Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.

9 January 1942. Sydney, Australia.
  • 9 January 1942. Sydney, Australia.

    The convoy MS 2 was preparing to sail for Singapore the next day. There was only one ship in the convoy, MS Aquitania, which was well used to taking Australian troops to their destinations. Aquitania, escorted by HMAS Canberra, would be carrying 3456 men to Ratai Bay in the Sunda Straight, where the men would be transhipped onto smaller Dutch vessels to carry on to Singapore.

    Most of the men were sent to build up the reinforcement pool for 8 and 9 Divisions. The arrival of 6 and 9 Divisions from the Middle East had included a good number of men who were waiting to be needed to replace losses. Since a great many of the veterans had been switched to training roles, or used to leaven less experienced units, building up the reserves was an important part of overall readiness. Along with these replacements, the ship also carried a contingent of RAAF pilots and ground crew, who likewise were needed to replace the losses suffered in the first month of operations.

    The only complete unit on board Aquitania was Australian 2/3 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment. As Gunner Robert Bryant of 8th Battery looked out over Sydney Harbour, he couldn’t really believe that it was just over a year ago he’d sailed away to the Middle East from Melbourne on the Mauretania. He wasn’t keen on the idea of transferring onto smaller boats, the memories of the voyage into Egypt on the Devonshire still haunted him.

    Having handed over their Italian AA guns to the Greek Army, they’d sailed back to Australia and retrained on Bofors 40mm guns. These were far more effective than the lighter 20mm guns, but much heavier work. The transition hadn’t been too difficult, and the men’s combat experience made much of the changes relatively easy on them.

    Bryant had had a few weeks’ leave and his time with his family and with Marjory was something he knew he could cherish. She had joked after love making that she wouldn’t be surprised if there was a baby in the house when he got his next leave. That was something that made getting home all the more crucial. His mates had been telling each other all about their adventures on leave, and Bryant had been a bit coy about his. To his mates it was a sure sign that he’d spent most of his leave in the marital bed, and they weren’t wrong.

    The news that the Japanese were making slow progress against the Indian troops in Malaya and Borneo was worrying, but Bryant and his mates had taken on the Italian air force and the German Luftwaffe. There was a confidence born of experience that the Japanese aircraft would go down just as surely as the others had done.
     
    10 January 1942. Grand Blanc, Michigan. USA.
  • 10 January 1942. Grand Blanc, Michigan. USA.

    Fisher Body, a subsidiary of General Motors, was one of the many firms that were responding to the President’s order to double the tank production schedule from 1000 to 2000 per month. The new plant was going to be 452000 square feet, some eight American football fields. Modelled on the Detroit Arsenal, Fisher’s plant would begin producing M4 medium tanks in July. The Pacific Car & Foundry, Ford and Federal Machine & Welder were the other companies added to the already impressive list. By the time the M3 production switched to the M4 at some convenient time in early 1942, and full production of the M4 begun, eleven plants would be building the new tanks.

    The Medium tank T6 wooden mock-up had been approved by the Armored Force Board in May 1941, the pilot model had been completed at the Aberdeen Proving Ground in September 1941. The T6 was standardised as the Medium Tank M4 in October. The pilot model was being built by Lima Locomotive works, and would be ready for full testing in February. Pressed Steel and Pacific Car & Foundry, along with Lima would begin full production in March. These three companies would be using cast hulls, and the engines would be the Continental R-975 engine and the same bogies as the M3 Medium tank. The gun was to be the M2 75mm, with counterweights, until enough M3 75mm guns were available.

    Once Fisher Body’s new factory was up and running, they would be making the M4A2 model of the tank. The main difference was having twin General Motors 6-71 diesel engines, Continental couldn’t provide enough of the radial engines for all the M4s planned. Other engine types would also have to sourced to meet the production numbers. Some tanks would have welded rather than cast armour, which would create yet another subtype.

    Despite advice from the British, the first models (known as M4A1) would also have two fixed machine guns in the front hull. These would be of limited use and compromised the armour protection of the hull. The British had also asked for thicker armour, the 50mm in the hull was considered too vulnerable, some of the turret protection of 75mm was much better, but there was always going to be the problem of increasing armour would increase weight, making the engine struggle to keep up the desired speed on roads of around 25mph, about 15mph off road. The British also had requested that the Lend Lease models destined for the UK would have protected ammunition stowage. This was standard on the Valiant tank that the Americans had studied to help with the turret mechanism.

    The first M4A1 built at the Lima plant would be handed over to the US Army, the second would be shipped to Britain for thorough testing. Members of the British Tank Mission, led by Major-General Douglas Pratt (Armoured Fighting Vehicles British Army Staff Washington) had attended the ground-breaking and was amused by the American alliteration of the Grand Blanc Tank Plant. In terms of size, efficiency and the speed of building a factory and starting production within such a short period of time, Fisher’s was a marvel. Pratt was better used to the smaller tank shops in Britain where sixty tanks per month was considered ‘big’. Here, once production was in full swing 180 tanks were expected to roll off the production line per month, that was enough tanks for a new British Armoured Brigade every month! It was no surprise to Pratt and his colleagues that the Americans weren't really prepared to listen to what the British had to say. The sheer muscle of American industry producing thousands of tanks per month was a confirmation to Pratt that Hitler and Tojo didn’t have a clue what was about to be unleashed upon them.
     
    11 January 1942. Tavoy, Burma.
  • 11 January 1942. Tavoy, Burma.

    Victoria Point aerodrome, an important stop in the air bridge between India and Malaya, had fallen to a battalion of the Japanese 143 Infantry Regiment in December. The small garrison of Burma Rifles had been withdrawn as resistance would have been futile against such an overwhelming force. Although an alternative route for bombers was possible over Sumatra, the loss of Victoria Point, made shifting fighters much more difficult.

    When the men of the Burma Rifles had pulled out of Victoria Point, there were still people able to keep an eye open about Japanese coming and going. The departure of much of the Battalion of Japanese troops that had taken the airfield was noted, and the information eventually reached Tavoy and Rangoon. Brigadier Arthur Bourke, (CO 2nd Burma Brigade) at Tavoy had been visited by Major Michael Calvert with one of his Special Service Detachments.

    These ‘Commandoes’ were making their way down the Tenasserim region, Tavoy being the end of the metalled road from Rangoon. Moving south Calvert had orders to gain as much intelligence about the Japanese over the border in Thailand and particularly to find out the situation at Victoria Point. If it was true that the airfield was now thinly guarded, then the possibility of regaining it would be considered.

    Bourke’s own intelligence was that they were seeing more of the Thai army on the border than the Japanese army. This confirmed what Calvert had been told by RAF photoreconnaissance. The arrival of 113 Squadron (Blenheims) from the Middle East had given the RAF the ability to reach out to the Japanese airfields that had been used to bomb Rangoon. The surprising thing was that instead of seeing a build up before an invasion of Burma, it seemed that the Japanese were being drawn south into Malaya.

    The Indian troops in Malaya had been able to find intelligence that their attackers over the last month had been elements of a number of different Divisions. The Japanese 5th, 18th Infantry Divisions and the Imperial Guards Divisions seemed to have been the first wave of attackers. These all came from the Japanese 25th Army. More recently, elements of 33rd and 55th Infantry Divisions had been identified. The limited British intelligence assets in Thailand had identified these last two Divisions as being likely to be part of an invasion of Burma, as they seemed to belong to a different (15th) Army from the first wave. The fact that they seemed to have gone south to Malaya was of great interest to the British commanders in Burma, General Harold Alexander and Lt-General Bill Slim.

    Slim’s fear was that some of the reinforcements he was expecting might be redirected to Malaya if that was where the main battle was taking place. General Auchinleck however, had tried to reassure him that once his forces had been built up, Slim would be leading them, not just in defence of Burma, but taking the war to the Japanese.

    Calvert and his commandoes, acting in a similar fashion to the Long Range Desert Group in North Africa, would be doing the reconnaissance on the ground, preparing the way for Slim’s Corps to secure India, the Burma Road, and, hopefully, Malaya.
     
    12 January 1942. Borneo
  • 12 January 1942. Borneo

    Singkawang II airfield now hosted not only the 750 strong Dutch garrison but had been more than doubled with the arrival of the best part of the two Indian Battalions (3/16th and 5/14th Punjab Regiments) that had been defending Kuching. Word had reached the Dutch commander that the island of Tarakan had fallen to the Japanese, but that the oil wells had been destroyed beforehand.

    Direct contact with the other Indian Battalion (2/15th Punjab Regiment) had been lost. The latest message from Singapore was that Colonel Lane’s force was still resisting but running short of rations and ammunition. Since they were under General Percival’s command, his orders had been to withdraw towards Jesseltown. After that it wasn’t clear what would happen to them.

    The fact that the Japanese had invaded the Dutch East Indies, once again aiming for an oil producing area, had given the senior commanders in the area a clue as to Japanese intentions. There were obvious objectives, not just the oil. Their attacks tended to be looking for airfields, and so far, in Malaya and Borneo, these airfields provided air support for the next phase, taking another resource rich area, with air-power giving their fleet and transport the cover needed to leapfrog from one objective to the next. The Japanese obviously had enough strength to capture Menado on Celebes the same day as on Tarakan. The use of paratroopers came as a surprise that brought back memories of the fall of the Netherlands in 1940.

    From his Headquarters in Java, Hein Ter Poortan, Commander-in-Chief of Netherlands East Indies forces looked at the map of Borneo and recognised that Balikpapan was likely to be the next objective. While Menado didn’t have oil, the airfields there was obviously the main target. That being the case, then Kendari would have to be considered as the next Japanese objective on Celebes. Ter Poortan wasn’t entirely when these movements would happen, but he thought it likely to be around two weeks, probably a bit less. Consulting with Vice-Admiral Conrad Helfrich (CO Zeemacht Nederlands-Indië (Royal Dutch Navy)) and the American Admiral Thomas Hart, Ter Poortan wanted a plan to intercept the Japanese fleets and sink them. It didn’t take long to identify the problems. The Makassar Strait (Tarakan, Balikpapan) and the Molucca Passage (Celebes) would need two separate naval forces, unless a combined fleet could act effectively in one, then the other.

    The Dutch and American naval staffs, along with their British and Australian allies attempted to put together a strong enough force, with submarines and aircraft for reconnaissance, and air cover for the ships.

    Ter Poortan focussed next on the defences of Balikpapan and Kendari. Major-General Ludolph Oyen, (CO Militaire Luchtvaart, KNIL (Air Force)) was requested to do what he could to hamper the Japanese use of Tarakan’s airfield. Oyen knew that it wasn’t a very well developed facility, and that making it difficult to be used was something that his limited forces might be able to achieve. Oyen began plans to organise as many bombers as he could to concentrate, using some of the airbases on Borneo that had been built for that very purpose. Hitting the airfields at Menado would be problematic, but he knew defending Kendari would be crucial. Oyen would have his work cut out to do so. He asked if he could strip some of his units from Java and Sumatra to defend Borneo and Celebes. Ter Poorten and the Civilian Governor, Van Starkenborgh disagreed over this, but as head of the armed forces, Ter Poorten gave Oyen permission to concentrate his force to fulfil the mission required.

    On Borneo, now that Tarakan had fallen, the Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger (KNIL Army) only had two Battalions available. One was based at Pontianak, the other, over a thousand strong, defended Balikpapan. Getting reinforcements to Balikpapan in time would be a problem, and the only large enough professional force on Borneo were the Indian Battalions at Singkawang II. From there, they would need to move to the coast at Pontianak, then be shipped to Balikpapan, a dangerous venture at this time. Ter Poorten had consulted Lt General Percival who agreed that if the Dutch could do it, then acting Brigadier Henry Moorehead would come under Ter Poorten’s direct command.

    Another alternative was to do the same with the KNIL Army as with the KNIL Air Force. So far, the local defensive units at Tarakan and Menado had proven too small and isolated to fulfil their task. By putting a larger force together that could go toe to toe with the Japanese risked them being by-passed, but seeing something of the Japanese methodology, it was possibly a risk worth taking. Running down the list of assets Ter Poorten identified at Surabaya a Marine Battalion and 6th Regiment KNIL in addition to the Surabaya Garrison Regiment. If these could be moved to Kendari, it would give the Battalion there a real chance to resist.

