Sir John Valentine Carden survives.

Status
Not open for further replies.
4 May 1941. Ras El Ali, Libya.

During the night, General Rommel’s impatience at not being able to strike the British when they were occupied by the events in Greece was beginning to show. It was only through the intercession of General Paulus that Rommel didn’t strip General Streich of command of the 5th Light Division. Paulus could well understand Streich’s reticence about attacking a dug-in force that was at least his equal. The vulnerability of the majority of panzers to the British 2-pdr guns made a panzer led attack likely to fail. Paulus knew that with the planned invasion of the Soviet Union that the numbers of panzers that would be shipped to North Africa would always be limited. The few months since the 5th Light Division had arrived in Tripoli had thrown up all sorts of problems which hadn’t really been considered, no one had thought of the panzers operating in a hot, sandy climate. Now that many of these problems had been solved, such as new air filters fitted to deal with dust and sand, the panzers were more reliable. This meant that 15th Panzer Division was likely to be fit for action quite quickly, but it seemed that General Rommel was determined to throw 5th Light Division away on a frontal assault on a strongly held British position. The losses to the German and Italian units the previous day were already going to be very difficult to replace.

The fact that the British had advanced seemed to suggest that they felt strong, even with all that had happened in Greece. In every encounter the German army had had with the British, the Wehrmacht had come away victorious, but it had always had a steep cost. The consensus among those who had examined the actions against the British had found that their equipment and training were good, especially in defence, but that their doctrine and tactics were lacking. What the OKH wanted was for Rommel to keep the Italians from suffering yet another defeat. Throwing away the best part of 5th Light Division in an unnecessary fight wouldn’t help fulfil that expectation.

The British had bested the Italians pretty easily, but Paulus and the German High Command were of the opinion that they wouldn’t have it so easy against the Germans. Which was why the Afrika Korps was here. Paulus eventually made it clear to Rommel that if he didn’t do what Berlin had sent him to do, then they would send someone else who would. The British attack had been thrown back, it was time to bring back the 5th Light and Ariete Divisions to the prepared defensive positions. Let the British batter their heads off a strong position, far from their supply bases, if they felt were strong enough. Then, once they were out on a limb, Rommel could let loose his mobile forces in a counter punch that would throw them right back to Tobruk and beyond. Rommel, very reluctantly, agreed to follow Paulus’ advice. In a letter to his wife he was able to express his frustration safely, and was delighted when Paulus was called back to Berlin.

General Gambier-Parry’s force therefore, found that instead of the expected attack, the Italian and German Divisions disengaged and by mid-morning the British and Indian troops found themselves no longer under siege. Once again Brigadier Scott-Cockburn was keen to chase the Italians back up the road to Nofilia. But Gambier-Parry, having been on the radio to both Generals O’Connor and Wavell, had decided that Ras El Ali would continue to be held in force.

Once the 7th Armoured Division, 6th Infantry Division and 4th Indian Division were ready for the next phase of the advance, they could use the positions currently held by Gambier-Parry’s unit as their starting point. General Wavell had noted that the near loss of 3rd Motor Brigade was due in part to using the Brigade as the basic battle formation. It was clear from the fighting the day before, that acting with anything less than a full Division would invite the Germans to deal with things piecemeal. The fact was that Operation Brevity could very easily have become a disaster. Instead, it could be shown as a success, driving the British position in North Africa closer to Tripoli, and holding off the attacks of both a German and Italian Division.

General O’Connor was keen on moving the 9th Australian Division up from their positions at El Agheila, to take over the defensive positions at Ras El Ali. Wavell could see that that would have the beneficial effect of allowing Gambier-Parry’s force to rest and resupply. However, Wavell was worried that the excellent defensive position at the salt pans, behind which large supply dumps were being readied for the next phase of the plan, might be more vulnerable by moving the Australians forward. Wavell had taken to calling the force commanded by Gambier-Parry as 22nd Division, and he was aware that their position could still be outflanked by the Germans through the desert. If El Agheila wasn’t properly protected, then the initiative could be taken by the Germans. 22nd Division was mobile enough to strike in any direction, and so keeping them where they were, while building up their Field Supply Depots, would give the next phase a good starting point.

