Sir John Valentine Carden survives.

[allanpcameron]

8 February 1941. Bardia, Libya.

The A10 tanks of 1st and 6th Battalion RTR, and the A9 tanks of 7th and 8th Hussars had picked their way carefully back over the tracks of Cyrenaica to Bardia. 7th Armoured Division’s RAOC workshops had taken over Italian installations which allowed a fairly efficient processing of vehicles. While the rest of the Division had been in action, the wrecked tanks had been gathered from various points and entirely stripped of anything of value. This added to the supply of spare parts.

The tanks went through what in other situations might be described as triage. The tanks that were literally on their last legs, usually they had been towed back to Bardia, were put to one side. The RAOC Officer in Command marked them to be shipped back to the Delta to the main depots and workshops. They would need a lot of man-hours to get them fixed up, and would drain the stores at Bardia of vital parts.

The second lot of tanks were those with known defects. Each tank was inspected and a report of what was needed to bring it up to full operations was noted. The question was whether or not the defects could be fixed from the existing stores and how long it would take. If it could be done with the resources at hand and in a timely manner, they were put to one side and would be worked on. Those needing more profound work would join the shipment back to the Delta.

All the other tanks, the Division’s ‘runners’, tended to be overdue on their servicing needs and there were jobs beyond the capability of their own crews that needed time in the workshop. These were the first to be worked on. All four Regiments had been together a long time, and were used to mucking in with the fitters and mechanics of the Divisional workshops. The objective was getting as many of the ‘runners’ up to full capability. If possible, General Creagh wanted at least one Regiment’s worth of each type ready for action, just in case.

With word coming through that the Division was to be re-equipped with Valiant Mark I Infantry Tanks, the men of the four regiments started working with the 44th & 48th Bn RTR to become familiar with the new type of tank. For the men of the two Royal Tank Regiment Battalions swapping an A10 for a Valiant was like an upgrade. For much the same speed, they were getting vastly more protection, range and comfort. The same 2-pdr gun meant that it wasn’t a complete upgrade, but so far, the 2-pdr had proven itself a useful tool. The Hussars were more conflicted. The speed difference between the A9 and Valiant wasn’t that vast, and if pushed for honesty, there weren’t that many times that the A9 had been driven at its supposed top speed. The increased armour was certainly a big change. The Italian anti-tank guns were a real threat to the A9, the Valiant would be all but invulnerable. The problem was that the tank was the Infantry Tank Mark III, not a cruiser tank. Somehow it felt that their cavalry heritage was being lost using a tank designed to support the foot-infantry, rather than the dashing efforts of reconnaissance, screening and exploiting.

In the days that followed, as the men worked hard, and had their stories to tell of the victories over the Italians. Generally, there was a very positive mood in 7th Armoured Division about the new tanks they were going to get. There was much to learn about diesel engines and a suspension system that felt like a step backwards over the ‘slow motion’ of the A9 and A10. There was a lot of discussion about the relative merits of one kind of tank against another, and some had feared that like the Australian Division’s Cavalry Regiment some Italian tanks might end up having to be used. The men had all been fully informed about the Panzer II, III and IVs captured in Flanders. If the rumours were true and that Hitler was going to prop up Mussolini, then going up against the German tanks in a Valiant was likely to be a much better experience than facing them in an A9 or A10.

NB. None of this is OTL.

 

[kelgar04]

Don’t think the Germans have a clear idea of what the Valiant is capable of if memory serves though they should be getting some report from thr Italians which should be filling in the gaps if their officers take them seriously. Also would it be worth expansion of the repair and maintenance for armour at Tobruk so they don’t have to ship everything back to the Delta?

 

[Ramp-Rat]

On the question of the provision of spares.

Throughout history the military has had a problem with providing spares for the troops sailors, in service. From making sure that there are significant spare boots, clothing, tents, horse equipment, swords, spears, to the more complex items once equipment became more advanced. So you have provided you men with a Brown Bess musket, did you remember to order spare flints, bullet moulds, stocks, etc. The government, re treasury, while it might be prepared to order enough muskets to equip every infantry man, would often forget to order extra to allow for breakages, loses in combat, and spare parts for items that wear out, ie flints, lock springs. Once military equipment became more complex, you have the added problem of shop window, ordering, you can have one hundred tanks, and no spare parts, that look very effective, but are soon reduced to eighty, as twenty are cannibalised to keep the eighty running. Or you can order seventy and all the spares you need to keep them in service.