    Looking at the notes, Ter Poorten saw an addendum. Calling one of the staff to ask about it, he was informed that some Americans had arrived at Surabaya the day before. Originally bound for the Philippines, the 2nd Artillery Battalion of 131st American Field Artillery Regiment of the Texas National Guard was currently unattached. The fact that the Americans had their artillery and ammunition with them was a bonus. Whether Ter Poorten could get them under his command and sent to Kendari was something he’d need the Americans to agree to and he immediately got in contact with Admiral Hart, the senior American officer in the Dutch East Indies, who told him he’d find out and get back to him.

    Ter Poorten realised he was in a race against time. To increase his forces at Balikpapan and Kendari before the Japanese got there would hopefully slow the Japanese. If the allied navies could knock out one of the Japanese invasion fleets, that would hamper the enemy further. If the air force could make it more difficult for the Japanese to have control of the air, that would be even better. There were a lot of ‘ifs’ in that thought. Ter Poorten had to do something to regain some initiative, otherwise the Japanese would just overrun his home one airfield at a time.
     
    13 January 1942. Kuala Krai, Malaya.
  • 13 January 1942. Kuala Krai, Malaya.

    2nd Malaya Brigade (2nd Bn Loyal Regiment, 2nd Bn Gordon Highlanders, and 2nd Bn 17 Dogra Regiment) had been assigned to 9th Indian Division, allowing 8th Indian Brigade to be withdrawn to Kuantan to rest and refit.

    All three battalions, regular troops, had been in Malaya since before the war had started in September 1939, mostly used as garrison troops on Singapore Island. Now they stood alongside the men of 9th Indian Brigade and 22nd Indian Brigade, both of which had been involved in the fighting almost continually since 8 December.

    Major-General Arthur Barstow and Lt General Lewis Heath (GOC III Indian Corps) had thought long and hard about what to do on the east coast. Currently their position was solid, and the initial Japanese advances had been blunted. The Japanese had obviously wanted to airfields around Kota Bahru, but these had been destroyed before being abandoned. The Japanese had based their aircraft instead at airfields in Thailand. The main thrust of the Japanese attack was on the west coast, where 11th Indian Division was slowly falling back.

    Therein lay the problem. As the Japanese progressed south on the west coast, Barstow’s force was being isolated on the east coast. The main route of supply, and retreat, was the railway that ran from Kuala Krai south through the middle of the country to Gemas. Here the railway connected with the line that ran east to west, ultimately connecting Kuala Lumpur and Singapore. The other problem was the fear of another Japanese landing on the east coast. Part of the reason 8th Indian Brigade had been sent to Kuantan for R&R was to make sure the airfield there was completely protected.

    There was evidence that a Japanese column was making its way down the east coast, though the nature of the terrain and lack of roads should slow it down. Lt.Col. James Mackellar (CO 4th Battalion, Federated Malay States Volunteer Forces) reported that he had made contact with B Company of 1st Battalion Mysore Infantry which had retreated first to Kuala Terengganu then to Kuala Dungan. It was here that one of 4th Battalion patrols had discovered them. The Indian State troops were in poor condition, and reported that they had been chased much of the way by Japanese troops. When they had made contact, Mackellar had moved two of his Companies to Kuala Dungan to make sure all crossings of the Dungun River had been destroyed and to try to prevent any crossings.

    Brigadier Francis Fraser (CO 2nd Malaya Brigade) had proposed to Barstow that his men were fresh enough to mount a limited counterattack to push the Japanese back across the River Kelantan. The previous attempt to do so in December had failed, even with tank support. Barstow wanted to keep his freshest troops in readiness for the whatever happened next. His fear was that Fraser’s units would be gutted in a counterattack for no great progress. The limited counterattacks there had been consistently found the Japanese loath to surrender, they literally fought to the death, often taking as many Indian troops with them as possible.

    From Barstow’s point of view, one which he found support from Heath, was that the situation was currently stable. Three fresh battalions had allowed tired troops time to rest. The Japanese still seemed to be putting their greatest effort into the attacks on the west coast. As long as 11th Indian Division didn’t completely collapse, 9th Indian Division could hold in place for at least another week, all being well.

    The tanks that had been withdrawn to Gemas for repair and to rest the crews had returned along with the 2nd Malaya Brigade. What had begun as a Squadron of eighteen tanks had been reduced to two troops of three, meaning that Barstow had a total of six Matilda II infantry tanks at his disposal. These precious vehicles were being kept alongside his reserves. When the time came, those six tanks could make all the difference.
     
    14 January 1942. Penang, Malaya.
  • 14 January 1942. Penang, Malaya.

    The security of the island of Penang, with its port facilities, fixed defences and stocks of ammunition and stores had long been a concern. The two Battalions which had been allocated to its defence had been sent to North Borneo, and it had quickly become clear that if 11th Indian Division was pushed south of the island, that it would be mostly indefensible. The Cornwallis and Batu Muang forts had been built to protect the sea approaches to Penang, and the 6-inch guns of 8th Heavy Battery RA and 20th Battery Hong Kong and Singapore Royal Artillery, along 2nd Anti-Aircraft Regiment, Indian Artillery and the searchlight detachment had been ordered to move to Singapore when the Indian Battalions had been withdrawn.

    Intermittent air raids on Penang had caused extensive damage to buildings and dock installations. Half the town was set on fire and a break- down in the municipal services resulted. The only troops on the island were 3rd Battalion, Straits Settlements Volunteer Force (Penang and Province Wellesley Volunteer Corps) [SSVF]. Made up of mostly men of Asian origin, these had taken over most of the policing of the island when most of the police deserted after the first couple of Japanese air raids. Brigadier Cyril Lyon (Resident Counsellor and the Fortress Commander) had decided in December to evacuate all European women and children, together with the sick and wounded from the Military Hospital. These had been transferred to the mainland by the night of 13 December.

    Subsequently, all military and food stores, and as many of the population who wished to, had been shipped south on the many boats and junks that were in the harbour. The gunboats HMS Dragonfly and Scorpion had been involved, with other small craft to offer some protection to the boats as they hugged the coast.

    As the terminus of ocean cables connecting Malaya with India and Ceylon, it had an important strategic role in addition to its other facilities. The Royal Engineers had been asked to send a detachment onto the island to make sure that anything that may have been of use to the enemy would be completely destroyed, and unfortunately that included the cable office and infrastructure. This had been delayed as long as possible, but once 11th Division’s position on the River Muda had been lost, the explosives were detonated and the engineers were taken off in RN boats.

    The men of 3rd Battalion SSVF had been given a choice whether to stay on the island if that was where their family was, or keep fighting by joining the other battalions on Singapore Island. The fact that their families had mostly chosen to flee the island for Singapore meant that when the Royal Engineers withdrew, so did the 3rd Battalion SSVF. That meant that when the Japanese troops arrived on the island, they found it mostly deserted and destroyed.

    The arrival in Singapore of many more refugees from places like Penang had caused something of a ruckus among the Civilian Administration. Not only did they constitute ‘more mouths to feed’, they were also predominately of Chinese and Indian origin. While the Europeans were welcomed and made comfortable, there were complaints, especially among the soldiers of the SSVF of the way their families were being treated. It wasn’t clear yet to the civilian administration whether they had to prepare for a Malta type experience of being besieged, or if the refugees would be able to go home once the Japanese had been thrown back.

    For General Auchinleck, when he was eventually informed of this, had a brief call with Sir Shenton Thomas, the Governor, encouraging him to not undermine the fighting spirit of the Volunteer Forces. There were two Battalions of the Malay Regiment and four each of the SSVF and Federated Malay States Volunteer Forces. Those ten Battalions were playing an important part in the overall defence of Malaya and Singapore. Many in the Chinese community still had strong ties to families who had been fighting the Japanese in China since 1936. To alienate them, and all the other natives, was unhelpful at best and dangerous at worst.
     
    15 January 1942. Singapore.
  • 15 January 1942. Singapore.

    RAF Seletar had been on high alert since the early hours of the morning. The arrival of Hurricanes flown off HMS Ark Royal and Formidable meant that just about every RAF fighter on Singapore Island were involved in Combat Air Patrols to make sure the new arrivals could set down and be dispersed without enemy interference. These CAPS including the first operational Tomahawk squadron (No 3 Squadron RAAF). The exception was the six surviving Sea Hurricanes of HMS Ark Royal which flew back to their ship. Landing shortly after the other aircraft were launched, they were quickly turned around so that there was some extra fighter protection for the aircraft carrier. The surviving Swordfish from HMS Ark Royal, along with four RAAF Hudsons, had flown out, the Hudsons to guide the Hurricanes from their launch points to the airfields and the Swordfish to re-join the carrier. HMS Ark Royal (with 24 Hurricanes) and Formidable (with 48 Hurricanes) had approached to within the range of the Hurricanes which were flown off, meeting up with the Hudsons who guided them to the three airbases that were waiting for them. No 30 Squadron landed at Seletar, 135 and 136 Squadrons landed at RAF Sembawang and No 258 Squadron landed at RAF Tengah.

    The lessons of the ‘Club Runs’ to Malta had been implemented on Singapore, so that although the Hurricanes were configured for ferrying, they retained their guns and some limited ammunition just in case. Of the seventy-two aircraft that were due to launch, four failed to take off for various mechanical reasons, another two were forced to ditch and were lost with their pilots, five had problems with their landings, though only one of these was written off. The Japanese had taken the bait of some cruisers and destroyers which had made a show off the coast north of Penang bombarding the area around Alor Star. The ships had arrived during the night, fired off their main guns for a few minutes and then dashed back out to sea. A squadron of Dutch Buffaloes operating out of Medan on Sumatra were on hand to protect the ships as they withdrew at high speed.

    It took most of the morning for the Japanese bombers to react to the bombardment and send off reconnaissance aircraft. The ships were well out of range by the time a strike could be launched. It was later in the afternoon that Japanese aircraft appeared heading towards Singapore, but no air raid occurred, they attacked the rail line around Kuala Lumpur instead.

    The sixty Hurricanes that arrived safely were somewhat less that Air Vice Marshall Pulford had expected. There had been two issues. Although HMS Ark Royal and Formidable had plenty of experience of flying off Hurricanes to Malta, the restrictions of how many aircraft they could carry meant that HMS Formidable carried the great number of Hurricanes, while HMS Ark Royal retained enough Swordfish, SeaHurricanes and Fulmars for protection and limited strike potential. The other two squadrons expected to be sent to Singapore (No 17 and 232) had been unloaded at Ceylon and were moving by stages to Rangoon to reinforce the defenders of Burma.

    Under the cover of the air umbrella Admiral Phillips wanted to bring part of his force into Singapore, rather than going all the way back to Ceylon for refuelling. The arrival of HMS Nelson and Warspite, with HMS Ark Royal, the cruisers Exeter and Gloucester, the destroyers HMS Electra, Express, Encounter, Greyhound, Jupiter, Juno, Kashmir and Kelly was a sight to behold. The ships would be refuelled and sail to Pontianak to pick up the two Indian Battalions, then rendezvousing with elements of the Dutch fleet, they would sail to Balikpapan. Once the troops were off-loaded the fleet would attempt to confront any Japanese force in the Makassar Straight.

    The rest of Phillips’ fleet, led by HMS Prince of Wales, would sail back to Ceylon with the aircraft carrier HMS Formidable, which would then carry on, returning to the Mediterranean. HMS Indomitable was expected to arrive at Ceylon around the end of March, followed by HMS Illustrious in April or May. HMS Hermes was still under refit at Durban and would be available around the same time as HMS Indomitable. By that time all the carriers would be carrying Martlet fighters for protection. The arrival of the four old R Class battleships at Ceylon would be complete around the same time as the two aircraft carriers.
     
    16 January 1942. London, England.
  • 16 January 1942. London, England.

    On a visit to London, Carden had lunch with the American Colonel George Green. Green was one of the Americans in the Harriman Mission sent by the President to coordinate with the British regarding Lend-Lease and other matters. Green had been invited to sit on the Tank Board and act as Liaison Officer regarding design and production issues on Armoured Fighting Vehicles.

    Carden had been told that the American was an Army Reserve Officer, but had been Vice-President in one of General Motors subsidiaries (Yellow Truck and Coach Manufacturing). Green had also been vice-chairman of the Advisory Committee of the Ordnance Department, and Carden had been impressed by him. Green wanted to know more about Carden’s work and was particularly interested in the Birch Gun. Green had been spending some time with 6th Armoured Division, who were the first to be equipped with both the Birch Self-Propelled Gun and also the Vanguard SPAAG.