With the German roadblock gone, the supply convoy for the 3rd Motor Brigade were able to come forward, along with the Indian Cavalry Battalion and a battery of a Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, to help with the resupply and defence. At the same time the RASC and ROAC lorries that had set up the Field Supply Depot made their way back, with all the wounded, to begin the process of bringing forward more of the stocks needed for the next phase of the advance towards Tripoli.

Missing Threadmark @Ramp-Rat
 
The problems of resupplying North African, Germany, Italy and the British Commonwealth.



There has been a lot of discussion about the various problems in resupplying North Africa, and how this affects the campaigns. So starting with the new boys, Germany, who up until now haven’t been involved in the North African campaign. Germany prior to 1941 had no involvement in North Africa, even on a commercial scale. The three colonial powers, France, Italy and Britain would have done their best to keep German industry out of their play pen. And after Hitler and his gang of crooks got into power, the German policy of Autarky meant that those opportunities there were for trade, were reduced by the colonial powers. The Germans have now entered a very poorly developed area, with very limited infrastructure. Between Tripoli and Alexandria there isn’t a railway, or sealed road, nor is there a modern port, and Tripoli itself lacks many facilities. Thanks to under development by the colonial authority, there is little to no industry to draw on.

Virtually everything that the Germans require, other than limited food, and all water, has to be sent from Germany. This involves a train journey through the Alps and neutral Switzerland, to an Italian port, and then on an Italian ship to Tripoli, then by road to the German forces. And the only bit of this journey that is under German control is the very first bit. Once the train crosses the boarder, you will have to switch engines train crew, and it passes into the control of a different system. While you might have given it AAA priority, they will have their own demands and AAA could become BBB, overnight. Also everything you send has to fit on a train and though/under the various bridges/tunnels on route. You want to send three 20ton dockside cranes, that you have confiscated from Poland to improve the facilities at Tripoli. First dismantle the cranes into suitable loads to be transported by train, then move them to a port in Italy, negotiate Italian shipping to move them across the Mediterranean to Tripoli, then negotiate with the Italian port authority to build them in their port. Britain decides to borrow for the duration a 50ton floating crane from Haifa, Suez, Mombasa or Suez, to improve the facilities in Benghazi. An order is sent out and the equipment is impounded, an escort from the RN is arranged, the crane is moved to Benghazi, and put to work. Unfortunately for the Germans, they don’t control the ports in Italy or North Africa, they have to negotiate with the Italian authorities for everything they want to do.

Italy is in the worst position of the three, it is the weakest both militarily and industrially in comparison to Britain or Germany. It lacks the large industrial base that both Britain and Germany have, nor does it have access to the basic resources that are the bases of heavy industries, iron ore and coal. While it had built a fantastic electric power grid based on hydro power, this was essentially only in the North, and the South was in many ways feudal. Yes it did have a far better navy than the Germans, but one that was servile constricted in its ability to act, by its lack of oil to fuel its ships. Mussolini in his ambition to aper to have an army equal to that of others, Germany, France in particular, made a number of mistakes. He reduced the number of men in a division, so that it took three Italian devisions to equal two British devisions. He tried to integrate political devisions ( Black Shirt ), with the ordinary Army devisions, which wasn’t a great success. While the various Black Shirt devisions tended to be more enthusiastic, and the regular army had far more unenthusiastic conscripts, who were there because they were forced to be. Both types of devisions were in comparison to ether British or German, less effective, there kit, arms, armour, logistics, were generally inferior. Britain had been in control of Egypt since 1882, the Italians had had control of what is now Libya since 1912. And while the British had had the time and finances to build up Egypt, plus Egypt was a far wealthier country, with a higher and better educated population. The Italians were dealing with a much more primitive country, were lacking thanks to WWI, and the general poverty of Italy, the strong financial resources to develop their colonial possession. So from a poor industrial base, and with the added problem of supplying the Germans, and against British opposition, through inadequate ports, Italy is trying to fight one of the leading international powers in the world.

