Until Every Drop of Blood Is Paid: A More Radical American Civil War

[Athelstane]

I'm now imagining Burnside and Hunter leading a North Carolina campaign. I kind of like Burnside... he was dealt a very shitty hand, and though Fredericksburg was absolutely his fault, I think he could have easily done better had circumstances been different.

Burnside was not a *bad* or vicious man; just promoted beyond his abilities - not an uncommon occurrence in Civil War armies.

Like McPherson says, "Lincoln would rather win the war than the argument; Davis would rather win the argument."

One of McPherson's best quips.

McPherson's excellent "What they fought for" shows many causes for fighting. Some fought for the legacy of 1776, because they wouldn't let the "greatest government in earth" fall down. To allow the Confederacy to win would be to repudiate their forefathers, their history, the Founders, Liberty, and Democracy; it would create a chain reaction that would destroy the US. Whether out of rhetoric or real fears that the US would become many "petty Republics" and that that would lead to a worse life for themselves and their families, this theme was ever present in letters and declarations by Union soldiers, who were very aware of the causes of the war and the possible consequences.

I really do think this has great explanatory value for Northern perceptions of the war and the CSA in that generation. Nor were they wrong to fear those consequences!

But I do not think it factors into present-day attitudes, which is how we got off on this tangent. More than once, in fact, have I heard progressives arguing (after certain elections) that the country would have been better off letting the South go. Ours is really an anti-nationalist age, for now; the animus is really driven by Slavery, and its centrality to why the South chose secession and war.

 

[Athelstane]

Breckinridge's main problem is that, given enough time, Unionism will assert itself and Kentucky will be lost. Especially after legislative elections return an Unionist majority. To win, Breckinridge would have to bait Lincoln into breaking Kentucky's neutrality, and making Lincoln fall for something like that wouldn't be easy.

And of course the reason the Union in OTL did *not* break Kentucky's neutrality is because Lincoln put Robert Anderson (a Kentuckian) in charge of that theater, and Anderson was smart enough to stay in Cincinnati, sitting back patiently to let Bishop Polk violate Kentucky neutrality first.

But in THIS timeline, Robert Anderson is not the Hero of Sumter, and is not likely to be given that job. Hmmmm....

One other thought on Breckinridge:

This timeline is oriented around a more radicalized war, with a more radicalized outcome. Breckinridge as CSA president is a double edged sword in this respect, as I have hinted before: He's more competent, more respected, and going to be a more effective commander in chief than Davis ever could be. This will make the CSA, in turn, fight a more effective (and thus bloodier and more destructive) war.

The flip side is that Breckinridge was *also* much more willing to throw in the towel once he concluded that the war was lost. William C. Davis's An Honorable Defeat is essentially a narrative of what amounted to a non-stop set of maneuverings by Breckinridge to get the CSA to end the war, even on terms of surrender and reunion, from the moment he took over as Secretary of War. It was Davis who was the bitter ender, the one who *would* have adopted E. Porter Alexander's idea of turning the conflict into a guerrilla war - if he could have gotten any commanders to go along with it.

Of course, if Breckinridge were to die, especially at Yankee hands, that bitterness could be supplied...

 

[DTF955Baseballfan]

There were a couple of Revolutionary War soldiers still alive, albeit ones who were drummers or something. It would be fun to see their perspective on things in a mini update.

 

[Red_Galiray]

And of course the reason the Union in OTL did *not* break Kentucky's neutrality is because Lincoln put Robert Anderson (a Kentuckian) in charge of that theater, and Anderson was smart enough to stay in Cincinnati, sitting back patiently to let Bishop Polk violate Kentucky neutrality first.

But in THIS timeline, Robert Anderson is not the Hero of Sumter, and is not likely to be given that job. Hmmmm....

One other thought on Breckinridge:

This timeline is oriented around a more radicalized war, with a more radicalized outcome. Breckinridge as CSA president is a double edged sword in this respect, as I have hinted before: He's more competent, more respected, and going to be a more effective commander in chief than Davis ever could be. This will make the CSA, in turn, fight a more effective (and thus bloodier and more destructive) war.

The flip side is that Breckinridge was *also* much more willing to throw in the towel once he concluded that the war was lost. William C. Davis's An Honorable Defeat is essentially a narrative of what amounted to a non-stop set of maneuverings by Breckinridge to get the CSA to end the war, even on terms of surrender and reunion, from the moment he took over as Secretary of War. It was Davis who was the bitter ender, the one who *would* have adopted E. Porter Alexander's idea of turning the conflict into a guerrilla war - if he could have gotten any commanders to go along with it.