    The American army were experimenting with a ‘Howitzer Motor Carriage’ based on the hull of an M3 Medium tank carrying the standard M1A2 105mm howitzer. Green had thanked Carden as a Birch SPG had been sent over to America for evaluation and had helped those working on the T32 project a great deal. The Vanguard SPAAG had also been evaluated by the Americans and was provoking a lot of interest.

    The fact of the matter was that, with the run down of Valiant II production about to begin, moving over to Victor tanks, the Birch and Vanguard SPGs were being redesigned using the Crusader hull built by the Nuffield Group of companies. It was possible that some of the Valiant I hulls might be used for the Birch and Vanguard once their use as tanks was no longer needed. In Carden’s opinion the Nuffield designs for a SPG and SPAAG weren’t quite as good as his own, but the War Office had to have its way.

    Colonel Green had seen some of the design work and thought that the American M7 was probably the better choice than Nuffield’s. He had to admit that as the M7 was using the American 105mm gun, rather than the British 25-pdr, he didn’t believe that the War Office would want it. Carden accepted that that was the probability, with things going the way they were in North Africa, production of British built AFVs was just about meeting War Office needs.

    The Canadians were making progress with their Ram tank, and since it would likely be armed with the 25-pdr as standard, there was the possibility that some of their Valiant I production would be turned over onto Birch and Vanguard SPGs. Carden also knew that the Canadian production of the Valiant II was likely to be allocated to Russia on completion of their own army’s needs. It certainly made some kind of sense to load up a ship in Halifax, then sail it via two convoys to Murmansk, rather than unload it in Liverpool, then load another ship in Liverpool with British made Valiant IIs and then sail to Murmansk.

    Colonel Green asked Carden what he thought about the Tank Destroyer idea that the T12 had developed into the M3 Gun Motor Carriage. Carden smiled as he realised the M3 Gun Motor Carriage had nothing to do with the M3 Light or Medium tanks, but was a half-track with a 75mm gun on it. The old British system of tanks with names like A10, A11, A12 etc seemed child’s play compared to the American desire to call all sorts of things the same M-something. As to the concept of the tank destroyer he noted Leslie Little’s idea to mount a 6-pdr gun in a low profile hull based on the Tetrarch. So far, as far as Carden could see from German developments, they were using armoured hulls to carry infantry support weapons, though there had been a couple of panzerjägers captured which had some merit for anti-tank regiments being mobile enough to keep up with an armoured division.

    The idea of a dedicated ‘tank destroyer’ was, as far as Carden was concerned, unnecessary because the best destroyer of other tanks was a tank. Having a good tank with a good gun that could take on enemy tanks, and support the infantry with HE shells, was all that was necessary. He called it the ‘universal tank’. One tank with good speed, armour and gun would be enough to win the war. By all means, have a family of Armoured Fighting Vehicles based on the same hull/engine for the various SPGs, Engineering tasks, the kind of things Percy Hobart was working on, but one kind of tank would do. The Infantry vs Cruiser idea would be obsolete with a universal tank.

    Carden told Green that that was why he liked what he’d seen of the new M4 Medium tank. It wasn’t perfect, but its speed and gun were fine, he did think it could do with a bit more armour. He could also see that it had room for development, the turret ring size meant that it could take a bigger gun if that became necessary. He could see it taking its place in both Armoured Divisions and Tank Brigades (to use the British distinction). Carden was surprised that its designers had organised the engine driving the forward sprocket which made the hull much taller than it had to be. The British tended to like a lower profile, the Victor would be about a foot lower than the M4. Carden suggested that was why the M3 Grants were going to the Australians and Indians who’d probably be up against the Japanese whose tanks weren’t up to much.
     
    17 January 1942. River Kerian, Malaya.
  • 17 January 1942. River Kerian, Malaya.

    The British Empire forces holding positions on the south of the river was made up of elements of 10th/28th Brigade. After their efforts at Gurun, the two Brigades had been withdrawn to Ipoh for a rest. Casualties had been heavy, it had been necessary to amalgamate the two Brigades as 6th/15th Brigade had been previously. 10th/28th Brigade’s main force was alongside 12th Indian Brigade in the area around Kuala Kangsar, which was much more suitable for creating a sustainable defensive position.

    The Battalions had detached Companies (B & C) of 1st/2nd Gurkha Rifles at the road and railway bridges nearer the coast, and B Company 2nd Bn HLI at Selama. Their roles were simply to blow the bridges in the face of the enemy and then withdraw at their best possible speed to their fall-back positions. After destroying the river bridges, it had been arranged for the Perak Public Works Department to flood the trunk road between Nibong Tebal and Bagan Serai. Two Companies of the Baluch/Garhwal Regiment had been working with Royal Engineers and Bombay Sappers and Miners to destroy as much of the infrastructure that may have been useful to the enemy between the river Kerian and Taiping.

    It wasn’t entirely clear to the British commanders just why exactly there had been a hiatus in the Japanese offensive. Reports from the 1st Independent Company working behind enemy lines had noted that more men and supplies were being moved forward. This tallied with the arrival of more ships into Bangkok, probably with new drafts of troops to replace losses or even new formations. The likelihood was that the Japanese would have needed to resupply their artillery, and there had been some evidence of less intensive air movements, which perhaps was due to the need for more aviation fuel and bombs.

    The reality for the men on the river Kerian was that whatever had been slowing the Japanese advance was now resolved. Reports of Japanese movement, especially of tanks, were increasing. A last wave of refugees had been allowed to cross the bridges, but B Company of 1st/2nd Gurkha Rifles were horrified to find that a group of what they believed to be Chinese in fact were an advance party of Japanese, driving Malay civilians ahead of them at gunpoint. The fighting around the detonator for the demolition of the road bridge was fierce, the kukris of the Gurkhas were edged with blood when one of the sergeants, grievously wounded, threw himself onto a hand grenade, allowing the Royal Engineer officer time to press the plunger and set off the demolition charges. Some of the Japanese had been trying to pull wires and explosives off the bridge, so the demolition was less effective than it should have been. The bridge was only partially destroyed, so that soldiers on foot could cross, and the Japanese engineers only had to patch it up to allow tanks and other vehicles to cross.

    The surviving senior Lieutenant of B Company ordered the men to go immediately to the Motor Transport to withdraw as planned. One Platoon volunteered to stay behind as a rear-guard and to protect the engineers from the Public Works to be able to flood the road. In this they were only partially successful, but they took a toll on the Japanese troops trying to stop them.

    Similar attempts at both the railway bridge and at Selama were less successful, but the HLI Company found a roadblock at their rear when they were pulling out. The infiltration technique was still one of the Japanese basic tactics. The men of B Company 2nd Bn HLI were mainly pre-war regulars from around the Glasgow area, who’d fought in East Africa and at the Ledge, so there was no panic. They used their Bren Gun Carriers effectively to overwhelm the blocking force and escape, leaving behind some of the Motor Transport in flames and eight dead men, with a few more wounded men who’d been left who were soon dispatched by the Japanese. As the Gurkhas and HLI withdrew, the other demolitions that had been prepared were carried out in a more hurriedly way than originally planned for. This meant that a couple of platoons had to abandon their transport and make their way by foot back to the main positions.

    Because the area around the river Kerian tended to be swampy, most of the demolitions were to culverts and small bridges to make the progress of the Japanese, which would be tied mostly to the road as slow as possible. The decision made by Percival, Heath and Murray-Lyon was to make the main line of resistance the Perak River. Although it generally ran north to south parallel to the coast, the main road and rail links crossed the river around the area of Kuala Kangsar.

    Ipoh, where the 11th Indian Division had its main depot, was only fifteen miles away, and so for the first time since the invasion of Malaya, Murray-Lyon was able to concentrate his whole Division. Now made up of the two combined Brigades, 6th/15th and 10th/28th as well as the fresh 12th Indian Brigade. 29th Indian Brigade had become III Indian Corps reserves, although it had been weakened at the Muda River battles. Earlier in January the two convoys BM 9A and 9B had arrived from Bombay carrying 3800 Indian troops, with stores, as drafts of replacements for 9th and 11th Indian Divisions. The men allocated to 11th Indian Division had been brought to Ipoh where their training was brought up to scratch. Those furthest advanced in training had been allocated to 6th/15th and 10th/28th Brigades, bringing all six battalions up to full strength. The rest were drafted into 29th Indian Brigade to complete their readiness for battle.

    The other advantage for Murray-Lyon was that his whole Royal Artillery strength could also be concentrated. 22nd Mountain Artillery Regiment, 137th and 155th Field Regiments RA had all taken casualties, but were now battle hardened and experienced. III Corps artillery, which had originally been part of 5th Indian Division, had been spilt between 9th and 11th Indian Divisions. The 4th and 144th Field Regiments were available to 11th Division and 28th Field Regiment and 24th Indian Mountain Regiment were available for 9th Division. All these had been in action at various points and Lt General Heath was keen for 11th Division to use the artillery wisely. Brigadier Claude Vallentin had taken over as Commander Royal Artillery for 11th Division and he had presented Heath and Murray-Lyon with a comprehensive fire plan for the defence of the Perak River positions.

    In addition to the Field Regiments, 80th and 85th Anti-Tank Regiments RA were available, along with Machine Gun companies from 3rd Bn 17th Dogra Regiment and 1st Battalion Manchester Regiment. Murray-Lyon was particularly pleased to have 3rd Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment of the Hong Kong and Singapore Royal Artillery under his command. The various batteries of this Regiment had been previously defending the airfields of northern Malaya. Heath had managed to persuade Percival that the problems caused by Japanese aircraft, particularly to the artillery, meant that giving 11th Division some integrated anti-aircraft defence was essential.

    The Royal Engineers and Bombay Sappers and Miners had been working with local levies of labourers to prepare for a defence in depth. This work had been going on for almost a month, it was always obvious that the Perak River provided one of the best positions to defend the rest of the country. It was by no means perfect, but knowing that the Australian Corps (8 & 9 Divisions AIF, 18th Infantry Division) were undergoing a Corps level exercise as the final preparation for taking over from III Indian Corps, Heath and Murray-Lyon were confident that they could hold here long enough to stymie the Japanese plans and then allow Mackay’s men to take the initiative.
     
    18 January 1942. Tobruk. Libya.
  • 18 January 1942. Tobruk. Libya.

    Field Marshall Smuts had been touring the victorious battlefields with General Wavell, and the crowning moment of his visit was his visit to the Headquarters of 1st South African Division where he took the salute of the Union Defence Forces gathered in North Africa, standing alongside Major-Generals George Brink (GOC 1st South African Infantry Division) and Isaac de Villiers (GOC 2nd South African Infantry Division)

    It hadn’t been easy for the South Africans to field two full Infantry Divisions. When war had been declared there were only 3353 men in the Permanent Force (more than 2000 short of establishment) and the Citizen Force stood at 14,631 more than a thousand men short of establishment.

    The 1st SA Infantry Division (SAID) had excelled during the campaign in East Africa. On completion of that first victory for the British Empire, the Division had transferred to Egypt. In June 1941 2nd SAID sailed for Egypt. Both Divisions underwent strenuous training in desert warfare. By the end of 1941, more than 100 000 UDF personnel were deployed in Egypt and Cyrenaica.

    Major-General Brink had been critical of General Wavell and Lieutenant-General O’Connor that his men hadn’t been involved in any significant way in the defeat of the Italians and Germans in North Africa. Smuts had deflected that criticism, he knew that the men of 2nd Division especially were desperately short of training and were only coming to their full establishment of Motor Transport and most other equipment. Now, having had those extra few months of training, Wavell and O’Connor were confident that both SAIDs were as good as any other Infantry Division in the Middle East.

    It could be thought of as unfortunate that the two Divisions had missed the operations which led to the capture of Tripoli and the end of the Italian Empire in Africa. Wavell was aware that there was a long way to go before the war was won, and he had been losing many of his formations to Auchinleck’s command in Burma and Malaya. The 6th and 9th Australian Divisions had gone, 9th Highland Division was going.

    On the other hand, Wavell could count on the two South African Divisions, the 4th Indian and 2nd New Zealand Divisions. The British 6th, 50th Infantry Divisions, along with the 2nd and 7th Armoured Divisions gave him a very powerful force. Behind this force Wavell had a growing and improving Greek force, keen to take the war to their enemy. The Free French were hoping that their brothers in arms in the Levant and North Africa would soon join the fight against the Nazis. The Poles were expecting to be reinforced with those freed by the Soviets, having been captured when Stalin had knifed Poland in back, while in cahoots with Hitler.

