh Ahmad of Kuwait were able to muster the domestic resources to tide over their population for a second year in a row, and instead saw themselves forced to turn to the British for aid. It was at this moment, with the populace increasingly worried about the prospect of a famine, that the feud between the two states and their connections to rival parts of the British government, reared its ugly head. While the Indian Secretariat proved themselves swift to act, dispatching famine relief and medical staff to support the Kuwaiti state, the Colonial Office in London felt itself too far removed from the situation and thus directed the Indian Secretariat to extend its famine relief to Arabistan as well.
Now, in most circumstances this would not have been a major ask, but over the preceding four years the conflict between the Indian Secretariat and Colonial Office had escalated to the point at which dispatches between the two could barely be considered civil. Any attempt by the Colonial Office to direct Indian efforts had come to be seen as a wedge which the Labour government could use to push the Liberal-Conservative administration in India from their posts, and further, the emerging agricultural crisis in British Africa required assistance as well to deal with their sudden food shortages. The result was that while Kuwait saw the arrival of significant support to combat the growing crisis, Sheikh Khaz'al was left without any aid at all, stuck in the midst of a bureaucratic feud with seemingly no end in sight. With relations already dismal between Kuwait and Arabistan, it should come as little surprise that cross-border raids from Arabistan in an effort to secure famine relief rose rapidly, soon resulting in open skirmishes between Kuwaiti and Arabistani forces and a resultant hampering of relief efforts in Kuwait, as the situation degenerated further (18).
The escalation of tensions between Kuwait and Arabistan caught the British off guard and severely worsened the situation in both states. The raids on famine relief deliveries resulted in the formation of large armed convoys, greatly slowing the efforts, while the Arabistanis sought to rob their neighbors of food to feed their own families on a larger scale. In response to Kuwaiti entreaties, British representatives from the Indian Secretariat met in person with Khaz'al to protest the attacks and demand that he bring his people back under control. While Khaz'al was ostensibly open to the suggestion, he was swift to point out that there was little he could do to stop starving peasants and pastoralists from trying to survive in a crisis, adding that considering the availability of resources to deal with the Kuwaiti famine, the same effort should be extended to his own people. With this added pressure motivating them, the Indian Secretariat ultimately decided to expand famine relief efforts by half, and then split it evenly between the two middle eastern states.
However, far from resolving the issue, it enflamed the situation further as the Kuwaitis suddenly saw their famine relief cut by a quarter, resulting in new protests being lodged with the Indian Secretariat, which it turn set off another round of bureaucratic infighting. Throughout this constant bickering and backbiting, the situation for the common man worsened, as emergency rations ran out and the intense heat of summer dried out already reduced sources of water on a wide scale. The result was that many shuttered their homes and sought towards the cities in hope of better access to food, the famine relief efforts having extended from the Persian Gulf Coast, up the rivers, with depots constructed in the cities and towns along the way, wherefrom relief efforts should theoretically extend into the hinterlands, although it rarely got that far.
It did not take long before bandits began to emerge, raiding the famine relief caravans and their neighbours, and people took to the streets in public protest at the state of affairs. Even as alarms began to ring across the colonial administration, and the scope of the crisis became clear, these protests turned into riots as granaries warehouses used to store famine relief were attacked by mobs of people in towns and cities across both Kuwait and Arabistan, although the further upstream the less troops were available to guard these supplies and thus saw their greatest losses. In Kuwait City and Basra, the British soldiers guarding the warehouses opened fire on the crowds, dispersing them for a time before armed bandits could join in on subsequent attempts on the warehouses. Increasingly desperate, the two Sheikhs turned to their neighbours for aid, breaking away from British authority in the process, with Khaz'al and Arabistan securing some food stock from the Ottomans and the Persian Socialists while the Kuwaitis were able to leverage ties to Bedouin tribes in Hashemite Arabia and Oman for purchase and transportation of food, which were often sold in return for the younger children of starving peasants or what few material goods most families had (19).
