The design process for the next generation of German tanks is detailed here and is essentially the same as OTL.
Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.
- Thread starter allanpcameron
- Start date
Hey, I think I wrote that timeline
Oh indeed! And your campaign in SE Asia was the most plausible one considering the POD! That's why I think there will be a similar development here or even more advantageous for the Allies since Ambon has a full Aussie brigade other than the KNIL troops. The Australians had correctly identified the landing spots, but they lacked the manpower to properly defend the beaches. Now the Japanese will face slaughter, at least in their first attempt. So if anything, the Allies have even more time to move forces to Timor.
I assume you're talking about Keynes Cruisers?
I read the first volume, but haven't started Volume 2 yet.
Ramp-Rat
Monthly Donor
Just a quick point and something to remember, the French Army in FNA and the Levent is not The French Army. France at this time had three armies, the Home or Metropolitan Army, predominately conscript and only for use in Metropolitan France, the Colonial Army, which was full time professional and principally used in the French Colonies and was made up of French men. Finally there was the Colonial Levies and the Legion, made up of Colonial subjects or in the case of the Legion foreigners, Officered by Frenchmen and used principally in the colonies but could be deployed in France. Therefore the troops in the Levent and FNA, will be a mix of French Colonial forces and Local Levies, with only a few mostly senior officers from the French Metropolitan Army. As for the ability of the French to mobilise so quickly once they have the opportunity to need to read the history of IBM, during WWII. A very senior French functionary, was able to maintain the register of available men on IBM cards, without the Germans knowledge. And thus when required, and with the use of IBM Hollerith Tabulating machine, it was reasonable quick and easy to organise mobilisation.
RR.
RR.
3 December 1941. Singapore.
allanpcameron
Donor
3 December 1941. Singapore.
General Claude Auchinleck (C-inC India) had flown in to consult with Air Chief Marshall Robert Brooke-Popham (C-in-C Far East Command) and Admiral Tom Philips, newly arrived C-in-C China Station as well as his predecessor Vice-Admiral Geoffrey Layton. They were also joined by Vice-Admiral Geoffrey Arbuthnot (C-in-C East Indies Station). As well as the Royal Navy, the Army’s presence at the meeting included Lieutenant-Generals Arthur Percival (GOC Malaya Command), Donald McLeod (GOC Burma Army), Lewis Heath (GOC III Indian Corps), and Ivor Mackay (GOC AIF Malaya). The RAF were represented by Air Vice Marshall Conway Pulford (AOC RAF Far East). The mounting concern of a Japanese attack on Thailand, Malaya and Burma had the British and Empire forces on heightened alert. There were plenty of people who had a very low opinion of the Imperial Japanese Army, after all they hadn’t been able to subdue the Chinese. Auchinleck however had an inkling that this wasn’t the whole story, and unlike the majority of the forces in Far East Command, the Japanese had plenty of actual fighting experience.
Since Admiral Tom Philips was newly arrived, he was invited to be the first to speak. He noted that along with the battleships HMS Prince of Wales, Nelson and Barham, the battlecruiser HMS Repulse and aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal, the China Station fleet also had been reinforced with the cruisers HMS Carlisle, Gloucester and Fiji, the destroyers HMS Electra, Express, Encounter, Greyhound, Ilex, Imperial, Jupiter, Juno, Kashmir and Kelly. Some of the submarines which had joined the Mediterranean Fleet from Hong Kong and Singapore at the beginning of the war had also now returned.
When asked about his plans, Philips replied that he had worked with Layton to make sure that a picket of submarines was extended up the Malay peninsula, with the area between Hainan Island and the Thai coast of the South China Sea particularly well patrolled. There were also nine Dutch submarines included in that picket line. In addition to the submarines, a number of small vessels, such as Motor Torpedo Boats and sloops were patrolling the coastal waters. All mine sweepers were on constant alert and making sure there were no barriers to the fleet sailing. There were regular flights by RAF Hudsons and Catalinas (including Dutch crewed aircraft) also looking for any sign of Japanese aggression.
