Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.

28 November 1941. Nottinghamshire, England.
  • 28 November 1941. Nottinghamshire, England.

    Welbeck Abbey had become home to the 43rd Bn RTR, or “43rd (6th City) Battalion, The Royal Northumberland Fusiliers, Royal Tank Regiment” to give them their full title. As with a number of pre-war territorial units, it had been converted to an armoured role. Along with two other such battalions, 144th and 148th Royal Armoured Corps (formerly 9th Loyal Regiment North Lancashire and 8th East Lancashire Regiment) made up 33rd Army Tank Brigade.

    43rd Bn RTR had been chosen for this particular role because it had been lucky enough to have some Matilda II and Dragon artillery tractors to train on after Dunkirk. Having done so, they would now pass on this experience to the two new RAC regiments. Those Matilda II tanks had been passed on to other units, and now 43rd Bn RTR were the first unit to be equipped with the new A22 Infantry Tank Mark IV. Known as the ‘Churchill’, this Vauxhall product had been through a lot of development before being issued to a tank battalion, but it was still a rush job.

    Some of the officers and men of the Battalion had been detached to Vauxhall and to some of the other firms making the tanks, especially Broom & Wade, Beyer Peacock and Gloucester Railway. Others had gone to the factories to learn about the Bedford twin-six engine, and others to learn about the new gear box, steering gear and final drive.

    Having worked alongside the civilian workers to learn about their new tanks, some of these same civilians were now at Welbeck Abbey working with the soldiers to master the complexity of a new type of tank. Brigadier Roy Jerram, OC 33rd Army Tank Brigade, had very particular orders. The numbers of A22s being delivered on a monthly basis would equip his Brigade by early next year. Each of the three battalions had been issued twenty tanks initially, for familiarisation. Once the men and machines were ready, then Jerram would have to work out the best use of this new Infantry Tank.

    Differing from previous Infantry Tanks, the Churchill resembled the French Char B1 (bis) in that the turret contained the standard 2-pdr gun, and also had the 3-inch tank howitzer mounted in the hull. Normally only Close Support tanks were armed with the howitzer, but this was on all the tanks. The difficulty for the hull gunner to make best use of the howitzer had led to a request for a new prototype from Vauxhall for a Mark II, which would replace the howitzer in the hull with a Besa machine gun, and have the usual mix of gun and CS tanks using the 2-pdr or 3-inch howitzer.

    The reviews of the battles in Libya had called for a greater use of HE shells, and there was a case to be made of replacing the 2-pdr in the turret with the 3-inch howitzer, and having these as the majority of tanks in the battalion, with one 2-pdr tank in each troop. Jerram’s findings would be play a big part in the decision about the best way forward. Already the concept of the Infantry Tank protecting the infantry from enemy tanks, therefore needing the penetration of the 2-pdr, had been refuted in combat experience. An Infantry Tank supporting the infantry had to be capable of overcoming prepared enemy defences, for which an HE shell was much more useful.

    Once more the threat of invasion was remote, between the winter weather and the German commitment in Russia, meant that the army could focus over the next few months on training. As Brigadier Jerram sat with his senior officers working out a full training program for the next few months, it was difficult not to be sceptical about the new tanks. As a replacement for the Matilda Infantry Tank II it wasn’t much of an improvement, except in armour protection, now four inches thick at the front. The men weren’t too impressed with the problem of trying to fight a vehicle with two main guns, especially as the howitzer had such a limited traverse and elevation. Because the 3-inch howitzer had been designed to be fitted into the 2-pdr mounting, the armourers were fiddling about, trying the idea of the howitzer in the turret, allowing for more ammunition storage for the HE and smoke shells.

    The mobility of the new tank was impressive over obstacles, the Merritt-Brown transmission allowed the drivers to take the tank places that most tanks would avoid. The power to weight ratio wasn’t great, and it was extremely noisy, reminding some of the oldest men of the early tanks of 1916. Brigadier Jerram had commanded a Mark IV tank at Cambrai, and had commanded a Squadron of Matilda I and IIs of 7th Bn RTR at Arras in 1940, later becoming its CO. Thinking back to that fight, going up against the Czech made tanks of 7th Panzer Division, he couldn’t help feel that the new Churchill tank had learned more from the lessons of the fighting in Flanders and France in 1917 or 1918 than from 1940. The Churchill would have been an unbeatable tank over the trenches and shell holes. For what lay ahead in 1942 and beyond, he just wasn’t convinced that this was the machine that would win a war.
     
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    29 November 1941. Aldershot, England.
  • 29 November 1941. Aldershot, England.

    A week had passed since the men of the 5th Canadian (Armoured) Division had disembarked from convoy CT15 at Gourock. The men had been brought by train to the Aldershot area and had been undergoing the usual work for new arrivals: improving their camps, fitness training and orientation.

    The men were getting settled and were waiting to be reunited with their tanks, which were due to arrive at the beginning of December in a separate convoy, along with the Division’s other vehicles. The next few weeks would be a busy time for the men of the Division as they sorted themselves and their equipment out.

    Major-General Ernest Sansom, GOC 5th Canadian (Armoured) Division was participating in a meeting with Lieutenant-General Andrew McNaughton, GOC Canadian Corps. Along with Major-General George Pearkes (GOC 1st Canadian Infantry Division), Major-General John Roberts (acting GOC 2nd Canadian Infantry Division) and Major-General Charles Price (GOC 3rd Canadian Infantry Division), and senior staff officers, there were many items that needed to be discussed and problems resolved.

    Like 5th Armoured Division, 3rd Infantry Division had not long arrived in Britain. 1st and 2nd Divisions were now well established and had had plenty of time for training. Roberts had just replaced Major-General Odlum who would be going to Australia, and 2nd Division needed a bit of work to bring it up to scratch, Odlum seemed to have focused on unimportant things. In addition to the three Infantry and one Armoured Division, the Canadian Corps also had a Tank Brigade and all of the normal artillery, engineers, transport, and other services necessary.

    McNaughton had called the meeting as he was expecting a visit from C-in-C Home Forces, General Alan Brooke shortly. Having a full Canadian Corps on hand was a strong part of Britain’s defences. While 2nd, 3rd Infantry and 5th Armoured would need more time to come to full readiness, McNaughton was conscious that the British Army was now beginning to think more in terms of going on the offensive, rather than the defensive posture since Dunkirk.

    The first matters on the agenda were to do with the practicalities of having such a large Canadian contingent in the British Isles and what problems needed to resolved. The second was to discuss the likelihood of the creation of a Canadian Army with two Corps. This would mean that more artillery and other units would need to be sourced to provide two Corps level support. Thirdly the generals had to sketch out a training schedule so that by early spring of 1942 a whole Corps Exercise could be run, keeping in mind that the arrival of 4th Canadian Division, currently Infantry, but being considered to be redesignated as Armoured, next summer. Two Armoured Divisions and three Infantry Divisions would make for an impressive Canadian Army.

    Unlike 1st and 2nd Canadian Infantry Divisions, which had arrived in Britain undertrained and underequipped, 3rd and 5th Divisions had arrived with their full equipment totals and had the chance to train well before embarking. Sansom and Price were confident that they would be ready for Divisional size exercises by January and Corps level training by March 1942. Exercises Waterloo and Bumper, which the Canadian Corps (1st and 2nd Canadian Infantry Divisions) had taken part in had focused on throwing back an invader. The criticism of 2nd Canadian Infantry Division in the second exercise had in great part led to the decision to replace Odlum. The need for all four Canadian Divisions to have worked together fully was agreed to be a priority.

    The last thing on the agenda was where and when the Canadians would cut their teeth. The fighting in Libya was reaching its conclusion, so the Middle East was less of a possibility than previously. War warnings in the Far East were increasing, and the arrival of Canadian troops in Hong Kong mean that Prime Minister King was aware of that threat. The invasion of France to liberate it was something that was beginning to be talked about, but doing so anytime before 1943 at the earliest was as much as anyone could foretell. Until all four Divisions were fully prepared it was somewhat speculative, but McNaughton was confident that his meeting with General Brooke would be positive.
     
    30 November 1941. Washington DC, United States of America.
  • 30 November 1941. Washington DC, United States of America.

    The new American tank, known as the T6 prototype, had for the three months undergone strict and exhaustive testing. A variety of changes had been ordered, and a number of pre-production models were now being produced.

    Major-General Douglas Pratt (Armoured Fighting Vehicles British Army Staff Washington) had been involved with the Americans in the development of the T6. Examining the Valiant tanks had helped with the development of the traversable turret, and Pratt was quite happy with the cast hull version of the T6. Writing his report about the new tank he noted that, with minor adaptations for British use, the T6, or M4 as it was likely to known once ordered, would be a good medium tank.

    While the American tank had undergone testing, the Canadian Valiant IIA* had also been tested at the Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland. With the diesel engine, and the 6-pdr gun, it was a difficult job to choose between the two. The T6 had been fitted with a M2 75mm L31 as the production version L40 wasn’t available. The 75mm had a very good HE round and a good AP round. The 6-pdr had an excellent AP round and a reasonable HE round. The Valiant was better protected, but the T6 was faster and more manoeuvrable, the Valiant’s suspension was a limiting factor. Pratt knew that the Victor prototypes were doing well, and would have liked to compare the T6 to the Victor, which he thought might be the better tank.

    The good news was that when the Purchasing Commission had ordered both the M3 Light and Medium tanks, it had written into the contracts that delivery of these would be changed over to their successor tanks. The first three M3 Medium tanks, known as the Grant, had been shipped to Australia, another eleven would be in the hands of the Australian Armoured Division in December. Realistically, production of the M4 wouldn’t begin until at least February of 1942, with delivery, possibly, by late summer. The initial order for 500 M3 Grants and 500 M3 Stuarts would equip the 1st Australian and 1st Indian Armoured Divisions, with a reasonable reserve for training and replacements. British 10th Armoured Division in Iran would be a mixture of A15 and Stuart tanks.

    Pratt was aware that the Canadians and Australians were cooperating on their replacement of the Valiant with the Ram/Jumbuck. Work on the successor to the A15, becoming known as the Crusader, wasn’t progressing as fast as work on the Victor. Tweaks to the Crusader to allow it to mount the 6-pdr was one thing, but, Pratt couldn’t see Nuffield Mechanisation coming up with something as good as the T6/M4 was likely to be, at least in the period between 1942 and 1943. His recommendation to the War Office was that the British Government should apply for Lend Lease M4 tanks to supplement the Armoured Divisions equipped with the Victor. Whether Nuffield would be interested in switching to building Victors instead of their own design was a political issue that Pratt couldn’t weigh in on.
     
    1 December 1941. Tripoli, Libya.
  • 1 December 1941. Tripoli, Libya.

    It had been a hard slog for the New Zealanders, but their efforts were paying off. The Italians and Germans had hoped that the Tarhuna-Homs line would hold for about three weeks, allowing reinforcements to cross the Mediterranean. In fact, they had only held for a few days, and the remaining German panzers, providing the mobile flank guard and counterattack force, had failed to stop 2nd Armoured Division. The Germans had taken a toll, but the British tank force was altogether stronger and better equipped. Major-General Harold Charrington had learned a lot in Greece, and despite the difficult terrain, had managed to make sure that when there was a clash, the Germans would always be outnumbered. The last Panzer III and IVs had all been destroyed, and the remaining Panzer IIs were last seen by the RAF heading west.

    Alongside 2nd Armoured Division, the New Zealand Division had fought hard against those elements of the Italian and German army that were prepared to fight. There had been two epic battles to get to this point. The first was the defile that brought the Division down from the Gebel heights. Once that was cleared, the second was the capture of Point 193, ten miles to the east of Azizia. This was the lynchpin of the last defences of Tripoli, and 6th Infantry Brigade had finally pushed the Italians off the previous night.

    At first light, the New Zealand Divisional Cavalry moved forward aiming for the main airbase at Castel Benito, with 4th Infantry Brigade at their heels. With the fighting now on the plain of Tripoli, there was greater room for manoeuvre. The reality was that Italian army was finished. The numbers of prisoners slowed the New Zealanders. 2nd Armoured Division, with the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade, had orders to head first for Azizia, then to cut the coast road between Tripoli and Zuara.

    Likewise on the coastal road, the victory at Cussabat had opened up the Italian line, which 7th Armoured Division had been exploiting, along with 6th and 50th Infantry Division, making up XIII Corps. The delaying tactics of the Italians, had slowed the advance as demolitions and mining had made forward movement, even for tracked vehicles difficult. Finally, the 22nd Guards Brigade had successfully taken Coradinni, with a flank attack having made a difficult night march. After heavy fighting the town fell. Now at last the last fifty miles to Tripoli along the coast road was cleared of organised resistance, but not demolitions or mines. Major-General Gott put 4th Armoured Brigade in the vanguard and ordered them to reach Castelverde by nightfall. Two Brigades of 50th (Northumbrian) Division followed the tanks in support.

    The Royal Navy’s Force K, based in Malta, which had been reinforced, working with the RAF and Fleet Air Arm had been able to interdict many of the ships heading both away from and towards Tripoli. There had been a steady stream of transport aircraft also heading in both directions. Less of these were intercepted, and the arrival of a new Italian fighter, the Macchi C.202 Folgore flown by 1° Stormo Caccia Terrestre, proved a greater challenge to the Hurricanes and Tomahawks of the RAF.

    General Ettore Bastico, as Governor-General of Italian Libya and commander-in-chief over all Axis forces in North Africa, faced with the British breakthroughs, appealed to Rome for instructions. The reply from Mussolini was that he was turn Tripoli into a fortress and fight for every street and house. This was an order that Bastico recognised as coming from desperation. It also clarified for him where his duty lay. He ordered contact to be made with the British to discuss the terms of surrender.

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    2 December 1941. Tunis, Tunisia.
  • 2 December 1941. Tunis, Tunisia.

    General Maxime Weygand, was still technically the Delegate-General of The Vichy government in North Africa, and Governor General of Algeria. It was expected that Lieutenant-General Alphonse Juin, currently commander-in-chief of troops in Morocco would succeed him, but as yet, Petain’s government hadn’t yet confirmed this. The pressure from Berlin to bring Weygand back to Metropolitan France was growing, but with the British advances in Italian Libya, it was felt in Vichy, that it was not the right time to change horses.

    For his part, Weygand opposed in principle the Parish Protocols agreed between Berlin and Darlan, which allowed for Germans to be based in the French colonies of Senegal, Syria and Tunisia. Worse yet, the Germans expected local French forces to have to come to the defence of these bases against any threat. While he was no admirer of Charles De Gaulle, it was becoming clear that Weygand’s assessment of the British was wrong. He believed that after Dunkirk, like France, Britain would sue for peace to retain their empire. Now that the British Empire forces had all but knocked Italy out of North and East Africa, he was clear that they wouldn’t stop at the border with Tunisia. This would be particularly the case if German forces continued to act against the British from Tunisia.

    Weygand recieved a delegation led by Robert Murphy, the American Personal Representative of President Roosevelt. Murphy had brought with him, in great secrecy, General George Catroux. Catroux, when he had resigned as Governor-General of French Indo-China, had declared for the Free French under Charles De Gaulle. Catroux, along with a few others, had been landed from a British submarine and were attempting to persuade the French leadership in North Africa and the Levant, to join the struggle against Germany.

    When Murphy had approached Weygand, and managed to get Catroux into the meeting, the American passed on details of a joint agreement between the British Government and the French Government in Exile that Weygand would continue as Governor-General of Algeria and overall Commander-in-Chief of Free French North African forces.

    It was obvious to Weygand that if French North Africa broke off from Vichy, then the Germans would occupy the rest of France. Weygand was aware that there were many French officers, not least Alphonse Juin, who felt that the British withdrawal at Dunkirk and the attack on the French Fleet at Mers-el-Kébir, had damaged relations entirely. Their views of De Gaulle were unprintable, and that moving to support him and his “Free French” would be an act of treason.

    Catroux and his team informed Weygand that they had previously been in Beirut working to persuade General Henri Dentz, the High Commissioner of the Levant, to throw in with the Free French. With the threat of a British led invasion, Dentz had resisted, but agreed in principle (and in the strictest secrecy) that if Weygand brought North Africa to De Gaulle, he would also switch sides. Catroux had also agreed in principle that those French officers and men who disagreed with the decision to join De Gaulle, would be allowed to be repatriated to France. That same agreement would be made to Weygand’s men.

    Weygand was aware that this meeting, and even his consideration of the proposal would have drastic consequences. Before he could make any decision, he would need to consult with Major-General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, the commander-in-chief of troops in the protectorate of Tunisia. De Lattre already had his forces on the Libya/Tunisia border on alert. His orders were that any Germans or Italians crossing the border were to be peacefully disarmed and interred. If they resisted, then the French forces were to use all means necessary to follow their orders.