Then there is the problem of what spares to order, in peace time, once you are at war. A good mechanic/engineer can forecast some of the spares you will need, such as oil filters, fan belts, and on petrol engines spark plugs. But until they equipment in question has been subjected to hard service, and you have some feedback, you can only guess what else you might need. Your trails told you that the tracks were good for a thousand miles, but that was in the testing centre in the UK. Where the testing staff, made sure that the tracks were tensioned correctly, the track pins greased every day, and the tracks were not subjected to fine dust. So it turns out that under real world conditions that the tracks are only good for seven hundred and fifty miles, and the engines have to be completely rebuilt every two thousand hours of service. This engine hours is the reason many commercial vehicles are fitted with a separate engine hours counter, your back hoe has only done five hundred miles, but the engine has done ten thousand hours, and needs a complete service.

Then there is the question of motivation, it’s easy to stand up and tell the workers to produce more tanks, Tanks for our galant allies in Russia, Give the Boys the weapons they need, build more Tanks. Now try to explain why we don’t want you to produce more tanks, but do want you to produce more spare parts. The first is an easy sell, with banners as the thousandth tank for the front passes out the door, the big ten foot high sign that tells everyone how many tanks they made this week. The second is a much harder sell, it requires more explanation, and is not as easy to promote with simple signs. Trying to explain that rather than producing one hundred tanks a month, we are better off producing eighty, and the spares for another twenty, is actually a better way, is hard. Throughout WWII and right up until the present day, getting politicians, the public and some signor officers to realise that less is more, has always been a difficulty.

RR.

 

[Derek Pullem]

Don’t think the Germans have a clear idea of what the Valiant is capable of if memory serves though they should be getting some report from thr Italians which should be filling in the gaps if their officers take them seriously. Also would it be worth expansion of the repair and maintenance for armour at Tobruk so they don’t have to ship everything back to the Delta?

Actually very few reports and no physical evidence due to the nature of the Compass battles. The Italian High Command may be virtually in the dark about Valiants as well.

 

[ArtosStark]

What strange is before WW1 the field service regulations espoused combined arms warfare however it wasn't really implemented effectively or at all. It's the same with organisation, training and handling of brigades, division and Corps formations none of the generals or brigadier had the experience necessary outside of a few and most had to learn on the fly. Heck regimental command was seen as the highlight of an officers career at the time.

The British Army was actually historically very good at combined operations. The problem with that in WW1 was what they meant by the term.

The Artillery is maybe the best example. Nobody in basically any branch of the army, Artillery or otherwise, questioned that Artillery's job was to support the Infantry. And that is quite correct. However, the general learning of the first couple years of WW1 was the difference between "How the infantry want to be supported" and "How the Infantry are best supported". Incorrect lessons drawn from the Boer War (which did also have some good ones to teach) and the general philosophical triumph of "moral school" over the "firepower school" (sort of. Its a little more complicated than I make it sound) meant that the Artillery entered WW1 supporting the Infantry in the way it wanted rather than the way it needed.

Guns were moved up right into the firing line, and commanders faced significant criticism for "staying too far back". This was for moral purposes. It was felt the infantry needed to be able to see the artillery firing to "feel supported". Shrapnel was favoured over high explosive shells. Partly due to the type of wars the British normally fought but also because the effectiveness of guns was evaluated by the number of bullet equivalents they brought to the firing line. Artillery was organized at the Brigade level (and sometimes at the Battery level) with little organizational machinery for higher levels of command. This was because each artillery brigade was to be attached to and infantry body and was generally considered to be "their" artillery. This led to inadequate artillery support everywhere even when the overall number of guns would have been adequate had they been combined and properly coordinated.

These things had to be unlearned by both Infantry and Artillery during WW1 and new methods of coordination and support developed, so that the Artillery could give the support the Infantry (and other branches) needed rather than what it wanted. Similar stories generally reflected the entire process of going from an army that could effectively field combined arms units in small wars and effectively coordinate between cavalry and infantry and even Naval units to one that could combine Infantry, Armoured, Cavalry, Airforce, Artillery and Engineers in the context of total war. The more I study WW1, the more I am convinced that it was at least as dynamic a war, if not more so, than WW2.