As oil production ground to a halt in the face of food shortages for the local workers and word of Ottoman famine relief coming into use by the Arabistanis, the alarms truly began to ring in Whitehall and Delhi. Not only did the sudden stoppage in oil production precipitate a sharp rise in oil prices in Britain, it also brought the crisis firmly into the public spotlight as oil futures shrank in value and the London Stock Exchange as a whole experienced a short but sharp dip in value, resulting in public warnings by economists of a possible economic slowdown.
The response on the part of the British was swift and, by most measures, an overreaction. Two brigades were dispatched from India to supplement the already present King's African Rifles, commanded by Orde Wingate, and a wing RAF air support all coming under the command of Air Commodore Frederick Bowhill as commander of the force with orders to bring order to the situation. The arrival of this force in August of 1932 would have immediate effect, as any breach of the peace was met with harsh actions - most prominently the Basra City Massacre which saw more than 50 rioters killed when they tried to break into the recently restocked granaries, and the Safwan Air Raid in which two dozen Arabistani raiders were killed in strafing runs by RAF forces. These harsh measures were then followed by a streamlined famine relief effort, with each shipment protected by a soldiers backed up by the undefeatable force of air power.
In this way, the famine was slowly brought under control and oil production restarted, although not before tens of thousands had died. Furthermore, the decision of the British to remove Sheikh Khaz'al from power and appoint Sheikh Ahmad al-Jabar of Kuwait as his successor, while significantly strengthening British presence on the ground, would prove immensely unpopular, with Khaz'al fleeing into the mountains of Persia before making his way northward to the Ottomans, where he found succour. The unification of Arabistan with Kuwait, undertaken in a hasty and relatively unplanned manner at the behest of the recently appointed civilian administrator of the region, Bernard Rawdon Reilly from the Indian Secretariat, caused widespread unrest across much of Arabistan and required the further use of force to implement, resulting in almost a thousand more deaths before the region was pacified. With harvest season having been disrupted by the chaos and violence of the late summer, the British soon came to realize that they would need at least another year of famine relief and a resolution to the use of water resources along the Euphrates and Tigris with the Ottomans before they could restore the situation in southern Mesopotamia (20).
As a result of the realization that matters had to be settled with the Ottomans to resolve the crisis, the British Foreign Office lodged a protest with the Ottomans in early September, even as British arms were paving the path for famine relief. This was far from the first protest, the Kuwaitis, Arabistanis and the Indian Secretariat having all demanded restitution, aid or half a hundred other things from both provincial and national governments in the Ottoman Empire. However, this time it was Whitehall calling on the Porte, elevating the matter considerably from what had previously been seen as a minor colonial squabble to one of the most pressing international diplomatic incidents since the end of the Russian Civil War.
Nevertheless, the Ottomans proved surprisingly lax in replying to the British, barely acknowledging any shred of responsibility for the events leading up to the South Mesopotamia Famine and questioning what right the British had to question Ottoman domestic policies. This response, coming at a time when the British were coming to view their state as being in a state of crisis, proved far too little to satisfy British demands, and drew furious responses when read aloud in the halls of Parliament. The result was a worsening of relations over the next two months, as affairs were gradually resolved in South Mesopotamia, which saw a rise in jingoistic slogans and calls for the humbling of Turkey in media and parliament. The flight of Sheikh Khaz'al of Arabistan to the Ottoman Empire, where he was received as though still an incumbent Sheikh by the Ottoman Sultan Abdulmejid II in December of 1932, turned a diplomatic tiff into an open crisis as the prospect of the Ottomans backing Khaz'al in a restoration to his throne, in addition to the ongoing conflict over the management of the Tigris and Euphrates, reached a climax.
The result was the issuing of the January Demands, a diplomatic communiqué which set out the British diplomatic position as to the various issues causing conflict between the Ottoman Empire and the British Empire. The first demand was the handover of Sheikh Khaz'al to British authorities so that he could be persecuted in his role in the violent turmoil of South Mesopotamia. The second was a demand that the Ottomans cease all damming and irrigation efforts on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers until the matter could be resolved properly. Third, and most outrageously, this matter of how the water resources of the two rivers should be utilised was to be handed over to a Tigris-Euphrates Water Management Board with seating for the Ottomans, British, Kuwaitis and Arabistanis, which would in effect give the British three-quarters majority on the board as outlined by the British. Not only would this put an effective end to the Ottoman efforts at redeveloping northern and central Mesopotamia, it would result in the undermining of Ottoman autonomy and control over almost the entirety of their southern provinces in favor of the British. The January Demands could hardly have met with a more hostile reception in Istanbul when they arrived. The Two Rivers Crisis had begun (21).