    Weygand believed it would be best if De Lattre was able to hear for himself the offer that was being made. Robert Murphy, again accompanied by Catroux, visited De Lattre in his Headquarters in Tunis and gave him the same information. On hearing this de Lattre was keen that Weygand should break with Vichy. In his view, the French forces in North Africa and Levant would be a nucleus for a powerful army to regain the liberation of France. De Lattre visited Weygand and made his feeling clear. Weygand reiterated his orders regarding German and Italian forces crossing the Tunisian border. What happened there would influence the decision. If the Germans would accept French sovereignty, then all well and good. If not, if they treated the French forces without respect, then it would become obvious which direction Weygand and French North Africa would take.

    The British, in consultation with De Gaulle, had organised that the Royal Navy to bring forward General Paul Legentilhomme’s 1st Independent Free French Brigade, (1e BFL), by sea. The 2nd Free French Brigade was still sitting on the border of Lebanon, ready, with 7th Australian Division and elements of 10th Armoured Division to invade, should Dentz decide not to join the Free French. The ships carrying the French troops were currently holding at Malta, ready to sail to Tunis. Two Battalions of Middle East Commando ('C' and 'D' Battalions) under the command of Colonel Robert Laycock were also prepared to support the Free French forces if necessary.
     
    3 December 1941. Singapore.
  • 3 December 1941. Singapore.

    General Claude Auchinleck (C-inC India) had flown in to consult with Air Chief Marshall Robert Brooke-Popham (C-in-C Far East Command) and Admiral Tom Philips, newly arrived C-in-C China Station as well as his predecessor Vice-Admiral Geoffrey Layton. They were also joined by Vice-Admiral Geoffrey Arbuthnot (C-in-C East Indies Station). As well as the Royal Navy, the Army’s presence at the meeting included Lieutenant-Generals Arthur Percival (GOC Malaya Command), Donald McLeod (GOC Burma Army), Lewis Heath (GOC III Indian Corps), and Ivor Mackay (GOC AIF Malaya). The RAF were represented by Air Vice Marshall Conway Pulford (AOC RAF Far East). The mounting concern of a Japanese attack on Thailand, Malaya and Burma had the British and Empire forces on heightened alert. There were plenty of people who had a very low opinion of the Imperial Japanese Army, after all they hadn’t been able to subdue the Chinese. Auchinleck however had an inkling that this wasn’t the whole story, and unlike the majority of the forces in Far East Command, the Japanese had plenty of actual fighting experience.

    Since Admiral Tom Philips was newly arrived, he was invited to be the first to speak. He noted that along with the battleships HMS Prince of Wales, Nelson and Barham, the battlecruiser HMS Repulse and aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal, the China Station fleet also had been reinforced with the cruisers HMS Carlisle, Gloucester and Fiji, the destroyers HMS Electra, Express, Encounter, Greyhound, Ilex, Imperial, Jupiter, Juno, Kashmir and Kelly. Some of the submarines which had joined the Mediterranean Fleet from Hong Kong and Singapore at the beginning of the war had also now returned.

    When asked about his plans, Philips replied that he had worked with Layton to make sure that a picket of submarines was extended up the Malay peninsula, with the area between Hainan Island and the Thai coast of the South China Sea particularly well patrolled. There were also nine Dutch submarines included in that picket line. In addition to the submarines, a number of small vessels, such as Motor Torpedo Boats and sloops were patrolling the coastal waters. All mine sweepers were on constant alert and making sure there were no barriers to the fleet sailing. There were regular flights by RAF Hudsons and Catalinas (including Dutch crewed aircraft) also looking for any sign of Japanese aggression.

    His plan was to have a fast and slow group, with HMS POW and Repulse as the fast group, and HMS Nelson, Barham and Ark Royal in the slow group, each with two Cruisers and various destroyers. The air group of HMS Ark Royal would have to maintain a standing Combat Air Patrol over both groups. If an invasion force was encountered the fast group would engage, allowing the slow group to close and bring their guns to bear, while the aircraft carrier stood off with its own escort. Philips wanted a meeting with AVM Pulford to coordinate land based reconnaissance and support to the Fleet Air Arm’s efforts. Pulford was happy to meet, but was aware of the short comings of his force.

    Philips then noted that Singapore was vulnerable to air attack, and that he was considering that the main fleet would tend to work out of Ceylon. The admiralty were talking about sending the old R Class battleships to Ceylon, and that would give an added slow force, if necessary. He also noted that he was due to fly to the Philippines on 5 December to meet with Admiral Hart and General MacArthur to talk about joint operations. Vice-Admiral Layton wished him luck with that, Hart was a good man, but MacArthur had no desire to cooperate with the British. Philips and Layton had already met with Vice Admiral Conrad Helfrich, C-in-C Netherlands East Indies and were happy to report that good cooperation was likely to be the result.

    The other good news came from the Royal Australian Navy in Sydney. The arrival home from the Mediterranean of the destroyers HMAS Vampire, Vendetta, Voyager, Waterhen, Napier, Nestor, Nizam, as well as the sloop HMAS Parramatta had given the crews time for some home leave. With the four cruisers, HMAS Perth, Hobart Australia and Canberra, the RAN was busy escorting troop convoys to Singapore, Rabaul, Timor and Ambon. Most of the Australian reinforcements to Rabual, Timor and Ambon were complete, the next phase was the completion of the reinforcement of the Australian Imperial Force Malaya.

    That led to Lieutenant-General Ivan Mackay reporting that 8th Australian Division, having been reinforced to three full Brigades, was undergoing a great deal of training as a Division, previously they had worked almost as independent Brigades. The first arrivals of the men of 9th Australian Division at Singapore were the Royal Australian Engineers, 9th Division Signals, 9th Division Supply Column, and the other units that were necessary to prepare camps and set up Headquarters for the arrival of the rest of the Division. Mckay had been assured by Major-General Morshead (GOC 9th Australian Division) his division would be complete and fully prepared by the middle of January 1942. 20th Brigade, with 2/2 MG Battalion, 2/7th Field Regiment RAA and 9th Divisional Cavalry were due to arrive on 7th December, with all their support units. Followed by 24th Brigade, 2/8th Field Regiment, 3rd anti-tank Regiment RAA on 14 December, and finally 26th Brigade with the rest of Divisional troops on 21 December. Once 8th and 9th Australian Divisions were in place, Canberra wanted to create II Australian Corps, with Mackay as GOC.

    Lieutenant-General Lewis Heath reported that III Indian Corps had been reinforced with two Brigades from 5th Indian Division (9th and 10th Indian Infantry Brigades). This brought both 9th and 11th Indian Divisions up to full strength. Heath was delighted at having a battle-hardened Brigade in each of his two Divisions. Previously he had expressed concerns that many of the men making up the two Indian Divisions, along with the Line of Communication and reserves, were untested, and there were elements of training that could be improved.

    5th Indian Division’s arrival in Singapore of had begun piecemeal beginning in November. 29th Indian Infantry Brigade was the last to arrive and Heath had planned to use them as III Indian Corps’ reserves. He had taken the difficult decision to use the rest of 5th Indian Division’s assets to bring 9th and 11th Divisions up to full strength. The artillery alone would make an enormous difference to his Corps’ strength. The Divisional Cavalry, signals, engineers, Machine Gun Battalion and the host of other support units would make up the shortfall in all of those roles throughout the Corps.

    Asked by Auchinleck whether it would have been better to keep the whole Division together, Heath admitted, having commanded the Division in East Africa, that it had kept him awake at night. 9th and 11th Indian Infantry Divisions had their merits, not least their time acclimatising to Malaya, but they were weak formations. By integrating 5th Divisions assets, he had strengthened them to the extent that they would now be able to fulfil their responsibilities. With the lack of infrastructure, having a third Division would affect mobility and complicate logistics. Having two strong Divisions, and a good Corps reserve, helped him sleep easier.

    Heath then noted that the arrival of two squadrons of Matilda II Infantry Tanks under his command had increased his confidence. Until their arrival all he had was 100th Light Tank Squadron with some Vickers Mark VI light tanks and universal carriers. One of roles had given to these tanks was because of reading about the Crete campaign. He had assigned one Infantry Tank to each airfield. He would have preferred two tanks at each, but with only 36 tanks, he had to make hard decisions. There were four Battalions of Indian States Forces which were spread out protecting the airfields (Alar Star, Sungei Patani in the west and Kota Bahru, Machang, Gong Kedah and Kuantan in the east). This tied down a sixth of his available tanks, but he believed that each airfield was now much better off.

    Operation Matador, the plan to put forces into Thailand in the event of a Japanese landing, was still under discussion, there were many voices against the invasion of Thailand. Heath had given responsibility for this to 11th Indian Division. From his experience of working in East Africa, while taking the initiative was all well and good, Heath was aware that he was asking a lot of a Division that wasn’t quite as well trained as necessary. They would also be moving into territory over which little reconnaissance had been possible, to find themselves in a situation where they might be fighting the Thai army as well as the Japanese.

    Major-General David Murray-Lyon (GOC 11th Indian Infantry Division) had his staff prepare number of different plans, including a more simplified operation to achieve some of the objectives.

    The primary goal of Operation Matador was to advance to contact with Japanese invasion forces. Murray-Lyon and Heath had agreed that his force wasn’t strong enough to fulfil the two roles of both invading Thailand and defending Jitra. Of the two Brigades under his command, 6th Indian Infantry Brigade was the more effective. It had been suggested that instead of putting all its eggs in one basket, a column of infantry and engineers could move into Thailand and do as much damage to the road as possible to slow up a Japanese advance. That would allow the rest of 6th and 15th Brigades to deploy to prepared positions. Murray-Lyon also had 28th (Gurkha) Infantry Brigade as his Divisional reserve. Heath had agreed to provide the Corps reserve (29th Indian Infantry Brigade) to position itself around Ipoh, allowing the Gurkhas to move forward to Kroh.

    At Kroh Murray-Lyon had assembled a mobile force based on 10th Indian Infantry Brigade, carried by their own and borrowed Australian lorries. Accompanied by an artillery mountain battery, a battery of anti-tank guns and a company of engineers. These would aim to cut the road over the middle of the country at a point known as the Ledge. This would prevent the Japanese from getting into 11th Indian Division’s rear area. Heath had approved this plan, he had arranged for ‘Krohcol’ to be strenghened by one Matilda II troop and a troop of Light Tanks from the 100th Light Tank Company and some armoured cars from the 3rd Cavalry Regiment.

    Heath also reported that Major-General Arthur Barstow (GOC 9th Indian Infantry Division) had moved 9th Indian Brigade to support 8th Indian Brigade at Kota Bahru. Most of 8th Brigade were forward based on the possible landing beaches. With 9th Brigade in and around the triangle of airfields, he had an effective counter-attack force. Heath had authorised 9th Brigade to have three troops of Matilda II Infantry tanks, which would give them even greater effectiveness. Should it be necessary, 9th Brigade could also be used to move into Thailand towards Japanese landing beaches. In addition, 1st Duke of York’s Own Skinners Horse, 5th Division’s Reconnaissance Regiment had been provided to 9th Brigade. Equipped with Indian Pattern Carriers, some light tanks and universal carriers, it gave Brigadier Bernard Fletcher (CO 9th Indian Infantry Brigade) a useful tool to carry out his role.

    Once the talk about Malaya had been completed, Lieutenant-General McLeod (GOC Burma Army) also reported having received reinforcements, allowing him to prepare better. With the surrender of the Italian forces in East Africa, 11th African Division had been withdrawn initially to Kenya. The threat of Japanese aggression had been a strong argument between Auchinleck and Wavell for moving the African Division to Burma, just as the 5th Indian and 6th and 9th Australian Divisions were also released from Middle East Command.

    The 1st West Africa Infantry Brigade group had sailed in August 1941 to Rangoon. The 21st East Africa Infantry Brigade group followed in September and finally the 22nd East Africa Infantry Brigade Group arrived at the beginning of November. The arrival of the African troops had given McLeod a battle-experienced Division to add to his 1st Burma Division. The African troops were coping quite well with the new environment, and Major-General Charles Fowkes was keen to have 11th African Division continue to show its abilities. McLeod had placed 11th African Division forward based around Moulmein, covering the road from Thailand. The problem of protecting the RAF stations that protected Rangoon in the Burmese province of Tenasserim was still unsolved. Fowkes was working particularly hard at protecting the crossings of the Salween River, the first main barrier protecting the rest of Burma.

    McLeod noted that while the African Division was a great help, the Burma Division, his other main force was weak. It was short of just about everything in terms of artillery, signals, engineers, medical and transport units. Also, its training was sorely lacking, especially at Brigade level. The need to protect Burma, like Malaya, was a question of resources, and McLeod knew that his command was sorely lacking.

    General Auchinleck was already aware of the problem, ACM Brooke-Popham had been urging him to find more forces from India to reinforce both Burma and Malaya. The problem was that while he had five Indian Infantry Divisions at various stages of being formed, and none of them would be capable of being put into the field until 1942 at the earliest. Three Indian Infantry Divisions, including Major-General Bill Slim’s 10th Indian Infantry Division were tied up in ‘PAI force’ (Persia and Iraq force). Having secured the oil infrastructure in Iraq, they had cooperated with the Soviets in the occupation of Persia. Now they were sitting around in case the Germans broke through the Caucasus mountains. Given half a chance Auchinleck would withdraw one of these three and use it to reinforce Burma, and Slim’s Division would be his first choice. He could then send 17th Indian Infantry Division to Persia where it could continue its training. With the end in sight in Libya, Wavell would still have more than enough forces. He would need to consult with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, but he felt he had a strong argument. Bringing Major-General Slim to Burma, would give McLeod a good candidate for a Corps commander for 10th Indian and 11th African Divisions.

    Lieutenant-General Percival noted that the British 18th Infantry Division were sailing directly from Britain, WS 12Z had arrived at Durban and due to sail directly to Singapore to arrive by Christmas Day. The plan was for this Division to join the two Australian Divisions as II Australian Corps. Having five full Divisions in Malaya would be close to that which would be required to hold the territory and protect Singapore.

    ACM Brooke-Popham noted that the reinforcements that had arrived in Malaya and Burma were most welcome, but there were still areas under his command that were in dire need of even the minimum of protection. He really wanted to strengthen the Sarawak and Borneo force. Looking at the forces available, he requested that Percival and Heath would agree to send two more battalions to make the force on Borneo a Brigade. There were two Punjab Battalions (3rd Bn, 16th Punjab Regiment and 5th Bn, 14th Punjab Regiment) in Heath’s organisation that could possibly be spared. These had originally been assigned to Krohcol before 10th Indian Infantry Brigade had arrived. Lt Col Henry Moorehead (OC 3/16 Punjab) would be a suitable acting Brigadier to take over the Sarawak force.

    Air Vice Marshall Conway Pulford (AOC RAF Far East) was the last to speak and perhaps gave the most negative assessment of the situation. Despite all the efforts of ACM Brooke-Popham to persuade London to strengthen the RAF in the Far East, there was very little to show for it. Promises of reinforcements were still to be seen. 96 crated Tomahawk IIbs were due to arrive in the same convoy that was bringing 18th Infantry Division. It would be well into January before those had arrived, were assembled, tested and the pilots familiarised with them. The request from Admiral Philips for more reconnaissance and fighter cover was something that Pulford wanted to offer, but his resources were so stretched that he couldn’t promise everything that Philips wanted. He was aware that the Royal Navy and RAF had worked out a very efficient and effective support structure in the Mediterranean, but in Malaya that wasn't so much the case.

    He was willing to work towards a solution, but there were signs that a great many Japanese fighters and bombers were based in French Indo-China. Even if, and that was unlikely, they weren’t very good aircraft, his own force of fighters and bombers weren’t exactly first class as well as being heavily outnumbered. The other problem was the decision to forward base the majority of his squadrons. It made perfect sense to interdict a Japanese invasion fleet, but if the Japanese were to base themselves in Thailand, his squadrons would be terribly vulnerable. Unlike Malta his squadrons wouldn’t have the advantages of radar and heavily defended airfields with plenty of anti-aircraft guns. Lieutenant-General Mackay added that the experience in Greece was that airfields when abandoned had to be thoroughly destroyed. The Luftwaffe had the bad habit of moving up close behind the ground forces and bringing abandoned bases into operation very quickly. He saw no reason to believe that the Japanese wouldn't do the same. Pulford agreed, but noted that that would be a job for the infantry defending the airfields.