 

[Orry]

Actually very few reports and no physical evidence due to the nature of the Compass battles. The Italian High Command may be virtually in the dark about Valiants as well.

They will discount some of the stories as being the typical tales of defeated troops explaining away their defeat.

And many of the stories will be exagerations - can they read between the lines to understand exactly what happened? Probably not

 

[alfredtuomi]

I think a lot more final assembly work was done in destination countries remember that one of the reasons that the depression was so bad was the erection of high tariff walls which made it uneconomic to ship complete vehicles hence final assembly being done in the destination country instead. Also in Australia we seem to use both metric and imperial fasteners without problems today I can’t imagine another set of sockets and taps would have been beyond the scope of a Reme detachment in 1941

It's not a problem for the end user but with the manufacturer where all there machinery is intended for one type.hard to justify idling one set of machine tools when they were in short supply.

 

[kelgar04]

The British Army was actually historically very good at combined operations. The problem with that in WW1 was what they meant by the term.

The Artillery is maybe the best example. Nobody in basically any branch of the army, Artillery or otherwise, questioned that Artillery's job was to support the Infantry. And that is quite correct. However, the general learning of the first couple years of WW1 was the difference between "How the infantry want to be supported" and "How the Infantry are best supported". Incorrect lessons drawn from the Boer War (which did also have some good ones to teach) and the general philosophical triumph of "moral school" over the "firepower school" (sort of. Its a little more complicated than I make it sound) meant that the Artillery entered WW1 supporting the Infantry in the way it wanted rather than the way it needed.

Guns were moved up right into the firing line, and commanders faced significant criticism for "staying too far back". This was for moral purposes. It was felt the infantry needed to be able to see the artillery firing to "feel supported". Shrapnel was favoured over high explosive shells. Partly due to the type of wars the British normally fought but also because the effectiveness of guns was evaluated by the number of bullet equivalents they brought to the firing line. Artillery was organized at the Brigade level (and sometimes at the Battery level) with little organizational machinery for higher levels of command. This was because each artillery brigade was to be attached to and infantry body and was generally considered to be "their" artillery. This led to inadequate artillery support everywhere even when the overall number of guns would have been adequate had they been combined and properly coordinated.

These things had to be unlearned by both Infantry and Artillery during WW1 and new methods of coordination and support developed, so that the Artillery could give the support the Infantry (and other branches) needed rather than what it wanted. Similar stories generally reflected the entire process of going from an army that could effectively field combined arms units in small wars and effectively coordinate between cavalry and infantry and even Naval units to one that could combine Infantry, Armoured, Cavalry, Airforce, Artillery and Engineers in the context of total war. The more I study WW1, the more I am convinced that it was at least as dynamic a war, if not more so, than WW2.

Without turning it into too much of a derail the problem that came out of the Beor War was not enough was learnt on the artillery side of things while much was learnt by the infantry and the cavalry as well as the Commanders who had to fight the conflict. The next opportunity to learn anything else was the Russo-Japanese War however the problem there is that there was the question of what lessons would be relevant and usually spent a great deal of time debating it between the Royal Artillery Regiment, the Royal Horse Artillery, the various fortress artillery regiments and the costal deference batteries about what would be relevant in there particular areas.

Indeed the training of the gunners was some of the best they could get their shells off rapidly but for the Royal Artillery Regiment and the Royal Horse Artillery, there were some areas they were lacking like there ability to shoot off the map for instance as an example as well as lacking in stock of telephone line which hampered communication.

 

[CB13]

Parts and spares could be requested of Canada as in isolation they would be much easier to produce than completed vehicles.

As this post appears to have taken discussion WAY off the rails I will take ownership of that and attempt to clarify my thought.

1. General Industrial Capacity: At this point UK home industries are at full capacity, especially in terms of manpower. And any spare capacity that does exist would be being fought over by manufacturers trying to deliver on contracts for the various branches, with the Army most likely coming in a distant third on that priority list....not to mention the manpower demands of the growingarmed forces themselves. Canada in contrast would still have a massive surplus. The United States which was willing to trade "parts" with Canada even during the early stages of the war had an even a greater surplus of capacity and OTL that was often utilised indirectly by Canada as an extension of their own supply chains.