Britain and the British Commonwealth forces, have a number of problems, they are at the end of a very long supply line, and resent events in France and Norway, have made the Middle East less of a priority than it should be. But unlike ether the Germans or Italians, only the very first part of their supply chain is vulnerable to interdiction, and only to a limited extent on a small number of supplies. Let us look at two different convoys carrying supplies to North Africa, one British and one Italian, note the Germans would be extremely lucky to get even a single blockade runner from Hamburg to Tripoli, let alone a convoy. The Italian convoy assembles in Naples, which the British observe, and from when its in port to when it gets to Tripoli and after, it is liable to attack, from the air, surface, and under water. The British convoy assembles in Liverpool, first do the Germans observe this, and do they know where its going, and do they have any knowledge of the routing to be able to prepare a trap. The British convoy sails north about Ireland to stay out of range of the majority of German aircraft, and proceeds to Gibraltar, were it slips a few ships carrying supplies for the Rock and the RN units based there. It then sails south along the West African coast, slipping ships carrying supplies for the various British Colonies, which will pick up a backload for Britain, before sailing independently to Gibraltar to join a convoy for Britain. The ships that slipped for Gibraltar can ether pick up a load from Spain, mostly minerals, or dead head to West Africa for a return load. Once past Gibraltar there is a small risk from German U-Boats, or surface raiders. Once past Lagos, up until the Horn of Africa there is virtually no risk to the British ships. And the risk passing Italian East Africa is of basically been seen, not of being attacked.

And the convoy from Britain will only be carrying ‘ big ticket ‘ items, like artillery, armour, vehicles, and heavy artillery ammunition, electronic/electric items. Food, fuel, building supplies, even uniforms can be sourced from Britains colonial and commonwealth possessions/partners. And these items can be shipped at little or no risk, plus there is virtually no limit to availability. Take fuel, there is unlike no shortage of fuel, Britain can get all the fuel it needs from its owed and controlled oil fields/refineries in the Middle East. British ships can pull up to the end of a pipeline in Haifa, that stretches across Palestinian, Jordan to Iraqi, and fill its tanks, with sweet crude that can be used as boiler fuel. The problem that the British have with fuel, is not availability, it’s having the transport and containers to deliver it to were it is needed. But until Britain is forced by events in the Far East to divert supplies and attention to yet another major campaign, given resent events their position in North African will only get stronger and stronger day by day. In addition if they can “ liberate “ North Africa, before the change in the situation in the Far East, this will improve their ability to deal with the changed situation that arises.

RR.
Actually, as far as railways go, there is in fact a railway from Alexandria, all the way to Marsa Matruh (probably further actually, since I'm sure they'd have been pushing forward as soon as Halfaya Pass was secure, if not earlier), plus a couple of narrow gauge railways from Benghazi, ine headed vaguely east, the other vaguely south, though how much they could carry is up for debate.
 
I think you did a fine and more than plausible job.

Rommel was a political creature and his rise reflects not only his abilities but also being political savvy. I don't think he would go against Paulus in such a brazen manner. After all Paulus went to Tripolitania only temporarily. After he is gone, then Rommel can do a "reconnaissance-in-force" in his manner.

What is interesting is the formation of the 22nd Division and an earlier deployment of the 6th Division. Even in OTL the British had the infantry for two full divisions. What was needed were signal, transport, engineer units along with additional artillery. If there is less invasion panic, there is no reason why such units could not have been sent to Egypt months before their OTL departure. There is also no need to replace the losses of the OTL loss of Cyrenaica and supply Tobruk under Stuka threat. Thus, I think shipping would be available. Also for once, I doubt the Tiger Convoy would be sent via the Med.