    Then there was all the other odds and sods that Jumbo Wilson and Edward Quinan had between them in Palestine, Iraq and Iran. 7 Australian Division and 10th Armoured Division were there, as were 2nd Indian Armoured Brigade Group, 8th Indian Division and the first elements of 17th Indian Division had begun arriving.

    2nd and 7th Armoured Divisions had been taking advantage of the excellent Italian workshops in Tripoli to overhaul and fix up their tanks. The battlefields had been scoured for any disabled or destroyed British tank that could be either fixed up or stripped for parts. Convoys along the North African coast, under the cover of land based RAF and SAAF Tomahawks had brought much of the Delta’s stock of spares and tools for the Valiant tanks. Just about every tank had needed a complete overhaul and there were some shortages of some components. The two Divisions were going about their business conscious that the war wasn’t over.

    Tons of captured Italian weapons and ammunition was being shipped back to Egypt on these convoys where the Greek forces were making use of them. The Italian weapons wouldn’t be their first choice, but there were plenty of them, and large stores of ammunition. There was certainly some irony is turning the Italian guns on their previous owners, and morale among the Greek troops was rising as they were better equipped and trained.

    Field Marshall Smuts and his two Major-Generals had lunch together to talk about the next steps on their journey. George Brink was very strongly of the opinion that at least one of the Infantry Divisions should be retrained as an Armoured Division. It had been quite clear from the fighting in North Africa that tanks were where the future of ground combat lay. Isaac de Villiers agreed, but only to a point. In his opinion he didn’t think that a whole Division would have to be retrained. There was something to be said for having a mixed Division, where two Brigades of Infantry would have one Brigade of tanks would make a more flexible and viable force than one Armoured and one Infantry Division.

    Smuts could see the value of having an Independent Tank Brigade assigned to an Infantry Division, keeping the overall strength of the Infantry, but with close support available at hand. Both Brink and de Villiers had noted that the somewhat artificial difference between Infantry and Cruiser tanks had been overcome in the Valiant tank. From all that could be learned about the new Victor tank that was expected soon, there wouldn’t need to be a distinction made. Maintaining the two Divisions as Infantry Divisions was certainly causing problems in terms of manpower. An infantry Division needed over 17000 men, while an Armoured Division was more like 12000 men.

    The question was moot anyway, there was a long list of people who wanted tanks, and until the American production ramped up the way it was planned, starting a South African Armoured Division would take a great deal of effort and frustration. Having two Infantry Divisions fully equipped and ready for action was, at least for General Wavell, a bird in the hand. Retraining as an Armoured Division would take at least a year. What Smuts, Brinks and de Villiers did agree on was the matter was worth further discussion, including how the volunteers in the Divisions would feel about leaving Africa altogether to take part in the liberation of Europe.
     
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    18 January 1942. Kuala Kangsar, Malaya.
  • 18 January 1942. Kuala Kangsar, Malaya.

    The Japanese reinforcements, added to the reorganisation of units which had previously been fighting the Indian troops 11th Division, meant that General Yamashita’s 25th Army had been strengthened. This had come at the expense of Lieutenant General Iida’s 14th Army and the delay to the invasion of Burma.

    Lieutenant-General Yamashita had placed the onus on General Matsui’s 5th Division to finally break the back of the Indian troops and get the timetable back on track. Drafts of replacements had given his three Regiments something like their full complement. Major-General Kawamura’s 9th Brigade (11th and 41st Regiments) had the role of passing through Taiping and straight at Kuala Kangsar. In this they would be supported by two tank regiments (2nd and 6th) each with 37 M-97 and 20 M-95 tanks. Losses had been made up by taking the surviving tanks of 1st Regiment as replacements. Major-General Sugiura’s 21st Brigade (21st Regiment, with 14th Tank Regiment) were in reserve, ready to take over after 9th Brigade had achieved a breakthrough.

    The Imperial Guards Division, now constituting only two regiments (1st and 2nd) had moved through Kroh and Grik to attack the Indian positions from the direction of the Perak River. In the original plan, if the Patani landing force had managed to achieve their objective, then the Indian positions would have been flanked very quickly. With the destruction of the road at the area called ‘The Ledge’ that hadn’t happened. Now the Imperial Guards had managed to make their way to Kroh once the Indian troops had withdrawn from the Muda River positions. Once the Imperial Guards had been reorganised and rested, they found that there was little or no opposition as they approached Kroh except the occasional demolition to make road repairs an ongoing necessity. Passing through Kroh they followed the trail to Grik, where again they found no opposition, but regular attempts to block any progress.

    Things had begun to change after Grik. Recognising the danger of a flanking move from the direction, Major-General Murray-Lyon had Brigadier Rees (CO 10/28th Brigade) have a blocking force to protect the flank. The initial battalion of the Imperial Guards 2nd Regiment as they approached a demolished bridge over the river Kenering were ambushed. Although advancing in tactical order a concentration of a Vickers HMG and four Bren LMGs cut through the advance platoon, halting the rest of the Battalion. As the Imperial Guards began to send out lightly armed units through the jungle to get around the ambush position, these encountered mines, some of which were set off with tripwires.

    This wasn’t something they’d had much experience of and made them very cautious. The British/Indian force had withdrawn almost as soon as the ambush had held up the Japanese. There was a great pressure coming down on the lowliest Japanese officer to move as quickly as possible. This pressure meant that the cautiousness of the soldiers was quickly matched by shouted orders to keep going, no matter what. The Guardsmen who’d survived the first battles, their baptism of fire, had been reinforced by men whose training was limited. Often it was the replacements that were sent out, while the regulars waited to see if there were more mines or another ambush. The 2nd Bn HLI, with support from the Royal Engineers and Straights Settlement Volunteers, therefore managed to both hold up and cause disproportionate casualties on the Imperial Guards Division. When 5th Division’s frontal attack on Kuala Kampar began it was meant to be supported by the Imperial Guards Division’s flanking attack. Instead, two separate battles were fought, allowing Murray-Lyons to concentrate most of his force on holding the 5th Division’s attack.

    Lieutenant-General Yamashita had one other flanking attack planned, this time from the south. Aerial reconnaissance had noted there was a pontoon bridge over the Perak River at Banja, some twenty miles south of 11th Indian Division’s main positions at Kuala Kampar. For this task, Yamashita had ordered Major-General Sakurai’s 33rd Division (214th and 215th Infantry Regiments) to concentrate at Banja and time their attack to support the main thrust at Kuala Kangsar. Lieutenant-General Heath had seen the danger of the Japanese approaching the river Perak around Banja, or indeed anywhere in that area to force a crossing. He had detached the last of the Corps’ mobile reserves, 1st Horse (Skinner’s Horse) to fight a delaying action south of Taiping, eventually falling back to the pontoon bridge which would be destroyed after crossing it.

    Lt Colonel Ian Hossack’s Skinner’s Horse had a variety of armoured vehicles, and he had, with Heath’s approval, secured the help of the Armoured Car Squadron, Federated Malay States Volunteer Forces (OC Major C.E.Collinge). The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and the FMSVF’s Lanchester and Marmon-Harrington armoured cars had been cooperating before the Japanese invasion in training for the kind job that Skinners Horse had been allocated. 1st Horse had served in Gazelle Force during the East African force and had often cooperated with the Sudan Defence Force’s Motor Machine Gun Companies, and so acting in unison with other disparate groups was something his men were used to.

    Hossack therefore had integrated within his various squadrons the FMSVF armoured cars, and the four platoons of the Argylls which had volunteered for the mission. The route between the coast and the hills that separated the coast from the River Perak was relatively narrow, only a few miles wide, and there were a number of rivers that the road crossed. Along with a battery each of 25-pdrs and 2-pdrs, and a cheerful bunch of Bombay Sappers with a large stock of explosives, Hossack had prepared his ground well.

    The 214th Infantry Regiment took the brunt of Hossack Force’s delaying tactics. Without much room for manoeuvre, the Japanese troops just had to attack frontally, only to discover that their enemy had disappeared when they closed, leaving a variety of booby-traps and demolitions that needed to be repaired. The Japanese troops were either walking, or using bicycles. The Skinner’s Horse were all in vehicles, so that retiring always gave them the ability to gain space to reset for the next encounter.

    The effects on the Japanese advance, like that for the Imperial Guards, was that when the 5th Division’s attack at Kuala Kampar began, it was not supported from the south. The time taken by the Japanese to bring more supplies and reinforcements had allowed their air force to catch up on necessary maintenance, and rebuild stocks of fuel and ammunition. The support of 25th Army’s attack was now the main focus for the Japanese pilots. This went against their own inclination. The British also had time to strengthen their position, and while the Japanese got some intelligence about the arrival of Hurricane fighters, they weren’t entirely sure what they were up against. The 3rd Air Division (CO Lieutenant-General Sugawara) wanted to keep up the attempts to wear down and destroy the RAF by attacking their airfields. Count Terauchi (GOC Southern Expeditionary Army) had to intervene when Sugawara and Yamashita disagreed strongly on the correct course of action.

    Sugawara was further annoyed that the destruction of the British airfields had been so effective that the time taken to bring them back to operational standard meant that his fighters were still flying from bases in Thailand. The station at Alor Star was getting close to opening, but there was some kind of British irregular force operating on the lines of communication. This had caused delays that from Sugawara’s point of view that Yamashita should have dealt with speedily and effectively.

    Sugawara was furious when informed that the first strike on the British positions at Kuala Kangsar had been intercepted by enemy fighters, and strongly opposed by anti-aircraft fire. The loss of eight Ki-21 bombers, along with five Ki-43 fighters from 7th Air Brigade, confirmed to Sugawara that he did not have command of the air over the battlefield, and that he was putting his pilots, crew and aircraft in danger on missions that weren’t his first priority. The fighter pilots claimed to have taken a heavy toll on the British fighters, but he knew that such estimates were always exaggerated. It seemed that the British had sent at least three squadrons of fighters to protect their army. Thirty-six British fighters was far more than his intelligence experts believed the British had operational. None of the British fighters were identified as ‘Buffaloes’ but he didn’t believe there were Spitfires either.

    To make matters worse, British bombers had visited Singora airfield and managed to hit some of the vital fuel stores. They’d left at least four of their Blenheims as funeral pyres, but Sugawara needed to concentrate his force on destroying the enemy air force. Under direct orders from Count Terauchi to support Yamashita, Sugawara’s options were limited. He wasn’t directly ordered not to hit the RAF, and so he decided that he would use his light bombers (Ki-48s and Ki-51s) to support the army and keep his Ki-21 bombers to hit the British airfields. Likewise, he’d need the Ki-43 fighters to escort the bombers on the longer journey to the Singapore airfields. The more numerous Ki-27s would be sufficient to support the light bombers.

    Another piece of Yamashita’s plan to finish off the Indian troops was to push them out of their east coast base at Kuala Krai. 56th Division (113 and 148 Regiments) reassigned from 15th Army had been making its way into position to both push aside the Indian troops and to send a force south towards Kuantan which would provide a good base for the ultimate attack on Singapore. This attack on Kuala Krai would have the added benefit of not allowing the two forces to support one another. Yamashita was convinced that the four thrusts would not only break the Indians, who’d fought much better than imagined, but also draw in the British reserves, believed to be Australians.

    Yamashita knew that the Perak River would be a hard nut to crack, but he had the concentration of forces needed, and with a renewed confidence and spirit any sense of defeatism would be exorcised. When the artillery opened up after the air force had bombed the British positions, Yamashita’s confidence in his plan was high.
     
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    19 January 1942. Kuala Kangsar, Malaya.
  • 19 January 1942. Kuala Kangsar, Malaya.

    Lt-Col Ian Stewart couldn’t have been prouder of his 2nd Bn Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. Ever since they’d arrived in Singapore Stewart had trained the men to live and fight in the worst terrain Malaya had to offer. Now that they were finally able to put that training into practice, Stewart kept finding wherever he went in the Battalion’s positions that the men were in high spirits.

    General Murray-Lyon had agreed to Stewart’s request to stay on the western side of the Perak for as long as possible. He wanted to give the Japanese a taste of their own medicine, even though he was short of one full Infantry Company detached in various places. The men of the Administrative and Pioneer Platoons had volunteered to a man to leave their normal jobs to strengthen the fighting strength of the Battalion. Stewart joked with the Padre that he seemed the only man not sporting at least a handgun. But the Padre was up with a party of stretcher-bearers with A Company, so Stewart had no complaints about the Church of Scotland minister. The Pipe Major accompanied the Battalion CO wherever he went, acting as a personal bodyguard, along with his own and Stewart’s batman.