2. Tank Part Specific Capacity: In the process of setting up their own Valiant Production, Canada would have just assessed all the available part and sub-assembly suppliers in both Canada and the United States and whether it be failed bidders or winning bidders with excess capacity, they would know where the opportunities existed. This is not to say that ALL parts and spares could be sourced from Canada (often acting as a conduit for the USA as well). Instead that it would make sense to assess the "low hanging fruit", and to order those pieces immediately, before moving onto to more complicated components which may require manufacturing in the UK. As an example if Canada had identified a steel mill/foundry capable of producing tracks and track pins, but the order for their domestic Valiant production was only 15% of the mill/foindry's capacity, then obviously there is a major opportunity to contract additional parts beyond their own requirement. Same opportunity would likely have existed with bogeys, storage boxes, air filters, fuel filters, spark plugs/glow plugs, carburetors, etc., etc., etc. It should be noted that Allan had previously identified that the engines for the Canadian Valiants were from Cummins in the USA, which most assuredly would have had spare capacity to provide full "engine in a box" kits upon request, specifically to meet this exact need. Once ordered, all those "low hanging fruit" items could be boxed for immediate international shipment and be directed straight to the key in-theatre logistics depot, most likely as part of a larger shipment of food, ammunition, etc. That would make the "critical UK production" list MUCH short for the Ministry of Supply and they could focus their limited remaining resources on those critical components.

3. Currency: The main issue with the UK purchasing either completed systems or parts directly from the United States was that they demanded payment in USD (or gold). While the UK was hesitant to expend either of those currencies, Canada was happy to act as an intermediary and it could make use of both currencies quite easily.

I hope this takes some of the contentiousness out of the suggestion.....

 

[alfredtuomi]

As this post appears to have taken discussion WAY off the rails I will take ownership of that and attempt to clarify my thought.

1. General Industrial Capacity: At this point UK home industries are at full capacity, especially in terms of manpower. And any spare capacity that does exist would be being fought over by manufacturers trying to deliver on contracts for the various branches, with the Army most likely coming in a distant third on that priority list....not to mention the manpower demands of the growingarmed forces themselves. Canada in contrast would still have a massive surplus. The United States which was willing to trade "parts" with Canada even during the early stages of the war had an even a greater surplus of capacity and OTL that was often utilised indirectly by Canada as an extension of their own supply chains.

2. Tank Part Specific Capacity: In the process of setting up their own Valiant Production, Canada would have just assessed all the available part and sub-assembly suppliers in both Canada and the United States and whether it be failed bidders or winning bidders with excess capacity, they would know where the opportunities existed. This is not to say that ALL parts and spares could be sourced from Canada (often acting as a conduit for the USA as well). Instead that it would make sense to assess the "low hanging fruit", and to order those pieces immediately, before moving onto to more complicated components which may require manufacturing in the UK. As an example if Canada had identified a steel mill/foundry capable of producing tracks and track pins, but the order for their domestic Valiant production was only 15% of the mill/foindry's capacity, then obviously there is a major opportunity to contract additional parts beyond their own requirement. Same opportunity would likely have existed with bogeys, storage boxes, air filters, fuel filters, spark plugs/glow plugs, carburetors, etc., etc., etc. It should be noted that Allan had previously identified that the engines for the Canadian Valiants were from Cummins in the USA, which most assuredly would have had spare capacity to provide full "engine in a box" kits upon request, specifically to meet this exact need. Once ordered, all those "low hanging fruit" items could be boxed for immediate international shipment and be directed straight to the key in-theatre logistics depot, most likely as part of a larger shipment of food, ammunition, etc. That would make the "critical UK production" list MUCH short for the Ministry of Supply and they could focus their limited remaining resources on those critical components.

3. Currency: The main issue with the UK purchasing either completed systems or parts directly from the United States was that they demanded payment in USD (or gold). While the UK was hesitant to expend either of those currencies, Canada was happy to act as an intermediary and it could make use of both currencies quite easily.

I hope this takes some of the contentiousness out of the suggestion.....

It is a good thought but unfortunately not quite so easy.As an example when Packard started building Merlins they had to redesign to North American standards(i.e their machinery) so if you took a part from a Packard merlin it would not necessarily fit a British built Merlin.Now if you wanted to use complete units(engines) in new build that could and was done but required mods to the tank to fit.