Of course, if Breckinridge were to die, especially at Yankee hands, that bitterness could be supplied...

I'll check Davis' book, thanks for the suggestion.

I was troubled by that as well. However, Breckinridge only recognized the war as lost by February 1865. Then he started to make his efforts to end the war. By then the war looks pretty hopeless, with Atlanta and Savannah fallen, and Lee seemingly unable to hold on for much longer. Before the situation had reached such a critical stage, he seemed willing to do everything in his power to continue fighting. For example, in September 1864, he said to his General: "Well, general, there is little left for me if our cause is to fail", in response to him advising caution. In 1864, the Mississippi had already fallen, and Gettysburg had ended all chances of the South taking the offensive in the East, with the only hope of the Confederacy being a Democrat defeating Lincoln in the election. This leads me to believe that Breckinridge would lead the Confederacy admirably, until it became clear that they would lose no matter what. But by then it would be too late, and a more radical Lincoln would be able to not negotiate with him at all because doing so would recognize that a Confederate government existed as a material reality. A more competent CSA president results in Lincoln and the Union having to "use their other arm", leading to further violence, greater losses, and the radicalization I seek.

There were a couple of Revolutionary War soldiers still alive, albeit ones who were drummers or something. It would be fun to see their perspective on things in a mini update.

I plan to write about them in a mini update about soldier life. I don't think there's enough content to fill an entire mini update.

 

[Athelstane]

I was troubled by that as well. However, Breckinridge only recognized the war as lost by February 1865. Then he started to make his efforts to end the war. By then the war looks pretty hopeless, with Atlanta and Savannah fallen, and Lee seemingly unable to hold on for much longer. Before the situation had reached such a critical stage, he seemed willing to do everything in his power to continue fighting. For example, in September 1864, he said to his General: "Well, general, there is little left for me if our cause is to fail", in response to him advising caution. In 1864, the Mississippi had already fallen, and Gettysburg had ended all chances of the South taking the offensive in the East, with the only hope of the Confederacy being a Democrat defeating Lincoln in the election. This leads me to believe that Breckinridge would lead the Confederacy admirably, until it became clear that they would lose no matter what. But by then it would be too late, and a more radical Lincoln would be able to not negotiate with him at all because doing so would recognize that a Confederate government existed as a material reality. A more competent CSA president results in Lincoln and the Union having to "use their other arm", leading to further violence, greater losses, and the radicalization I seek.

Davis, who's actually written more than one book on Breckinridge, finds some evidence that Breckinridge had reached the conclusion earlier. But being made Secretary of War suddenly gave him far more influence than he had ever had as a general: the first real opportunity to give expression to whatever he had been thinking. And after all, the CSA Army articles of war, like those of the US Army at the time, prescribed death for officers who urged surrender on their commanders...

My sense is that after Lincoln's reelection, Breckinridge saw the writing on the wall.

I don't disagree that by January 1865, no Confederate administration could have had any leverage to negotiate anything with Lincoln, who even at Hampton Roads only received the Confederate commissioners for what amounted to reasons of domestic politics. We can see what Breckinridge tried for with Sherman at Bennett Place, and he surely would have tried it sooner had he suddenly become President rather than Sec'y of War four months earlier. What I could see him doing, perhaps, is making Lee as commander in chief make an offer to surrender all Confederate forces in the field to Grant, even if it meant settling more or less for the terms given at Appomattox.

 

[Red_Galiray]

Davis, who's actually written more than one book on Breckinridge, finds some evidence that Breckinridge had reached the conclusion earlier. But being made Secretary of War suddenly gave him far more influence than he had ever had as a general: the first real opportunity to give expression to whatever he had been thinking. And after all, the CSA Army articles of war, like those of the US Army at the time, prescribed death for officers who urged surrender on their commanders...

My sense is that after Lincoln's reelection, Breckinridge saw the writing on the wall.

I don't disagree that by January 1865, no Confederate administration could have had any leverage to negotiate anything with Lincoln, who even at Hampton Roads only received the Confederate commissioners for what amounted to reasons of domestic politics. We can see what Breckinridge tried for with Sherman at Bennett Place, and he surely would have tried it sooner had he suddenly become President rather than Sec'y of War four months earlier. What I could see him doing, perhaps, is making Lee as commander in chief make an offer to surrender all Confederate forces in the field to Grant, even if it meant settling more or less for the terms given at Appomattox.