    Stewart had managed to beg, borrow or steal (mostly steal) enough Thompson submachine guns so that there was at least one in each section of infantry, most of the infantry Companies managed two per squad. Much of the work done by the men would be up close and personal, and there was something of the Jimmy Cagney ‘gangster’ look that the men liked. With the Carrier Platoon not using their vehicles, the extra Bren teams were spread among the platoons. Extra bags of grenades were carried in each section, and most of the men, since they were moving from one prepared position to another, carried as little kit as possible except for ammunition.

    The battle had begun the previous day when just after dawn the Japanese artillery opened up after an air raid. The road from Taiping to Kuala Kangsar went through a fairly narrow valley, which Stewart had chosen to be the place where he would show the Japanese what jungle fighting was really like. It was an obvious chokepoint, and Major-General Kawamura’s 9th Brigade led the way with 11th Regiment, supported by two companies of 2nd Tank Regiment. The leading battalions had deployed expecting a fight, one battalion pushing up each hill on either side of the valley. Most of the tanks concentrated on the road, attempting to support the infantry with cannon and machine gun fire, a few enterprising tank commanders attempted to accompany the infantry through the jungle.

    Stewart had organised his signal platoon to work with a pair of Royal Artillery Forward Observers on each hill, who’d had time to work out fire plans. As the Japanese advanced, they were under almost constant, accurate bombardment. The Argylls had been preparing for this battle for over a week. Just about every foot of ground had been gone over, sorting out firing positions, withdrawal routes, and having prepared killing grounds, often created with the help of the 15 Field Company Queen Victoria’s Own Madras Sappers and Miners, and a good supply of mines and explosives.

    All that preparation was immediately effective as the first platoons of Japanese troops, usually showing signs of being undertrained, fell into trap after trap. No sooner had an officer or NCO tried to bring some kind of order into the Japanese movements than Scottish snipers cut them down. The Scots weren’t interested in a stand-up fight. They drew increasing numbers of Japanese troops into the killing zones, and then withdraw to do it all again. By the middle of the day, both Japanese Battalion commanders were dead, and their units’ strength was depleted. The road itself was pockmarked with craters rapidly filling with water from the heavy rain showers that covered the battlefield in the early afternoon. Kawamura had ordered the third battalion of 11th Regiment to stop for nothing but to get to the far side of the valley. With great bravery the men set off to do so, but the concentration of a British Division’s worth of artillery raining down HE on them, and with a Machine Gun battalion putting down indirect fire along the road, their bravery didn’t stop them dying in large numbers.

    Brigadier Paris (CO 12th Indian Brigade) had 5th Bn, 2nd Punjab Regiment support the Argylls, ready to cover them as they withdrew eventually the river crossing. The Punjabis had put up a roadblock at the eastern end of the valley which the survivors of 11th Regiment didn’t have the strength to even attempt to attack. A battery of 2-pdrs were on hand to persuade the Japanese tank commanders that forward movement wasn’t a solution to their problems.

    The problems encountered by the Japanese 11th Infantry Regiment had in no way dissuaded Yamashita from his expectation of victory. He was well aware that this was never going to be easy. Some of his staff had suggested earlier in December that by 18 January his men would be in Johore readying for the final attack on Singapore that should fall by the middle of February! Fanciful nonsense of course.

    The order to Major-General Kawamura was for the rest of his Brigade to advance and keep up the momentum. For every Japanese soldier killed, at least one British soldier must also have died. Kawamura requested, and got, more artillery to try to counter the British artillery. 25th Army’s twenty-eight 150mm guns were already concentrated and were given special permission to use more shells than they were normally allowed. In addition, another Battalion of 81mm mortars were released to Kawamura from Army reserves. An extra 36 mortars would certainly make life difficult for the British in the hills.

    Lt Col Stewart had his Pipe Major play the Regimental Quick March “The Campbells are Coming” during a lull in the fighting. The tired men of the Argylls hearing the pipes recognised the ‘well done’ from their CO. If they heard ‘Hielan’ Laddie’ they would know it was time to withdraw. As part of their reconnaissance of the battlefield the Argylls had planted stores of ammunition, fresh water, cold rations and medical kits at various points. These replenished the men, with each platoon trying to make sure that every section had time to get their breath back, clean their weapons, recharge their ammo supplies and if possible, get something to eat.

    The fighting went on in the hills until failing light and exhaustion had the Japanese halt and try to consolidate their gains. The nightly resupply was brought up and carried up to the forward companies. The Argyll’s ‘goodnight’ to their opponents was a barrage of 2-inch mortar rounds, and a few rousing reels on the bagpipes. Once darkness had fallen completely each platoon sent out a squad split into two four-man patrols. Using all the skills honed in pre-war exercises, many a Japanese sentry was found the next morning dead, with the occasional crash of a handful of grenades being thrown into Japanese positions. Not many Japanese soldiers slept at all that night, almost none slept well, even those completely exhausted by their efforts of the day.

    To the north, on the road from Grik, the Imperial Guards Division’s problems continued, and once more it was a Scottish Regiment causing them difficulty. Trying to move a large body of men over very poor roads and tracks had its own problems. If the men were carrying heavy equipment, manhandling artillery pieces, and under the occasional ambush, then that was a whole other problem. The objective of putting in a flanking attack meant the Division had to cover fifty miles from Grik to Kuala Kangsar. They managed just five miles, and to make matters worse, four RAAF Hudsons appeared and managed to land their sticks of bombs pretty accurately near the crossroads at Grik where an ammunition dump had been set up. The RAAF crews noted in their briefing that they had seen secondary explosions as they left the area. At the scene itself large numbers of casualties had been caused, especially among the Division’s supply troops.

    To the south, the 1st Duke of York’s Own Skinners Horse, with their various supporting units, had given up ten miles to Major-General Sakurai’s 33rd Division. In doing so the Indian cavalry had managed to frustrate Sakurai who ordered the commander of 214th Infantry Regiment to allow no level of casualties to slow down the advance. Without the width, or speed, to flank and envelop the Indian Cavalry, there was no way the Regiment could achieve anything other than being bled at just about every turn in the road. Even the intervention of Japanese bombers and fighters to support 33rd Division’s progress couldn’t derail the Cavalry’s slowing of the Japanese advance.

    To the east, Lieutenant-General Watanabe’s 56th Division (113 and 148 Regiments) had relied on the railway on Thailand’s east coast to bring the men and equipment most of the way to the front line. The Australian Rose Force had been doing their best, with the occasional help from a Dutch or British submarine, to infiltrate and do whatever damage they could to the railway, concentrating on the bridges. Two groups had been captured and killed, but others had got away scot-free and the Japanese railway units, along with engineers and impressed Thai workers were doing their best to keep the line open. The delays meant that most of the men of 113th Regiment had arrived, but much of their heavier equipment and ammunition resupply hadn’t.

    Two battalions of 113th Regiment moved up to reinforce the men of 143rd Regiment, who in turn had taken over from 142nd Regiment. 143rd Regiment, having been reassigned from the southern tip of Burma, hadn’t had much chance to make progress against the 9th Indian Division. Japanese probes were finding that the Indians were firmly seated in well prepared defences, with their supply line was keeping them well provisioned. The efforts of those who had attempted to defeat the Indians never managed to get the weight of men necessary to break through the Indian’s lines. The arrival of 113th and 148th Regiments to strengthen 143rd Regiment would finally give at least parity with the three Indian Brigades, though the British had a far higher number of artillery units than the Japanese did.
     
    20 January 1942. Ipoh. Malaya.
  • 20 January 1942. Ipoh. Malaya.

    Lt-General Heath visited Major-General Murray-Lyon’s HQ to get an up to date report. The news about the fighting around Kuala Kangsar was generally good. The initial Japanese movements had been resisted and it was believed that the Japanese had taken heavy casualties. Murray-Lyon’s chief Intelligence officer showed Heath on a map the three-pronged attack that was forming. Thankfully the Japanese hadn’t been able to coordinate their efforts so far, allowing the Royal Artillery to focus entirely on the central attack. The Intelligence officer pointed out how the work of Skinner’s Horse in slowing the southern movement, and the HLI slowing the northern thrust, had been crucial.

    While Murray-Lyon noted that the Japanese were going all out to defeat 11th Indian Division, Heath shared the worrying news that another attack was building against 9th Indian Division at Kuala Krai. Heath had almost nothing left in the locker as reserves except 29th Indian Brigade, which was in the process of resting and recuperating from their efforts at the Muda River.

    The two generals spent some time with their staff to sort out clear instructions about what conditions would lead to 11th Division’s withdrawal, so that it could be done in an orderly fashion. Heath who’d toured the positions around the Perak River were congratulated 11th Division’s Commander Royal Engineers, they were among the best defensive positions available in the north of the country. Murray-Lyon expressed his fear that there were real dangers of being outflanked, especially to his south. The advantage that 11th Division had was that even if the Japanese were able to cross the Perak, the main railway and road ran behind another ridge of hills, giving his line of communication some protection.

    Murray-Lyon’s men had taken the brunt of the Japanese attack, he really wanted to know Lt-Generals Percival and Mackay was when the Australian Corps would be ready to either take over the defence of Malaya or indeed, go on the attack?

    Heath told him he’d been asking the same question. The latest update was that the Australian Corps’ level exercise had been completed. There were a lot of lessons that had to be learned, and quite a few problems that needed to be ironed out. Generally, the news was good, 18th Infantry Division were fully fit, and pretty well acclimatised, the two Australian Divisions were keen to get involved. Heath then shared Percival’s worry that if the Australian Corps moved north from Johor to Perak it could leave a gap for another amphibious landing nearer Singapore. Murray-Lyon expressed surprise, he’d been told that Singapore Island was now more defensively prepared for an attack, surely, he asked, delaying putting the Australian Corps into the fight could prove disastrous?

    Heath knew that Lt-General Mackay had been having that debate with Percival too, and the timing of a counter-offensive was as important as where it happened and by whom. The reality was that when Australian Corps did go on the offensive, it was likely that Heath’s III Indian Corps would take over the Australian positions in Johore to rest and reorganise. If there was another Japanese landing, it would themselves who’s have to face it again. General Auchinleck was keen on having the Australians and Slim’s Burma forces to attack simultaneously. If that could be organised, then the Japanese would find themselves in real trouble.

    What was important for now, was for 11th Division to hold the Japanese and bleed them as much as possible. The weaker the Japanese were, the easier for the Australians when the attack went in. Murray-Lyon couldn’t help think of his own men who’d been in almost constant battle since 8 December. Their morale was still good, they’d done well against an enemy who had surprised the senior officers’ who’d written the Japanese troops off for racial reasons.

    Lt-General Heath left Murray-Lyon’s HQ satisfied that the situation, while threatening, was still in hand. The chances of 11th Indian Division collapsing were remote. There was always the possibility of being outflanked, but Heath was confident that Murray-Lyon wouldn’t abandon his very good position unless it was absolutely necessary. The next problem was getting over to Arthur Barstow’s HQ. 9th Indian Division’s GOC had already been sending out worrying messages about Japanese intentions. Once more Heath, having to move from one side of the country to the other, by going far enough south to be able to travel north again, made him fret about the two Divisions in his Corps being unable to support one another.
     
    21 January 1942. Hayling Island, England.
  • 21 January 1942. Hayling Island, England.

    Lord Louis Mountbatten, Combined Operations Advisor to the Chiefs of Staff, watched as the Duplex Drive Valiant I* tank ran down the ramp of the new LCT (2). Everyone unconsciously held their breath as the tank transitioned from the ramp to the sea. Nicholas Straussler, the designer of the floatation device that prevented the tank from sinking was standing beside Mountbatten, smiled as the tank moved away from the landing craft obviously under its own power. As it did so a second tank, this time, the light Tetrarch moved to the front of the ramp and followed the larger tank onto the water and headed towards the beach. This was where Mountbatten, Straussler and all the other big wigs were gathered.

    It was a cold day, but mercifully quite calm. The two tanks arrived at a depth where they were no longer floating, and the tracks began to bite on the seabed. The Tetrarch managed the incline without too much trouble, but the Valiant I* had obviously found a patch where the tracks couldn’t get enough grip. The tank commander’s solution was to order the driver to back off until they were floating free, then using each track separately to crab the tank over to where the Tetrarch had exited the water and follow it up the beach. Once the two tanks were safely on dry land, the process of dropping the floatation screen was demonstrated, with the tanks then able to fight freely.