    He went on to say that he was being asked to support the navy and interdict the Japanese fleet. Also, to support the army by bombing any troops that landed as well as keeping the Japanese aircraft from attacking the army. As if that wasn’t enough, he also had to defend the civilian population and his own airfields. All this with a total of 161 front line aircraft, of which 60 were Buffalo fighters. The arrival of HMS Ark Royal with her Hurricanes and Fulmars was in fact the greatest boost to the air defence of Malaya yet.

    With this pessimistic assessment the meeting broke up. Auchinleck and Brooke-Popham asked Percival to join them at a meeting with Sir Shenton Thomas. As the Governor-General of the Straits Settlements, as well as High Commissioner in Malaya, Brunei, and British Agent for Sarawak and North Borneo, it was clear that he would be essential in working with the civilian population to prepare for war.
     
    4 December 1941. Liverpool. England.
  • 4 December 1941. Liverpool. England.

    Another Winston Special Convoy was being prepared to sail in a few days. The ships were gathering, the equipment and stores were being loaded on. Generally, the troopships would sail from the Clyde, and many of the men were enjoying their last few days of home leave for the foreseeable future. There were however plenty of men of 8th Armoured Division working in Liverpool to make sure that their tanks were prepared for an ocean voyage and that nothing of any importance went missing in the process.

    23rd and 24th Armoured Brigades had been formed originally as Army Tank Brigades, but in November 1940 had been redesignated as Armoured Brigades when 8th Armoured Division was formed. The two Brigades were made up of six battalions of the Royal Tank Regiment (23rd Brigade: 9th, 46th, 50th; 24th Brigade: 10th, 45th, 47th). Four of the Battalions were equipped with Valiant I*, the cruiser variant of the Valiant I. 9th and 11th Battalions were the first equipped with the Valiant II*, with the 6-pdr gun, to be shipped abroad.

    Major-General Richard McCreery, GOC 8th Armoured Division, was aware that his orders were likely to change after they sailed. The plan originally was that 8th Armoured Division were going to relieve 7th Armoured Division in North Africa, allowing the men of that Division to rest and regroup since they had been in the thick of the action for almost two years. As well as the Valiant I* & II* tanks of his own Division, the convoy would carry another 350 tanks to re-equip 2nd and 7th Armoured Divisions, covering their losses during Operation Crusader. Nearly all the Valiant II* tanks built so far would be sailing in WS 14.

    With the news coming from Tripoli, McCreery and his staff weren’t sure what the future would hold for them. He could find himself fighting the French, or working with 10th Armoured Division holding back the Germans if they broke through the Caucasus Mountains into Persia. Rumours of action in the Far East were also swilling around. The fact that the equipment issued was for the tropics meant that he knew at least that he could look forward to sunnier climes.

    Changes had been made to the Support Group due to the lessons of North Africa. While the three RA regiments, 5th RHA, 73rd Anti-tank and 56th LAA were still assigned, 133rd Motorised Infantry Brigade (4th Bn Buffs, 4th & 5th Bn Royal Sussex Regiment) had been added to 8th Armoured Division. The three Battalions were equipped with the new Viking Tracked Personnel Carrier Loyd carrier, designed by Vivian Loyd, an expanded and better protected version of the Loyd Carrier. The other two Motorised Infantry Brigades of 44th Infantry Division (131st & 132nd) had been assigned to 6th and 9th Armoured Divisions to have one Motor Brigade to two Armoured Brigades.

    For McCreery the power of 8th Armoured Division was breath-taking. Along with 340 excellent tanks, 2 Derby Yeomanry in a mixture of Humber Armoured Cars and Daimler Dingoes were his reconnaissance force. He had two more Royal Horse Artillery Regiments (11th and 104th) in addition to 5th RHA, all equipped with Birch SPGs, as well as 146th Field Regiment RA, with towed 25-pdrs. The Royal Engineers and Signals and all the other Administration units meant that he was going to war with a force that he could only have dreamed of when fighting as part of 1st Armoured Division in France in 1940.

    McCreery had turned down the chance to command the Armoured Group of Home Forces, consisting of 1st, 6th, 9th, Armoured Divisions, along with Canadian 5th Armoured Division. Guards, 11th and 42nd Armoured Divisions were still equipping and training. Sending the 8th Armoured Division abroad earlier than planned was only because the Canadians had their own tanks built in Canada and shipped over with their men.

    The opportunity to take the Division that McCreery had trained into battle was too good to miss, wherever that might take them.
     
    5 December 1941. Tripoli, Libya.
  • 5 December 1941. Tripoli, Libya.

    The impromptu victory parade through Tripoli had begun with the tanks of 7th Armoured Division moving west to close the gap with 2nd Armoured Division at Zuara who were heading to the Tunisian border. The men of 7th Motor Brigade, accompanying the tanks, began flying flags and generally enjoying the procession. Not wanting to be left out, the first couple of units of 50th Infantry Division got themselves into marching order and stepped out smartly along the main road through the city. 6th Infantry Division, not be outdone had 1st Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders pipers following the Guards Battalions.

    The New Zealanders and 4th Indian Division who were moving towards the Tunisian border, along with 2nd Armoured Division heard about XIII Corps ‘victory parade’. Lieutenant-General Pope (GOC XXX Corps) agreed to allow a contingent from the various regiments to travel into Tripoli to take part in the celebrations. The disconsolate Italian prisoners shuffling along in the opposite direction just added to the British and Empire troop’s feeling of elation.

    Lieutenant-General O’Connor found himself taking the salute of the men passing, while standing in a Daimler scout car. The General and his staff had been finalising the Italian surrender details when they heard cheering. Going out to see what was happening, O’Connor found himself at the centre of the events. He was clear that the men deserved their moment of glory. The road and the miles from the Egyptian border all the way to the border with Tunisia was an accomplishment as great as any achieved before by the British army. He did pass on orders for the Military Police to be on full alert, just in case.

    The Royal Navy were busy at the port trying to sort out the damage inflicted over the campaign. The senior officer present had estimated that ships could start unloading within a few days. Mine clearance, and checking for unexploded ordnance, was the priority. The Royal Air Force was rushing forward to take ownership of airfields previously occupied by the Regio Aeronautica and Luftwaffe.
     
    6 December 1941. London, England.
  • 6 December 1941. London, England.

    The bells of churches throughout the land pealed in response to the Italian surrender of Libya. Silenced at the beginning of the war, except to be used to warn of parachute attacks, now they rang for victory in Africa. The end of both Italian North and East Africa had been a victory of the Empire’s arms. British, Australian, New Zealanders, South Africans, Indians, Kenyans, Nigerians, Sudanese, men from Gold Coast, Somaliland, Northern and Southern Rhodesia, Uganda and Nysaland had all played a part in the victory.

    Generals Wavell and O’Connor were hailed in the newspapers and newsreels as the heroes of the hour. A nation which had seen its armed forces forced to withdraw from Norway, France, Belgium and Greece now had an unquestionable victory. Prime Minister Churchill’s speech to the House of Commons was recorded later to be broadcast on the BBC.

    In private, the telephone conversation offering congratulations from President Roosevelt, was for the Prime Minister a great boost. After the fall of France, the possibility of a British capitulation had been greatly feared in Washington DC, and almost expected by some. The Lend Lease agreement, the bases for destroyers, the Tizzard Mission had all been matters of desperation. The fact that, not only had Britain stood firm, but knocked the Italians (and Germans) out of Africa had changed quite a few minds in Washington DC.

    The Soviet Union was still holding the line at Moscow and Leningrad. Not just holding the line, word of a counterattack beginning would hopefully push the Germans back. Getting British and American support to Stalin would be a major headache, but so far, the first few Arctic convoys had been successful, without loss.

    The situation in North Africa was still tense. General De Gaulle was up in arms about the American ‘interference’ in French affairs. Catroux’s negotiations with Weygand, which the Americans had enabled, included the idea that Weygand, not De Gaulle would be the face of Free France, especially as Governor-General of Algeria. Both Churchill and Roosevelt weren’t unhappy that De Gaulle wasn’t happy. So far, with the failure at Dakar and the lack of enthusiasm from most French colonies to switch sides, perhaps he wasn’t really the right man for the job.

    Weyand and de Lattre had managed to successfully solve the problem with the Italian and German units crossing the border. The Italian troops had been detained as deserters until clarification could be obtained from Rome. The Germans, with their personal arms, were immediately being taken to the port of Sfax. There they would been loaded onto ships supplied by the French, and with British collusion, sail for Marseille unmolested. Weygand asked that no British or ‘Free French’ troops enter Tunisia. He hoped to persuade Vichy that, like Syria, French North Africa would remain non-belligerent in the ongoing conflict. That was something that Roosevelt and Churchill could live with, at least in the meantime. Whether Hitler could live with it remained to be seen.

    The discussion turned to the situation in the Pacific. The intelligence that a Japanese attack to gain the oil reserves of the Dutch East Indies was becoming increasingly undeniable. Churchill alerted Roosevelt that the War Office had ordered all British and Empire forces in the Far East to the highest state of alert. It was becoming clear that Japan wouldn’t need another Marco Polo Bridge incident to take action. Churchill also informed Roosevelt of what ACM Brooke-Popham’s instructions were. If he had information of a Japanese expedition approaching with the apparent intention on landing on the Kra Isthmus, or if the Japanese violated any other part of Thailand, then, without reference to the War Office, he could implement Operation Matador (the invasion of Thailand). He had also been made aware that this would certainly mean war with Japan, and therefore to tread carefully.

    The Admiralty had since informed the War Cabinet that they knew that at least one Japanese convoy was sailing towards the Kra Isthmus. Brooke-Popham had expressed to Admiral Philips that he had no authority to order attack on a Japanese expedition at sea until the Japanese had committed some definite hostile act. Philips understood Brooke-Popham’s hesitation, he didn’t want to be remembered as the man who started a war with Japan. Philip’s had been informed that one of the Catalinas on a reconnaissance mission had failed to return to base. This could be the result of a hostile act, or just bad luck. An Australian crewed Hudson had reported being fired upon by Japanese ships, and that for Philips was evidence enough.

    Admiral Philips informed the Admiralty, and Churchill informed Roosevelt, that he had given orders to all China Station assets, including the Dutch submarine shadowing one of the convoys, that if the Japanese approached within 30 miles of the coast, then they were to be considered hostile and to initiate action against them. Roosevelt expressed surprise that Philips had done this without the explicit consent of Brooke-Popham, his Commander-in-Chief. Churchill made some remark about the Nelson legacy. He also thanked Roosevelt that Admiral Hart had ordered four of his destroyers at Balikpapan in Borneo to join Philip’s force. Roosevelt already knew that the meeting between Hart and Philips had ended abruptly, as American reconnaissance aircraft had sighted a large Japanese convoy on its way from Camranh Bay towards the Gulf of Siam. War seemed inevitable, it was just a question of where and when it would start.
     
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    7 December 1941. Tamworth, Australia.
  • 7 December 1941. Tamworth, Australia.

    1st Australian Armoured Brigade (1st AAB) arrived at its new training area. Having had less than a month together at Greta Army Camp in New South Wales, the Brigade HQ and the three armoured regiments (2/5th, 2/6th, 2/7th) along with 15th Motor Regiment (Northern River Lancers) had, for the first time, come together as a whole. The vast majority of training that had been accomplished so far in Armoured Fighting Vehicles courses only included officers and NCOs. The maintenance of tanks, and the training of soldiers as drivers, gunners, loaders, wireless operators, mechanics, and all the other roles needed in an armoured formation, was still at an early stage.

    The good news was that they had 166 American built M3 Light Tanks (named for General Stuart). The Continental R-670 radial engine in the tank, was found to require very high levels of maintenance, and while the Americans had sent a large number of technicians to help the Australian Army, the lack of basic mechanical training was an issue. Two Divisional Cavalry Regiments (8th and 9th) had had priority in receiving the M3s, so 1st Armoured Brigade were just catching up.

    The theory and practice of armoured warfare had been studied intensively, the Divisional GOC (Major-General John Northcott) had spent two months with 7th Armoured Division, and had managed to bring with him some officers, NCOs and other ranks from 7th Armoured who were recovering from wounds to help train the new Australian tankies. 1st AAB was commanded by Brigadier Fred Hinton. He’d previously commanded 4th Australian Cavalry Brigade, and had very particular ideas about how his Brigade was to be run. He had gone to England in 1939 to undertake various attachments, including to 17th/21st Lancers, which were still awaiting their tanks at that point. Having commanded the Recruitment Reception Depot at Sydney Showground, he had been chosen by Northcott to command the 1st Armoured Brigade.

    Now that he had the men and the machines, the next phase was to work together as a Brigade. He had set up a number of exercises that would push his men to their limits. Whether in the Army at Gallipoli or Passchendaele, or as a sheep farmer, Hinton wanted to excel, and that was what he expected of his command. Major-General Northcott had shared with Hinton that when the Division was set up, it was expected to be shipped with the rest of the Australian Imperial Force to the Middle East. Now that campaign had come to an end, it seemed that the threat the Division would have to face would be the Japanese, either in Malaya, or even in defence of Australia itself.

    Northcott, Hinton and William Locke (CO 2nd AAB) had talked over how best to prepare themselves and their men for the tasks ahead. Locke’s Brigade had taken delivery of the first 12 M3 Medium tanks (named for General Grant) from America. Until then his men had been training on universal carriers. Because the Stuart tanks were arriving first, Northcott had decided to have 1st AAB totally equipped with the Light tanks, and 2nd AAB to have the Medium tanks as they arrived. Eventually the home grown Jumbuck tanks would equip the Division, but in the meantime they would be using the American designs. There had been some dubiety about the effectiveness of the Stuart and Grant, but everything they could find about Japanese tanks suggested that they would be more than adequate to go up against them.

    Northcott had also had a warning sent that he may have to put together two Independent Squadrons for immediate deployment. Hinton recognised that 2/6th Armoured Regiment (AAR) was the furthest along in its training. Lt-Col Charles Hodgson (CO 2/6th AAR) had been asked which of his squadrons he felt would be capable of action. His response was that A and B Squadrons would likely be the best choice, Northcott thanked him and asked that those two squadrons be advised of the potential to be shipped overseas. Hinton expressed his worry that his force would be sent off piecemeal. Northcott agreed that wouldn’t be something he’d want either.

    Going back to the issue of training, one of Northcott’s aides had been looking around for a place where the whole Division could train together. He had identified Narrabri in New South Wales as a potential training area, which Northcott had requested Canberra to organise. Locke’s 2nd AAB were located at Puckapunyal, Victoria, with some elements attending training at Greta Army Camp. Having somewhere to have the whole Division co-located with plenty of space for exercises was a priority for Northcott. Once both Brigades were fully equipped they would need to use the exercises to see whether they would need to mix two types of tanks to make for a more balanced force structure.

    The last issue was the formation of the Support Group, or a Motor Brigade as was now the preference. The Light Horse regiments were likely to be the foundation of Motor Regiments, just as 15th Motor Regiment (Northern River Lancers) had done. Brigadier Hinton was keen on his old 4th Cavalry Brigade (6th, 7th and 14th Light Horse) becoming 4th Motor Brigade. Northcott wasn’t particularly fussy about whichever Cavalry Brigade he got, as long as he got one in a reasonable amount of time and with a reasonable amount of training and equipment. The whole Australian army was trying to do the same, get the equipment and train for war.
     
    8 December 1941. Kota Bharu. Malaya.
  • 8 December 1941. Kota Bharu. Malaya.

    Sergeant Tommy Docherty cursed his luck. His Matilda II had been working with B Company of sepoys from 3rd Bn 5th Mahratta Light Infantry, but the constant rain had made everything marshy. The driver, Noel Woods, had misjudged the depth of a stream, and they were now stuck, the engine flooded, and the hull of the tank with a foot of water in it. The other two tanks in the troop were off somewhere else with other sepoys, so there was no chance of a tow.

    The B Company Commander came to the turret hatch. Subedar Namdeo Ghadge couldn’t help smiling at Docherty’s use of very colourful language. For the previous week the two men had been working together closely training the Company in cooperation with the tank. Ghadge was always very proud of his spoken English, but Docherty was a man from somewhere called Paisley, and sometimes Ghadge didn’t think he spoke English at all. “The fucking fucker’s fucking fucked” wasn’t a phrase that Ghadge understood very well, but the tone of voice behind it did emphasise that Docherty wasn’t a happy man.

    Ghadge’s pride his command of the English language wasn’t shared by Docherty. Half the time he didn’t understand a single word, and the other half he just smiled and nodded as if he did. Now the Subedar was smiling and saying something unintelligible. If he wasn’t up to his bollocks in cold slimy green water, maybe he might of have made more of an effort to understand what the wee Gunga Din wanted, but right now he had other things on his mind.