His plan was to have a fast and slow group, with HMS POW and Repulse as the fast group, and HMS Nelson, Barham and Ark Royal in the slow group, each with two Cruisers and various destroyers. The air group of HMS Ark Royal would have to maintain a standing Combat Air Patrol over both groups. If an invasion force was encountered the fast group would engage, allowing the slow group to close and bring their guns to bear, while the aircraft carrier stood off with its own escort. Philips wanted a meeting with AVM Pulford to coordinate land based reconnaissance and support to the Fleet Air Arm’s efforts. Pulford was happy to meet, but was aware of the short comings of his force.
Philips then noted that Singapore was vulnerable to air attack, and that he was considering that the main fleet would tend to work out of Ceylon. The admiralty were talking about sending the old R Class battleships to Ceylon, and that would give an added slow force, if necessary. He also noted that he was due to fly to the Philippines on 5 December to meet with Admiral Hart and General MacArthur to talk about joint operations. Vice-Admiral Layton wished him luck with that, Hart was a good man, but MacArthur had no desire to cooperate with the British. Philips and Layton had already met with Vice Admiral Conrad Helfrich, C-in-C Netherlands East Indies and were happy to report that good cooperation was likely to be the result.
The other good news came from the Royal Australian Navy in Sydney. The arrival home from the Mediterranean of the destroyers HMAS Vampire, Vendetta, Voyager, Waterhen, Napier, Nestor, Nizam, as well as the sloop HMAS Parramatta had given the crews time for some home leave. With the four cruisers, HMAS Perth, Hobart Australia and Canberra, the RAN was busy escorting troop convoys to Singapore, Rabaul, Timor and Ambon. Most of the Australian reinforcements to Rabual, Timor and Ambon were complete, the next phase was the completion of the reinforcement of the Australian Imperial Force Malaya.
That led to Lieutenant-General Ivan Mackay reporting that 8th Australian Division, having been reinforced to three full Brigades, was undergoing a great deal of training as a Division, previously they had worked almost as independent Brigades. The first arrivals of the men of 9th Australian Division at Singapore were the Royal Australian Engineers, 9th Division Signals, 9th Division Supply Column, and the other units that were necessary to prepare camps and set up Headquarters for the arrival of the rest of the Division. Mckay had been assured by Major-General Morshead (GOC 9th Australian Division) his division would be complete and fully prepared by the middle of January 1942. 20th Brigade, with 2/2 MG Battalion, 2/7th Field Regiment RAA and 9th Divisional Cavalry were due to arrive on 7th December, with all their support units. Followed by 24th Brigade, 2/8th Field Regiment, 3rd anti-tank Regiment RAA on 14 December, and finally 26th Brigade with the rest of Divisional troops on 21 December. Once 8th and 9th Australian Divisions were in place, Canberra wanted to create II Australian Corps, with Mackay as GOC.
Lieutenant-General Lewis Heath reported that III Indian Corps had been reinforced with two Brigades from 5th Indian Division (9th and 10th Indian Infantry Brigades). This brought both 9th and 11th Indian Divisions up to full strength. Heath was delighted at having a battle-hardened Brigade in each of his two Divisions. Previously he had expressed concerns that many of the men making up the two Indian Divisions, along with the Line of Communication and reserves, were untested, and there were elements of training that could be improved.
5th Indian Division’s arrival in Singapore of had begun piecemeal beginning in November. 29th Indian Infantry Brigade was the last to arrive and Heath had planned to use them as III Indian Corps’ reserves. He had taken the difficult decision to use the rest of 5th Indian Division’s assets to bring 9th and 11th Divisions up to full strength. The artillery alone would make an enormous difference to his Corps’ strength. The Divisional Cavalry, signals, engineers, Machine Gun Battalion and the host of other support units would make up the shortfall in all of those roles throughout the Corps.
