Until Every Drop of Blood Is Paid: A More Radical American Civil War

In fairness Davis didn’t appoint Bragg on friendship. Their history dates back to Davis’ tenure as Secretary of War. Davis undertook a number of initiatives to reform the army, including the army's artillery arm. Bragg, as the most prominent artillery commander to emerge from the Mexican War, disagreed with Davis's reforms. This turned into a squabble. After Bragg was given an unfavorable posting (assigned to the frontier to "chase Indians with six-pounders"), he decided that Davis had it in for him and resigned. At the start of the ACW, Bragg was posted to the relative backwater of Pensacola.

When Davis appointed Bragg commander of the Army of Tennessee Bragg was the obvious choice. His main commander in the west, Albert Sidney Johnston, was dead. And now Johnston's successor was Beauregard. Beauregard was already a political opponent of Davis, and he performed a number of actions without having the liberty to do so or to have the courtesy inform Davis of his decisions. This is where Bragg comes in. He was already chief of staff of the army and had exercised command of the Army of the Mississippi when Beauregard was sick or was acting as an army group commander (after Van Dorn's army had come to Corinth). He had also received praise for his actions at Shiloh.

The idea of replacing Bragg after Kentucky and Stones River was discussed for some time but the issue was his replacement. Johnston could have replaced Bragg but chose not to. Beauregard was a nonstarter. Returning him to command would be an admission that Davis had made a mistake in replacing him. Like Johnston, Beauregard was an anti-administration figure. This left Hardee, the senior subordinate from the Army of Tennessee. Yet he had turned down command of the army before, despite his criticisms of those would assume the responsibility of commanding it.

Still that is not to say Davis made very bad personnel choices. The worst of which Leonidas Polk. Despite resigning the army just after graduation, Davis thought Polk would make a fine general while A.S. Johnston made his way west. This resulted in the Confederate invasion of Kentucky and opened the floodgate for the Federals to pour into the Confederate Heartland. Even that Polk remained in the army and remained as inept as ever. The problem of Polk wouldn’t be solved until a Yankee cannon sent him his just reward. Sherman should have cashiered the gunner out of the army!

Your characterization of Bragg's pre-war relationship with Davis is accurate. (The animus was, however, more on Bragg's side than Davis's, which may well have been an important distinction).

The initial promotion of Bragg to commander of the Army of Tennessee is at least arguable; Bragg's flaws were perhaps not fully apparent yet, save possibly to those officers who knew him most intimately. Keeping him on after Stones River and Kentucky is harder to defend, especially with Hardee (the man who made Stones River come within an ace of decisive victory for the South) available; it has always been inexplicable to me (and to Hardee!) why Davis saw Hardee's initial refusal of command as perpetually disqualifying.

But what counted in Bragg's favor for Davis in 1863 was indeed loyalty, in an indirect way: Davis had a low opinion of the the very idea of criticism of Bragg by his senior officers. It looked to him like, well, disloyalty. It made it harder for him to credit their views.

Bragg is less likely to fare well with a Breckinridge Administration. In OTL, Breckinridge had sound relationships and sterling reviews from every commanding general he served under, save one: Braxton Bragg.

But that's Braxton Bragg for you.

Sherman should have cashiered the gunner out of the army!

But it was actually Sherman who ordered the barrage, after spotting Johnston's party on Pine Top (albeit not without realizing it included Polk). "How saucy they are," he said. "Make 'em take cover."

Sherman actually loathed Polk, and what he stood for - not just a secesh, but clergy, too, and Sherman had little use for clergy. He was actually delighted with Leatherbreeches Dilger.
 
The idea of replacing Bragg after Kentucky and Stones River was discussed for some time but the issue was his replacement. Johnston could have replaced Bragg but chose not to. Beauregard was a nonstarter. Returning him to command would be an admission that Davis had made a mistake in replacing him. Like Johnston, Beauregard was an anti-administration figure. This left Hardee, the senior subordinate from the Army of Tennessee. Yet he had turned down command of the army before, despite his criticisms of those would assume the responsibility of commanding it.