    The persistent taping on his shoulder eventually made Docherty stop berating Woods for a moment, and there was Ghadge pointing excitably towards the treeline. Growing up in Paisley, Docherty thought he knew rain, but not like this. Peering through what appeared to be a curtain of rain, the crack of a bullet passing and flashes from the direction Ghadge was pointing to, silenced Docherty. It took him an eternity to realise that people were actually shooting at him, trying to kill him. Then he was aware that the sepoys were returning fire, and suddenly his training took over. A quick boot to the shoulder of his gunner, Corporal Pat Currie (oh how they enjoyed that name since they started working with the Indians). “Wake up man, enemy front, two hundred yards, co-ax, open fire!” Turning to Ghadge he gave him a thumbs up sign, then closed the hatch and started fighting his tank.

    The good news was that he was in a perfect hull down position. The bad news was that he was in a perfect hull down position without the engine running or any juice to power the turret traverse. He was also pretty sure that the radio had shorted out, and that there wasn’t any help coming. Currie had opened fire with the co-axial. The loader, Jimmy McMahon, was trying to sort out the ammo belts. The 2-pdr was pretty useless at this point, but at least the Besa was working well. Curry was having to use the manual traverse to keep the machine gun cutting along the tree line. Docherty told Curry to watch his ammo, while he tried to get an idea of what was happening. There was no way of working that out with the rain soaking the periscope view. Docherty knew he needed Ghadge’s help, so he opened the turret, to find the aforementioned Subedar smiling at him still from the rear of the turret. The Indian officer gave him a thumbs up sign, and then pointed to the left. When Docherty saw what he was looking at, he called down to Currie to cease fire at the treeline and shift to a new target to his left at 9 o’clock.

    The Japanese, that was the only folk Docherty could think of who wanted to kill him, had been using the tree line as a base of fire, and what seemed like at least a hundred of them were flanking the Sepoys with what to all the world looked like a bayonet charge. Traversing the turret manually was slow, and it felt like forever before the Besa barked again. Ghadge gave him another thumbs up sign and jumped off the tank. Docherty could see one of Ghadge’s platoons were moving to protect the flank.

    Woods was no use to anyone in the tank at this point. Docherty told him to clear the tank, pick up a few sepoys and head back to the airfield. He needed to tell the senior officer what was happening, and then bring back as much ammunition as he and the sepoys could carry. If he saw anyone who could give them a tow out of the stream, then that would be useful too. From its brackets on the turret beside him, Docherty took the fancy new machine pistol they’d been issued with and threw it to Woods ‘just in case’. Woods expressed his unhappiness in a particularly eloquent manner, to which Docherty replied, “Fuck off and don’t get killed.”

    The front of the turret received regular bullet strikes against it, which meant that Docherty wasn’t keen on putting his head out of the hatch. The persistent banging on the hatch however was obviously something important. The smiling face of Subedar Ghadge was waiting, and he excitedly told Docherty something about what was going on. Docherty smiled and nodded, thinking to himself ‘not a clue what he’s on about.’

    Eventually the sweeping hand gestures began to make sense. The sepoys were moving forward, and he seemed to be gesturing for covering fire. Another near miss made both men duck, so Docherty gave a thumbs up and closed the hatch. Currie at the same moment called a misfire and he and McMahon began the clearance procedure. Docherty warned McMahon to make sure the ammo belts were dry before loading, to which McMahon replied, “what with?” Everything in the tank was soaking, so Docherty just shrugged and said, “do your best”. He ordered Currie to fire the main gun in the direction of the tree line, and while McMahon worked on the Besa, Docherty loaded for Currie from the ready rack, which was thankfully still above the water. What effect the 2-pdr was having on the Japanese could only be guessed at, but at least it was something.

    McMahon called out that the co-axial MG was clear and Currie, having been warned to watch for friendlies moving forward, began to hose the treeline as best he could. A flare went up, which was one of the pre-arranged signals from the infantry to cease fire. Currie worried that he had just about burned out the barrel of the Besa, and McMahon noted that he was on the last tin of ammunition for it. Docherty opened the hatch to see better. The rain seemed to have lightened slightly, or at least Docherty could see a bit better.

    Some sepoys were carrying back wounded men, and Docherty could see flashes that meant someone was on the receiving end of artillery, he just hoped it was the japs and not the sepoys. There was very little he could do about anything, but he got out the tank and had a look at their situation. He was totally bogged down, and the marshy ground around would make getting a successful tow out difficult. He looked around the battlefield and wondered where Gunga Din had got to. Then he wondered where Woods and got to. He jumped back onto the tank and stood up on the turret trying to make out what was happening. When Pat Currie asked “Do you think there’ll be snipers?” Docherty immediately realised that there was a war on and standing straight in full view wasn’t his cleverest moment.

    An hour later Woods arrived back, but on the back of another Matilda II. Docherty recognised Sergeant Morris and grimaced. He was never going to hear the end of this in the sergeants’ mess. Sure enough, Morris and his crew started the expected imprecations. Currie’s response of bailing out empty ammo tins and expended cartridges soon shut Morris’ men down. Another half-hour later, after two attempts, Docherty’s tank was back on dry land. A lorry from the Light Aid Detachment had arrived and the mechanics were working with Woods to dry out the engine and get it started. A spare barrel for the Besa was put in, and the ammo storage refilled. The radio did need replaced, so the Light Aid squad called the tank unserviceable and Docherty had the ignominious experience of being towed backwards to the airfield. At least when they go there, they could get a dry uniform, something to eat, and stay out of the rain in one of the hangers while the tank was fixed up. Jap planes had been bombing the place on and off, most of the Australian flown Hudsons had disappeared.

    Docherty couldn’t believe how happy he was to see Subedar Ghadge lead a much-reduced company back to their starting point. The Indian officer explained at great length just exactly what his Company, and the rest of Battalion had done when the left Docherty’s tank. Docherty didn’t really understand any of it, but the Japs wouldn’t be heading to the airfield. “All dead” were the first words that Docherty really understood. The japs were all dead. He slapped the Subedar and the back, gave him the ‘thumbs up’ and repeated “all dead!” The two men laughed and laughed. That had been an interesting day.
     
    9 December 1941. Singapore, Malaya.
  • 9 December 1941. Singapore, Malaya.

    Lieutenant Colonel Hector Bastin (CO 9th Division Cavalry Regiment) couldn’t help compare his arrival in Egypt last year with his arrival in Singapore two days previously. When his troops had arrived in Egypt they had arrived with cast off light tanks and bren gun carriers. They’d had plenty of time to disembark, get themselves to a camp and eventually get their fitness back, then reunited with their clapped-out vehicles began to exercise. Eventually when they left Egypt, the men had been happy enough leave all their old vehicles behind. The Italian tanks they’d taken over, and whatever else was still running, had been handed on the Greek Cavalry Division

    When their ship had docked in Singapore they had disembarked, amid a certain degree of disorganisation. General Morshead had come down to welcome his men, but his opening remarks to the senior officers were that the Division seemed to have jumped out of the frying pan and into the fire. The possibility of a Japanese invasion of Malaya was now a probability and that time was of the essence to get the men trained and ready. Eventually transport arrived to take the majority of the men to their training camp just outside Johor Bahru. Bastin wanted to keep his own men local, to help supervise unloading their tanks. Brigadier Victor Windeyer, (OC 20th Australian Brigade) asked his old Battalion (2/48th) to likewise stay to keep an eye on the ships and their equipment, he didn’t want anything going missing.

    The ships that carried the cavalry’s tanks, and the equipment for 20th Brigade had docked, but it seemed that they weren’t given the priority that Morshead demanded, causing something of furore with the port commander. Bastin had been somewhat bemused to see his GOC ready to start a fist fight the RN officer. Calmer heads prevailed and Morshead was promised that the three merchant ships would be unloaded the next day.

    At 04:00hrs 8 December air raid sirens sounded all over Singapore and the men of 2/48th and 9th Cavalry watched in horror as Japanese planes unloaded bombs all over the city. Keppel harbour was one of their targets, and while luckily none of the ships were damaged, a few men had been killed and more injured. The whole lot of men were involved in fighting the fires burning at various places around the harbour facilities. When the RN port captain arrived and met the Australian delegation, the tension mounted very quickly. The whole Brigade could have lost its equipment if the ships had been hit. Progress on unloading the ships was slowed by the damage caused the night before, and some of the dock workers were absent from their work.

    Bastin’s tanks were split between the three merchant ships, one squadron on each. They were the first loaded, and so the last unloaded. Thankfully the cranes on the dockside hadn’t been hit. His own men had been brought back to the dock and as each tank was unloaded a crew and a Light Aid Detachment squad would get it ready to be driven away. All through the night of 8/9 December the roar of Continental radial engines reverberated around the main road through the city as the M3 Stuart tanks of 9th Division Cavalry Regiment raced off Singapore Island towards the AASC depot at Tampoi near Johor Bahru.

    The plan had been that the Cavalry and the rest of the Brigade would have a week to get themselves sorted before moving up to their forward positions around Malacca. Now that war had been declared that plan was shelved and General Morshead wanted them at Malacca as soon as possible. He asked Bastin to make sure that his tanks were ready for action. Some officers and men from 8th Division Cavalry Regiment would come to Tampoi to pass on as much intelligence as they could. Once Bastin’s Regiment was at Malacca, Morshead would want them to be working with the Lines of Communications Brigade to keep the roads between Malacca and the north clear of the enemy to give time for 9th Division to fully arrive and take up their positions.

    Compared to arriving in Egypt, this had been interesting, even exciting. Bastin was glad he’d been able to spend a couple of weeks leave with his family. There obviously wasn’t going to be much rest in his immediate future.
     
    10 December 1941. “The Ledge”, Thailand.
  • 10 December 1941. “The Ledge”, Thailand.

    Lieutenant Stan Alden’s war had been ‘interesting’ so far. He had been away two days, fought an engagement and returned to base. He was sitting trying to write to his parents at home, knowing that the censor would probably tear it up. It had begun at the stroke of midnight as 8 December began. He got orders over the R/T to move off, leading Krohcol into Thailand. Alden was a bit of a history buff, but for the life of him he couldn’t remember any time in the past that the British had invaded Thailand. But there he was, in a Matilda II tank, at the forefront of a strong force crossing the Thai border.

    There were some light tanks and armoured cars in the column, but Brigadier Thomas ‘Pete’ Rees wanted the heavy armour of the Infantry Tanks at the front. His reasoning had proven sound when, as soon as they crossed the border, they were fired upon. The standing order was to return fire, so the three Matilda IIs pushed through towards Betong working over the surrounding jungle with their machine guns. A few trees had been felled over the road, hoping to delay the invasion force, but these were simply crushed under the heavy tanks’ treads.

    Rees had 4th Battalion 10th Baluch Regiment sweep alongside the tanks. The Thai Police and volunteers opposing the British invasion were lightly armed, and the sheer invincibility of the tanks and the overwhelming firepower of the tanks and infantry combined, were just too much for the Thais to bear. A few sepoys were killed, but by the time the tanks rolled into Betong itself, the level of opposition had almost disappeared, in fact, a constable of the Thai police came forward to apologise for the ‘mistake’.

    Lieutenant Alden had wanted to try to explain why it wasn’t really an invasion, after all Thailand was actually being invaded by the Japanese, and the British were coming to their aid. Instead, five hundred rounds of ammunition had done their talking for them. Passing Betong, there was another 26 miles before they arrived at their objective. At a comfortable 10 miles an hour, Alden’s troop arrived at the Patani river just after 04:00hrs on 8 December.

    Brigadier Rees, after consultations with Major Dinwiddie (CO 45th Field Company Royal Bengal Sappers and Miners), decided to send a mobile force forward of the planned demolitions to the road. They would need to buy time for the Field Company should the Japanese arrive before the work was complete. One of the Matilda IIs would be part of that, and Lt Alden volunteered. A couple of armoured cars from 3rd Cavalry, with the carrier platoon of 2nd Bn Highland Light Infantry, were already forward of the main column reconnoitering the road. Alden came across one of the carriers on his way, the corporal reporting that they’d found this to be about the best position to throw up a road block.

    Alden’s tank, two 2-pdr anti-tank guns, two Vickers HMG teams, and two companies of 2nd HLI began to prepare their positions. Major Robertson from 2nd HLI took command of the forward group. The HLI men had fought at the battle of Keren in the East African campaign, so they had a fair idea of how best to site a blocking force, especially with the bulk of an Infantry Tank ready to stand in the middle of the road. Robertson had brought most of the platoon’s 2-inch mortar teams together to provide a concentration of mortar fire when it was needed. The place the 3rd Cavalry had picked was indeed a good position, there was a sheer drop on the right, and a good view down the road.

    A section each of the Cavalry and the carrier platoon carried on further along the road to give as much warning as possible to the roadblock of advancing Japanese. One enterprising serjeant in the carrier platoon had ‘borrowed’ some explosives from the Sappers and promised to leave a few problems for the Japanese, so that they’d have time to get back to the main force.

    The rest of the day had passed quietly. The sappers went about their business along the Ledge, while the infantry prepared positions to counter any flanking movement over the hills after the road was blasted. At Robertson’s roadblock, there was time to prepare good solid positions. The motor transport was already facing back they way they had come. Robertson had worked out a fairly simple set of signals so that each unit would know when to disengage, get back to their transport and hightail it back to the main position before the road was blown. Alden’s tank would be the last to leave, protecting the rear of the force. Once his tank was past the demolitions, the sappers would blow the road in such a way that it would take enormous efforts to repair it.

    The morning of 9th December had continued in much the same way. The only excitement had been some Japanese planes flying overhead. The whole force had done its best to camouflage itself and as far as anyone could see they had been successful. Because of the terrain radio communications was sporadic, and there was a dearth of radios generally. Alden had played around a bit with the tank’s radio trying to pick up anything within range. Just before 10:00hrs the distant sound of explosions and firing could be heard, followed by silence then some more. Major Robertson ordered his force to stand to, and sent a messenger on a motorcycle back to Brigadier Rees to report contact.

    At 10.45hrs a carrier appeared on the road ahead and approached at its top speed. There were four wounded men in the rear and the corporal in charge, reported that a strong Japanese force had been seen heading up the road from the direction of Yala. A couple of the armoured cars from 3rd Cavalry had gone as far as Yala and had spoken to Thai police who reported that a Japanese force had landed at Pattani in the early hours of the previous morning. The cavalry had tried to keep ahead of the Japanese while keeping an eye on them. When they got back to where the carrier platoon was wiring a bridge, they had put on a small ambush, blowing the bridge when a Japanese tank was crossing it. After a brief firefight they had withdrawn at speed to the next site that the serjeant with the explosives had identified.

    Again, they had done the same thing, but the firefight had got too hot. The four wounded men had got their injuries there to some kind of mortar barrage, three others had been killed. One of the Armoured Cars had been damaged and abandoned and one of the carriers destroyed. The corporal had been ordered to bring the wounded back, and report the contact. The rest of the carriers and armoured cars were behind him, but the serjeant had one more bit of mischief planned.

    Not long after the carrier with the wounded had left them, another explosion and machine gun fire could be heard, a good bit closer. The remaining armoured cars and carriers appeared, obviously at top speed. They carried straight on through Robertson’s position, except one armoured car. The 3rd Cavalry Jemadar reported that the Japanese force consisted of at least a company of tanks and he estimated it was probably about the strength of a regiment, though he had only counted one Battalion’s worth personally. Major Robertson thanked him, and waved him off back to the main position.

    Lieutenant Alden talked to his crew about what he wanted from them. If there were Japanese tanks, then the intelligence they had about them was that the 2-pdr would be more than adequate to deal with them. As far as he knew, they didn’t carry a gun that would be a threat to the frontal armour, so they should be pretty safe for the most part. Alden’s and Robertson’s orders were clear. The driver had spent the morning walking back over the route he would have to reverse along for about a mile before there was space to turn.

    The motorcycle messenger arrived back with word that the sappers were running final checks, so Robertson’s force wouldn’t have to stay much more than an hour before heading back. A quick Officers’ Call followed so that all the information could be passed on to each element of the force and any other questions dealt with. A section of HLI troops were ahead with a view beyond the main position’s outlook. They had orders to get a rough estimate of what was coming up the road, then return, preferably without being spotted.

    The four men arrived breathlessly a few minutes before noon. They had counted three light tanks with about a company of men, then a gap of about two hundred yards, then a bigger force, with at least five tanks. Most of the infantry were on foot, but there was some motor transport somewhere behind them, they could hear the grinding of gears. Robertson thanked them, ordered back to Motor Transport to get water and something to eat. Then they could rejoin their platoon.