    Most of the VIPs had seen similar demonstrations, though this was the first having two tanks unload from the single LCT (2). Percy Hobart, under whose overall control these types of vehicles were being developed, was a bit out of sorts. Mountbatten had simply asked what would be the effect of machine gun fire on the tanks as they ran into the shore. Straussler admitted that if the floatation screen was too badly damaged by enemy fire, then the tank would sink. Hobart and Mountbatten hadn’t yet got the measure of each other, and Mountbatten was attempting to rescue the situation with his innate charm, to which Hobart seemed immune.

    A second LCT (2) came towards the beach. Onboard was a Valiant I Infantry tank and a Churchill tank that had been adapted for ‘wading’. The hull had been sealed as best as possible, and the engine intake and exhaust had been modified to be well above the level of the hull. When the ramp was lowered the Valiant tank moved forward and seemed almost swamped. The engine however kept going, and the tank gradually managed to make it up the slope. The Churchill tank also successfully made it ashore. The Churchill’s tracks and gearbox dealt with the slope better than that of the Valiant.

    Overall, the demonstration had been successful. There were a number of things that would be learned, not least having some kind of clear knowledge of make up of the beach that tanks would land on to see if the ground would be suitable. Mountbatten thought that both ideas were worth pursuing, but worried that the DD tanks would be vulnerable against a defended beach until they were clear of the water and had dropped the floatation gear. Having tanks capable of wading coming off a landing craft meant that the problem of grounding the LCT could be done even if there was still a depth of water between the ramp and dry land.

    On the train back later in the day, Mountbatten wrote up some notes. Mr Churchill was pushing as hard as he could for something to be done to relieve the pressure on the Soviets. So far, the limited commando raids had been impressive, but without giving the Germans any real problems. Stalin’s call for a second front was obviously completely unrealistic. The build up of the kind of amphibious ships that would be needed to successfully put a strong force ashore would take years. By summer, if the ships currently out in the Mediterranean were brought back, Mountbatten’s planning team thought that they might, just might, have enough capacity to put the best part of a Division ashore.

    The difficulty was that Wavell and Cunningham had persuaded Churchill to allow them to keep those amphibious assets. They planned to use them in a campaign to capture some of the Italian islands, securing the eastern Mediterranean, and prepare to do something about some Greek islands or even Sicily. The 8th Army had plenty of men and tanks sitting around waiting to see what would happen with the French, but capturing Rhodes would be another big loss for Mussolini. The Australian 7 Division had been exercising as much as they could with the commandoes, so there was a solid core for taking the fight across the Mediterranean.

    Mountbatten’s problem was not only a lack of the correct shipping, but also an actual Combined Operations organisation that would be able to herd the three cats known as the Navy, Army and RAF. General Alan Brooke was keen on keeping the Prime Minister happy, without actually committing men to a half-baked plan would just end with lots of dead troops with nothing very much to show for it. Helping the Soviets was all very well, but realistically the Infantry and Armoured Divisions currently in the UK weren’t ready to take on the Wehrmacht. O’Connor’s 8th Army in Libya was about the only formation Brooke trusted to do the job. Supporting them, all the way around the Cape of Good Hope was just too long a line of supply for anything more than an island-hopping campaign. Even doing that much would mean some pretty hard lessons would have to be learned.

    Lord Louis Mountbatten sometimes wondered if captaining HMS Illustrious would have been the better option. The fact that the Prime Minister, when laying out his plan for Mountbatten to take over Combined Operations, in response to his request to stay with Illustrious the Prime Minister responded “You fool! The best thing you can hope to do there is to repeat your last achievement and get yourself sunk!”. Churchill wanted to take the war to the enemy and saw in Mountbatten a man who would be able to do that. Mountbatten was keen to do his bit, and the exercise that morning gave him another card in his hand.

    The ability to support a landing with tanks in the first wave would give the infantry useful support. The difficulties of getting tanks out of the water, up a beach and over any obstacles was still to be satisfactorily resolved. Mountbatten had pencilled in a meeting with Major-General Hobart to discuss just what exactly was in the pipeline and what else should be. The Landing Craft Tank (2) had worked out well, but getting them over the English Channel in anything more than slightly choppy water was a worry. There would probably have to be an American solution to that issue, the ability to build enough ships and smaller craft for an invasion was currently beyond British shipbuilding capacity.

    It was Mountbatten’s intention to fly out to Egypt in time to see the planned amphibious attacks that would lead to taking Rhodes. The Australian involvement had meant that the planning had to be absolutely clear on what would happen, the memories of Gallipoli were still very strong among the Australian senior officers. It was probably a godsend that Australian 7 Division were involved from the very beginning. There was a lot of work that was being done in Egypt that Mountbatten wanted to see for himself, and perhaps get a few of the planners back to England with him afterwards.

    The danger to all this was in Malaya and Burma. The last big exercise, the dress rehearsal, had had to be postponed because the shipping and the aircraft carrier had to be used to move troops, equipment and fighters from Egypt and Persia to Burma. Once all the ships were back under Cunningham’s command, the exercise would be rescheduled and then hopefully, the offensive to capture enemy held islands could begin.
     
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    22 January 1942. Balikpapan, Borneo.
  • 22 January 1942. Balikpapan, Borneo.

    The Royal Navy ships had sailed with the morning tide, led by the auxiliary minelayer Soemenep, which had laid a protective minefield to the entrance to the port. The Navy had delivered two depleted Indian Battalions (3rd Bn 16th Punjab Regiment and 5th Bn 14th Punjab Regiment) to try to work with the Dutch forces to strengthen the defences of the port and oil production facilities.

    KNIL Lieutenant Colonel van den Hoogenband had just over 1000 men in various positions, along with coast, with anti-aircraft and field batteries protecting the city. At Balikpapan and the nearby oilfields in Samarinda well-trained destruction groups were busy destroying the important oil installations.

    Lt Colonels Henry Moorehead and van den Hoogenband, with translators, spent some time walking the area to see how best to use the newly arrived 800 Indian troops. Because Moorehead’s men had already resisted a Japanese invasion, the Englishman thought he had some ideas that would help the Dutch. Unfortunately, despite the very positive messages of support from the Dutch commander at Singkawang II airfield, Hoogenband wasn’t terribly keen to listen.

    Hoogenband’s orders were quite clear. He was to cover the destruction of the oil producing equipment and all else that would be of use to the enemy. First of all, to resist any attempt at a coup de main, secondly to fight a slowing action to allow the demolitions to be completed. Thirdly the plan was for the men to withdraw into the hills and wage a guerrilla campaign. The demolitions had already been carried out to a large extent. The smoke from the burning oil farms and other factories was choking. Moorehead was shown the refugee accommodation and stocks of food and equipment that had been dispersed for the guerrilla campaign and to protect the civilian population.

    To Hoogenband’s mind the Indian troops were a complication with their different equipment and ammunition. Confident in his own men and their dispositions he suggested that Moorehead should have his men act as a counterattack force. While Moorehead wasn’t keen on the idea, what made it worse was that Hoogenband wanted to have the two Battalions stripped down into company sized forces at various points for counterattacking. To this Moorehead couldn’t agree. It was clear to him that his Dutch counterpart had no idea of the aggressive way the Japanese troops went about their business. Defending Kuching with a force of a similar size to the KNIL at Balikpapan had proven impossible, despite their best efforts. From Moorehead’s point of view, the Dutch plan was likely to hand the Japanese troops a fairly easy victory.

    Since the British officers were under the direct command of the KNIL’s Commander in Chief, Hein Ter Poorten, and Moorehead’s orders were to cooperate with Hoogenband, he offered another idea. He would keep his two battalions based at Manggar airfield, providing a strong defensive position on the Dutch flank. It seemed that airfields were always a priority for the Japanese. Having a strong force protecting the landing ground would throw a wrench in their plans. The Dutch plan didn’t include the airfield as it was too far from the essential oil infrastructure, and Hoogenband didn’t have a strong enough force to extend his defensive positions that far. The airfield itself was already out of commission, it had been bombed by the Japanese a few times and the secret airfield at Samarinda II was where the Dutch aircraft were based. Hooganband thought about it, and decided it was probably best to keep the two forces separate.

    When Moorehead asked for a levy of coolies to help prepare defensive positions he was promised some, though in the event they never arrived. His own Indian troops were well used to digging and fortifying their positions so they just got on with it. The one concession given to the Indian Battalions was the attachment of two "Overvalwagens", trucks amoured with boiler plate and armed with a .50 machine gun for aerial defence. These would be the only vehicles available to the Indian troops whose vehicles and heavier equipment had been left with the Dutch at Pontianak.

    The Dutch did provide trucks to carry the Indians and their supplies to Manggar, where they got busy preparing to resist another invasion. Moorehead managed to get hold of some workers of the main oil company, Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij, who lent the British officer a couple of cars to help out. His Intelligence section immediately took these and began to trace out the various ways in which the Battalions would be able to withdraw. The BPM employees also gave over some maps which allowed the Battalion commanders to reconnoitre their positions properly.

    The Dutch liaison officer was the ML-KNIL commander of the airfield, who was otherwise out of a job. His small detachment proved extremely valuable, as some stores of fuel and bombs which hadn’t been destroyed or moved were made available to the Indian engineers to provide some extra explosive ordnance to play with. Moorehead had placed three Companies along the coast to provide a first line of defence. The majority of the rest of the force were digging in at the airfield itself, while one Company were working with the Intelligence section at sorting out evacuation routes.

    From Moorehead’s point of view, this wasn’t the best situation he and his men found themselves in. He just hoped that the Royal Navy, with the Dutch submarines and surface forces would do their job and prevent the Japanese force from being able to land in the first place.
     
    23 January 1942. Batavia, Java.
  • 23 January 1942. Batavia, Java.

    General Auchinleck’s appointment as Supreme Commander of ABDA (American, British, Dutch, Australian) forces had finally been agreed after a great deal of negotiation. Auchinleck in particular, had been keen to make sure that the job was clear about what the various battles going on against the Japanese would have some kind of overall direction, without interfering in each country’s own position. This was a fine balancing act, which would be difficult to get right.

    The Americans had withdrawn to their final defensive line on the Bataan Peninsula where they continued to resist the Japanese invasion of the Philippines. The problem was that, in Auchinleck’s view, they had conceded the rest of the islands to the Japanese. Of particular concern was Davao, which now seemed to be a base for Japanese aggression. The Asiatic Fleet of the United States Navy seemed to have lost their overall strategic visions having been chased out of the Philippines. They were working with the Dutch, but not decisively, their submarine force in particular seemed to be underperforming.

    The British position in Malaya was holding, though under pressure. There were enough reinforcements being rushed to Burma and Singapore, giving Auchinleck some confidence in the position there. The Royal Navy were split between protecting the convoys of reinforcements, and Admiral Phillip’s Force Z which was hoping to deal a blow to the Japanese in the Makassar Strait.

    The Dutch were resisting in Borneo and Celebes, though the loss of Tarakan and Manado had given the Japanese airfields to cover their advance. The Dutch Koninklijke Marine had been doing a reasonable job, especially the submarine force, but Admiral Conrad Helfrich and the American Admiral Thomas Hart didn’t seem to see eye to eye about the best way to cooperate.

    The Dutch were going all out to support Phillip’s Force Z, and the Americans were concentrating to the east of Celebes in the Banda Sea. To increase a sense of comradeship, it had been agreed with the Australian and New Zealand governments that two light cruisers (HMAS Perth and HMNZS Achilles) and two destroyers (HMAS Vampire and Voyager) would be assigned to the American Task Force 5 (USS Houston, Marblehead and Boise, along with eight USN destroyers). The rest of the Royal Australian Navy, along with the New Zealanders, were doing their best to maintain the open sea lanes back towards America.

    The Australian force in Rabual had reported strong attacks from carrier based aircraft and that all of their own fighters and bombers were either destroyed or withdrawn. Radio communications were patchy, but the recent messages were reporting Japanese invasion forces being resisted.