At this point, the 50th Northumbrian is also en route to Egypt. Soon, either after a victorious Battle of Crete or by butterflying the battle altogether, the Australians and New Zealanders will be back to Egypt. While they replace their losses and getting new equipment they can act as a garrison while the 6th and 22nd are in Cyrenaica. I think they can be rebuilt sooner since without a defeat in Crete they will have suffered fewer losses and they have retained part of their equipment compared to to OTL/

To be honest, I think the developments so far butterfly the need for a Syria-Lebanon Campaign. Vichy Syria with the British close to Sirte and Crete holding, won't be seen as a threat that needs to be removed. The strategic situation is much better compared to OTL with Rommel at the border of Egypt and Crete a Luftwaffe base. Less bad blood with the French and the current Vichy garrison may join de Gaulle intact in the future.

By the end of June the British will have the following division in theater:

7th Armoured
2nd Armoured (minus a brigade rebuilding after Greece)
6th British
22nd British
50th British
4th Indian
7th Australian
9th Australian
6th Australian (rebuilding)
2nd New Zealand (rebuilding)
1st South African
1st Light Free French Division
Polish Independent Carpathian Brigade

Naturally, the British cannot supply all of them for an offensive. But they can throw a strong corps each time. Then during the next offensive another fresh strong corps etc.


Lastly, I found this comment:
Roald Dahl has the following to say regarding Vichy France and Syria and Lebanon:
Roald Dahl said:
...not many know about the chaos the Vichy French caused at the same time in Syria and the Lebanon. They were fanatically anti-British and pro-German, and if the Germans with their help had managed to get a foothold in Syria at that particular moment, they could have marched down into Egypt by the back door. The Vichy French had therefore to be dislodged from Syria as soon as possible.
The Syrian Campaign, as it was called, started up almost immediately after Greece, and a very considerable army composed of British and Australian troops was sent up through Palestine to fight the disgustingly Pro-Nazi Frenchmen. This small war was a bloody affair in which thousands of lives were lost, and I for one have never forgiven the Vichy French for the unnecessary slaughter they caused...
-Going Solo (1986 edition), 'Palestine and Syria'

Setting aside the writer's own biases for a moment, there is still a question here for the UK war cabinet to very clearly consider of how much do they trust the Vichy French not to let the Germans in, in Syria and the Lebanon?
 
Roald Dahl has the following to say regarding Vichy France and Syria and Lebanon: -Going Solo (1986 edition), 'Palestine and Syria'

Setting aside the writer's own biases for a moment, there is still a question here for the UK war cabinet to very clearly consider of how much do they trust the Vichy French not to let the Germans in, in Syria and the Lebanon?
ITTL, Crete will hold, so the chances of Germany managing to get any forces to Syria will be much smaller than OTL.
 
Roald Dahl has the following to say regarding Vichy France and Syria and Lebanon: -Going Solo (1986 edition), 'Palestine and Syria'

Setting aside the writer's own biases for a moment, there is still a question here for the UK war cabinet to very clearly consider of how much do they trust the Vichy French not to let the Germans in, in Syria and the Lebanon?
If crete is held, and the north african battles are being fought near sirte rather than tobruk, they dont have to trust the Vichy French.
Nothing big enough to worry about is getting to Syria or Lebanon regardless of intent.
And although Vichy forces may have defended "French" territory from invaders, I dont think the same level of commitment would have been present if ordered to invade "British" territory.
Even getting the Vichy government to issue the orders, and getting them obeyed all the way down the command chain, is pretty unlikely.
 

Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
@MattII
I am sorry that I didn’t clarify what I meant by, there wasn’t a railway or road between Tripoli and Alexandria. What I meant was there wasn’t a single railway that ran between the two cities, and of the various railways that did exist, they weren’t built to a single gauge or connected in anyway. The rail line that went to the boarder from Alexandria was built to Standard gauge as was any extension of it. I don’t know if any of the Italian rail lines were built to standard gauge, or what gauge any of the narrow gauge lines were. And even if the British poured in unlimited resources to extending their rail line, they are not going to achieve better than 10 miles a day of new line, and then they will have to find the engines and rolling stock to service the line. Yes the British can draw engines and rolling stock from India, but why bother, it will be far more economic to improve the ports that they have captured. Yes there is a track between Tripoli and Alexandria, but not a made up sealed road that can take heavy traffic. Large sections at this time are unmade tracks, that at the slightest sign of rain, turn into porridge. Logistics in North Africa in the nineteen forties, were a pig, and it was only years of experience that enabled the British to succeed, were as the Germans/Italians seriously failed.

RR.
 
@MattII
I am sorry that I didn’t clarify what I meant by, there wasn’t a railway or road between Tripoli and Alexandria. What I meant was there wasn’t a single railway that ran between the two cities, and of the various railways that did exist, they weren’t built to a single gauge or connected in anyway. The rail line that went to the boarder from Alexandria was built to Standard gauge as was any extension of it. I don’t know if any of the Italian rail lines were built to standard gauge, or what gauge any of the narrow gauge lines were. And even if the British poured in unlimited resources to extending their rail line, they are not going to achieve better than 10 miles a day of new line, and then they will have to find the engines and rolling stock to service the line. Yes the British can draw engines and rolling stock from India, but why bother, it will be far more economic to improve the ports that they have captured. Yes there is a track between Tripoli and Alexandria, but not a made up sealed road that can take heavy traffic. Large sections at this time are unmade tracks, that at the slightest sign of rain, turn into porridge. Logistics in North Africa in the nineteen forties, were a pig, and it was only years of experience that enabled the British to succeed, were as the Germans/Italians seriously failed.

RR.
In OTL efforts were made to build a rail line, interrupted by Rommel on various occasions, extending the existing egyptian line. It eventually reached in OTL to just south of Tobruk.
Efforts were also made to refurbish (after every advance) and extend the narrow guage railways from Benghazi.
The best average build speed was about 2 miles per day.
Still worth it.
A single 1940s train could carry 500 tons, so even a single track railway could carry all the supplies for the army and provide a supply route direct from Alexandria with less break of bulk than transshipping to coastal freighters.
The further forward the railhead gets, the less the distance required for road transport, and either the more effective all those lorries become, or the fewer are needed.
Egypt had a developed rail network, and India a highly developed rail infrastructure and maintenance industry.
Building and running a railway would be both manageable, and normal practice,
 
Last edited:
@MattII
I am sorry that I didn’t clarify what I meant by, there wasn’t a railway or road between Tripoli and Alexandria. What I meant was there wasn’t a single railway that ran between the two cities, and of the various railways that did exist, they weren’t built to a single gauge or connected in anyway. The rail line that went to the boarder from Alexandria was built to Standard gauge as was any extension of it. I don’t know if any of the Italian rail lines were built to standard gauge, or what gauge any of the narrow gauge lines were. And even if the British poured in unlimited resources to extending their rail line, they are not going to achieve better than 10 miles a day of new line, and then they will have to find the engines and rolling stock to service the line. Yes the British can draw engines and rolling stock from India, but why bother, it will be far more economic to improve the ports that they have captured. Yes there is a track between Tripoli and Alexandria, but not a made up sealed road that can take heavy traffic. Large sections at this time are unmade tracks, that at the slightest sign of rain, turn into porridge. Logistics in North Africa in the nineteen forties, were a pig, and it was only years of experience that enabled the British to succeed, were as the Germans/Italians seriously failed.

RR.
Wikipedia suggests the Tripoli section had a gauge of 950mm, while the Benghazi one had a gauge of 750mm.