    The Company Sergeant-Majors had spent the morning going round the HLI men’s positions making sure everyone had had something to eat and drink. They also reminded the men why there was an elephant of their cap badge and reminded them of the 74th of Foot’s stand at Assaye. The men of the 74th would be watching down on the work that would be done today, and they had better be bloody proud, or else. The warning was left open ended, but the vast majority of the men had seen action before, and had a veteran’s eye for where things were, what their field of fire was, and the signals to watch out for.

    The intermittent rain showers passed for the moment and Alden, watching the road through his binoculars, began to see movement through the haze. Sure enough, there were three tanks coming up the road. Tank recognition skills weren’t Alden’s strong point, but his gunner called them as ‘tin cans’. Robertson had noted that the presence of the Matilda II would be noticed at just over 1000 yards. Range markers had been laid out down the road to aid the defensive fire. At 1000 yards, the gunner noted that he was ‘on’, so Alden quietly said, ‘Fire!’

    The leading tin can stopped dead. They couldn’t see it, but the shell had penetrated the armour and gone straight through the driver and bounced around inside the tank killing the gunner and commander. As no smoke could be seen, the gunner put another two rounds through the dead tank, just to be sure. The effect on the Japanese was to respond rapidly. They’d already been ambushed on the road, and the leading company spread out and started moving forward quickly. The other two light tanks managed to push the destroyed tank out of the way, and were providing covering fire for the infantry, with their 7.7mm MG and 37mm main gun.

    Alden’s gunner hit the second tank almost as soon as it cleared the dead tank. A shot through the turret seemed to silence the main gun, though the forward machine gun was still firing, and the tank was still moving. Another two strikes knocked it out, though there had also been two misses which had caused some swearing. At four hundred yards the 2-inch mortars dropped their loads, scattering the Japanese troops, most of whom disappeared into the jungle to the side of the road.

    This was exactly what Robertson had guessed would happen. He had D Company prepared to counter a flanking movement, and one of the Vickers HMGs was supporting them. 18 Platoon were furthest forward, and soon the noise of their Bren gun teams spraying the jungle and the rifle sections putting lots of lead down range signalled that they were in contact. The platoon OC, Lieutenant Bill Hamilton, blew his whistle three times to signal his men to get ready to pull back. On hearing the whistle blown twice as many men as possible threw hand grenades towards the enemy and immediately withdrew. One long whistle told the other platoons of D Company that 18 Platoon had successfully disengaged. These signals were followed by a Very Light to have the rest of D Company disengage.

    The men returned to the road and immediately headed for their lorries and were the first to move back past the Ledge. C Company, with Alden’s tank, covered their withdrawal, and that of the two anti-tank guns and Vickers teams. The third Japanese tank had been dispatched by Alden’s tank and the co-axial Besa kept up a continual fire down the road, and the gunner occasionally took a shot with the 2-pdr to keep the Japanese honest.

    Major Robertson fired the green flare that told everyone else to head for the motor transport. As C Company began to disengage, Alden warned the driver to be ready to pull back. The loader noted that they were running low on MG ammo, so it was just as well. Alden was watching back and forth, calling targets to the front and checking for the signal that the rest of the MT had left. The driver revved the engine as the tank was bracketed by mortar shells. Alden told him to calm down, but he had another look to see if the signal was made. The red flare burst and Alden said ‘move.’ The driver stalled the engine. The loader and the gunner cursed, more and more bangs and things rattling off the tank, and the low ammunition count were getting to them all.

    Alden calmed spoke to the driver, ‘take a breath, and start it up, just like usual. Don’t panic, there’s plenty of time.’ The engine fired and the tank began to move backwards, Alden said, ‘right lads, nice and easy, short bursts until were out of contact. Put a few 2-pdr rounds down range occasionally. Everything’s going to be fine. Gunner, keep your eyes forward, I’ll direct Harry back down the road.’

    Having stalled the engine once, the driver was concentrating hard not to do anything daft, especially with a long drop down the hill on one side of the road. Alden calmly called for corrections and the Matilda II broke contact with the Japanese. In five minutes, they reached the place where the tank could turn around. Once they were driving away, with the gun trained over the rear of the tank towards the enemy, everybody began to breathe again. Soon they were smiling, especially as they passed along the part of the Ledge that was going to be blown up.

    An hour later, as the leading Japanese troops and vehicles passed into the blast area, a satisfying series of cracks and bangs caused almost a mile of road to disappear from view. A long cheer from the men of 10th Indian Brigade and attached forces echoes over the hills. The plan had worked, the Japanese weren’t getting along that road any time soon.

    With the mission accomplished, Brigadier Rees had consulted some of the Thai police and locals for their local knowledge. The road that had been destroyed was the best road (which wasn’t saying much) between Yala and Betong. He didn’t want to have his Brigade flanked by lesser roads or paths through the hills. There were indeed trails and pathways used by the locals, and while they weren’t much use to motor transport, an enterprising infantry commander could certainly use them to get round the flank. A couple of times in Ethiopia, those kind of trails known only to locals, had proved very helpful, and once, quite dangerous when the Italians used one.

    Rees decided to leave one Battalion of infantry (4th Bn 10th Baluch Regiment), with some heavy weapons to hold the area and try to dissuade the Japanese to fix the road. The majority of his Brigade he wanted to take back to Betong, where he could block access to the Malayan road network. Rees also thought that the other Brigades of 11th Indian Division at Jitra would likely need reinforcing at some point. If 10th Brigade was at Betong, or even back at Kroh, then he could pivot his force in whichever direction the Division needed him.

    The three Infantry tanks were ordered back to Kroh immediately where they could meet up with their section of the Light Aid Detachment to do some of the maintenance which was always required after travelling 100 miles. Lieutenant Alden had led his troop of three Matilda IIs back along the road and back over the border. His invasion of Thailand had been short-lived, just two days. He couldn’t help wondering whether “Veni, Vidi, Vici” was a description he could use in his letter to describe the previous two days. Just like Julius Caesar’s visit to Britain, it hadn't lasted long.
     
    11 December 1941. Jitra, Malaya.
  • 11 December 1941. Jitra, Malaya.

    While Operation Matador, as it had originally been conceived, had been taken off the table, Lieutenant-General Heath (GOC III Indian Corps) had ordered three spoiling attacks. “Krohcol” (10th Brigade) had successfully fulfilled its mission to stop a Japanese advance from the direction of Petani. Major-General Murray-Lyon had committed to two other operations. The simplest of these involved an armoured train, manned by a platoon of the 2/ 16th Punjab and some engineers. The train party reached Khlaung Ngae, in Thailand, blew a 200-foot railway bridge on the line to Singora, and then withdrew to Padang Besar.

    The second was "Laycol" (a column taken from the command of Brigadier William Lay [OC 6th Indian Infantry Brigade]). Since the objective of this column was limited to slowing the enemy, giving time for the rest of 11th Division to prepare, it was a much smaller column than Krohcol. Comprising just two companies, and the carrier platoon of 1/8th Punjab, with one Matilda II infantry tank, along with anti-tank guns and engineers. Laycol (commanded by Major Eric Andrews) advanced along the Changlun road towards Ban Sadao, eight miles beyond the frontier on the way to Singora, reaching it at dawn on 9 December, taking up defensive positions north of the village. Although they hurriedly prepared positions, the day passed quietly.

    Andrews sent a section of three carriers forward towards Khlaung Ngae where the railway bridge had been destroyed to find out what was happening. From what could be gathered from the locals, the Thai military and police had attempted to resist the Japanese invasion at Singora, but it seemed that an armistice was declared to begin 12:00hrs. The good news seemed to be that the Japanese landing force had taken losses, though it wasn’t clear what exactly had been lost, but obviously not enough.

    At 21:00hrs a Japanese reconnaissance column of thirty-five vehicles, preceded by tanks, and with headlights blazing, bore down on Laycol’s positions. Four of the tanks were knocked out by the Matilda II and the anti-tank guns. The Japanese infantry, who had dismounted at the beginning of the action, were soon engaged in an enveloping movement. The order not to get involved in anything more than delaying actions meant that Major Eric Andrews ordered his force to withdraw immediately. The engineers had set demolition charges on a number of places that would deny the road to motor transport. As they withdrew, they destroyed three bridges, that would take the Japanese time to replace.

    Crossing back over the Malaya border, Andrews had his force take up positions to once again slow the Japanese force. The destruction of the bridges had obviously effectively delayed the Japanese as well as they had hoped. By the evening of 10 December there was still no sign of the vanguard of the Japanese force.

    Lieutenant-General Heath had reviewed Murray-Lyon’s plans for defending Jitra, and had made some simple suggestions to improve the way he had laid out his force. Murray-Lyon didn’t have much in the way of experience, except from the Great War and action on the North-West Frontier. Heath showed him how he could make more use of his artillery and to think less of holding a line, and more of a defence in depth. Heath had tried, since he arrived in May, to share with the two generals commanding the Indian Divisions, David Murray-Lyon and Arthur Barstow, some of what he’d learned in East Africa. He had appointed some of the staff officers from 5th Indian Division onto 9th and 11th Indian Division’s staff to have some experience present when planning operations.

    One of the fundamental problems Heath had discovered since arriving in Malaya that there was a feeling that the Japanese army was not considered an effective fighting force, having lost to the Soviets at Khalkhin Gol in 1939 and the fact that they were unable to defeat the Chinese army. Heath however had the feeling that the Japanese would have learned a great deal from their time at war. The Indian army was used to small wars with limited numbers. Many of the men in 9th and 11th Divisions were new recruits who hadn’t even had that experience. Many of the regular officers with experience had been sent to firm up the vastly expanding Indian Army. Therefore, many of the junior officers under his command were hastily promoted to fill the posts.

    Heath was pleased that Murray-Lyon had taken his advice. While infantry could easily enough work round flanks through ‘impenetrable’ jungle, the motor transport couldn’t. Keeping control of the road was therefore Murray-Lyon’s main task. Gazelle Force in East Africa had given Heath the idea of using some of his infantry tanks and all of his light tanks as a mobile force, working with a couple of the Division’s carrier platoons. These would be the links between the various Battalion positions, making sure that if the enemy got round the flank and appeared in the rear of a position, then the tanks and the carrier platoons would counter these roadblocks to keep the road open.

    Lt-Col Michael Hedderwick (CO 11th Bn RTR) had been worried about the way in which his unit was being parcelled out in penny packets and had challenged Lieutenant-General Heath about the way he was using up his men and tanks. With only one squadron of 18 tanks in each of the two Divisions Heath admitted that he was taking a chance adding a troop here and there, even a single tank on some occasions. What he had managed to do was to keep six tanks (the squadron HQ and one troop) together as part of each Division’s reserves. Heath reckoned that six Infantry Tanks working together would probably be strong enough to take on just about anything the Japanese would throw at them. Hedderwick saw his reasoning, but he was aware that Malaya Command hadn’t had much experience of tank warfare, and he worried that his men would pay the price for being used in ineffective ways.

    At 08:00hrs on 11 December, Major Andrews’ 'Laycol' sent a motorcycle messenger to say that there was a strong Japanese column moving over the border into Malaya. Andrews had set up his force into two parties. One Company, with an anti-tank gun and the Matilda II tank would engage the enemy, the second Company would be in a supporting position further back along the road. Each company would leapfrog the other back to the Battalion’s main positions around Changlun, with the tank providing covering fire.

    Sergeant Arthur Hickson, commanding the tank “Milly”, was worried about having enough ammunition for the co-axial machine gun. While he had brought more than the usual amount, at the expense of some of his 2-pdr ammunition, there was always the fear that there wouldn’t be enough. The RTR support units had wondered how best to service their charges which were so spread out. In this case, a universal carrier had been provided with cans of petrol and ammunition reloads was being held at Changlun ready to replenish the tank when it arrived back.

    The other two tanks of Hickson’s Troop were at Jitre, one each with the 2nd Bn East Surrey Regiment and 1st Bn Leicestershire Regiment. As his tank worked back from one position to the next, Hickson and his gunner had managed to knock out at least three enemy tanks. A couple of lorries had also been machine gunned, but still the Japanese advanced. The final pull back was to the 1/8th Punjab main position at Changlun. As the tank arrived in friendly lines, the first artillery shells started falling on the forward elements of the Japanese. Under the cover of this bombardment, Hickson was glad to get into a hidden position and begin to replenish the ammo and fill up on fuel. The driver did a spot of tightening of various nuts, and checked the engine, adding some more oil.

    Laycol was now back to simply being part of 1/8th Punjab Regiment. Major Andrews came over thank Hickson and his men, and make sure, that like his own men, they had got some food and hot tea. Finding that Hickson was doing fine, Andrews returned to the Battalion HQ. Lt-Col Bates was happy with how things had gone. Although the two Companies that Andrews had taken forward had suffered a few casualties, the spirit of the men was good, though tired. Bates’ orders were to hold Changlun, but to withdraw in good order through Asun, where they would pass through a Gurkha Battalion and back to the main 6th Indian Brigade positions at Jitre.

    A runner from Battalion HQ found Hickson and passed him a message to attend an Officers Call at the HQ. When he arrived, Bates wanted to have Hickson do what he had done with Andrews’ Column. The tank would cover the withdrawal of the battalion Motor Transport, then do the same with the Gurkhas at Asun. Hickson nodded that he understood, but was aware that he and his crew were vulnerable if something happened to the tank. Timings were worked out, and signals confirmed, Bates wished everyone good luck, and Hickson went back to his tank.

    Informing the crew of the plan, they also nodded their understanding, and got back to work, knowing that their lives depended on making sure everything was in tip top condition. Hickson had noted a position that would give the tank some cover, but with good visibility, and as soon as the crew was ready, they moved into their position and waited. The British artillery from somewhere behind them was still firing, but a heavy shower at 16:00hrs hid a Japanese assault until the last minute.

    Japanese medium tanks, followed by infantry in lorries burst out of the rain and onto the forward positions of 1/8th Punjab. Hickson was as surprised as everyone, but his gunner fired at the front tank as soon as he saw it. There were four 2-pdr guns with the Battalion, and although one of them was overrun, the other three, with Hickson’s tank, knocked out the leading tanks. The sepoys, after their initial shock, were quick to respond, and they began to take a heavy toll of the Japanese infantry.

    The Japanese troops, presumably from a Reconnaissance Regiment, moved to find and turn the Punjab’s flanks. Lt-Col Bates had kept his force in quite a tight formation, with the Motor Transport and support troops in the centre, and four infantry companies forming a square around the town. When the signal to begin withdrawing was given the first few vehicles moving south towards Asun came under fire from both sides of the road. The Japanese infantry had infiltrated around the Punjab’s position and were now blocking the road out of town.

    Lt Col Bates’ plan was now threatened, he ordered Major Andrews to use his company to clear the road. A runner arrived at Hickson’s tank and passed him a message, asking for his support. It was clear that using the tank would be the easiest way to break the roadblock, and since the anti-tank gunners were still effective, Hickson ordered the driver to move out. Reaching the edge of town, Andrews had the Battalion’s carrier platoon ready to follow up. Once the ambush was cleared, Hickson would stay put until the rest of Battalion passed, then, as planned, protect the rear of the column.

    The Japanese infantry had nothing that could harm the Matilda II tank with them. An artillery piece, firing over open sights, could stop Milly, but rifles, hand grenades and mortars were ineffective. With a full load of ammunition, and a fresh barrel in the Besa MG, the Japanese roadblock was completely overwhelmed, with the arrival of the Bren gun carriers adding their fire, and the Company’s 2-inch mortars adding their weight of fire, the Japanese who weren’t killed, melted back into the jungle.

    The weight of the Japanese efforts from the north increased, and Lt Col Bates was relieved when the last couple of lorries carrying the rear-guard passed him at the tank’s position. Taking off in a carrier Lt Col Bates made all sorts of promises about medals and mentions in despatches. Hickson was just keen to get himself and his crew back to friendly lines. With the gun pointed over the rear deck, the driver gunned the engine and got Milly up to her top speed heading to Asun.

    Once more a barrage of artillery shells blanketed the road, obviously there was a Forward Observer somewhere calling in coordinates. Hickson brought Milly to a stop and went to find the HQ of 2nd Battalion, 1st Gurkha Rifles, and their commanding officer, Lt Col "Jack" Fulton. Fulton had been briefed by Lt Col Bates on his way through the position.