Asked by Auchinleck whether it would have been better to keep the whole Division together, Heath admitted, having commanded the Division in East Africa, that it had kept him awake at night. 9th and 11th Indian Infantry Divisions had their merits, not least their time acclimatising to Malaya, but they were weak formations. By integrating 5th Divisions assets, he had strengthened them to the extent that they would now be able to fulfil their responsibilities. With the lack of infrastructure, having a third Division would affect mobility and complicate logistics. Having two strong Divisions, and a good Corps reserve, helped him sleep easier.
Heath then noted that the arrival of two squadrons of Matilda II Infantry Tanks under his command had increased his confidence. Until their arrival all he had was 100th Light Tank Squadron with some Vickers Mark VI light tanks and universal carriers. One of roles had given to these tanks was because of reading about the Crete campaign. He had assigned one Infantry Tank to each airfield. He would have preferred two tanks at each, but with only 36 tanks, he had to make hard decisions. There were four Battalions of Indian States Forces which were spread out protecting the airfields (Alar Star, Sungei Patani in the west and Kota Bahru, Machang, Gong Kedah and Kuantan in the east). This tied down a sixth of his available tanks, but he believed that each airfield was now much better off.
Operation Matador, the plan to put forces into Thailand in the event of a Japanese landing, was still under discussion, there were many voices against the invasion of Thailand. Heath had given responsibility for this to 11th Indian Division. From his experience of working in East Africa, while taking the initiative was all well and good, Heath was aware that he was asking a lot of a Division that wasn’t quite as well trained as necessary. They would also be moving into territory over which little reconnaissance had been possible, to find themselves in a situation where they might be fighting the Thai army as well as the Japanese.
Major-General David Murray-Lyon (GOC 11th Indian Infantry Division) had his staff prepare number of different plans, including a more simplified operation to achieve some of the objectives.
The primary goal of Operation Matador was to advance to contact with Japanese invasion forces. Murray-Lyon and Heath had agreed that his force wasn’t strong enough to fulfil the two roles of both invading Thailand and defending Jitra. Of the two Brigades under his command, 6th Indian Infantry Brigade was the more effective. It had been suggested that instead of putting all its eggs in one basket, a column of infantry and engineers could move into Thailand and do as much damage to the road as possible to slow up a Japanese advance. That would allow the rest of 6th and 15th Brigades to deploy to prepared positions. Murray-Lyon also had 28th (Gurkha) Infantry Brigade as his Divisional reserve. Heath had agreed to provide the Corps reserve (29th Indian Infantry Brigade) to position itself around Ipoh, allowing the Gurkhas to move forward to Kroh.
At Kroh Murray-Lyon had assembled a mobile force based on 10th Indian Infantry Brigade, carried by their own and borrowed Australian lorries. Accompanied by an artillery mountain battery, a battery of anti-tank guns and a company of engineers. These would aim to cut the road over the middle of the country at a point known as the Ledge. This would prevent the Japanese from getting into 11th Indian Division’s rear area. Heath had approved this plan, he had arranged for ‘Krohcol’ to be strenghened by one Matilda II troop and a troop of Light Tanks from the 100th Light Tank Company and some armoured cars from the 3rd Cavalry Regiment.
Heath also reported that Major-General Arthur Barstow (GOC 9th Indian Infantry Division) had moved 9th Indian Brigade to support 8th Indian Brigade at Kota Bahru. Most of 8th Brigade were forward based on the possible landing beaches. With 9th Brigade in and around the triangle of airfields, he had an effective counter-attack force. Heath had authorised 9th Brigade to have three troops of Matilda II Infantry tanks, which would give them even greater effectiveness. Should it be necessary, 9th Brigade could also be used to move into Thailand towards Japanese landing beaches. In addition, 1st Duke of York’s Own Skinners Horse, 5th Division’s Reconnaissance Regiment had been provided to 9th Brigade. Equipped with Indian Pattern Carriers, some light tanks and universal carriers, it gave Brigadier Bernard Fletcher (CO 9th Indian Infantry Brigade) a useful tool to carry out his role.
