Chapter 6: Rather Rambunctious Reactionary Rebels
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Huallpa before the rebellion
Auqui Huallpa Túpac was younger then Atahualpa and not as politically adept as his half brother. But he was from the traditional power base of the empire and was a royal, giving him influence as he organized the Machu Picchu Rebellion. He used his influence in Cusco to arrange for those opposed to Atahualpa to be placed at the royal retreat, not far from the capital. He smuggled new weapons to areas opposed to the Quitians and subtly organized defenses around Machu Picchu. His supporters were disorganized and often had conflicting goals but his stature enabled him to rally them around his image.
Auqui Huallpa Túpac was a firm believer in the traditional Tawantinsuyu way of life, though not necessarily the traditional ways of war. As such, to the disappointment of some of his supporters, he never declared himself Sapa Inka, only ever claiming to remove foreign influence from Cusco. In the earliest days of the rebellion he seemed to be poised for success. He struck Atahualpa by surprise and he had new weaponry that shocked local garrisons into defeat. The nearest Quitian garrison to Machu Picchu was slaughtered in a surprise attack. Rumor spread faster then truth, as it always does, and reports of vast uprisings reached Cusco. Atahualpa began making plans for a flight to the north while sending runners to summon Ucumari and Chalcuchima to assist him. The Machu Picchu rebellion was succeeding.
But the balance would soon shift. News that the armies of the Inka were being rallied caused nervousness in Haullpa's proto-court and this nervousness produced cracks in the groups. An assault aimed at gaining Spaniards for the cause failed at Urcos, limiting the resources the rebels could use, only furthered these cracks. The factions in Machu Picchu came to a head, some wanted to declare Huallpa Sapa Inka while others were appalled by such proposals against the living god. Some wanted to translate their strength into negotiations for power while others (rightly) pointed out that Atahualpa was unlikely to be merciful in the situation. The various internal factions in Huallpa's quasi-court kept squabbling and gave conflicting orders to their respective forces as well as made conflicting pronouncements regarding their goals. Huallpa repeatedly refused to declare himself Sapa Inka or even definitively demand anything of Atahualpa, such as the removal of Quitan forces. In his efforts to avoid picking a side in the disputes in Machu Picchu he ended up pushing his supporters further apart. And some sought a new path.
Agua Panti was the most prominent. Agua Panti was a General who had always been opposed to Atahualpa's rule and had flocked to the cause of a man he had heard proclaimed as Sapa Inka Túpac Huallpa. But he was gravely disappointed in the dithering man he found and felt betrayed that he was not serving a "true" Inka. So in January 1534 Agua Panti, after definitively confirming that Huallpa would not declare himself Inka, left Machu Picchu with some similarly dissatisfied forces. He snuck south words to meet up with a new player.
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Manco had a natural charisma
Manco Inca Yupanqui was only a teenager, but he had already demonstrated savvy by taking extended journeys to the south of the Empire while Atahualpa was consolidating his control over Cusco. The third surviving son of Huayna Capac with any relevance he might prove a valuable asset. Reports were vague but he was also said to be a rather charismatic in his way, a useful trait for gaining followers. He was militarily inexperienced but with a general like Agua Panti he wouldn't need that. So Agua Panti approached him, offering him support in claiming the mantle of Sapa Inka and pledging his forces to Manco. The young royal stung him along for a bit then him and his fellow co-conspirators seized for treason. Manco's reasoning for this is vague but most agree that he saw the power Atahualpa had and decided to not suicidally run up against it. He also likely noticed that Atahualpa had no children that were near Cusco or politically relevant, giving Manco a solid possible bid should Atahualpa fall victim to a strange disease. It was a post-Atahualpa world that Manco was thinking of when he engaged in the most audacious military action of the Macchu Picchu.
First he successfully won over forces that had very recently been in rebellion to Atahualpa's despite them outnumbering his own entourage by a large margin. He archived this by inflicting brutal and often deadly punishments on those he had arrested and then offering the remaining forces full pardon if they served faithfully. He then turned them around and continued on the road to Cusco. When he heard rebel forces were assembling to march on Cusco he immediately sped up to attack them at their rallying point a few miles from Urcos to fall upon them. His ambush was well timed a brilliantly executed scattering the forces quickly with the element of surprise and an effective use of what little Spanish weaponry he possessed. Manco immediately began hailing himself as the Savior of Cusco. This was not entirely true, Quisquis had evacuated everyone in Urcos to Cusco and had set up his army in a strong defensive position. Any hypothetical Second Battle of Urcos would have likely been a resounding Quitan victory. But Manco's victory at the Battle of the Collasuya Road had the added benefit of not being done by Quitian troops, dampening feelings of an occupation. Immediately following the battle Atahualpa ordered Manco back to Cusco under close watch for fear of the young prince's popularity, but still was open in congratulating him for his courage.
The loss at Collasuya Road marked the end of the Machu Picchu Rebellion as a substantial threat to Atahualpa, the armies sent for were sent back to their postings as the seizure of Agua Panti's forces and the crushing defeat by Manco had cut into their forces significantly. The Huallpa was reduced to sending raids out for food from Machu Picchu. Quisquis would combine his army with Manco's ex-army and slowly restore control over the area. By the start of the new (Christian) year all the rebels still held was Machu Picchu and the surrounding areas. By February the siege of Machu Picchu began.
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Cliffs
Machu Picchu was surrounded on three sides by sheer cliffs into huge canyons. This gave it a natural choke point, making it relatively easy to defend. Unfortunately for the defenders it was not filled with farms, leaving them with a limited food supply. Quisquis was relentless in his pressure and introduced the new (to the Tawantinsuyu) tactic of mass arrow attacks to keep the defenders off guard. By mid-February the defenders were pushed to the brink of surrender and then past it. Atahualpa's army swarmed over Machu Picchu and captured and/or massacred the defenders. Huallpa was unceremoniously driven off a cliff, the rebel leader preferring the fall to any torture that could be concocted.
The failure of the Machu Picchu rebellion did not end the resentment of the Quitian occupation but it did completely destroy all of the men capable of organizing a rebellion against Atahualpa. The situation was helped by the removal of large numbers of the army from the area in late spring of 1534. Iron had finally been found in large quantities, in the Southern frontier and a large army was needed to secure the fringes of the Empire that now was crucial. And it also provided a perfect opportunity to settle an old score.