    There was a bridge on the road over a stream wired for demolition just north of the village. Fulton had positioned two companies on either side of the road using the stream as their forward positions. Each company had an anti-tank gun sited down the road. There were also a couple of anti-tank rifles spread out among the troops. In addition, Fulton had managed to get a battery of four mountain guns from 22 Mountain Regiment RA to provide immediate support.

    Fulton mentioned to Hickson that he planned to blow the bridge when the first Japanese tank was on it. Fulton noted that Hickson didn’t look happy, and asked why. Hickson pointed out that if the charge didn’t blow, then the forward Japanese troops would have all the momentum. The bridge wasn’t exactly the biggest bridge in the world, and although the stream was in full flow because of the rain, it wasn’t exactly the English Channel. Between the tank’s 2-pdr, and the two towed anti-tank guns, plus the mountain howitzers, Hickson thought if he was attacking this place, his fear would be being knocked out at range. This would mean the infantry would need to attack over open ground without tank support. Lt Col Fulton had almost no experience of working with tanks, and he hadn’t thought of it from a tank’s perspective. He agreed, and ordered the Royal Engineer officer to detonate the explosives when the Japanese were first spotted.

    In the event it was just as well. When the plunger on the detonator was pushed, nothing happened. The tank and anti-tank guns engaged the Japanese tanks, and the four howitzers put down a barrage on the road behind them. Meanwhile the Royal Engineers went out to see what had happened to their explosives. Eventually the found the broken connection and the bridge was successfully destroyed. The Ghurka infantry were facing off their Japanese opponents, who, as Hickson had noted, were advancing without the support of Japanese tanks.

    Fulton’s men had noted that most of the enemy in the front had gone to ground, but were fixing them in position with rifle and machine gun fire. The flanking movement that Fulton had been warned about was being opposed by a platoon of Ghurkas of either side of the position, each platoon trying to cut into the Japanese side as they bypassed the main force. The Ghurkas were badly outnumbered, but they gave a good account of themselves. With the position nearly surrounded, Fulton gave the order for his Battalion to withdraw, he wanted to use the last hour of daylight to his best advantage. The two Companies that had been defending the stream had taken casualties which slowed the process of loading the Motor Transport down. The gunners from the Mountain Regiment and the Anti-Tank Regiment were all set to move, when once more the Ghurka Battalion found a blocking force to their rear.

    Hickson had a feeling that that might happen and had moved back from covering the road to the north, to prepare to lead the Motor Transport south. When he got the order, Hickson’s driver took the tank down the middle of the road, with the gunner training his Besa MG on the left-hand side of the road. A burning lorry marked the spot that the Japanese had set up, the lorry having been rolled into the middle of the road, with various tree trunks and other material forming a roadblock. With the gun blazing, the driver aimed the tank at the centre of the roadblock and pushed the tank as fast as it would go.

    Pushing the roadblock was successful in as far as it allowed the Motor Transport to drive through the Japanese ambush with a minimum of losses. However, in doing so, the tank had thrown a track. As the last carrier passed, Hickson and his crew jumped on board, having tried to destroy the tank as much as they could. It would have been easy enough to repair, but that wasn’t an option in this case. When the carrier brought him into Jitre, Hickson and his men sought out the Light Aid Detachment, and after contact with Lt-Col Michael Hedderwick, their CO, Hickson and his men were ordered back to the main depot. There weren’t any spare tanks, but their usefulness was too great to be used as infantrymen.
     
    12 December 1941. Singapore.
  • 12 December 1941. Singapore.

    Admiral Phillips and the remaining elements of Force Z had sailed during the night for Ceylon. The job of deterrence had failed, but in the best traditions of the Royal Navy, Force Z had taken the battle to the enemy. Between Force Z, and the other ships of the China Station, including the Dutch submarines, four Japanese transports, four Cruisers and three Destroyers had been sunk. The RAF and RAAF had also managed to sink a transport at Kota Bharu and damage another. The cost however had been HMS Barham with heavy loss of life, along with HMS Fiji, Ilex, Imperial, and damage to HMS Repulse, which left her in Singapore’s dry dock. HMS Prince of Wales, Nelson and Ark Royal were retiring to Ceylon. One of Ark Royal’s squadron of Hurricanes, and half a squadron of Swordfish, had been left at RAF Seletar.

    The losses had come as a surprise from torpedoes which must of have had a much longer reach than the Navy expected. The other battleships had been lucky to comb the torpedo tracks, HMS Barham hadn’t been. The Royal Navy China Station was left with three elderly light cruisers and four destroyers, only one of which was modern (HMS Kashmir).

    The senior intelligence officer who was conducting the briefing updated the senior officers of about the news from the Americans. The Japanese raid on Pearl Harbour had sunk the majority of the battleships of the Pacific Fleet, and it seemed that the Navy and Army Air Corps on the Philippines had been badly mauled. It wasn’t clear of an invasion of the Philippines had begun, but it had to be expected. There would be no help coming from the Americans.

    Air Vice Marshall Conway Pulford’s described the loss of over half of his force in the first day of the invasion. Percival had agreed to Pulford’s decision to pull some his forces back to RAF Kuala Lumper, but the majority to RAF Seletar. Lieutenant-General Heath noted that enemy air attacks had been increasing, obviously they were moving from attacking the airfields having won air supremacy. The usual questions about protecting the troops from air attack, and bombing the enemy troops were dismissed by Pulford, as being unrealistic. His aircrew and aircraft were struggling just to stay alive and in the fight. Whatever support they could give the army would happen, when and if possible. This had been a regular complaint since the beginning of the war. Heath mentioned that the 8th Army seemed to have got a system to work. Pulford gripped about resources, but Percival cut off the argument, saying it was a matter for Air Marshall Brooke-Popham.

    Heath then laid out the situation of his III Indian Corps. 9th Division had defeated the Japanese landing at Kota Bharu, helped by the fact that one of the three transports had been sunk by a torpedo from a Dutch submarine on the way, and the intervention in the morning of 8 December by the RAAF Hudsons which had sunk a second and damaged the third. Between the men of the 8th and 9th Brigades, the depleted Japanese force were mostly held on the beaches. One Japanese unit had managed to get off the beach but ran into a tank and reinforcements heading for the beach and were defeated. The Japanese had been identified as belonging to 18th Division of the IJA.

    Heath went on to report that the job done by 10th Indian Brigade at The Ledge had prevented the Japanese advance from Patani. While there was still some movement in the area, it seemed from what little reconnaissance they had been able to get, the majority of that force was moving in the direction of Kota Bharu. Major-General Arthur Barstow (GOC 9th Indian Infantry Division) had confidence in his current situation holding and had reorganised his defences to face an attack coming down the road from Thailand.

    11th Indian Division, Heath continued, had been countering the Japanese approach from Singora. The information he had was that this invasion force had also lost transports, though it was unknown what exactly had been on those ships. The intelligence gathered from various sources had identified that it was the Japanese 5th Division that had landed at Singora and Patani. 18th and 5th Division had been identified as belonging to the Japanese 25th Army, and it was expected that there would be a third division as part of that army. Intelligence sources from Thailand had noted that a large force was advancing from French Indo-China, and that other landings had taken place further north on the Kra Peninsula. Just exactly what strength the Japanese had was unknown, but likely to be about six divisions.

    The current situation was that Major General David Murray-Lyon (GOC 11th Indian Infantry Division) was being forced slowly back from his initial positions at Jitra. Both 8th and 15th Brigades were fighting a good rear-guard battle, while 28th Brigade and elements of 10th Brigade were preparing positions at Gurun. Once 8th and 15th Brigades had passed through Gurun, they would go into reserve, giving them time to rest and reform. Heath explained that his plan was to continue to bleed the Japanese, and lengthen their lines of communication, trading territory for time. Hopefully, by the time the Australian Corps was at full strength, his Corps would have weakened the Japanese, allowing for a counter-attack.

    Heath pointed out the aim of his plan for 8th and 15th Brigades to fall back through Gurun, being replaced in the front line by 28th and 10th Brigades. This would allow 8th and 15th Brigades to join 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, the Corps’ reserves, currently at Ipoh. Heath planned to have 29th Indian Brigade move to the vicinity of Butterworth and Penang Island. As a battle-tested Brigade, they would have plenty of time to prepare their defensive positions. If the force at Gurun could slow the Japanese enough, then 8th and 15th Brigades would have time to reform. It would have to be expected that both Brigades would have taken casualties and would be weakened, so that they might have to be amalgamated to form one complete Brigade.

    Heath asked Percival to consider that when it came time for 28th and 10th Brigades to fall back though Butterworth, probably to Ipoh, it would be helpful if they were to be joined by Malaya Command’s reserve, 12th Indian Brigade, another Regular Brigade currently at Port Dickson. This again would allow 28th and 10th Brigades to rest and re-organise, be merged, if necessary, but ready to work with 12th Brigade.

    Finally, Heath requested that the Squadron of 11th Bn RTR that had been assigned to the AIF be reassigned to III Indian Corps. Now that the 8 and 9 Divisional Cavalry had arrived with the Stuart tanks and armoured cars, the needs of 11th and 9th Indian Divisions were greater. The presence of the tanks seemed to be making all the difference to the units holding their positions, or being able to withdraw through the roadblocks the Japanese were creating when infiltrating through the jungle around the Indian’s positions.

    Percival had approved Heath’s plan but was worried that III Corps was fighting two different battles on either coast of the peninsula. If 9th or 11th Division were to suffer a severe setback, it would allow the Japanese to advance more rapidly, possibly crossing from one side to another, and he was still worried about more landings along the coast.

    Lieutenant-General Ivor Mackay (GOC AIF Malaya), as the newest arrival among the senior officers, noted the principle that trying to defend everything meant running the danger of defending nothing. He reported that his 8 Division were at full strength, and that the first elements of 9 Division had arrived ‘to a warm reception’ from Japanese bombers.

    Mackay noted that Percival’s plan was to defend the coastline from the danger of landings. While it was still feasible that another landing might take place south of Kota Bharu, Mackay noted that the plan was tying down at least two Brigades worth of men: 9th Indian Division’s 22nd Brigade and 8 Division’s 22 Brigade. Mackay wanted permission to move his 22 Brigade into a more central position where they could respond to an invasion, but also be prepared to face an enemy working down from the north.

    Heath agreed that having 9th Division’s 22nd Brigade free to move north from Kuantan to join the rest of Barstow’s Division would be advantageous. One of their Battalions was already with 8th Indian Brigade, having the other two, along with 5th Field Regiment RA, would give Barstow a better chance to hold the Japanese on the east coast. Percival was still worried about the possibility of being outflanked by sea.

    Mackay noted that Kuantan certainly was important, as an airfield near the sea it was an obvious target. But two Infantry Battalions and a Field Regiment were there ‘just in case.’ Meanwhile the Japanese 5th Division were marching from Pattani towards Kota Bharu, that was the imminent threat. Mackay had already talked to Heath before the meeting, and he was prepared to offer a squadron of M3 Stuart Tanks from 8 Division Cavalry to patrol between Kuantan and Mersing. He suggested using the Federated Malay States Volunteer Forces as coast watchers, and the Australian 22 Brigade would act as a counter-attack force if required. Percival, as much as he wanted to, couldn’t disagree with the proposal. He agreed that he would speak to Lt Col James Mackellar (CO 4th Battalion, Federated Malay States Volunteer Forces (Pahang)) about what could be done.

    Mackay also reported that he had spent some time with Lt Col Ian Stewart (CO 2nd Bn Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders) and had approached him about using the Argylls to help train the Australian 9 Division’s new arrivals in jungle warfare. There had been a bit of history between the Highlanders and the 8 Division men in the bars of Singapore. Stewart had smiled at the suggestion, knowing that the Australians would find his men hard teachers. Heath too was looking to give 29th Indian Infantry Brigade an intensive course.

    Lt Col Stewart proposed sending platoon sized units from his Battalion out to the Australians and Indians to pass on their knowledge and tactics. There was plenty of jungle around Ipoh and Kluang where the Brigades would be preparing. All he asked was that the Officers of those Indian and Australian units would be ordered to make sure that the training was taken seriously at every level, even up to Brigade HQ. Some of Percival’s staff had written Stewart off as deranged, but the fighting so far had shown up the need to be able to use the jungle, not to see it as an enemy in itself. Mackay from his experience in North Africa and Heath in East Africa knew that training the men to cope with the environment in which they were operating was every bit as essential as marksmanship and small unit tactics. When arranged, two platoons from B Company of 2 ASH were detached to the Indians at Ipoh, and two from C Company were detached to the Australian 20 Brigade to initiate them in the ways of jungle fighting.

    Percival was able to share some good news from General Auchinleck. Reinforcements from the Middle East and Persia were on their way. Percival started with Burma. Major-General Bill Slim’s 10th Indian Division was currently moving to Basra where they would be shipped to Rangoon. Along with them, the newly renamed 252nd Indian Armoured Brigade would also be sailing from Basra. They had a mix of light tanks, some well-travelled Vickers A9s and A10s, armoured cars, and 14th/20th King's Hussars had been given the M3 Stuart tanks which had previously belonged to 1st Household Cavalry Regiment.

    The rest of 9 Division from Australia and 18th Infantry Division from England were all expected to arrive, as planned, by Christmas. As soon as shipping was available General Wavell had agreed to send 9th (Highland) Division, which had been Line of Communications troops in the Delta, Canal and Cairo areas of Egypt. Now that the fighting in Libya had finished, Wavell was able to juggle his forces, and Major-General Douglas Wimberley (GOC 9th Division) had been pestering Wavell ever since the Division arrived in Egypt to be given a chance to show their stuff. Percival made a comment about the 9th Indian, 9 Australian and now 9th Highland Divisions, should be put together into an IX Corps, just to confuse matters more.

    Unfortunately, both 2nd and 7th Armoured Divisions were around the Tripoli area, and both needed time to repair and maintain the tanks after all their efforts. The success of 11th Bn RTR so far had made getting more infantry tanks a priority. Major-General Neil McMicking, Deputy Adjutant & Quartermaster-General British Troops in Egypt had been scouring the Delta workshops for running tanks and had scrapped together enough fixed up Valiant I and I* to make a Tank Battalion. This would be shipped along with 9th Highland Division when transport allowed. The various training units, replacement units, and hospitals had been combed through looking for RTR and RAC men who could man these tanks. Since 44th Bn RTR, once part of 7th Tank Brigade, had been stripped of vehicles and men as replacements, it was reformed to join 11th Bn RTR in Malaya. Lt Col Yeo was given his command back, and managed to beg, borrow and steal enough to make his Battalion an effective force. So much so that when it eventually sailed, it did so with the reputation of being worse thieves than the New Zealand Division.

    The last piece of good news came from the surprising source of Air Vice Marshall Pulford. In addition to the Fleet Air Arm Hurricanes and Swordfish reinforcement from HMS Ark Royal, he had been notified that the pilots and ground crew of one of the Tomahawk squadrons from the Middle East, (No 3 Squadron RAAF), were being flown in stages to Singapore. They should arrive about the same time as the crated P40s arriving with 18th Division. The pilot and ground-crew’s experience of the fighter would help make the transition from Buffaloes to Tomahawks much easier. A squadron of Wellington bombers from the Middle East was also being sent, initially to India, along with a squadron of Beaufighters. Pulford hoped this would be the beginning of a serious effort to reinforce the RAF in Singapore and Burma.
     
    13 December 1941. Alor Star, Malaya.
  • 13 December 1941. Alor Star, Malaya.

    The Blenheims of 62 Squadron, or at least the surviving aircraft, had been withdrawn south, and now the airfield had become a battleground. Thick smoke hampered both sides as the airfield’s fuel and ammunition supplies burned. Lt Col Harry Tyrell (CO 1st Battalion Bahawalpur Infantry (Indian States Forces)) had the pe-war job of protecting the airfield. Now his men were part of 15th Indian Brigade’s defence of the area. The Bahawalpur Infantry, mostly Punjabi Moslems, had never seen tanks before the arrival of the Matilda II which had been sent to defend the airfield along with them. As was common among the Royal Tank Regiment, the tank, from A Squadron, had its ‘name’ stencilled on its side. When naming it, they had used a common term used by British troops to mean ‘can’t be bothered’: ‘Allahkaffik’. To the Punjabi’s, after some discussion, agreed that it was a misspelling of ‘Allah Kiyfik’, ‘God is Sufficient’. This was seen by the men of the Bahawalpur Battalion as a great portent of victory.

    Once Sergeant John Runcie, the tank commander, got used to the almost reverential way his tank and his crew were treated by the Bahawalpurs, he began to enjoy it. The first few days he’s had the sepoys climbing all over the tank like children, and the glee they showed when they were sitting on the tank when it moved was unbelievable. The Company that had been chosen to work with the tank as the counter-attack force, walked with straighter backs and preened themselves when they came on duty, they felt every bit as superior as if they were the Nawab’s own bodyguard.