Once the talk about Malaya had been completed, Lieutenant-General McLeod (GOC Burma Army) also reported having received reinforcements, allowing him to prepare better. With the surrender of the Italian forces in East Africa, 11th African Division had been withdrawn initially to Kenya. The threat of Japanese aggression had been a strong argument between Auchinleck and Wavell for moving the African Division to Burma, just as the 5th Indian and 6th and 9th Australian Divisions were also released from Middle East Command.
The 1st West Africa Infantry Brigade group had sailed in August 1941 to Rangoon. The 21st East Africa Infantry Brigade group followed in September and finally the 22nd East Africa Infantry Brigade Group arrived at the beginning of November. The arrival of the African troops had given McLeod a battle-experienced Division to add to his 1st Burma Division. The African troops were coping quite well with the new environment, and Major-General Charles Fowkes was keen to have 11th African Division continue to show its abilities. McLeod had placed 11th African Division forward based around Moulmein, covering the road from Thailand. The problem of protecting the RAF stations that protected Rangoon in the Burmese province of Tenasserim was still unsolved. Fowkes was working particularly hard at protecting the crossings of the Salween River, the first main barrier protecting the rest of Burma.
McLeod noted that while the African Division was a great help, the Burma Division, his other main force was weak. It was short of just about everything in terms of artillery, signals, engineers, medical and transport units. Also, its training was sorely lacking, especially at Brigade level. The need to protect Burma, like Malaya, was a question of resources, and McLeod knew that his command was sorely lacking.
General Auchinleck was already aware of the problem, ACM Brooke-Popham had been urging him to find more forces from India to reinforce both Burma and Malaya. The problem was that while he had five Indian Infantry Divisions at various stages of being formed, and none of them would be capable of being put into the field until 1942 at the earliest. Three Indian Infantry Divisions, including Major-General Bill Slim’s 10th Indian Infantry Division were tied up in ‘PAI force’ (Persia and Iraq force). Having secured the oil infrastructure in Iraq, they had cooperated with the Soviets in the occupation of Persia. Now they were sitting around in case the Germans broke through the Caucasus mountains. Given half a chance Auchinleck would withdraw one of these three and use it to reinforce Burma, and Slim’s Division would be his first choice. He could then send 17th Indian Infantry Division to Persia where it could continue its training. With the end in sight in Libya, Wavell would still have more than enough forces. He would need to consult with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, but he felt he had a strong argument. Bringing Major-General Slim to Burma, would give McLeod a good candidate for a Corps commander for 10th Indian and 11th African Divisions.
Lieutenant-General Percival noted that the British 18th Infantry Division were sailing directly from Britain, WS 12Z had arrived at Durban and due to sail directly to Singapore to arrive by Christmas Day. The plan was for this Division to join the two Australian Divisions as II Australian Corps. Having five full Divisions in Malaya would be close to that which would be required to hold the territory and protect Singapore.
ACM Brooke-Popham noted that the reinforcements that had arrived in Malaya and Burma were most welcome, but there were still areas under his command that were in dire need of even the minimum of protection. He really wanted to strengthen the Sarawak and Borneo force. Looking at the forces available, he requested that Percival and Heath would agree to send two more battalions to make the force on Borneo a Brigade. There were two Punjab Battalions (3rd Bn, 16th Punjab Regiment and 5th Bn, 14th Punjab Regiment) in Heath’s organisation that could possibly be spared. These had originally been assigned to Krohcol before 10th Indian Infantry Brigade had arrived. Lt Col Henry Moorehead (OC 3/16 Punjab) would be a suitable acting Brigadier to take over the Sarawak force.