I agree that Bragg's initial appointment wasn't a result of Davis' incompetency, and in fact I've argued before (in reddit) that without the benefit of hindsight, Bragg seemed like a natural, good choice. My problem with Davis is how he refused to take the measures necessary to ensure balance and professionalism within the Army of Tennesse. Perhaps he couldn't replace Bragg because he didn't have a suitable replacement, but he could have handled better the complains of the officers. One of the main problems these officers found was that Davis seemingly didn't care about Bragg's shortcomings, and did nothing to remedy them. At the very least, I think Breckinridge would be able to assuage their fears.
 
I agree that Bragg's initial appointment wasn't a result of Davis' incompetency, and in fact I've argued before (in reddit) that without the benefit of hindsight, Bragg seemed like a natural, good choice. My problem with Davis is how he refused to take the measures necessary to ensure balance and professionalism within the Army of Tennesse. Perhaps he couldn't replace Bragg because he didn't have a suitable replacement, but he could have handled better the complains of the officers. One of the main problems these officers found was that Davis seemingly didn't care about Bragg's shortcomings, and did nothing to remedy them. At the very least, I think Breckinridge would be able to assuage their fears.

Anyone who had a close familiarity with Bragg's pre-war record in the old army would have known he was utterly unfit for high command - or hell, almost any position.

The problem is, I don't think Davis was aware of most of it.

Or at least, I hope he wasn't. Bragg's efforts to undermine Winfield Scott (see the "Notes on Our Army" episode, and his 1844 court martial) were precisely the sort of thing that would have offended Davis as acts of disloyalty to a superior. But then again, Davis himself clashed heavily with Scott, and I'd be curious to dig into the record to see how much he knew of Bragg's actions along these lines, and how he perceived them.

The obvious replacement for Bragg in 1862-63 was Hardee. But for some reason, Davis didn't particularly like him, and was more than happy to take Hardee's initial refusal to take the job as perpetually disqualifying.

In this regard, much of the failures of the Army of Tennessee must be laid at Davis's feet. Geography and superior Union leadership in the West were always going to make that army's task a difficult one, but so many of its wounds were self-inflicted by terrible leadership, leadership Davis selected and sustained despite its manifest failures.
 
The irony of the confederate president hating disloyalty is highly amusing.

Also, while I'm enjoying the alternate political and military developments, are there any plans for alt-technological development?

The period just before and during the civil war really saw an explosion of development, particularly in the area of small arms. Granted, a lot of ideas were either stupid or beyond their means (for the south in particular), but some had a ton of potential
 
One thing that could happen, without Davis' belief in West Pointers, natural talent could probably rise further and faster. Cleburne as a Corps or even late war Army Commander, like Hood but good, Forrest doing greater things would be interesting.

I always thought Forts Hood and Bragg were named in honor of the Confederate commanders who most aided the Union war effort.
 
The irony of the confederate president hating disloyalty is highly amusing.

Also, while I'm enjoying the alternate political and military developments, are there any plans for alt-technological development?

The period just before and during the civil war really saw an explosion of development, particularly in the area of small arms. Granted, a lot of ideas were either stupid or beyond their means (for the south in particular), but some had a ton of potential

Yeah. I don't plan to focus too much on small arms, since my knowledge is limited, and honestly I'm more interested in political and social developments, but as I mentioned previously I plan to do mini updates. One of them will focus on technology, such as the CSA's infamous submarine, small arms, gatling guns, and the like.

One thing that could happen, without Davis' belief in West Pointers, natural talent could probably rise further and faster. Cleburne as a Corps or even late war Army Commander, like Hood but good, Forrest doing greater things would be interesting.

I always thought Forts Hood and Bragg were named in honor of the Confederate commanders who most aided the Union war effort.

I despise Forrest, but he was a good commander. As for Cleburne, well, his ideas were interesting, especially recruiting Blacks to fight for the Confederacy.

Yes and perhaps one never moderated like OTL. I do also think that the greenback party it was still come into existence because after all the civil war made their existence sort of inevitable...

Most likely. Greater radicalism will probably lead to an evolution of the Free Labor ideology, and Greenbacks and others probably could adapt it into a pro-industrial labor ideology.
 
Cleburne as a Corps or even late war Army Commander, like Hood but good

That would be something to see.

It's speculative, but I really do think that Cleburne could have flourished at corps and army command.