    Naik Muhammed Fazil had made himself Runcie’s personal assistant, the British sergeant wanted for almost nothing, except to be left alone. The Captain of A Company, Khan Mir Khan did everything that was asked of him. He trained his men diligently to know the best way to cooperate with the tank. The men were surprised that it was their job to protect the tank, everybody assumed it was the tank’s job to protect them. Fazil and his squad made themselves ‘the last line of defence’: a couple of black eyes and swollen lips among other squads having won them that role.

    Now that the battle was raging, Runcie and Khan’s Company had been held back in reserve, ready to plug any gaps in the line. Brigadier Garrett (CO 15th Indian Brigade) had 2nd Bn 9th Jat Regiment working alongside the Bahawalpurs at the airfield, while 1st Bn Leicestershire Regiment and 1st Bn 14th Punjab Regiment were holding closer to the coast. As well as Allahkaffik, two other Matilda IIs were part of the defensive posture of the Brigade. The Japanese had already tried a few times to attack, and had run up against an accurate barrage from the 25-pdrs of 137th (2nd West Lancashire) Field Regiment RA, supporting the defence of the airfield.

    The problems started when there was break in the monsoon rains, and some Japanese planes arrived overhead. The British artillery fire ceased, either the guns were being moved, or the men were keeping their heads down. The increase in mortar and machine gun fire from the Japanese signalled that another attack was underway. The Japanese had managed to find where the Jats and the Bahawalpurs positions joined and were striking there with a large force, including some tanks.

    Allahkaffik was based near the Regiment’s HQ, and a runner came to Captain Khan to order a counterattack at the point where the Japanese were breaking through. Sergeant Runcie and his crew were already aboard the tank, ready for just such a moment. The driver, Jock Anderson, got the tank moving, with Fazil and his squad were on the engine hatches. Fazil himself was kneeling behind the turret, with a Vickers–Berthier (VB) LMG pointing forward. Runcie, in the turret hatch, had warned him plenty of times not to fire the gun when his head was beside it, it would deafen him.

    Khan’s Company were spread out, sweeping ahead and to the side of the tank, as they had practised time and time again. The gunner and loader, Nigel Coote and Bert Leitch, were busy checking and double checking the guns and ammo loads. Runcie had always warned Fazil that when they went into action, the tank would become a bullet magnet, and staying on the tank was likely to be deadly. Fazil had just shrugged, “Allah Kiyfik!” As they drew near the site of the breakthrough, the reality of the tank drawing fire from just about every Japanese soldier hit home. Two of his squad were knocked off the tank, and when Runcie had ducked down and pulled the hatch shut, Fazil opened up with the VB.

    Coote very quickly identified a Japanese tank and engaged it with the 2-pdr, firing three shots in quick succession, moving to the co-axial Besa when the Japanese tank was burning. The wave of just over 100 men of Khan’s Company, along with Allahkaffik’s guns pushed the Japanese back. Once the breach was sealed, and the Jats and Bahawalpurs were able to tie their positions together again, Runcie ordered his driver to reverse, and shouted to Captain Khan that it was time to withdraw.

    The Japanese aircraft must have left, because artillery shells began to fall again on the Japanese positions. Only eighty men from Khan’s Company withdrew back to their starting position, and of them many had suffered some kind of wound, the fighting had become hand to hand at one point. Coote and Leitch ran off with two of Fazil’s squad to bring more ammunition into the tank, while Jock Anderson refilled the fuel tank. They’d only travelled about a mile, but Anderson maintained that he never knew when they’d be able to refuel, and even a pint of diesel could make all the difference. Fazil had lost three of his squad and his helmet was dented from a Japanese bullet, giving him a very sore head. The mess tin of hot sweet tea was pressed into Runcie’s hand, Fazil had obviously somebody around the HQ ready for just this moment.

    Firing was dying down along the front line. The Japanese seemed to have pulled back. Men raced forward to the fighting men with more ammunition, water, and with stretchers to bring back the wounded. That was when the Japanese aircraft reappeared. There were at least twelve aircraft, and they seemed to wheel about overhead, then dive and fire long bursts. Many Indian troops tried bringing their rifles and VBs to bear, but the aircraft pulled away unharmed. One aircraft concentrated on the area around the Regimental HQ, and having dropped its four bombs, turned round again to take another strafing run. The aircraft had two machine-guns firing through the propeller and was flying directly towards Allahkaffik, Fazil was standing on the back of the tank with his VB at his shoulder attempting to return fire.

    The Japanese machine gun bullets rang loudly over the tank though without any real threat to the armour, even on the thinner top armour. Once it had passed Runcie, who’d automatically closed the turret hatch opened it again, fearing that he’d find Fazil dead. The naik was standing completely unscathed, laughing and pointing as the Japanese plane flew off trailing smoke. “Allah Kiyfik! Allah Kiyfik!” Fazil kept repeating, and Runcie could do nothing else, but join him. Thinking it meant ‘Can’t be bothered’ when he’d chosen the name, now he had to agree, ‘God is Sufficient.’
     
    14 December 1941. Chertsey, England
  • 14 December 1941. Chertsey, England

    The regular review of progress on Vickers’ tank development and production was dominated by the situation in Malaya and the Pacific. The celebration of the defeat of the Italians in Africa hadn’t had long before the news gave way to a new enemy and a new theatre of war.

    Leslie Little’s project on the A17 Light Tank Mark VII (now officially known as the Tetrarch) was continuing its production run at North British Locomotives in Glasgow. With the Springburn company no longer building Matilda IIs, it was expected that they would be able to double their monthly output from eight to sixteen Tetrarchs at the beginning of the new year. The original order for 120 had been doubled to 240, but the bad news was that the follow-on design, the A25 Light Tank Mark VIII had not made much of an impression on the army after the trials of the prototypes. The heavier armour and larger size, while retaining the same engine as the Tetrarch, gave poor results. The Crusader (as Nuffield’s A15 was now officially known) was being considered for the reconnaissance role rather than the light tanks.

    The Duplex Drive which had been tested on the Tetrarch had been a success, and there were now a few Valiant I* tanks undergoing tests to see it Straussler’s system could be used on heavier tanks. The first forty of the second batch of Tetrarchs from Glasgow would be built with the Duplex Drive as standard.

    Little went on to say that the 1st Airborne Division had been looking at various vehicles for their reconnaissance squadron, and the Tetrarch was one of the options, but a special glider would have to be designed to carry the tank. Little had spoken to a few people, but it was still very early days to see where it would go. The other thing he mentioned was that the turret of the Tetrarch had been chosen by Daimler for use on its armoured car. The Tetrarch seemed to have a found itself a niche for roles with the Commandoes and Glider troops.

    There was one other idea that Little had approached the design team with and had been encouraged to begin drawings for. The appearance in Greece and in Libya of the German assault gun which had been revealed as being the StuG III Ausf. A. While the idea of an assault gun hadn’t been part of the British army’s, particularly the Royal Artillery’s, thinking, Little could see the value of a self-propelled anti-tank gun. The towed 2-pdrs and future 6-pdrs were an important part of the arsenal, having a tracked vehicle, protecting the crew and allowing fast redeployment would seem a good idea.

    He showed his drawings to the design team and had a model made. Using the A25 hull, it did away with the turret and carried a 6-pdr gun low in the adapted hull, making a fast, low, lightweight self-propelled gun. Without the turret, the weight didn’t put as much strain on the engine, and with the angle of the armour it provided better protection for no more weight. The length of the barrel extending out the front of the vehicle and its limited traverse could cause problems, but the design team could see why Little was enthused by the project. Whether the army would share his enthusiasm remained to be seen. For the roles that the Tetrarch was fitting into, supporting light forces, having an anti-tank gun, or even some with the kind of close support found in the German StuG, might win some orders.

    Sir John Carden moved onto the Valiant tank, the next item on the agenda. Valiant I and I* were coming to the end of their production run and the new Valiant II and II* production was ramping up alongside the numbers of 6-pdrs being produced. Vickers itself were still producing about 100 6-pdrs a month, while the new Royal Ordnance Factory were producing 200 of the longer L/50 guns. Except for a few prototypes, all the Valiant II & II* tanks so far had been equipped with the shorter Vickers barrel. The L/50 6-pdrs had been issued to anti-tank regiments to begin training on it. In the new year there would be enough production for all Valiants to have the L/50 barrel. This could also be retro-fitted to the older tanks in due course.

    The decision to ship Valiant IIs to Russia without guns, so that the Soviets could fit them with their own 76.2mm gun, meant that pressure on the 6-pdr production was lessened. Carden noted that the company had finally been given a copy of the Soviet L11 tank-gun and it was a small matter to move some of the fittings in the turret to take the 76.2mm gun. Looking at Vickers new 75mm HV and the Soviet L11 had shown that the British gun was the far better of the two which boded well for the Victor.

    Since Valiant IIs were likely to be kept in production for the Soviets, even after production of the Victor began, the production of engines coming from Perkins’ diesel Lion would need to continue. Its reliability and ease of maintenance had impressed the Soviets, as it had the British tank crews and fitters. Perkins in Britain and Cummings for the Canadian tanks were both capable of meeting the demand for tanks for Russia.

    The next item on the agenda was a report on the Valiant I and I* used in North Africa. One of Vickers’ executives and a senior engineer had been in Egypt meeting with all those involved in the use and care of the Valiant tanks. The responses were very heartening. The tank had the reputation of being reliable, and capable of the long journeys involved in North Africa without too many troubles. Like any piece of machinery, if it was well maintained it generally worked well. Some of the breakdowns that had been identified were cases of quality control, where something had broken that shouldn’t have. But most breakdowns were easily explainable and relatively easy to fix. One of the complaints was that sometimes there was a lack of spare parts, and that some tanks had been stripped for components that otherwise might have been recoverable. While that was a Quartermaster’s problem, the need for the company to ship plenty of spare parts, especially engines, along with the tanks was crucial.

    The men who had been using the tanks generally preferred the diesel Valiant I over the petrol Valiant I*. Although it was the Infantry Tank Mark III, it could be deployed in a Cruiser role, making the Valiant I* with its slightly better top speed, but thinner armour and less reliable engine, almost unnecessary. The general gripe of the tankies was the 2-pdr gun, which was definitely obsolescent, and without a decent HE shell, it was pretty useless. Otherwise, the men were happy with the layout of the tank and the protection it gave them. They were generally happy with the idea of the Valiant II, the hull, engine and suspension remaining the same, but a turret containing a 6-pdr gun, which would be supplied with both AP and HE shells.

    The Vickers team also noted the numbers of tanks which had replaced the 2-pdr with the 3-inch Close Support gun, the advantage of the HE shell being more useful when not fighting other tanks, which was the most common use of the tanks so far. The problem with the 3-inch gun was it was quite inaccurate. The question of just how effective the HE 6-pdr shell would be had been discussed at length, and it was generally felt to be adequate rather than good. The chances were that the Valiant II and II* would also need to have a number of CS variants.

    Carden noted that the Department of Tank Design had just agreed to look into this at their meeting on 12 December. Just as the 3-inch Howitzer Ordnance Quick Firing Mark I had been designed to fit the turret carrying the 2-pdr, so a Close Support gun would be needed for turrets fitted with the 6-pdr. Carden expected that the problem would be keeping the CS gun down to the weight of the 6-pdr to avoid having two different mountings. The Vickers gun team were up to their eyes in the development of the 75mm HV and the idea of looking at another gun was beyond their capacity. The role of the Close Support tank was to provide smoke, but more and more, the need for HE. This brought Carden back to the purpose of the 75mm HV which would be able to do both, have an excellent AP and good HE capability. A smoke shell in the same cartridge as the HE was also developed, saving on having two sperate types of gun.

    The Canadian/Australian plan to fit a slimmed down 25-pdr into the Ram/Jumbuck would certainly fit the bill for Close Support, but even slimmed down, the 25-pdr weight would still be a problem. The Department of Tank Design had thought of using the old 3.7-inch howitzer as the basis for the new gun, giving it a 95mm projectile. When the gun team talked about it, it became clearer in Carden’s mind that once tanks had a good HE capability the idea of a Close Support version would die off. Putting a howitzer in a tank was always going to be limited by the elevation the turret would allow. For direct fire, anything round the 75mm gun would be adequate enough. For indirect fire a howitzer would probably need something like a 45° angle, something a tank turret would struggle to achieve, especially if the gun had to be reloaded at that angle. The Birch Gun, a self-propelled 25-pdr would probably be the better bet, perhaps fitted with more armour to make it like the StuG, an assault tank.

    Vauxhall had been asked by the Tank Board meeting about using the Churchill (as the A22 was now officially known) as the basis for such a vehicle using the old 3-inch 20 cwt anti-aircraft gun as the main armament. Carden wasn’t terribly impressed by Vauxhall’s idea of a limited traverse with a raised box to hold the crew and ammunition storage. The gun would be set low down on the hull making it even more limited in its traverse, and therefore limited in its application. Carden believed it was a dead end, but that at some point a bigger gun than the 75mm HV would be needed for the successor of the Victor. The 3.7-inch AA gun was likely to be a good starting point, just as Carden expected that the German 88mm AA gun was likely to appear in German tanks.

    Getting a bigger gun into tanks was something that the Tank Board had been working on generally. The new 17-pdr that was being developed as a towed anti-tank gun had been given to Nuffield to work on a as a successor to the Crusader. Carden couldn’t see how they do it without moving away from the Liberty engine, but that seemed to be their plan, the gun was big and heavy, and so would the tank that carried need to be. The obvious answer was for Nuffield to start using the Perkins Lion rather than the Liberty, but it seemed that wasn’t something they would consider. Hopefully Lord Beaverbrook might be able to change Lord Nuffield’s mind, but that might be hopeful thinking.

    The Victor’s 75mm HV could well fit the bill as a tank alternative to the 17-pdr, but with the Victor well on its way to production, Carden had been working on detailed plans for the next tank, and at the heart of that was the need for the next generation gun. There was room for development in the Victor’s engine, gears and suspension combination to move up to a tank in the range of forty to forty-five tons. Carden had worked out that the turret ring for a bigger gun would need to be at least 70 inches, probably more like 74 or 75 inches. Going by the research coming from Egypt about the German 88mm Flak gun which had been used in the anti-tank role, the new tank would need the equivalent of at least 5, possibly 6 inches of armour in the crucial places to protect it. Designing the armour to be as sloped as possible would help keep some weight down. Carden knew that the Meteor engine would give the Victor a reasonable horsepower to weight ratio but would be at the top end of its power for a 45-ton tank.

    One of the other problems identified by the studies in North Africa was that the tank needed a lot of fuel capacity to give it the kind of range without always having to retire to be refuelled. The Meteor was a thirsty beast, and Carden felt that diesel gave a better performance than petrol in terms of consumption. He’d spoken at length to Harry Ricardo and Roy Robotham about an engine that was capable of about 1000-1200hp, probably a V12, preferably diesel. Robotham though that perhaps these requirements would mean looking at the Rolls Royce Griffon engine. Ricardo and Perkins had been working with The Old Gang on the super heavy tank and had a V12 diesel currently producing 600hp which Ricardo believed could be improved upon. Whether an improvement of doubling its output could be achieved without major work remained to be seen.

    The other solution would be to work on the Meteor engine to try to get the most out of its capacity, but again, there wasn’t, at least on the face of it, that much room for improvement. Engines and guns, these were the things that tank designs always seemed to have problems with. The ‘Venom’ project still had a long way to go, it would early 1944 at the earliest before it would be able to enter service. Getting a 1000hp engine and a gun more capable than the German 88mm Flak was going to be difficult. Carden, aware that 45 tons was a lot of weight had been playing with the idea of trying torsion bar suspension as an alternative to Horstman suspension. The captured Panzer III Ausf F had been thoroughly examined, and Carden had been particularly interested in the suspension as a possibility. As with the Valiant (Valiant I 2-pdr, Valiant II 6-pdr) Carden was aiming to design the tank to take the bigger gun but could have a Mark I version starting with the current gun if the new gun wasn’t ready. The Venom could start with the 75mm HV, if necessary and then the new gun, once mature enough, could be fitted to the turret already designed with the new gun in mind.