Air Vice Marshall Conway Pulford (AOC RAF Far East) was the last to speak and perhaps gave the most negative assessment of the situation. Despite all the efforts of ACM Brooke-Popham to persuade London to strengthen the RAF in the Far East, there was very little to show for it. Promises of reinforcements were still to be seen. 96 crated Tomahawk IIbs were due to arrive in the same convoy that was bringing 18th Infantry Division. It would be well into January before those had arrived, were assembled, tested and the pilots familiarised with them. The request from Admiral Philips for more reconnaissance and fighter cover was something that Pulford wanted to offer, but his resources were so stretched that he couldn’t promise everything that Philips wanted. He was aware that the Royal Navy and RAF had worked out a very efficient and effective support structure in the Mediterranean, but in Malaya that wasn't so much the case.
He was willing to work towards a solution, but there were signs that a great many Japanese fighters and bombers were based in French Indo-China. Even if, and that was unlikely, they weren’t very good aircraft, his own force of fighters and bombers weren’t exactly first class as well as being heavily outnumbered. The other problem was the decision to forward base the majority of his squadrons. It made perfect sense to interdict a Japanese invasion fleet, but if the Japanese were to base themselves in Thailand, his squadrons would be terribly vulnerable. Unlike Malta his squadrons wouldn’t have the advantages of radar and heavily defended airfields with plenty of anti-aircraft guns. Lieutenant-General Mackay added that the experience in Greece was that airfields when abandoned had to be thoroughly destroyed. The Luftwaffe had the bad habit of moving up close behind the ground forces and bringing abandoned bases into operation very quickly. He saw no reason to believe that the Japanese wouldn't do the same. Pulford agreed, but noted that that would be a job for the infantry defending the airfields.
He went on to say that he was being asked to support the navy and interdict the Japanese fleet. Also, to support the army by bombing any troops that landed as well as keeping the Japanese aircraft from attacking the army. As if that wasn’t enough, he also had to defend the civilian population and his own airfields. All this with a total of 161 front line aircraft, of which 60 were Buffalo fighters. The arrival of HMS Ark Royal with her Hurricanes and Fulmars was in fact the greatest boost to the air defence of Malaya yet.
With this pessimistic assessment the meeting broke up. Auchinleck and Brooke-Popham asked Percival to join them at a meeting with Sir Shenton Thomas. As the Governor-General of the Straits Settlements, as well as High Commissioner in Malaya, Brunei, and British Agent for Sarawak and North Borneo, it was clear that he would be essential in working with the civilian population to prepare for war.
General Claude Auchinleck (C-inC India) had flown in to consult with Air Chief Marshall Robert Brooke-Popham (C-in-C Far East Command) and Admiral Tom Philips, newly arrived C-in-C China Station as well as his predecessor Vice-Admiral Geoffrey Layton. They were also joined by Vice-Admiral Geoffrey Arbuthnot (C-in-C East Indies Station). As well as the Royal Navy, the Army’s presence at the meeting included Lieutenant-Generals Arthur Percival (GOC Malaya Command), Donald McLeod (GOC Burma Army), Lewis Heath (GOC III Indian Corps), and Ivor Mackay (GOC AIF Malaya). The RAF were represented by Air Vice Marshall Conway Pulford (AOC RAF Far East). The mounting concern of a Japanese attack on Thailand, Malaya and Burma had the British and Empire forces on heightened alert. There were plenty of people who had a very low opinion of the Imperial Japanese Army, after all they hadn’t been able to subdue the Chinese. Auchinleck however had an inkling that this wasn’t the whole story, and unlike the majority of the forces in Far East Command, the Japanese had plenty of actual fighting experience.
Since Admiral Tom Philips was newly arrived, he was invited to be the first to speak. He noted that along with the battleships HMS Prince of Wales, Nelson and Barham, the battlecruiser HMS Repulse and aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal, the China Station fleet also had been reinforced with the cruisers HMS Carlisle, Gloucester and Fiji, the destroyers HMS Electra, Express, Encounter, Greyhound, Ilex, Imperial, Jupiter, Juno, Kashmir and Kelly. Some of the submarines which had joined the Mediterranean Fleet from Hong Kong and Singapore at the beginning of the war had also now returned.