Of course, if you can get enough surveyors in you can start building the railway at multiple points at once, thus reducing the time needed to complete it.

In OTL efforts were made to build a rail line, interrupted by Rommel on various occasions, extending the existing egyptian line. It eventually reached in OTL to just south of Tobruk.
Efforts were also made to refurbish (after every advance) and extend the narrow guage railways from Benghazi.
The best average build speed was about 2 miles per day.
Still worth it.
A single 1940s train could carry 500 tons, so even a single track railway could carry all the supplies for the army and provide a supply route direct from Alexandria with less break of bulk than transshipping to coastal freighters.
The further forward the railhead gets, the less the distance required for road transport, and either the more effective all those lorries become, or the fewer are needed.
Egypt had a developed rail network, and India a highly developed rail infrastructure and maintenance industry.
Building and running a railway is
At this point I'm in debate over whether it's be better to try to extend the original Italian narrow gauge in Benghazi, try to regauge them to standard guage, or some mix of the two.
 
Wikipedia suggests the Tripoli section had a gauge of 950mm, while the Benghazi one had a gauge of 750mm.

Of course, if you can get enough surveyors in you can start building the railway at multiple points at once, thus reducing the time needed to complete it.


At this point I'm in debate over whether it's be better to try to extend the original Italian narrow gauge in Benghazi, try to regauge them to standard guage, or some mix of the two.
depends on what rolling stock they've captured, and what state it's in, for Italian narrow gauge. If there is enough, extend it from Benghazi south towards the front lines. They're using Benghazi as a resupply port anyway, so better to have stuff moving forwards from there, rather than trying to extend it from Egypt first
 
Yes, that was apparently the intention and as CryHavoc101 said Jock Columns were a stopgap that was used for far too long. The issue with Jock Columns is that they stripped assets away from Brigades that were desperately needed in combined arms warfare. Jock Columns worked against the Italians in Operation Compass. They did not work against the Germans and persisting with them was a mistake.
Then D-S starts to try and persuade the Auk about the viability of a British version of the German brigade group. As Barnett points out this (or something close to it) becomes NATO doctrine after the war. The issue is that re-writing doctrine and experimenting with these groups in the middle of a campaign where they were fighting Rommel's panzer units was asking for trouble and the result was Gazala. The minute Monty comes in he does away with all of this experimentation, tells his commanders that Divisions will fight as Divisions and then tears a strip off an armoured commander who asks when the British armour would be unleashed on the Germans at Alam Halfa.
It comes back to the Germans with a larger number of combat experienced and educated officers (pretty much across the Heer which was more a single tribe at this time) allowed them to very rapidly form such expedient units.

The British Army was still a collection of Trade unions in 1941 and with notable exceptions not yet a single tribe made even more difficult when you consider that the 'British army' in North Africa was at least 6 different army's speaking multiple languages (English, French, Hindi*, Polish etc) and in terms of experience was behind the curve with regards to the Heer and having expanded from a far smaller force than the Heer was still short of educated officers and experienced NCOs.

It would take until mid 42 for example before Op Sec standards across the Tribe were good enough and as you say Monty who had run the pre war staff collage classes wondering why no one was managing the army as they had been taught pre war.

Loony Hinde apparently having passed said Staff course under Monty immediately burned his notes in front of his peers - its no wonder Monty wanted to have nothing to do with him

*And whatever other languages the Indian troops spoke?
 
And whatever other languages the Indian troops spoke?
Some of this might have changed by 1940 but at least in 1914 there were only a few Hindi speaking battalions in the Indian Army. Most soldiers in the Indian Army came from the North of modern India and throughout modern Pakistan. Urdu was the linga franca but battalions (they were usually segregated) could speak Ghurkali (Nepali), Urdu, Punjabi, Hindi, Sindhi, Pashto, Bengali and probably one or two others I have missed.
 