Whereas Hood's ceiling really does seem to have been as a division commander. No shame in that: he was one of the best division commanders in the war.
 
Yeah. I don't plan to focus too much on small arms, since my knowledge is limited, and honestly I'm more interested in political and social developments, but as I mentioned previously I plan to do mini updates. One of them will focus on technology, such as the CSA's infamous submarine, small arms, gatling guns, and the like.

Oh well, thats understandable. Admittedly the ACW wasn't a war where the each side's small arms (on the whole) are significantly different, so unless the north made a sudden breakthrough in rifle technology that it could implement rapidly/widely, it wouldn't make much of a difference.
 
Oh well, thats understandable. Admittedly the ACW wasn't a war where the each side's small arms (on the whole) are significantly different, so unless the north made a sudden breakthrough in rifle technology that it could implement rapidly/widely, it wouldn't make much of a difference.

I won't say it won the war for the North, but the Spencer Rifle did make a material difference for the Union cavalry arm late in the war.
 
I won't say it won the war for the North, but the Spencer Rifle did make a material difference for the Union cavalry arm late in the war.
The spencer is cool and all, but its not a very long lived design. And its flaws are big enough the the cavalry later ditched it for a single shot trapdoor Springfield.

It would be interesting if the Henry was in the Spencer's place, interms of popularity, in the cavalry. It wouldn't change much in ACW, but post-war it could significantly effect the indian wars and possibly change American fighting doctrine, eg: using an intermediate cartridge instead of a full powered rifle round (at least among the cavalry. Its unlikely for the regular army to give up their love of full powered rifles for a long while)
 
Your characterization of Bragg's pre-war relationship with Davis is accurate. (The animus was, however, more on Bragg's side than Davis's, which may well have been an important distinction).

The initial promotion of Bragg to commander of the Army of Tennessee is at least arguable; Bragg's flaws were perhaps not fully apparent yet, save possibly to those officers who knew him most intimately. Keeping him on after Stones River and Kentucky is harder to defend, especially with Hardee (the man who made Stones River come within an ace of decisive victory for the South) available; it has always been inexplicable to me (and to Hardee!) why Davis saw Hardee's initial refusal of command as perpetually disqualifying.

But what counted in Bragg's favor for Davis in 1863 was indeed loyalty, in an indirect way: Davis had a low opinion of the the very idea of criticism of Bragg by his senior officers. It looked to him like, well, disloyalty. It made it harder for him to credit their views.
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Yep, Davis did not take personal disloyalty or slights, perceived or otherwise. One of the reasons some historians artribute Lee and Davis's positive relationship was that Lee discouraged negative talk of Davis by his subordinates.
 
Mini-updates 1: "Give us factories, and we will assert our rights."
Mini-updates 1: "Give us factories, and we will assert our rights."

In the decade of 1850, there were two main movements that dominated the southern mindset. Both movements were based around the future of the South, both also placing slavery at the center. The crux of the issue was whether the future of the South laid in expansion or modernization.

The later view was especially popular at the start of the decade. It envisioned a South that modernized and adopted the industrial technologies of the north. Proponents argued that the South had languished behind the other section in several key economical aspects. For example, the Southern share of canals was a measly 14%; their share of railroad mileage had dropped from 44% to 26%; their population grew much slower than the Northern one due to immigration both internal and external boosting Northern growth; and they only had 18% of the nation’s industry.

Overreliance on cotton had defined the economy and society of the South. Cotton was immensely profitable thanks to slave labor and the cotton gin. As trade increased, so did the price and demand of cotton. Due to this, becoming a planter became the Southern version of the American dream. Southerners ditched the development of industry or cities, dedicating themselves to agriculture. “To sell cotton in order to buy Negroes, to make more cotton to buy more Negroes, etc., is the aim of all the operations of the cotton planter”, commented Joseph H. Ingraham, a New England Yankee who authored a book about the Midwest, published in 1835. Ingraham commented that the ambition to possess a plantation and slaves drove many. Those who studied trades or educated themselves to be doctors or lawyers, would abandon their profession as soon as they obtained enough to start a plantation of their own: “As soon as the young lawyer makes enough to purchase a few hundred acres of rich land and a few slaves, he quits his profession at once, though perhaps just rising into prominence, and turns cotton planter. The legal profession at Natchez is composed entirely of young men.”