Footnotes:
(18) While there were damming efforts in the region IOTL, the scale of it ITTL dwarfs those efforts. That, coupled with an explosion in irrigation projects across the region and an extended dry period, are the cause of drought further south. The crisis which emerges as a result is very much a man-made one, a fact which the British, Arabistani and Kuwaiti leaderships are all well aware of, and have protested. Never the less, while the crisis might have been manageable for a year or two longer with proper British support, the internal turmoil of the British colonial administration makes the entire situation worse. We have previously seen how the ascension of the Labour government has provoked troubles with the British bureaucracy, but the emergent crisis in Mesopotamia is, at least initially, one amongst many crises the British have to deal with in the early 1930s.
(19) Basically, things go completely off the rails as calamity strikes and the British mishandle affairs. Now it is important to note that up until this point, the famine hasn't really come to wider attention as both the responsible parties in the Indian and Colonial Secretariats are trying to keep their bickering in-house, neither wanting to take the blame for the crisis. However, events are rapidly escalating and the crisis is beginning to enter the media and political limelight in Britain - forcing greater action. The decision to split relief between the two states, which results in a reduction of Kuwaiti aid, is an example of British failures to really grasp quite how dire the situation has become - most of the decision makers being in India and Britain respectively and communicating with each other by telegram (hardly the most expressive of mediums) - and also a failure to understand quite how hostile relations between Arabistan and Kuwait have become. It is worth noting that this crisis is overlapping with various others around the world, which I haven't gotten to describing just yet, such as the food crisis in British Africa to name one already mentioned example, which should help explain why the British are being particularly sluggish in their response this time around. However, the decision on the part of Khaz'al and the state of Arabistan to negotiate for relief with the Ottomans and Socialist Persians certainly draws British focus to the crisis.
(20) So the situation in southern Mesopotamia has finally been brought to order, at least for the time being. However, in the process the British have pretty much pissed off just about everyone they could in the region. While they do begin to get a handle on the immediate crisis, the effort has turned a mild distaste into open hatred amongst many locals in the region. The decision to unite Arabistan and Kuwait, taken by a recently arrived civilian appointee with little to know experience in Mesopotamian affairs, is done because many in the British colonial service (particularly in India) believe that the reason the situation went so badly was the divided nature of the leadership in the region - thus, by removing the figure (Khaz'al) who has been the more troublesome (negotiating with the Ottomans and Persians, being unable or unwilling to restrain raids into Kuwait and more) they believe that they can resolve the issue in a quick and simple manner. Of course, it isn't that simple, and the move firmly alienates Arabistan from the British to an even greater extent than in the past while giving the Ottomans a weapon in the struggle to come over control of the Tigris and Euphrates river.
(21) Yes, yes, I am sorry about ending this section on a cliffhanger as well. The Two Rivers Crisis, as it will be known to posterity, really has two distinct phases, the first phase, which centers on the South Mesopotamia Famine and the chaotic situation which results therefrom, and a second phase in which the international powers come into conflict with one another in the first major conflict between great powers since the end of the Russian Civil War, possibly the end of the Great War depending on your outlook. Neither side in this diplomatic conflict is particularly well positioned to argue that they are in the right, but the British are overplaying their hand quite a bit at this point. The Ottomans are no longer the Sick Man of Europe, a power to be bullied and exploited at the drop of a hat. They are a powerful, oil-fuelled great power which has spent the last decade modernising and expanding their capacities in all matters, while the British are dealing with colonial troubles abroad and worrying economic prospects at home.
End Note:
I hope you all enjoyed this segment. We are now starting to move into the sections where I start introducing somewhat new developments. I know that the Brit-Screw is a bit heavy handed in this update, but I will be giving a much more detailed explanation of what is actually happening in both Britain and the Ottoman Empire to justify these developments.