All very good points, but Breckinridge also considered Lincoln to be "the best friend of the South". With Lincoln as a radical(ish) figure instead of a moderate one, Breckinridge may decide that surrender would mean a painful peace, and also death for him and his lieutenants. After all, you usually hang traitors. This, and a newfound sense of duty because he'd be the leader of the Confederacy, may push him towards fighting until the bitter end. Or not. It all depends on how the TL develops the war. I can definitely see him pushing Lee towards an unconditional surrender.

 

[Ironshark]

Fun fact I just read an interview the hereald had with the last surviving revolutionary war veterans apperently they all opposed secession

 

[Ironshark]

There were a couple of Revolutionary War soldiers still alive, albeit ones who were drummers or something. It would be fun to see their perspective on things in a mini update.

They were all against the confederacy
A newspaper had an interview with them

 

[Gaius Julius Magnus]

Any plans for McClellan? I'd assume he'd intially be treated the same as he was in OTL (hailed as a military hero before he actually did anything), at least initially.

In OTL, he rather quickly developed a disdain for Lincoln for a variety of reasons. I'd imagine Lincoln's more radical feelings on slavery would only lead to increased conflict between the two.

 

[Whiteshore]

Is it me or will this more radical civil war and Reconstruction result in a more authoritarian United States?

 

[Gentleman Johnny]

Is it me or will this more radical civil war and Reconstruction result in a more authoritarian United States?

Likely so, imo.

 

[ramdomperson]

Why does everyone here hate the south so much?

To add to other posters, it is the Planter Class we hate for the cause of so much of America's ills. In addition to being traitors and slavers, they were also massive hypocrites who implemented a social system terrible for everyone else. They couched their need to kill (at very least) thousands of people in terms of "state's rights", conveniently ignoring how among things, the Fugitive Slave Act completely trampled on state's rights by essentially extending slavery to the entire country; or other means of using the federal government to impose slavery on the rest of the continent. The social system they implemented wound up creating an enormous divide between the planters and the rest of the population, where their European-descended lower classes had living standards only slightly less horrible than the slaves, but got away without internal "race" conflict because poor whites could see slaves as an underclass to make their own awful situations seem bearable. We hate them because they duped hundreds of thousands of their countrymen into fighting and dying for a cause that only benefitted the planters.

When the war concluded, they proceeded to revive slavery under a different name, sharecropping, in some ways worse than slavery in that they could now get away with paying less than a living wage. Then they acted as cancer on America, impeding progress on science and humanity to this day. We (or least I do) dislike them because we can see those same toxic behaviour patterns in their descendants in the donor class continuing to dupe people into acting against their interests in favour of a disproportionately influential, wealthy few - white women being convinced to stand against women's rights to conform to survive against the patriarchy they maintain; rural poor being convinced to stand against healthcare, education and welfare reforms in the sadly misguided belief that they might strike it rich somehow or that receiving public services are demeaning.

EDIT: Now with less paranoid theorizing.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

As his own wife once noted privately: "If anyone disagrees with Mr. Davis, he resents it and ascribes the difference to the perversity of his opponent."

Genuine problem. He couldn't get along with commanders and so field army support suffered, he bickered with politicians so the putative nationalism of the South suffered, he couldn't get along with his cabinet so organization suffered... there's a pattern there for sure.

If nothing else, he won't allow Lucius Northrop within 200 airline miles of the Confederate Commissary office. In OTL, Breckinridge made Northrop's firing a condition of his acceptance of the Secretary of War job.

The prevention of Northrop getting that job might be worth a whole other corps of men to the Confederate war effort!

I would expect a President Breckinridge to positively micromanage everything related to all matters related to Kentucky.

The odds are still stacked heavily against the CSA, of course. Breckinridge just won't be scoring as many own-goals as Davis did.

He won't, which is a huge advantage on his end. But even so, he'd still have to turn up aces over time to get it, but he would be the man for it.

Reading through contemporary correspondence, it's obvious that many Northerners grasped this point instinctively. It was definitely a motivating factor in Northern support for the war.

I just don't think it has much explanatory value for the loathing of the Confederacy in our rather anti-nationalist era. I think it really does come down to slavery.

