4 May 1941. Ras El Ali, Libya.
During the night, General Rommel’s impatience at not being able to strike the British when they were occupied by the events in Greece was beginning to show. It was only through the intercession of General Paulus that Rommel didn’t strip General Streich of command of the 5th Light Division. Paulus could well understand Streich’s reticence about attacking a dug-in force that was at least his equal. The vulnerability of the majority of panzers to the British 2-pdr guns made a panzer led attack likely to fail. Paulus knew that with the planned invasion of the Soviet Union that the numbers of panzers that would be shipped to North Africa would always be limited. The few months since the 5th Light Division had arrived in Tripoli had thrown up all sorts of problems which hadn’t really been considered, no one had thought of the panzers operating in a hot, sandy climate. Now that many of these problems had been solved, such as new air filters fitted to deal with dust and sand, the panzers were more reliable. This meant that 15th Panzer Division was likely to be fit for action quite quickly, but it seemed that General Rommel was determined to throw 5th Light Division away on a frontal assault on a strongly held British position. The losses to the German and Italian units the previous day were already going to be very difficult to replace.
The fact that the British had advanced seemed to suggest that they felt strong, even with all that had happened in Greece. In every encounter the German army had had with the British, the Wehrmacht had come away victorious, but it had always had a steep cost. The consensus among those who had examined the actions against the British had found that their equipment and training were good, especially in defence, but that their doctrine and tactics were lacking. What the OKH wanted was for Rommel to keep the Italians from suffering yet another defeat. Throwing away the best part of 5th Light Division in an unnecessary fight wouldn’t help fulfil that expectation.
The British had bested the Italians pretty easily, but Paulus and the German High Command were of the opinion that they wouldn’t have it so easy against the Germans. Which was why the Afrika Korps was here. Paulus eventually made it clear to Rommel that if he didn’t do what Berlin had sent him to do, then they would send someone else who would. The British attack had been thrown back, it was time to bring back the 5th Light and Ariete Divisions to the prepared defensive positions. Let the British batter their heads off a strong position, far from their supply bases, if they felt were strong enough. Then, once they were out on a limb, Rommel could let loose his mobile forces in a counter punch that would throw them right back to Tobruk and beyond. Rommel, very reluctantly, agreed to follow Paulus’ advice. In a letter to his wife he was able to express his frustration safely, and was delighted when Paulus was called back to Berlin.
General Gambier-Parry’s force therefore, found that instead of the expected attack, the Italian and German Divisions disengaged and by mid-morning the British and Indian troops found themselves no longer under siege. Once again Brigadier Scott-Cockburn was keen to chase the Italians back up the road to Nofilia. But Gambier-Parry, having been on the radio to both Generals O’Connor and Wavell, had decided that Ras El Ali would continue to be held in force.
Once the 7th Armoured Division, 6th Infantry Division and 4th Indian Division were ready for the next phase of the advance, they could use the positions currently held by Gambier-Parry’s unit as their starting point. General Wavell had noted that the near loss of 3rd Motor Brigade was due in part to using the Brigade as the basic battle formation. It was clear from the fighting the day before, that acting with anything less than a full Division would invite the Germans to deal with things piecemeal. The fact was that Operation Brevity could very easily have become a disaster. Instead, it could be shown as a success, driving the British position in North Africa closer to Tripoli, and holding off the attacks of both a German and Italian Division.
General O’Connor was keen on moving the 9th Australian Division up from their positions at El Agheila, to take over the defensive positions at Ras El Ali. Wavell could see that that would have the beneficial effect of allowing Gambier-Parry’s force to rest and resupply. However, Wavell was worried that the excellent defensive position at the salt pans, behind which large supply dumps were being readied for the next phase of the plan, might be more vulnerable by moving the Australians forward. Wavell had taken to calling the force commanded by Gambier-Parry as 22nd Division, and he was aware that their position could still be outflanked by the Germans through the desert. If El Agheila wasn’t properly protected, then the initiative could be taken by the Germans. 22nd Division was mobile enough to strike in any direction, and so keeping them where they were, while building up their Field Supply Depots, would give the next phase a good starting point.
With the German roadblock gone, the supply convoy for the 3rd Motor Brigade were able to come forward, along with the Indian Cavalry Battalion and a battery of a Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, to help with the resupply and defence. At the same time the RASC and ROAC lorries that had set up the Field Supply Depot made their way back, with all the wounded, to begin the process of bringing forward more of the stocks needed for the next phase of the advance towards Tripoli.
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