When asked about his plans, Philips replied that he had worked with Layton to make sure that a picket of submarines was extended up the Malay peninsula, with the area between Hainan Island and the Thai coast of the South China Sea particularly well patrolled. There were also nine Dutch submarines included in that picket line. In addition to the submarines, a number of small vessels, such as Motor Torpedo Boats and sloops were patrolling the coastal waters. All mine sweepers were on constant alert and making sure there were no barriers to the fleet sailing. There were regular flights by RAF Hudsons and Catalinas (including Dutch crewed aircraft) also looking for any sign of Japanese aggression.
His plan was to have a fast and slow group, with HMS POW and Repulse as the fast group, and HMS Nelson, Barham and Ark Royal in the slow group, each with two Cruisers and various destroyers. The air group of HMS Ark Royal would have to maintain a standing Combat Air Patrol over both groups. If an invasion force was encountered the fast group would engage, allowing the slow group to close and bring their guns to bear, while the aircraft carrier stood off with its own escort. Philips wanted a meeting with AVM Pulford to coordinate land based reconnaissance and support to the Fleet Air Arm’s efforts. Pulford was happy to meet, but was aware of the short comings of his force.
Philips then noted that Singapore was vulnerable to air attack, and that he was considering that the main fleet would tend to work out of Ceylon. The admiralty were talking about sending the old R Class battleships to Ceylon, and that would give an added slow force, if necessary. He also noted that he was due to fly to the Philippines on 5 December to meet with Admiral Hart and General MacArthur to talk about joint operations. Vice-Admiral Layton wished him luck with that, Hart was a good man, but MacArthur had no desire to cooperate with the British. Philips and Layton had already met with Vice Admiral Conrad Helfrich, C-in-C Netherlands East Indies and were happy to report that good cooperation was likely to be the result.
The other good news came from the Royal Australian Navy in Sydney. The arrival home from the Mediterranean of the destroyers HMAS Vampire, Vendetta, Voyager, Waterhen, Napier, Nestor, Nizam, as well as the sloop HMAS Parramatta had given the crews time for some home leave. With the four cruisers, HMAS Perth, Hobart Australia and Canberra, the RAN was busy escorting troop convoys to Singapore, Rabaul, Timor and Ambon. Most of the Australian reinforcements to Rabual, Timor and Ambon were complete, the next phase was the completion of the reinforcement of the Australian Imperial Force Malaya.
That led to Lieutenant-General Ivan Mackay reporting that 8th Australian Division, having been reinforced to three full Brigades, was undergoing a great deal of training as a Division, previously they had worked almost as independent Brigades. The first arrivals of the men of 9th Australian Division at Singapore were the Royal Australian Engineers, 9th Division Signals, 9th Division Supply Column, and the other units that were necessary to prepare camps and set up Headquarters for the arrival of the rest of the Division. Mckay had been assured by Major-General Morshead (GOC 9th Australian Division) his division would be complete and fully prepared by the middle of January 1942. 20th Brigade, with 2/2 MG Battalion, 2/7th Field Regiment RAA and 9th Divisional Cavalry were due to arrive on 7th December, with all their support units. Followed by 24th Brigade, 2/8th Field Regiment, 3rd anti-tank Regiment RAA on 14 December, and finally 26th Brigade with the rest of Divisional troops on 21 December. Once 8th and 9th Australian Divisions were in place, Canberra wanted to create II Australian Corps, with Mackay as GOC.
Lieutenant-General Lewis Heath reported that III Indian Corps had been reinforced with two Brigades from 5th Indian Division (9th and 10th Indian Infantry Brigades). This brought both 9th and 11th Indian Divisions up to full strength. Heath was delighted at having a battle-hardened Brigade in each of his two Divisions. Previously he had expressed concerns that many of the men making up the two Indian Divisions, along with the Line of Communication and reserves, were untested, and there were elements of training that could be improved.