It was the only serious attempt to break up the nation, which I think earns it a place in the annals of bad things and loathing in contemporary culture.

If the capital is moved to Philadelphia for the time being, the strategic situation of the Union could improve on some fronts because Lincoln wouldn't have to defend Washington and would be free to launch other attacks, such as an offensive in North Carolina.

Moving the capital does neatly solve the problem of having the heart of the Northern government so close to the Southern capital.

Breckinridge's main problem is that, given enough time, Unionism will assert itself and Kentucky will be lost. Especially after legislative elections return an Unionist majority. To win, Breckinridge would have to bait Lincoln into breaking Kentucky's neutrality, and making Lincoln fall for something like that wouldn't be easy.

Agreed. The state, despite is Southern sympathies, didn't have much reason to secede, especially when it was the South that dragged it into the war. Even theoretically I have difficulty imagining a way for it to join the CSA. The only semi-plausible method I've thought of is if Bragg's Heartland Campaign were to occupy Frankfort over the winter of 1862-63 which might induce more Kentuckians to see the CSA as a successful entity and ruling body. Only facts on the ground would change people's minds I think.

 

[Gaius Julius Magnus]

No Davis might also mean many of the more incompetent commanders (in particular those in the Western theater) might not keep their jobs as long as they did in OTL given Davis was prone to promoting friends.

 

[Red_Galiray]

Any plans for McClellan? I'd assume he'd intially be treated the same as he was in OTL (hailed as a military hero before he actually did anything), at least initially.

In OTL, he rather quickly developed a disdain for Lincoln for a variety of reasons. I'd imagine Lincoln's more radical feelings on slavery would only lead to increased conflict between the two.

MClellan described himself as a "strong democrat of the Stephen A. Douglas school." He was a great admirer of Douglas, and came into contact with him thanks to his position in the Illinois Central Railway. McClellan allowed Douglas to use his trains during the Lincoln-Douglas debates. This, as Ethan Rafuse points out in McClellan's War, is despite McClellan having being previously a Whig. Either way, McClellan supported Douglas in 1858, and 1860 too. Some historians argue that McClellan developed an early contempt for Lincoln there, seeing him as his social inferior, and not worthy of challenging the Little Giant. Since ITTL Lincoln practically build his career around opposing Douglas, and also Lincoln actually prevailed and made Douglas lose his seat, McClellan probably hates Lincoln with a passion. Lincoln may not have as much patience with him ITTL, especially since the Northern Democratic Party has effectively ceased to exist, and the National Union hasn't provided a suitable replacement, strengthening the Republican position and thus Lincoln's. Yet, based on Lincoln's character and personality, he's not likely to snuff McClellan based on personal slights or hostility. McClellan probably would still get an Army post, and since he was a damn good organizer, he would also gain his early fame.

Is it me or will this more radical civil war and Reconstruction result in a more authoritarian United States?

That's almost a given. The powers of the Federal government and executive would have to be greatly expanded to allow to take some measures, such as confiscating land permanently, put the Confederate leaders before military juries for treason, enforcing African-American rights and protecting them from private individuals and states, and others. The Federal government would be much more powerful.

Moving the capital does neatly solve the problem of having the heart of the Northern government so close to the Southern capital.

I could see Lincoln being forced to give up Washington, and then not moving back until Treason is put down. He would have already faced the fallout of losing the capital, at least he can reap the benefits of not being threatened like that anymore.

No Davis might also mean many of the more incompetent commanders (in particular those in the Western theater) might not keep their jobs as long as they did in OTL given Davis was prone to promoting friends.

Such as Bragg... I mean, come on, literally every one of his Corps Commanders is urging you to remove him from command, yet you don't because you are still sore Johnston talked back to you, Davis?

 

[TonyA]

To add to other posters, it is the Planter Class we hate for the cause of so much of America's ills. In addition to being traitors and slavers, they were also massive hypocrites who implemented a social system terrible for everyone else. They couched their need to kill (at very least) thousands of people in terms of "state's rights", conveniently ignoring how among things, the Fugitive Slave Act completely trampled on state's rights by essentially extending slavery to the entire country; or other means of using the federal government to impose slavery on the rest of the continent. The social system they implemented created an enormous divide between the planters and the rest of the population, where their European-descended lower classes had living standards only slightly less horrible than the slaves, but got away with it because they set up the slaves as an underclass to make their poor whites comfortable with their own awful situations. We hate them because they duped hundreds of thousands of their countrymen into fighting and dying for a cause that only benefitted the planters.