Statistic further emphasized this point. In 1840, 86.3% of the people in the South were plantation owners, farmers, slaves, or dedicated themselves to agriculture. Just 0.8% were learned professionals. Despite Southern claims that slavery allowed them to “cultivate the arts and the sciences”, while the greasy mechanics of the North labored in the mud, the truth is that slavery stunted Southern grow. The English traveler Robert Russell wrote: “Traveling through a fertile district in any of the southern states, the appearance of things is very different than that in the Free States. During two days’ sail on the Alabama River from Mobile to Montgomery, I did not see enough houses in any one spot to call it a village.” Unlike the North, the South was no land of opportunity. In fact, three times as many people migrated from the South to the North than the other way around.

Erosion resulted in exhausted soils as well. “Our small planters, after taking the best off their lands, are unable to restore them with rest, fertilizer, or otherwise. So, they are moving further west and south, in search of other fresh lands which they will also ruin”, said an Alabama state legislator who denounced this practice, which eradicated small farmers in favor of great plantations. Frederick Law Olmstead, a Yankee travelled, reported a similar phenomenon in Louisiana: “The hillsides were worn, cracked, and channeled like icebergs; the stables and Negro quarters were all abandoned— everything was given up to nature and decay.”

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J. D. B. De Bow

But the greatest source of Southern preoccupation wasn’t erosion or lack of development; it was honor, and standing firm in the face of Northern insolence. The country was faced with several important choices, as the debates about the Mexican cession and the Compromise of 1850 dominated the nation, and president Zachary Taylor threatened to march South and hang every traitor. Tensions were increasing, and talks of secession started. But the South was painfully aware of its economic inferiority, and what aggravated Southerners the most, their dependency on the North.

Most plantations relied on Northern and British banks for loans and credit; most Southern ports relied on Northern and British firms for shipping their cotton; most Southerners bought their products, including textiles, from the North. As an Alabamian explained, “our whole commerce except a small fraction is in the hands of Northern men.” This was a form of “degrading vassalage” that irritated him to no end; “financially, we are more enslaved than our Negroes”, he also added. A newspaper concurred, “The slaveholder dresses in Northern goods, rides in a Northern saddle… reads Northern books… In Northern vessels his products are carried to market… and on Northern-made paper, with a Northern pen, with Northern ink, he resolves and re-resolves in regard to his rights.” DeBow’s Review, a popular New Orleans newspaper, was the greatest denouncer of this vassalage, and the greater proponent for the solution of modernization.

“Does Ireland sustain a more degrading relation to Great Britain? Will we not throw off this humiliating dependence?”, DeBow cried, signaling to statistics that showed a stark trade deficit. He further demanded “Action! ACTION!! ACTION!!!—not in the rhetoric of Congress, but in the busy hum of mechanism, and in the thrifty operations of the hammer and anvil.” His objective was clear: maintaining Southern dominance over the Federal Government, a dominance that could be lost if they didn’t take the necessary measures, because "the North grows rich and powerful whilst we [Southerners] at best are stationary."

This fear was very real, and it combined with fears of the creation of an anti-slavery party in the South. “The fight will not be between North and South, but it will be fought in the South, between Southerners”, warned some. Hinton Rowan Helper, in his book The Impending Crisis, denounced Southern backwardness, and urged non-slaveholders to overthrow the Slavocracy. As the decade advanced, and hostilities increased, the fear of non-slaveholders constituting the “ply through which the North can extirpate slavery” from the South also increased. Through its use of statistics taken from the 1850 census that sought to prove that Free Labor was superior, The Impending Crisis also struck a raw nerve on Southerners who believed their section was being left behind.

The modernization the South sought was to be achieved through industry. They wanted railroads that crossed the entire South; Southern steam ships that traded with Europe without Yankee interference; a Southern route to the Pacific; they wanted to “throw off the degrading shackles of commercial dependence” throughout economic development. "Give us factories, machine shops, workshops, and we will be able to assert our rights”, said several editors.