It is for that reason it will take some time before we actually get back to the Two Rivers Crisis though.
I particularly enjoyed digging into Ethiopian history when researching for this update. I ended up finding just the right blend of court factional politics, religious tensions and strife over modernisation, really just hit all the right buttons.
I am really looking forward to hearing what everyone thinks of this update.
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I love this episode. This is one of my favourites in recent episodes because it has German Africa Colonies (to me they are really interesting) and small mention of my motherland, Turkey.
But, I have one question: What is going on in Tsingtao?
But, I have one question: What is going on in Tsingtao?
It will take more than this for the British Empire to collapse, but the Empire is undoubtedly going to be facing a painful decade to come.
Happy you enjoyed it.
As to Qingdao, the Germans got it back from the Japanese alongside Tianjin at the Copenhagen Conference in return for most of their other concessions in the region and the Pacific. You can go back to Update 16 for the contents of the treaty in detail.
Damn, a lot of that was depressing. But interesting too, so I'll keep reading. You mentioned that the Germans are in control of Katanga, is that referring to OTL Katanga or the long piece of land of Eastern Congo that they got in Copenhagen. Also you referred to French Eritrea, that's just French Djibouti right? Cuz I don't remember them getting Italian Eritrea, I though that still went to the British ITTL. I could be mistaken.
Also here's hoping for a better Ethiopia ITTL, though Haile Selassie is dead, which is a bit unfortunate.
. You mentioned that the Germans are in control of Katanga, is that referring to OTL Katanga or the long piece of land of Eastern Congo that they got in Copenhagen. Also you referred to French Eritrea, that's just French Djibouti right? Cuz I don't remember them getting Italian Eritrea, I though that still went to the British ITTL. I could be mistaken.Also here's hoping for a better Ethiopia ITTL, though Haile Selassie is dead, which is a bit unfortunate.
Damn, a lot of that was depressing. But interesting too, so I'll keep reading
Also here's hoping for a better Ethiopia ITTL, though Haile Selassie is dead, which is a bit unfortunate.
I try to maintain a balance with hopeful and depressing events, but there are some sections which are going to be rather dark. When I finished writing about events in British Africa (not this update, but the next one about the region) I honestly needed to take a bit of a break in order to improve my mood.
Katanga is in reference to German Katanga - i.e. the southern parts of the region they secured at Copenhagen.
Thanks for pointing out the bit with French Eritrea, it was my mistake - I meant French Somaliland. Should be in order now.
Haile Selassie was IMO very much on the wank end of the screw-wank spectrum (I can't believe I just wrote that), whereas Ethiopia is going to be having a pretty bad time. The succession crisis which erupts following Zewditu's death will be a pretty defining event in Ethiopian history.
Damn, I was really hoping Ethiopia would maybe get a better deal in this 20th century, but oh well.
Interesting developments, especially with the Ottoman Empire and Mesopotamia. Regarding the situation, I do not think the British will be able to gain much from the crisis. They will likely have to deal with the former Central Powers supporting the Ottomans (especially Germany), which also has the effect of making Britain's last resort, war with the Ottoman Empire a non-starter since it will very likely expand very quickly and I do not believe the British can count of French or American support, beyond diplomatic support even if that, on the issue. The British would basically have to fight the Central Powers alone. I believe that the resolution will be quite in favor of the Ottomans with only minor concessions to the British.
In the long run, I think this might be the beginning of the end of the British Empire, maybe even its "Suez moment" ITTL, depending on how the resolution of this crisis goes. It has now shown itself being rather incompetent at handling a crisis in a relatively small territory, which doesn't send good messages to other colonial subjects. Not to mention the economy beginning to slow down from aftershocks from this event.
In the long run, I think this might be the beginning of the end of the British Empire, maybe even its "Suez moment" ITTL, depending on how the resolution of this crisis goes. It has now shown itself being rather incompetent at handling a crisis in a relatively small territory, which doesn't send good messages to other colonial subjects. Not to mention the economy beginning to slow down from aftershocks from this event.