    Carden wasn’t sure what Major-General Campbell Clarke, Director of Artillery, was thinking for the follow up to the 17-pdr. The conflict between Vickers and Woolwich Arsenal about guns was long and difficult, as shown by Clarke’s dislike of the 75mm HV. Carden presumed that Clarke would be as likely begin with the 3.7-inch AA gun as the basis for a design, as Carden himself. When Carden had been looking at it he noted that the shell weighed something like 32 pounds, and it would take up a lot of space, so storage would be a design concern. When he’d mentioned this to the gun design team, they noted that the old 4-inch/45 BL that were being fitted to a lot of Merchant Ships, the shell weight was 31lbs, the muzzle velocity, when asked, was 2625 fps (800mps). The 3.7-inch gun’s muzzle velocity, the gun design team thought was about the same. He asked them what would be the result of having a 4-inch gun tube, with the barrel lined down to 3.7-inches, using the 4-inch cartridge case driving the 3.7-inch shell? Should it, theoretically, increase the muzzle velocity? The gun team spoke among themselves and agreed that the result, should take the muzzle velocity up to around 2800-2900 fps (880 mps). One of the team expressed the reservation that barrel wear would be a problem that would need addressed. Carden asked them that when they had time, they might think about it as the basis for a proposal for a tank gun to replace the 75mm HV in the follow-on tank.

    Which brought the discussion to the current situation with the Victor tank. Rover and Leyland were working at putting the 600hp Meteor engine into production, which as expected wouldn’t begin as soon as hoped, but was delayed until February 1942. The delays had been caused because of difficulty in getting machine tools, one of the ships carrying tools from America had been sunk by a U-boat. As well as creating new factory space and training workers, the production managers were dealing with the various companies that would be making subcomponents. Making sure that quality control would be consistent and strict, had led to some contracts being withdrawn and given to other companies which could produce the quality as well as the quantity needed.

    Meadows was having more of a problem getting their new production line set up. The decision had been made to delay Meadows involvement for at least six months. This gave the company more time to resolve the issues, and also to await more machine tools from America to be built and delivered. While production of engines built from scratch would begin in February, a large number of Merlin III engines recovered but unable to be made airworthy had been delivered. The adaptation of these into Meteors would mean that when production of the Victor got underway, there would be a stock of engines ready for them.

    The Production Manager of the engines department was able to report that the cooling problems had been overcome in the prototype engines, the change to the radiators and new fan drive seemed to have worked successfully. At a previous meeting worries had been expressed over the 4-inch armour plate that would be needed. The Ministry of Supply were aware of the problems of potential bottlenecks, and alternative sources for armour plate with proper quality control were in hand. Vickers had been assured that when production was underway, enough quality armour plate would be supplied.

    The Production Managers who had responsibility for the Merritt-Brown triple differential and gearbox was happy to report that some of the teething problems had been rectified. Some of this had happened because of collaboration with Vauxhall working on the Churchill infantry tank. As people were becoming more familiar with the system it was getting easier to see where problems, and solutions, might lie. The same was the case with the Horstman horizontal volute spring suspension, the teething troubles seemed behind them, and with a few adaptations, the prototypes were running smoothly.

    Carden was able to report that the feedback from Lulworth (where the gun had been tested) and Farnborough (where the full prototypes had been tested) was positive. All the changes that had been made seemed to satisfy those inspecting the tanks. Some of the results were being given very positive responses, and Carden expected that when the final report was completed, which he believed would happen before the end of the year, then they could expect that an order for a number of pre-production tanks to be made. The company had been working on these, so that when the order came in, they would be able to deliver them swiftly, hopefully by St Valentine’s Day. Half would be equipped with the 6-pdr gun and half with the 75mm HV. The delay to Rover and Leyland producing engines wasn’t therefore anything to worry about. All being well, the first full production Victor tank would roll out of the tank shop in March, certainly before Easter on 5 April 1942.
     
    15 December 1941. Rangoon, Burma
  • 15 December 1941. Rangoon, Burma

    News that the Japanese had occupied Victoria Point at the very south of Burma was confirmation that the threat to Burma was every bit as real as that to Malaya. General Auchinleck, C-in-C India Command had flown into Rangoon to inform Lieutenant-General Donald McLeod GOC (Burma Army) that the British Chiefs of Staff had transferred Burma Command from Far East Command to India Command. Faced with the task of defending Burma with even less resources than Malaya, McLeod’s time as had been spent trying to make the most of the little he had. Auchinleck knew this and was keen on letting McLeod know that his work had been appreciated. Major-General Bill Slim was on his way to Rangoon, with his 10th Indian Division following as fast as possible.

    Auchinleck, assuring McLeod that it was no reflection on the job he had done, told him that he had requested Lieutenant-General Harold Alexander to take over as GOC Burma Army. The arrival of 10th Indian Division, and whatever other reinforcements would come, would have Slim in charge, probably as Corps Commander, and Alexander would hopefully be able to coordinate with the Chinese and Americans to defend the Burma Road. Alexander wanted McLeod to stay on to make sure that Slim and Alexander were both fully briefed about the current situation.

    As well as 10th Indian Division, Auchinleck had ordered 7th Indian Division to move to Burma with all haste. Major-General Arthur Wakely would be arriving shortly to get the lay of the land but would be subordinate to Bill Slim. Auchinleck was also happy to say that he had negotiated with London that the 9th (Highland) Division would come to Burma rather than go to Malaya. While Percival wasn’t happy at this change, Auchinleck saw the need for Burma Command to have a British Division as well as the Indian and Burma Infantry Divisions. McLeod was also informed that 14th Indian Division would be prepared for moving to Burma but needed a few more months training before it would be fit to be deployed. At a push, its three Brigades could be used as line of communication troops by Slim if he wished. In addition to the 11th African Division and the Burma Division, that would give an army of six Divisions by about April 1942.

    The question that McLeod had always asked himself was how Burma could be defended. His answer was always that it couldn’t, large parts of the country could be protected with a large enough force, but realistically much of east Burma on the border with Thailand couldn’t. Burma had three rivers that could slow an enemy invading from Thailand. The River Salween was the first but defending the western bank would mean that Moulmein and everything south would have to be abandoned. That was where the majority of 11th African Division was stationed. The River Sittang was the next defensible position, but there were plenty of reasons for wanting to keep the enemy as far from Rangoon as possible. The road to Mandalay would also have to be defended, but that too would be a difficult feat. The last line of defence would be the River Irrawaddy, after that the border with India would be the next stop.

    From McLeod’s point of view the only real way to defend Burma would be to win a clear victory over the invading army, forcing them back. Depending on the size of the Japanese army that invaded, if Alexander and Slim had enough time to get their Corps and Divisions ready, and concentrated, then perhaps the Japanese could be defeated. Having small units, even Brigades, spread out trying to defend too many places would invite piecemeal destruction. Of course, having a large force concentrated, if that were destroyed or even cut off, would hand the Japanese a great victory. General Auchinleck was well aware of the problem and wanted to make sure that Alexander when he arrived would keep McLeod around, perhaps on his Staff, to help make the transition.

    General Auchinleck was also pleased to inform McLeod, and his senior RAF officer, Group Captain Edye Manning (AOC 221 Group) that the RAF had also transferred 221 Group to AHQ India’s command. Air Marshall Playfair (AOC-in-C) had been busy trying to organise some aid for Manning’s Group, but the Indian cupboard was bare.

    Once more it was Wavell’s Middle East Command that were trying to put together reinforcements for Malaya and Burma. AM Arthur Tedder had been Far East AOC for two years between 1936-38, knowing something of the situation, he was sending a group of officers who had brought about the transformation of the Middle East RAF. There was a need to get more mobile Radar sets and some way of integrating early warning systems with the fighters to be able to meet air raids in a timely fashion. Tedder knew that reading the reports and having actually done it was different. So, the men who would come into Manning’s team would be able to bring that experience to bear. Tedder was also trying to persuade the Air Ministry to get a Wing of Spitfires to Malta to even up the odds against the latest German and Italian fighters. If this happened, then this would free up Hurricanes that could be sent to India and then to Burma and Malaya.

    The need for more pilots and aircraft was a matter of priority. Having 221 Group in India Command meant that planes could be flown to the well-established care and maintenance facilities in India, to be overhauled before passing onto the forward bases. It was AM Playfair’s hope that 221 Group could be expanded to have it entirely as a Fighter Group and create another Group which would be a bomber group. India Command had also just taken over 222 Group (General Reconnaissance) from Far East Command, this took in all RAF units in Ceylon and flying boat bases in the Indian Ocean and its islands.

    Some of the Indian Air Force squadrons were currently transitioning onto Lysanders, but what Manning needed now was fighter aircraft. Currently all he had for the defence of Burma were sixteen Buffalos of No 67 (Fighter) Squadron and twenty-one P.40s of the American Volunteer Group. These had been based at Kunming for the defence of the Burma Road but had been specially detached by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek for the defence of Rangoon. There was no point in having the Burma Road if ships bringing supplies for China couldn’t dock at Rangoon and the supplies carried by train to Lashio. Pre-war estimates were that 280 aircraft was the minimum necessary to meet an invading enemy. Manning was pleading for at least another squadron of Hurricanes and one of Blenheim bombers to carry the fight to the enemy, even if it was only a raid on Victoria Point to let the Japanese know Burma wouldn't be a complete walk-over.

    General Auchinleck was about to fly to Singapore to meet with ACM Brooke-Popham and General Percival’s command. He wanted some of McLeod’s Staff to join him. The reports of how the Japanese were fighting, in the air and on the ground, would be worth studying in more detail before the troops in Burma actually had to face them.
     
    16 December 1941. Kota Bharu, Malaya.
  • 16 December 1941. Kota Bharu, Malaya.

    For a week now the men of 9th Indian Division had been fighting the Japanese. The first battles on the beaches had ultimately been successful, but a few Indian Battalions had taken casualties, especially 3rd Bn, 17th Dogra Regiment who had been defending the invasion beaches. Once the fighting had finished on 9 December, Major-General Arthur Barstow had redeployed 8th and 9th Infantry Brigades to defend the south bank of the River Kelantan. As the first elements of 22nd Indian Brigade had arrived at the railhead at Kuala Krai the 5th Battalion, 11th Sikh Regiment took up positions to defend the local area, along with “A” Company Malaya Regiment. The men of the 8th Brigade held the river from the sea to the road bridge at Pasir Mas. 9th Brigade then took over following the river past Guillemard Bridge, where the railway crossed the river. 22nd Brigade’s two Battalions would link with 9th Brigade from Kuala Krai.

    1st Battalion, 13th Frontier Force Rifles had crossed the river towards the Thai border on 10 December, with elements of 42nd Field Park Company (Royal Bombay Sappers and Miners) to delay the Japanese by destroying a railway bridge and as many ferries over the River Golok and other boats as possible. This had been done successfully. The Sappers had brought with them some land mines which they sowed in various spots where crossing the river was most likely.

    It was a sixty mile trip from the main landing beaches at Patani, and since some of Japanese 5th Division had been up to the Ledge above Yala, the Japanese came in two columns. One column followed the coast road and the other the railway line. The work of 13th Frontier Force Rifles and the Sappers did delay both columns by about a day. On the coast, 21 Mountain Battery and 73 Field Battery, Royal Artillery, (eight 4.5-inch howitzers) provided the artillery support for 8th Brigade. They had time before the invasion to organise pre-determined coordinates with the infantry for immediate barrage support. There had been four reconditioned 18-pdrs brought into service by 3rd Bn, 17th Dogra Regiment to give direct fire support on the beach. Two of these had been destroyed, but Havildar Dille Ram, the Battalion Gunnery Instructor, who had made effective use of them on the night of 8 December, had the surviving two positioned to fire across the river.

    Brigadier ‘Billy’ Keys had kept 1st Bn 13th Frontier Force Rifles in reserve and had two Matilda II tanks with them. The problem Keys faced was the possibility of another attempt to land troops from the sea. Even if it wasn’t another fully fledged invasion force, just a large force carried on a variety of boats taken from the Thai population would put 8th Brigade’s position in jeopardy.

    Major-General Barstow’s main reserve consisted primarily of 1st Hyderabad Infantry and 1st Battalion of Mysore Infantry, both Indian State Forces. With all three airfields completed destroyed, there was no longer any need to defend them. Neither of these two Battalions had been involved in the fighting so far, and Barstow was worried about whether they would be likely to distinguish themselves in battle. He had reinforced both Battalions each with a Squadron of 1st Duke of York’s Own Skinners Horse, 5th Division’s Reconnaissance Regiment. Equipped with Indian Pattern Carriers, some light tanks and universal carriers would have to respond to any beach landing, though the heavy rain had caused their mobility to be severely limited. The reality was that Barstow’s orders were to hold the Japanese as far north as possible, but to be prepared to withdraw by rail to join 11th Indian Division if the situation deteriorated too much.

    The first few attempts by the Japanese to cross the river had been repulsed quite easily. Between the artillery and pre-positioned machine gunners covering the probable assembly areas, the early Japanese units weren’t able to get properly set. The arrival of the Japanese III Bn of 5th Field Artillery began to have an effect, as did a couple of bombing and strafing attacks by Japanese aircraft.

    Under the cover of a torrential downpour III Bn 42nd Infantry Regiment managed to make a crossing on the shoulder of the river’s curve between Kota Bharu and Pasir Mas. 2nd Battalion, 10th Baluch Regiment were responsible for this section, and C Company was all but wiped out by the Japanese, though at considerable cost to themselves. 1st Bn 13th Frontier Force Rifles, with the two Matilda II tanks began the counter-attack and were lucky enough to arrive on the Japanese flank, rolling them up as they sealed the breach in the line. Sergeant Tommy Docherty and his crew had managed to get his Matilda II repaired and his tank along with Sergeant Bill Morris had played an essential part in rolling up the Japanese troops, who once again found they had nothing to stop the Matilda II tanks.

    Much to the surprise of the Indian troops none of the Japanese surrendered, even when they would otherwise have no option but to do so. It made the last few hours a very bloody affair. Some Japanese troops attempted to swim back over the river, it wasn’t clear how many made it back.

    Once the riverbank was back in Indian hands the butchers bill was 160 killed and about double that wounded. The Japanese loss was probably the entirety of the III Battalion. The Indian troops had been advised to do their best to destroy as many boats used by the Japanese as possible, to prevent them being used again. 15th Indian Field Ambulance were busy bringing the wounded back to the Division's Field Hospital, while the Brigade’s Transport Company (Royal Indian Army Service Corps) brought forward ammunition, water and rations for the men and guns.
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    17 December 1941. Miri, British Borneo.
  • 17 December 1941. Miri, British Borneo.

    The arrival of the Japanese had been expected. When they arrived, the destruction of the oil fields at Miri and Seria and the refinery at Lutong had been completed. The arrival of 3rd Bn 16th Punjab Regiment and 2nd Bn 14th Punjab Regiment the previous week had allowed Acting Brigadier C.M. Lane, [CO SARFOR (Sarawak Force)] to go back to plan A. The 2nd Battalion 15th Punjab Regiment had been preparing for the invasion for most of 1941. As their CO, Lane had recognised the impossibility of holding fixed positions in the terrain he was supposed to protect. Lieutenant-General Percival had countermanded this plan, instructing Lane to hold the Bukit Stabar Airfield seven miles south of Kuching, which became known as Plan B. Handing over responsibility for the defence of the airfield to Lt Col Henry Moorehead (CO 3rd Bn 16th Punjab Regiment, plus 5th Bn 14th Punjab Regiment), Lane had split the 2/15th Punjab into its four companies which would operate independently at various points.

    The destruction of the oil facilities and landing strip had begun as soon as war had been declared on 8 December. Most of the demolition party and vital pieces of equipment had been shipped out on 13 December, but Major Slatter’s B Company had withdrawn from the oil field and had taken up ambush positions around likely landing sites and obvious targets. He had a platoon at Seria, along with an armed police detachment, but his main force near Miri. The plan was to give the Japanese a bloody nose, then withdraw to a rendezvous point on the River Baram. Slatter had a detachment of Dyak tribesmen from the Sarawak Rangers who would help the Punjabis deal with travel through the jungle.

    In Brunei and Labuan the decision had been made not to resist a Japanese invasion, with the police to remain only on internal security duties. Anything of use to the enemy with regards oil had to be destroyed, and this order was carried out.

    The Japanese lost about forty men due to high seas as they were transferring from their troop ship to the landing barges. Before coming ashore at both Miri and Seria, Major Slatters men managed to hit another barge with 3-inch mortar rounds and the fire from two VB light machine guns, causing another forty deaths and more wounded. As the two parts of his Company melted back into the jungle, they had delayed but not stopped the invasion. Six sappers from 34th Fortress Company, Royal Engineers, under Lieutenant ‘Tubby’ Hancock had stayed with Slatters’ Company and had left behind a number of booby traps which caused the Japanese more casualties and more delays.

    Elements of the story in italics differ from OTL.
     
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