Textiles and railroads seemed the natural choices. “With cotton and spinners, and with industrious labor”, the South could achieve a flourishing industry, said an investor. As for railroads, “the railroad is the path through which civilization and progress is achieved”, declared various newspapers; a Southern Whig agreed: “This railroad business is the dispensation of the present era.”

But their efforts failed, and they did so miserably. The South did grow in the decade of 1850; its railroad mileage increased by a factor of 4, ahead of the Northern threefold increase, and both per capita and absolute investment in industry and business increased. But the North simply grew too fast for the South to catch on. As a result, the Southern industrial share actually decreased to 16%. Single cities in Massachusetts continued to operate more industry than the entire South. Southerners "are destitute of every feature which characterizes an industrious people”, said the frustrated textile industrialist William Gregg. He blamed slavery, calling it a “blight” that destroyed Southern ambition and growth.

250px-Hinton_Rowan_Helper_%281829-1909%29.jpg

Hinton Rowan Helper

Gregg was, perhaps unwittingly, echoing a common Republican theme: free labor was vastly superior to slave labor. Horace Greeley had declared that when you slave a man "you destroy his ambition, his enterprise, his capacity. In the constitution of human nature, the desire of bettering one's condition is the mainspring of effort." This itself echoed the words of Adam Smith: “a slave can have no other interest but to eat as much, and to labour as little as possible.” Free Labor defined the Republican ideology and mindset. To them, Northern Free Labor defined an ideal society, by allowing free enterprise, economic development, social mobility, and democracy. Southerners betrayed these values. For Republicans more focused on economic rather than social issues, the main sin slavery committed was preventing development. “An exhausted soil, old and decaying towns, wretchedly-neglected roads, and, in every respect, an absence of enterprise and improvement, distinguish the region through which we have come, in contrast to that in which we live. Such has been the effect of slavery”, wrote William H. Seward. Other Republicans agreed, and added their own observations, “Slavery withers and blights all it touches... slavery is a foul political curse upon the institutions of our country; it is a curse upon the soil of the country, and worse than that, it is a curse upon the poor, free, laboring white man."

Why did these Southern efforts to industrialize fail? Some economists have concurred with Republicans and blamed slavery, either because Southerners lacked the labor base and consumer market necessary to kickstart industry, or because they lacked the drive to do so. Use of slaves in industrial enterprises during the Civil War seem to dispel the first notion. Thus, Southerners must have lacked the capital necessary. But the South had plenty of capital in the form of farms, plantations, and trade. However, that capital was used to acquire more slaves, and more land, instead of being invested. “All spare cash is sunk here in purchasing negroes”, complained a British investor.

Southern hostility to the idea of industry can also be blamed. Industry, working manually to produce goods was a lowly profession, fit for Yankees but not for Southern gentlemen. Many Southerners denounced the “filthy, crowded, licentious factories,” of the North, or the “hireling labor, pauperism, rowdyism, mobism, and anti-rentism," of the society of the Free States. They rejoiced and took pride in their agricultural society. “Ours is an agricultural people, and God grant that we may continue so. It is the freest, happiest, most independent, and with us, the most powerful condition on earth”, said an Alabamian. James Hammond mocked Northerners as “mudsills” who had to labor so that Southern gentlemen could dedicate themselves to noble pursuits.

The failure to industrialize in the early 1850’s gave way to shift in Southern aptitudes. Instead of going after industry and development, Southerners started to crave land and territories. Commercial conventions that had once cheered industry, now dedicated their pages to agriculture and Southern nationalism. The industrializing desire of the early decade was forgotten, and the South instead moved its eyes further south, where Mexico, Cuba, and Central America were, and where the promise of a Southern Empire laid.
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AN: As promised, the first of the mini-updates! Of course, it's not really a "mini-update", being of the same length as the regular updates, but as you can see it doesn't form part of the regular narrative I've build, but rather provides additional information. This first mini-update deals with Southern attempts to industrialize at the start of the 1850's. Regular updates will continue as usual, with Chapter 13 being posted next week.
 
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Kick
First of all, I've been really been enjoying your timeline; I like the idea of a more radical Lincoln and stronger Radical Republicans.