When the war concluded, they proceeded to revive slavery under a different name, sharecropping, in some ways worse than slavery in that they could now get away with paying less than a living wage. Then they acted as cancer on America, impeding progress on science and humanity to this day. We (or least I do) dislike them because we can see those same toxic behaviour patterns in their descendants in the donor class continuing to dupe people into acting against their interests in favour of a disproportionately influential, wealthy few - white women being convinced to stand against women's rights to conform to survive against the patriarchy they maintain; rural poor being convinced to stand against healthcare, education and welfare reforms in the sadly misguided belief that they might strike it rich somehow or that receiving public services are demeaning.

Perceptive analysis, I specially like the (now) italicized and underlined sentence and the 2nd paragraph which sum up my animosity towards modern America's greedy oligarchs and plutocrats (frequently abbreviated GOP)...

 

[Athelstane]

Such as Bragg... I mean, come on, literally every one of his Corps Commanders is urging you to remove him from command, yet you don't because you are still sore Johnston talked back to you, Davis?

For Davis, it was all about loyalty.

 

[TonyA]

For Davis, it was all about loyalty.

Hmmm...who does that remind me of?

 

[Athelstane]

Perceptive analysis, I specially like the (now) italicized and underlined sentence and the 2nd paragraph which sum up my animosity towards modern America's greedy oligarchs and plutocrats (frequently abbreviated GOP)...

My hesitancy to agree here is rooted in the expression "they set up the slaves as an underclass to make their poor whites comfortable with their own awful situations." I think this imputes far too much design and foresight to Southern planters in the main. Chattel slavery expanded in the South because it was discovered to be extremely lucrative for cash crop farmers with black soil acreage. Lots and lots of individual decisions made in order to make more profit.

That it also created, over time, a white social solidarity and concomitant reduction of class conflict (of the sort which was becoming a problem in some industrializing cities in the North) was more of an unexpected benefit - albeit, arguably, one which Southern politicians in the final antebellum years increasingly took advantage of in their political fights with abolitionists.

 

[Arnold d.c]

Such as Bragg... I mean, come on, literally every one of his Corps Commanders is urging you to remove him from command, yet you don't because you are still sore Johnston talked back to you, Davis?

In fairness Davis didn’t appoint Bragg on friendship. Their history dates back to Davis’ tenure as Secretary of War. Davis undertook a number of initiatives to reform the army, including the army's artillery arm. Bragg, as the most prominent artillery commander to emerge from the Mexican War, disagreed with Davis's reforms. This turned into a squabble. After Bragg was given an unfavorable posting (assigned to the frontier to "chase Indians with six-pounders"), he decided that Davis had it in for him and resigned. At the start of the ACW, Bragg was posted to the relative backwater of Pensacola.

When Davis appointed Bragg commander of the Army of Tennessee Bragg was the obvious choice. His main commander in the west, Albert Sidney Johnston, was dead. And now Johnston's successor was Beauregard. Beauregard was already a political opponent of Davis, and he performed a number of actions without having the liberty to do so or to have the courtesy inform Davis of his decisions. This is where Bragg comes in. He was already chief of staff of the army and had exercised command of the Army of the Mississippi when Beauregard was sick or was acting as an army group commander (after Van Dorn's army had come to Corinth). He had also received praise for his actions at Shiloh.

The idea of replacing Bragg after Kentucky and Stones River was discussed for some time but the issue was his replacement. Johnston could have replaced Bragg but chose not to. Beauregard was a nonstarter. Returning him to command would be an admission that Davis had made a mistake in replacing him. Like Johnston, Beauregard was an anti-administration figure. This left Hardee, the senior subordinate from the Army of Tennessee. Yet he had turned down command of the army before, despite his criticisms of those would assume the responsibility of commanding it.

Still that is not to say Davis made very bad personnel choices. The worst of which Leonidas Polk. Despite resigning the army just after graduation, Davis thought Polk would make a fine general while A.S. Johnston made his way west. This resulted in the Confederate invasion of Kentucky and opened the floodgate for the Federals to pour into the Confederate Heartland. Even that Polk remained in the army and remained as inept as ever. The problem of Polk wouldn’t be solved until a Yankee cannon sent him his just reward. Sherman should have cashiered the gunner out of the army!