 

[edgeworthy]

Oh, better.
Thought you wanted bigger

If we want something remotely sensible, then there is the Canadian Indestructible Roller Device

Or the Bullshorn Plough

 

[Cryhavoc101]

With regards to spares - they are not all being built at the same factory - 100s of sub contractors were leveraged for the production of tank parts with final assembly at the main tank factory.

So things like roadwheels, tracks, engine, periscopes, guns etc where all built elsewhere.

It would take wartime experience to fully appreciate that each tank would need a 2nd engine, a spare gun and machine guns, spare radio, vision blocs, a complete replacement set of tracks, roadwheels and 1000 other things.

The USA got it right because they sent the NATO team (North Africa Theatre of Operations) to understand the hard lessons the British had learned operating AFVs 1000s of sea miles from your industrial base and report back to the USA regarding the fortes and foibles of operating armour under such conditions

Which is why we see Shermans being loaded with a entire power pack boxed up on the rear deck and a complete set of tools and other spares when they winched them aboard a given liberty ship.

 

[vizzer]

Which is why we see Shermans being loaded with a entire power pack boxed up on the rear deck and a complete set of tools and other spares when they winched them aboard a given liberty ship.

Which is probably where the Sharman's reputation for reliability comes from. It may have broken down just as frequently as any other tank but because it had spares & tools available & was easier to access it could be put back into operation while the crew of a broken down Comet were still trying to scrounge up parts & tools.

 

[Atrophied]

That isnt a probable reason why sherman had the reputation , that is actually the reason why - since it had a adequte numbers of spares wich contributed to making sherman equipped units be alot more available than other type of tanks . But here with victor coming wich has the potential to be main battle tank for the british for the war more or less till a centurion equilevant comes late 44 hopefully and few hundred get used rather than the 6 of otl .

So the brits might do alot better on the spare part availability if they are mostly equipped with victors for front line armored regiments for d-day atleast is my thought . The valiants can be kept in italy , as lend lease and against the japenese tough by then?
But yeah there is a chance you could get a few canadian firms with american help in reaction to this to start producing some spare parts maybe or if not that then atleast order more stuff from the sub contractors wich could affect production numbers a little but having more of ur stuff available is more important than more numbers of tanks . Valiant is going to absorb alot of the otl crusader order and as said before the coveanter orders aswell outside the valentine production and victor will replace both cromwell and comets and maybe even churchills if main battle tank decision is made.And the otl grant and sherman orders and firefly conversions aswell . Altough american tanks to the indians and australians isnt a bad idea to pursue ?

My thought is like lowering tank production numbers by 10-20% in total to get adequate spare parts is something to consider for the brits ?

 

[MattII]

Which is probably where the Sharman's reputation for reliability comes from. It may have broken down just as frequently as any other tank but because it had spares & tools available & was easier to access it could be put back into operation while the crew of a broken down Comet were still trying to scrounge up parts & tools.

Actually, the Sherman was more reliable than any of the British tanks, markedly so.

 

[duckie]

That isnt a probable reason why sherman had the reputation , that is actually the reason why - since it had a adequte numbers of spares wich contributed to making sherman equipped units be alot more available than other type of tanks . But here with victor coming wich has the potential to be main battle tank for the british for the war more or less till a centurion equilevant comes late 44 hopefully and few hundred get used rather than the 6 of otl .

So the brits might do alot better on the spare part availability if they are mostly equipped with victors for front line armored regiments for d-day atleast is my thought . The valiants can be kept in italy , as lend lease and against the japenese tough by then?
But yeah there is a chance you could get a few canadian firms with american help in reaction to this to start producing some spare parts maybe or if not that then atleast order more stuff from the sub contractors wich could affect production numbers a little but having more of ur stuff available is more important than more numbers of tanks . Valiant is going to absorb alot of the otl crusader order and as said before the coveanter orders aswell outside the valentine production and victor will replace both cromwell and comets and maybe even churchills if main battle tank decision is made.And the otl grant and sherman orders and firefly conversions aswell . Altough american tanks to the indians and australians isnt a bad idea to pursue ?

My thought is like lowering tank production numbers by 10-20% in total to get adequate spare parts is something to consider for the brits ?