Regarding the mini-update, I see someone's been reading The Battle Cry of Freedom. :biggrin: These economic realities should have made people think twice about secession and its effects on the economy of the southern states.

So why did industrialization fail in the south? All the reasons you listed are valid. I would also suggest another factor; Psychology. As the book Attack and Die noted; southerners, like their Celtic ancestors, lacked tenacity and discipline. Industrial work requires a lot of dull tedious work; southerners IMHO did not like such work. Also there was a disdain for labor in general; this was why the idea of being a planter held a lot of appeal; the prospect of easy living.
 
First of all, I've been really been enjoying your timeline; I like the idea of a more radical Lincoln and stronger Radical Republicans.

Regarding the mini-update, I see someone's been reading The Battle Cry of Freedom. :biggrin: These economic realities should have made people think twice about secession and its effects on the economy of the southern states.

So why did industrialization fail in the south? All the reasons you listed are valid. I would also suggest another factor; Psychology. As the book Attack and Die noted; southerners, like their Celtic ancestors, lacked tenacity and discipline. Industrial work requires a lot of dull tedious work; southerners IMHO did not like such work. Also there was a disdain for labor in general; this was why the idea of being a planter held a lot of appeal; the prospect of easy living.
I have no inclination to accept a take that generalizes an entire race, region, or culture as lazy and undisciplined. Just because we’re writing about the 1860s doesn’t mean we have to act like we live in them.
 
I have no inclination to accept a take that generalizes an entire race, region, or culture as lazy and undisciplined. Just because we’re writing about the 1860s doesn’t mean we have to act like we live in them.

I would further add that the pursuit of easy living isn't monopolized by enterprising, uppity southerners. It's a largely universal pursuit of anyone (anyone that isn't a Calvinist that is) existing in something approaching a modern context. It's unfair to lump that general impulse with odd ideas of cultural dispositions or anything else like it. It's unwise and lazy thinking.
 
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First of all, I've been really been enjoying your timeline; I like the idea of a more radical Lincoln and stronger Radical Republicans.

Regarding the mini-update, I see someone's been reading The Battle Cry of Freedom. :biggrin: These economic realities should have made people think twice about secession and its effects on the economy of the southern states.

So why did industrialization fail in the south? All the reasons you listed are valid. I would also suggest another factor; Psychology. As the book Attack and Die noted; southerners, like their Celtic ancestors, lacked tenacity and discipline. Industrial work requires a lot of dull tedious work; southerners IMHO did not like such work. Also there was a disdain for labor in general; this was why the idea of being a planter held a lot of appeal; the prospect of easy living.

Thank you very much. I'm glad you're enjoying it. And yes, The Battle Cry of Freedom served ss my main source for this mini-update, and I mean main. I couldn't find almost anythinf about Southern efforts to industrialize in my other sources except for some comments in Foner's Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men.

I have no inclination to accept a take that generalizes an entire race, region, or culture as lazy and undisciplined. Just because we’re writing about the 1860s doesn’t mean we have to act like we live in them.

Curiously enough, Southerners made a distinction between a Northern and a Southern race. According to the genealogies they produced, Southerners were descended from the Normans of William the Conqueror, while Yankees descended from Anglo-Saxon peasants.

I would further add that the pursuit of easy living isn't monopolized by enterprising, uppity southerners. It's a largely universal pursuit of anyone (anyone that isn't a Calvinist that is) existing in something approaching a modern context. It's unfair to lump that general impulse with odd ideas of cultural dispositions anything else like it. It's unwise and lazy thinking.

Free Labor emphazised a similar goal. In the view of many, Free Labor allowed you to advance socially from farm hand or factory worker to an employer. The employees of today are the employers of tomorrow.
 
Thank you very much. I'm glad you're enjoying it. And yes, The Battle Cry of Freedom served ss my main source for this mini-update, and I mean main. I couldn't find almost anythinf about Southern efforts to industrialize in my other sources except for some comments in Foner's Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men.

If you're interested in reading more deeply into this, 'Conjectures of Order' by Michael O'Brien is fantastic on Southern intellectual life and ideology. It's very academic and scholarly and quite expensive (although I think a relatively cheap edited edition was published recently) so it's not really for everybody but it's probably one of the most significant academic history book published this century.
 
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