    Auchinleck had accepted his role knowing full well that each of the countries would be focussed on their own particular problems, and with the exception of the navies, would be unable to really collaborate. The thing that Auchinleck had noted from each and every battle was the overwhelming power exercised by the Japanese Army and Navy air forces. The destruction wraught at Pearl Harbour now seemed to be falling on Rabaul. The American Volunteer Group in Rangoon were, so far, the only fighter group that seemed to be capable of taking on and defeating the Japanese fighters and bombers. The arrival of Hurricanes and Tomahawks at Singapore might have the same effect, but it remained to be seen if the RAF pilots would take on board the lessons the AFG were offering.

    There was a growing American Army Air Corps presence, mostly aircraft and pilots that were meant to be defending the Philippines. As these reinforcements had arrived too late, the bombers and fighters could play an important role, if only they could be concentrated and properly integrated. The obvious place was alongside the Dutch ML-KNIL. Auchinleck had spent a good hour with the various air force commanders. Air Marshall Richard Pierse was to be in overall command of ABDA Air, having lost his job as AOC-in-C Bomber Command, but wasn’t yet arrived in the Far East. Pierse’s American deputy, Major-General Lewis Brereton was the one Auchinleck really wanted to convince of the need for closer cooperation. Even although he was now out from under the command of Douglas MacArthur, Brereton was still sore from losing most of his bomber force on the ground on the first day of the war with Japan. To Auchinleck’s delight his own deputy, Maj. Gen. George H. Brett (USAAF) was fully on board with this plan and was keen to support Auchinleck’s proposals.

    Lieutenant-General Ludolph van Oyen, C-in-C ML-KNIL, had witnessed first hand the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. He and Brereton had much in common. Both the USAAF and ML-KNIL were short of everything, and desperate to stop the Japanese. Auchinleck had the difficult task to try to get the two men to get past their natural inclination to think first of their own needs, and somehow to work together to create not only a unified command, but a real collaboration.

    The basis for this had been established to some degree by the reconnaissance units. Kapitein ter Zee G. G. Bozuwa of Marineluchtvaartdienst (MLD) had been working well with the other operators of the PBY equipped squadrons including USN Patrol Wing 10 and No. 205 Squadron RAF. These most valuable assets had been covering various areas, but reporting back to Bozuwa as well as their own chain of command. Bozuwa’s staff were therefore in a position to update everyone’s intelligence sections about Japanese shipping movements.

    Auchinleck had Brereton and van Oyen meet together, along with Brett, to see if some kind of deal could be hashed out. General Marshall had informed Brereton by radio it was the War Department's fixed policy to seek the enemy's defeat by a unified effort under the leadership of General Auchinleck. Brereton's mission, as Marshall succinctly added, was to execute the orders issued by Auchinleck.

    The Dutch had prepared numerous airdromes on Java, with seven military fields and three commercial airports as well as a considerable number of emergency landing fields well distributed across the countryside. The Dutch had also constructed modern airfields on Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes, and Amboina, and suitable at least for use by pursuit planes were the fields on Timor, Soemba, and Bali. But the government of the Netherlands East Indies lacked a modern air force. In January 1942 its approximately 150 planes were obsolescent. The only real hope were the reinforcements coming to the USAAF.

    So far, Brereton had command of 18 P40s, fifty-two A24s (delivered to Australia) and fourteen B17s (escaped from the Philippines). 180 pursuit planes (P40s), with crews had now arrived in Australia, and another complete pursuit group with 80 planes had left San Diego on 10 January. 20 B-17's and 6 LB-30's had arrived by the South Pacific route, an additional 45 B-17's and 9 LB-30's were to follow.

    This was going to be a formidable force, but Brereton rightly noted that throwing aircraft into battle, without a chance to properly prepare the aircraft and train the pilots was a recipe for disaster. Brereton wanted time to for his force to be combat ready. Van Oyen was seeing his ML-KNIL force being ground down far too quickly. He was desperate for American assistance. Auchinleck, knowing that the RAF were struggling with the same problems in Burma and Malaya could well appreciate the position of both men.

    To add to the mix, Air Commodore Del Wilson, the senior RAAF officer had briefed Brett noting that nearly all the effective RAAF squadrons were defending Singapore, and he had almost nothing at home to protect Northern Australia. As had just become clear at Rabual, a few Wirraway trainers were no match for the Japanese aircraft. Wilson also wanted the American build up to happen in Australia, where they could be used in its defence.

    The final agreement was for the American Army Air Forces reinforcements to concentrate on the eastern side of the Dutch East Indies, as Australia was becoming the main operating base from which the Americans would have their logistical support structure in place. The current pursuit and bomber aircraft already in place would concentrate on Java from where the bombers would be able to operate over the wider area, and the P40s protect the island itself. Nobody was entirely happy with this outcome, but Auchinleck knew that the concentration of American forces at Darwin would become crucial in the next phase of operations.

    Regarding troops on the ground, some American and British army units were on Borneo and Celebes supporting the KNIL, but otherwise there was no real abililty to project power. The job of the allies would be to upset the Japanese plans as far as possible, and then, figure out how to knock them back.

    With Admiral Phillips’ Force Z the only real force in the area, it would fall to him in HMS Nelson, with HMS Warspite, HMS Ark Royal, and the various British and Dutch cruisers and destroyers to try to upset the Japanese plans. The Dutch had spotted a Japanese fleet of transports and escorts sailing south from Tarakan, expected to arrive off Balikpapan during the night. The weather was poor, but the Dutch had collected as many bombers and fighters as possible, along with a couple of submarines to attempt to harry the Japanese, allowing Force Z to close with them and, if their luck held, put them to the sword.
     
    23/24 January 1942. The Battle of Makassar Strait.
  • 23/24 January 1942. The Battle of Makassar Strait.

    The shadowing of the Japanese invasion fleet by Dutch aircraft had allowed Admiral Phillips to have an excellent picture of what he was up against. The experience east of Malaya which had resulted in the loss of HMS Barham had been examined in great detail. The best guess was that the Japanese had some kind of long-range torpedo, it was the only thing that could explain the losses taken by the British ships. With that in mind, Phillips had set up his fleet to try to split off most of the escorts and let the Dutch ships (cruisers Java and De Ruyter, destroyers Van Ghent, Van Nes, Piet Hein, Kortenaer) deal with the transports at Balikpapan.

    The Japanese escorts seemed to consist of one cruiser and about nine destroyers, with various patrol boats, submarine chasers and minesweepers. Fifteen transports had been identified. HMS Ark Royal, with HMS Gloucester and the destroyers HMS Electra and Express would be held back about eighty miles south of Balikpapan, its fighters covering the withdrawal of the main fleet during the hours of daylight.

    HMS Nelson, carrying the Admiral’s flag, with HMS Warspite, Exeter, Encounter, Greyhound, Jupiter, Juno, Kashmir and Kelly had sailed up the Makassar strait closer to the Celebes shore, hoping to avoid detection. Ahead of the fleet were the Dutch submarines, K-XIV and K-XVIII, lying off Balikpapan and ready to engage.

    First blood went to the ML-KNIL, at 15.25hrs, an attack by nine Dutch Martin Model 166 (B-10) bombers scored direct hits on Tatsugami Maru and Nana Maru, the latter having to be abandoned and later sank. The rest of the invasion force reached Balikpapan at 19.45hrs, at which point K-XVIII’s commander, Lt. Cdr. van Well Groneveld, operating on the surface due to the stormy weather, fired four torpedoes at the Japanese flagship, the cruiser Naka, but failed to hit it. A subsequent attack sank the transport, Tsuruga Maru. The Japanese commander of the fleet, Admiral Nisimura, was concerned about submarine activity and diverted his covering force towards the east to carry out antisubmarine sweeps.

    Twelve Swordfish from HMS Ark Royal arrived and were able to sink another two transports for the loss of two aircraft. Normally some of the Swordfish would drop flares to illuminate the objective, but the fires burning ashore gave the Fleet Air Arm more than enough light to launch their torpedoes.

    Admiral Nisimura had fallen into the very trap that Admiral Phillips had gambled on. The British ships, with the darkness of the Celebes behind them had the advantage over the Japanese ships, who were backlit by the burning oil fields of Balikpapan, as well as being spotted on the RN’s working radar sets.

    Before leaving Gibraltar, HMS Nelson had Fire Control Radars Type 284, 285 and 283 fitted for main and secondary armament and barrage control. These had been well tested during the crossing of the Mediterranean and through the Indian Ocean to join Force Z. HMS Warspite had also been fitted with the same three types of radar before leaving Alexandria. The first Nisimura knew of the arrival of a British fleet was the report of gun flashes. The 16-inch shells from HMS Nelson and 15-inch shells from HMS Warspite created great geysers of water around the Japanese warships. The Imperial Japanese Navy were well trained for night warfare and Naka and the destroyers immediately began their manoeuvres to fire off their Type 93 torpedoes.

    HMS Exeter, with the destroyers HMS Encounter and Greyhound, joined in the fight having come from the north, putting Nisimura’s force at an even greater disadvantage, as he was now facing two forces, the size and make up of which he was unsure. The destroyers Asagumo and Kawakaze were quickly disabled and sinking before Nisimura could order his surviving ships to withdraw. Having fired off the torpedoes, and being vastly outgunned he could see no other point. HMS Kelly was the only victim of the Japanese torpedo attack, HMS Nelson and Warspite were head on to the Japanese ships prepared to have to comb the torpedoes tracks.

    Umikaze and Natsugumo were the next two destroyers to be hit, HMS Warspite claiming the first and HMS Exeter claiming the latter. Naka’s 5.5-inch guns had been in almost constant action, trying to even up the score, but two shells from HMS Nelson just missed the cruiser, causing her damage and loss of power. With her speed slowed, and taking on water from broken seams the Japanese cruiser became a sitting duck. A 16-inch shell landed amidships and Admiral Nisimura was spared the embarrassment of having to explain losing the battle. Two more destroyers had been damaged, Minegumo and Suzakazi, the latter was severely damaged and would later be abandoned and sunk.

    Admiral Doorman, on the Dutch cruiser De Ruyter aimed to concentrate on the Japanese ships lying at anchor in Balikpapan Bay. Once again, the oil facilities burning onshore this gave the Dutch ships excellent night vision. The first Japanese ships to be encountered were three ex-Momi class destroyers now known as patrol boats P36 (ex-Fuji), P37 (ex-Hishi) and P38 (ex-Yomogi). In modifications made early in 1941 to the stern of these ships had been allowed for the launching of Daihatsu landing craft. These three ships carried 2nd Battalion of 146th Regiment known to the Japanese as the “Surprise Attack Unit”. The three patrol boats had separated from the main force and were transferring the men to the landing craft when the first Dutch ships came into view. This Surprise Attack Unit was meant to sail up the river, guided by locals to outflank the main Dutch defences.

    The cruiser Java, with the destroyers Van Ghent, Van Nes engaged the three patrol vessels, each of which were armed with only two 4.7-inch guns. The Japanese ships were quickly overcome, though Van Nes took some damage in the action.

    This action took away some of the element of surprise for Admiral Doorman on De Ruyter. Almost as soon as the Japanese transports had anchored, the job of getting the men of the Sakaguchi Brigade (56th Regimental Group) off the ships and onto the shore had begun. Daihatsu and Shohatsus landing craft, as well as the lifeboats of the transports were being used to get as many men off the transports as possible. The Japanese minesweepers W 16, W 17, and W 18, along with the sub-chasers Ch 10, Ch 11, and Ch 12 did what they could to protect their charges, but it made little difference to the Dutch cruiser and destroyers. When joined by Java, Doorman was able to finish off the Japanese transports, leaving all of them sunk or in flames, along with most of the escorts.

    The Japanese troops which had set off for the landing grounds to the east of Balikpapan had done so with only what they carried. There were no heavy weapons or resupply. As they looked back and watched the majority of their fellow soldiers sunk in their transports, when they approached the shore, and came under fire, their hearts were not in the attack.

    Admiral Phillips had been quite clear to the various elements of his force that they had to clear the area as quickly as possible to avoid, as far as possible, any Japanese air attack. The air group of HMS Ark Royal, along with two ML-KNIL squadrons of Buffaloes were prepared to cover Force Z as it withdrew to Surabaya. Admiral Doorman was elated at the victory, but was conscious of the need to preserve his ships for further action. As soon as the last Japanese transport was clearly sinking, he ordered his force to turn south to rendezvous with the British.


    This is what actually happened OTL.
     