Depends, one of the reasons for numbers of new build tanks, was because the olds tanks where shot up by 88mm. If fewer Valiants are destroyed in battle , the need for new tanks is reduced.

 

[marathag]

It is a good thought but unfortunately not quite so easy.As an example when Packard started building Merlins they had to redesign to North American standards(i.e their machinery) so if you took a part from a Packard merlin it would not necessarily fit a British built Merlin.Now if you wanted to use complete units(engines) in new build that could and was done but required mods to the tank to fit.

from https://www.enginehistory.org/Collections/british_fasteners.shtml

An often asked question is; "did Packard replicate the British thread system when they built Rolls-Royce Merlins under license during World War II?" The answer is yes; all threads that were used on the Merlin were accurately replicated by Packard. This would include BSW (British Standard Whitworth), BSF (British Standard Fine), BSP (British Standard Pipe) and BA (British Association). Having said that, however, Packard Merlins used U.S. built Bendix injection carburetors; PD-16 for single stage engines and PD-18 for two stage engines, both of which used U.S. Unified threads. British built Merlins employed S.U. carburetors using Whitworth threads. The job facing Packard when they undertook manufacture of the Merlin was daunting to say the least. It’s bad enough having to build a complex product like the Merlin but exacerbating the situation was the fact no tool maker in the U.S. made Whitworth taps or dies. Therefore, Packard were forced into making their own. Although this created a significant hurdle to overcome, the effort was well worth it, Packard and Rolls-Royce components were interchangeable.
...
After the war American, British and Canadian engineers finally sat down round a table and agreed on a common thread form, which, logically enough, they named ‘Unified’, which in the aero engine industry is still in use today, but to a lessening degree in automobile engineering.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Which is probably where the Sharman's reputation for reliability comes from. It may have broken down just as frequently as any other tank but because it had spares & tools available & was easier to access it could be put back into operation while the crew of a broken down Comet were still trying to scrounge up parts & tools.

The Cromwell, and the later marks of Churchills had a good reputation for reliability in Normandy as was the Comet into 45.

Those tanks not knocked out during the campaign were still running at the end of it - that was not the case with the earlier Crusiers

The reason for this is the British AFV workforce and industrial base had matured - there was from about the beginning of 1943 enough draughtsmen, trained workers and quality control engineers to produce well made reliable AFVs.

This resulted in a quality item unlike the Crusaders for example which upon arrival in Africa often needed many hundreds of man hours before it was deemed operational

Case in point workers intended to begin producing the Comet were during the Normandy campaign told to pack their bags and sent to the Cromwell factory's to allow for a sudden and massive increase in Cromwell production due to the heavier than expected AFV losses during that battle.

This was done both successfully and seamlessly - although it did delay Comet.

This could not have been done in say 1941 or 1942 as the workforce was yet to mature

It was determined earlier in the war that the Valentines were the most reliable tanks as they just kept running (Edit by some certainly not all)

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Depends, one of the reasons for numbers of new build tanks, was because the olds tanks where shot up by 88mm. If fewer Valiants are destroyed in battle , the need for new tanks is reduced.

In WW2 a tank will last about 6 months with a unit before it is worn out (and likely days in combat before it is knocked out or is abandoned and destroyed by its crew after it breakdown/runs out of fuel etc) and needs replacing with new tanks or rebuilding at a factory or a fully equipped workshop if overseas

This is where we currently find the A9s and A10 tank 'estate' in this story having been an earlier (lesser) design and earlier built tank and hard used they are all totally worn out.

So it is not so much a case of tanks lost in battle but also the need to replace worn out tanks through use - especially in somewhere as harsh as North Africa which was really harsh on...well pretty much everything that was not a camel or a fly.

So lots of new tanks will still be needed - even if fewer tanks are knocked out in battle - most tanks are used up through being worn out through use.

 

[allanpcameron]

The Cromwell, and the later marks of Churchills had a good reputation for reliability in Normandy as was the Comet into 45...
It was determined earlier in the war that the Valentines were the most reliable tanks as they just kept running (Edit by some certainly not all)

Good summary. The advantage for the Valentine was that Vickers had been building tanks consistently between the wars, so had a trained workforce, which Nuffield et al didn't. The majority of the A9 and A10s weren't built by Vickers, just 50 and 10 of each. A lot of their problems were due to tracks more than other mechanicals.