The British Army was still a collection of Trade unions in 1941 and with notable exceptions not yet a single tribe made even more difficult when you consider that the 'British army' in North Africa was at least 6 different army's speaking multiple languages (English, French, Hindi*, Polish etc) and in terms of experience was behind the curve with regards to the Heer and having expanded from a far smaller force than the Heer was still short of educated officers and experienced NCOs.
Pretty much go back as far as 1914 to the Field Service Regulations, Part I you find it exposing a combined arms approach but it was rarely applied due to the cult of the regiment still being a big thing. You can see the idea developed throughout WW1 and at the end the all arms battle was a thing but then I'm unsure what the hell happened but that idea seems to have been pushed aside OTL for quite some time until 1942 to 1943.
 
depends on what rolling stock they've captured, and what state it's in, for Italian narrow gauge. If there is enough, extend it from Benghazi south towards the front lines. They're using Benghazi as a resupply port anyway, so better to have stuff moving forwards from there, rather than trying to extend it from Egypt first
That was pretty much my idea too. To make it better, they could even lift track from the eastern line to extend the southern line.
 
o don t be silly,as soon as a certain someone's leash is dropped he'll be off,supplies be damned. 😲

That could very well be. But things may turn out differently thereby resulting in if not a much shorter North Africa campaign then a much lower intensity one instead. Here's what I mean.

Rommel, orders be damned, decides to go on the attack just as soon as he can manage it. The British and Commonwealth forces are just able to hold their defensive positions though suffering heavy losses. However they are also able to inflict very heavy casualties on the attacking German and Italian units which results in the Axis withdrawing back to Nofilia.

News of the costly failed attack makes its way back to Berlin. Rommel is now in a position where his superior, Paulus is reporting that he had ordered Rommel not to commence offensive operations. Rommel has done so anyway and unlike OTL has no successes to justify his decision. What would happen next? I think Rommel would be relieved of his command and recalled to Berlin. If "lucky" he'd end up in Russia. Perhaps later he would wind up sharing a prison cell with Paulus as prisoners of the Russians.

With the Operation Barbarossa occupying Hitler's attention and with no good news from North Africa the Germans assign a new commander who will follow orders. And they do not send significant reinforcements as happened in OTL but instead the Germans there receive only what is judged to be sufficient to maintain a strong enough defensive posture at the German and Italians current positions.

What would the British do? They have been mauled too. But their reinforcement and resupply is better then the Axis. Just how urgent is it for the British to take Libya as quickly as possible? Why hurry if they are reasonably confident that they won't be facing a renewed offensive from the Axis forces anytime soon? By early June Barbarossa has started. And with Japan forcibly occupying much of French Indochina it might occur to the British that maybe they can risk sending some of the Australian and Indian divisions to Malaya and Burma. The remaining British and Commonwealth forces can dig in for the long haul while their armies are slowly being built up. Which would include more and better equipped RAF units. With the plan being to recommence the offensive into Libya in about 6 or 8 months time.

That is unless Japan wrecks the British schedule.
 
What would the British do? They have been mauled too. But their reinforcement and resupply is better then the Axis. Just how urgent is it for the British to take Libya as quickly as possible? Why hurry if they are reasonably confident that they won't be facing a renewed offensive from the Axis forces anytime soon? By early June Barbarossa has started. And with Japan forcibly occupying much of French Indochina it might occur to the British that maybe they can risk sending some of the Australian and Indian divisions to Malaya and Burma. The remaining British and Commonwealth forces can dig in for the long haul while their armies are slowly being built up. Which would include more and better equipped RAF units. With the plan being to recommence the offensive into Libya in about 6 or 8 months time.
If the British can get to the Tunisian border (effectively forcing the main axis powers off the continent altogether), they can make a play Pantelleria, which would make the idea of running fast convoys through the Mediterranean (rather than around the Cape) that much more viable.
 

Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
On the question of languages spoken by the various components of the British forces and allies in North Africa. A trooper from the depths of Londons east end, would have had problems understanding and private from Glasgows Gorbals, let alone a Sepoy from India. But at the end of the day this doesn’t matter, all the officers, including in the case of the Indian Army, would have spoken English. And the Australian officer would speak English that was similar to that spoken by a native officer of the Indian Army, or a VCO. The only exception to this is the French and the Polish, but they weren’t major components of the forces assembled, and tended to operate mostly separate from the main force. And unlike the German and Italian forces, the basic drill, arms and equipment was the same for everyone involved. Yes a Guards officer had a Servant, while he counterpart in the Rifles had a Batman, and an Australian might stop for a brew while his English mate stops for Char. However other than the French and Polish, everyone was singing of the same Hymn Sheet.

RR.
 
-Going Solo (1986 edition), 'Palestine and Syria'

Setting aside the writer's own biases for a moment, there is still a question here for the UK war cabinet to very clearly consider of how much do they trust the Vichy French not to let the Germans in, in Syria and the Lebanon?

How can the Germans go to Vichy Syria? Not from Turkey for sure and due to butterflies not from the Aegean either. Of course, even in OTL with an occupied Crete, the Germans didn't have the ability to send anything to Syria, other than a few aircraft for a few weeks. To my knowledge, there was no concern in OTL of the Germans shipping a division in Syria.

The actual anxiety over the Vichy Mandate was what the Vichy would do when Rommel was menacing Egypt. The new circumstances are quite different and there is no reason at all for such fears. In any case, british Palestine will soon be full of veteran Greeks that will slowly rebuilt- in addition to the current garrison.


Paulus is reporting that he had ordered Rommel not to commence offensive operations. Rommel has done so anyway and unlike OTL has no successes to justify his decision. What would happen next?
"But it was not an offensive herr General. It was a reconnaissance-in-force! The initial success of the reconnaissance lead to further commitment to build upon our momentum! After all this is a standard procedure in our doctrine - to punch a hole and then exploit the initial success!"

The British and Commonwealth forces are just able to hold their defensive positions though suffering heavy losses. However they are also able to inflict very heavy casualties on the attacking German and Italian units
I also believe they will be able to hold if are dug-in. However, they may decide that it will be a precarious situation since only landing ships can resupply them and retreat back to El Agheila.

If that happens then Rommel can declare that he just inflicted the British the biggest setback since the start of the Desert War and in a typical prussian/german fashion to proceed in taking advantage of his success. There is a minor detail that the British have been building field fortifications in El Agheila for more than 2 months and they have large supply depots just behind them. But would such detail deter Erwin after he got the Tommies retreating?
 
Last edited:
"But it was not an offensive herr General. It was a reconnaissance-in-force! The initial success of the reconnaissance lead to further commitment to build upon our momentum! After all this is a standard procedure in our doctrine - to punch a hole and then exploit the initial success!"
Of course Colonel Rommel, now shut up and get to your new posting as VD control officer in Hamburg. You have a month to stamp it out or there'll be severe consequences.
 
Of course Colonel Rommel, now shut up and get to your new posting as VD control officer in Hamburg. You have a month to stamp it out or there'll be severe consequences.
As trying to stamp out VD in Hamburg would mean closing the brothels servicing the Kriegsmarine, I suspect there would also be adverse consequences in the event of success. Which I guess is your point.
 
If the British can get to the Tunisian border (effectively forcing the main axis powers off the continent altogether), they can make a play Pantelleria, which would make the idea of running fast convoys through the Mediterranean (rather than around the Cape) that much more viable.
I looked at the map to get a better understanding of your comment. Wouldn't it still be very dangerous attempting to run even high speed convoys through with the Luftwaffe and the Regia Aeronautica operating out of Sicily? I think similar as to OTL Sicily and Southern Italy must be taken before convoying can be resumed with acceptable risk.
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Top