    23/24 January 1942. The Battle of Kendari
  • 23/24 January 1942. The Battle of Kendari

    The reinforcements had begun arriving over the last week. The first to arrive was the Dutch Marine Battalion. Lieutenant-Colonel W.A.J. Roelofsen consisted of two companies of 125 marines and two companies of MBA (Marine Bewakings Afdeling Navy Guard Detachment). The latter were naval reserve personnel which returned to active duty to guard various facilities. The marines were well trained and very capable, the MBA companies were only really good for guard duties.

    KNIL Army Captain F.B. van Straalen, commander of the 400 men of the Dutch garrison was glad to hand command over to Roelofsen but remained his second in command. The MBA companies were sent immediately to the airfield to reinforce the Anti-Aircraft Battery (2 x 40mm guns) and Anti-Aircraft Machine-Gun Platoon (3 x AAMG).

    With two Marine companies reinforcing the KNIL Infantry Company, the other asset was 4 armoured cars, which van Straalen was using as a quick reaction force. This was still nowhere enough to defend the area. It was the arrival of the next reinforcements that gave Roelofsen hope to be able to do something effective.

    VIII battalion of 6th KNIL Regiment (OC Major Doorman), just under 600 men, were mostly reservists who’d been mobilised and their training and fitness still needed some improvement. They were sent immediately to the airfield to improve the defences.

    Most importantly was the arrival of the 2nd Artillery Battalion of 131st American Field Artillery Regiment of the Texas National Guard. Made up of about 750 men, under the command of Lt-Col Blucher Tharp, who were meant to have reinforced the Philippines. Three batteries of four 75mm guns were the core of the Battalion, but what they had, unlike anything the KNIL could boast, was the fully motorised capability. The half-tracks that pulled the guns and ammunition were festooned with the American fetish for extra machine guns. In addition to the twelve 75mm guns, they also had an anti-tank platoon with two 37mm guns.

    Lt-Col Roelofsen talked with Tharp to try to decide the best way to use his force in conjunction with the other forces available. The Texans set about their task with a vengeance, preparing themselves to do what they had trained for. The lack of aircover was a perennial problem, but the ML-KNIL were fully committed to protecting the fleet attempting to intercept the Japanese invasion force.

    The first signs that action was imminent were the flashes of gunfire off the coast. The coast watchers reported that a sea battle was underway, but was no way of knowing just exactly what was going on. Reports followed that landing forces were visible coming towards the beach.

    Between the length of the coastline and the uncertainty of where a landing might take place, Roelofsen had chosen to use his marines in ambushes on the road towards the airfield, hoping to slow their advance down and bleed them. Some Home Guard troops were on hand to guide the marines from one position to the next.

    The armoured cars, Overvalwagens, were an important part of the marines covering movement, but it was the Texans in their half-tracks armed with 0.3 and 0.5-inch machine guns who gave the Japanese Sasebo Combined Special Naval Landing Force the real problems. The Naval Infantry hadn’t been prepared for the level of resistance they were encountering.

    A force of American destroyers had managed to get among the Japanese escorts and transports, sinking two of the transports, which had disrupted the landing process. The fact that the Japanese troops were coming in dribs and drabs, helped the Dutch and Americans to inflict higher casualties than if they were fighting a more organised unit. By noon on 24 January the battle was still underway, the outcome still undecided.
     
    24 January 1942. War Office, London, England.
  • 24 January 1942. War Office, London, England.

    Looking over the figures for tank production during 1941 was heartening. The combined production for the last quarter was 1877 giving a total 4841 tanks for the year. The previous year’s total had been less than 1500, a number surpassed in the last three months.

    The introduction of the Churchill was still picking up, so between Matilda II and Churchills 479 Infantry tanks had been built. The slow production of Tetrarch light tanks continued, with twenty-three completed. The greatest output was in cruiser tanks. 1375 was the total of cruiser tanks, of which 459 were Nuffield’s Crusaders and 892 were Valiant I and IIs, with pre-production Victors making up the final twenty-four.

    One of the changes that had been noticed was that more tanks could have been produced, perhaps as many as 10%, but the fighting in North Africa had shown that spare parts were crucial to keep the tanks running. Each company had therefore been ordered to accept fewer tanks to allow for enough spares to be produced.

    As numbers of 6-pdr guns were increasing, the numbers of Valiant Is were running down, and should end during the first quarter of 1942. The primary difference between the two marks of tanks was in the turret, and with the decision to send tanks without guns to the Russians, there wouldn’t be too much disruption moving from the Valiant II to the Victor.

    Nuffield were working on the turret for their Crusader to take the 6-pdr, but their efforts so far were resulting in having to delete the loader, making the tank commander load the gun on top of his other responsibilities. Everything that had been learned so far argued against this. The problem was obviously caused by the diameter of the turret ring. The design team which had worked on the Crusader were currently working on their follow up design.

    Retaining the Christie suspension, the Liberty engine (although boosted to give 410 hp) and with less than three inches of armour, the main difference would be the turret ring of sixty inches. Nuffield’s estimate was that the 27-ton tank would have a top speed of 24 mph. There were obviously two immediate problems, the first was the design wouldn’t be able to be easily up-gunned. The sixty-inch turret ring would struggle with anything bigger than the 6-pdr and it seemed odd that they hadn’t thought about the probability of needing a larger gun in due course. The second problem was Nuffield’s commitment to the Liberty engine, even although both the Rolls-Royce Meteor and the Perkins diesel were already at least as powerful as the boosted Liberty.

    The pre-production models (Nuffield had argued that since the tank was based on an existing design it wouldn’t need the prototype stage) were due to be delivered for testing in March 1942. The decision to avoid the prototype stage was strongly criticised by a number of different people and organisations. The chances were that the problems that had bedevilled the early production Crusaders was likely to be repeated in the new A24 tank, currently given the name “Cromwell”.

    The Victor, had already gone through a long prototype process. The pre-production models that were being built were using hand-built conversions of the Meteor engine from otherwise unflyable Merlin IIIs. Newly built Meteor production was expected to begin in February, allowing the actual production Victors to be built. Work on the dual-purpose gun was continuing even although Major-General Clarke (Director of Artillery) was still intent on making sure that the 17-pdr ammunition and Vickers gun was compatible. Lord Beaverbrook, in his role as Minister of Supply, had been trying to resolve the conflict between Director of Artillery and Vickers. Carden was following the army’s expressed need for a dual purpose tank gun, while Clarke was still insisting that the tank gun and towed anti-tank gun were the same. Both viewpoints were understandable, but Beaverbrook (and Winston Churchill) were leaning more towards Carden’s point of view.

    The suggestion of looking to see if the 6-pdr could be used as the basis for a 75mm gun was progressing, and if that bore fruit, then Valiant IIs could be converted to take that compromise gun. If the 75mm HV proved ineffective against future German armour, then Carden was prepared to accept Clarke’s insistence on a 76.2mm HV, even though the gunners would need to take into account the differences of firing the AP and HE shells which would need different tables.

    The question turned to expected production figures for 1942. Because of the need to ship Valiant tanks to Russia, production of the Valiant would continue, even though most of Vickers’ consortium of tank manufacturers would move to building the Victor. The production forecast for the first quarter of 1942 was for 320 Matilda IIs 350 Churchills, 395 Crusaders, 1105 Valiant II and the first 100 Victors, if all went well during February and March. The quarterly output of Tetrarch light tanks should also produce 90 tanks. If 1941 had produced 4841 tanks, the hope for 1942 would be more like 9400, though the likelihood was probably about ten or twelve percent less than that.

    Canadian production at Canadian Pacific Railway (Valiant) and Montreal Locomotive Works (Ram) The arrival of American lend-lease tanks would pick up significantly during 1942, currently the Americans had capped deliveries to Britain at 180 per month, so that their own armoured formations could be built up. The M3 Light and Medium tanks (Stuart & Grant) were being shipped to Australia, and once the Australian Armoured Division was fully equipped, deliveries would be made to India for its armoured divisions. These would eventually be replaced by Australia’s own production of the Jumbuck. Depending on the outcome of trials of the new M4 (Sherman), deliveries to Commonwealth forces wouldn’t likely to begin until much later in 1942, possibly until the beginning of 1943. From the point of view of some in the army, this would be a better replacement for the Crusader than the Cromwell as proposed.

    That being the case, British armoured and tank formations would need to continue to rely on British tank factories for the foreseeable future. The good news in 1941 was that production had expanded towards the levels needed. If that expansion carried on in 1942, then, even with the need to ship tanks to Russia, the British formations would have the tanks they needed for training, and start to build up a strategic reserve of tanks for when the invasion of Europe would make that necessary.
     
    25 January 1942. Port Said. Egypt.
  • 25 January 1942. Port Said. Egypt.

    The ships of the convoy Winston Special 14A had dispersed off Aden a few days earlier. Now the troops were being disembarked and heading for the camps where they would regain their fitness and be prepared for life in North Africa and the Middle East.

    The ships that carried supplies were being tied up alongside and the well-rehearsed process of unloading was getting into full swing. The Quartermaster General’s staff were trying to bring some kind of order out of the chaos along the wharfs, ships’ manifests were being scoured and guards being assigned to things of value.

    A whole group of men from the Royal Armoured Corps’ depots were on hand to oversee the hundreds of tanks that had been delivered. As usual, despite the best efforts of the tank factory and the dockers at Liverpool, there would be some remedial work needed to get them ready for operations. Since the tanks were all from Vickers the work wouldn’t be as bad as it may have been.

    There were always a few Vickers’ employees on hand to supervise the loading at Liverpool. This was an aspect of Vickers’ commitment to their customers. A team from Vickers were also on hand in Egypt to pick up from the army comments and ideas for bettering the design of the tanks. Some new members of the team had arrived in the convoy and some of those who had been in Egypt for over a year would sail home on the ships.

    One of the questions that had been raised as tank manufacturing had expanded over the last few years was about quality control. In the initial rush to get more companies involved, many of which had never been involved before in building tanks, and even more companies who were building components for the tanks, just getting them started had been the priority. The result had been that the Royal Armoured Corps, the Royal Army Ordinance Corps and the Royal Army Service Corps had had to spend too much time repairing tanks that shouldn’t have left the factory until they had been properly examined and tested. The dearth of spare parts had made this worse, with otherwise good tanks being stripped to keep others going.

    Spread throughout the ships that had carried the tanks across the ocean were boxes of spare parts, tracks and extra tools. While there weren’t quite enough spare engines for every tank, the ships carried enough to provide a spare for every second or third tank. The men responsible for taking the tanks off the ships, preparing them for life in the Middle East, and then providing them to the Armoured Division, looked at the manifests with enormous relief.

    After the fighting that had ended the Italian and German efforts in North Africa, the depots had managed to put together a battalion of working tanks to send along with 9th (Highland) Division to the Far East. Then they had worked through the tanks used by the 2nd and 7th Armoured Divisions. Many of those that had been knocked out, and more that had just broken down, had been stripped to keep the rest running. Most of the tanks had reached the 1000-mile mark, which was just about all that a tank could take before it needed a major overhaul. Just keeping 2nd and 7th Armoured Division up to strength, or as near as possible, had cleaned out much of the depots’ stocks of spares. The new tanks and all the spares would finally mean that the depots might just be able to keep ahead of demand.

    8th Armoured Division’s tanks had all been fully prepared before being shipped out. The Divisional Adjutant had threatened severe repercussions on anyone responsible for a tank needing anything more than minimal remedial work on arrival in Egypt. As the tanks and other vehicles were unloaded, this threat seemed to have done its job.

    Major-General McCreery was currently meeting with Wavell and O’Connor about how best to use this fresh Division. The decision to bring the Division to Egypt, rather than send them to Rangoon or Singapore, had been a matter of great debate. Lieutenant General Bill Slim had declined the offer of a full Armoured Division as he didn’t believe it could properly be maintained in the field due to Burma’s woeful infrastructure. Lieutenant General Percival had given it greater consideration, but London was still looking at the German thrust into Russia with concern.

    Once the weather was right, then Wavell’s plan to secure more islands in the Mediterranean would get underway. The 7th Australian Division were now adept at amphibious warfare, and elements of 2nd Armoured Division would be involved. The situation with Vichy, especially in Algeria and Syria was still on a knife-edge, and if that came to blows, Wavell wanted at least one solid Corps ready to take them on. 10th Armoured Division were sitting in Persia, and it seemed that General Jumbo Wilson’s command was beginning to look like an army than a collection of units in the same area. Wavell wanted McCreery’s Division in Palestine, ready to move into Syria if it came to that, or ready to back up Wilson in Persia if the Russians collapsed.
     
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