5th Indian Division’s arrival in Singapore of had begun piecemeal beginning in November. 29th Indian Infantry Brigade was the last to arrive and Heath had planned to use them as III Indian Corps’ reserves. He had taken the difficult decision to use the rest of 5th Indian Division’s assets to bring 9th and 11th Divisions up to full strength. The artillery alone would make an enormous difference to his Corps’ strength. The Divisional Cavalry, signals, engineers, Machine Gun Battalion and the host of other support units would make up the shortfall in all of those roles throughout the Corps.
Asked by Auchinleck whether it would have been better to keep the whole Division together, Heath admitted, having commanded the Division in East Africa, that it had kept him awake at night. 9th and 11th Indian Infantry Divisions had their merits, not least their time acclimatising to Malaya, but they were weak formations. By integrating 5th Divisions assets, he had strengthened them to the extent that they would now be able to fulfil their responsibilities. With the lack of infrastructure, having a third Division would affect mobility and complicate logistics. Having two strong Divisions, and a good Corps reserve, helped him sleep easier.
Heath then noted that the arrival of two squadrons of Matilda II Infantry Tanks under his command had increased his confidence. Until their arrival all he had was 100th Light Tank Squadron with some Vickers Mark VI light tanks and universal carriers. One of roles had given to these tanks was because of reading about the Crete campaign. He had assigned one Infantry Tank to each airfield. He would have preferred two tanks at each, but with only 36 tanks, he had to make hard decisions. There were four Battalions of Indian States Forces which were spread out protecting the airfields (Alar Star, Sungei Patani in the west and Kota Bahru, Machang, Gong Kedah and Kuantan in the east). This tied down a sixth of his available tanks, but he believed that each airfield was now much better off.
Operation Matador, the plan to put forces into Thailand in the event of a Japanese landing, was still under discussion, there were many voices against the invasion of Thailand. Heath had given responsibility for this to 11th Indian Division. From his experience of working in East Africa, while taking the initiative was all well and good, Heath was aware that he was asking a lot of a Division that wasn’t quite as well trained as necessary. They would also be moving into territory over which little reconnaissance had been possible, to find themselves in a situation where they might be fighting the Thai army as well as the Japanese.
Major-General David Murray-Lyon (GOC 11th Indian Infantry Division) had his staff prepare number of different plans, including a more simplified operation to achieve some of the objectives.
The primary goal of Operation Matador was to advance to contact with Japanese invasion forces. Murray-Lyon and Heath had agreed that his force wasn’t strong enough to fulfil the two roles of both invading Thailand and defending Jitra. Of the two Brigades under his command, 6th Indian Infantry Brigade was the more effective. It had been suggested that instead of putting all its eggs in one basket, a column of infantry and engineers could move into Thailand and do as much damage to the road as possible to slow up a Japanese advance. That would allow the rest of 6th and 15th Brigades to deploy to prepared positions. Murray-Lyon also had 28th (Gurkha) Infantry Brigade as his Divisional reserve. Heath had agreed to provide the Corps reserve (29th Indian Infantry Brigade) to position itself around Ipoh, allowing the Gurkhas to move forward to Kroh.
At Kroh Murray-Lyon had assembled a mobile force based on 10th Indian Infantry Brigade, carried by their own and borrowed Australian lorries. Accompanied by an artillery mountain battery, a battery of anti-tank guns and a company of engineers. These would aim to cut the road over the middle of the country at a point known as the Ledge. This would prevent the Japanese from getting into 11th Indian Division’s rear area. Heath had approved this plan, he had arranged for ‘Krohcol’ to be strenghened by one Matilda II troop and a troop of Light Tanks from the 100th Light Tank Company and some armoured cars from the 3rd Cavalry Regiment.
Heath also reported that Major-General Arthur Barstow (GOC 9th Indian Infantry Division) had moved 9th Indian Brigade to support 8th Indian Brigade at Kota Bahru. Most of 8th Brigade were forward based on the possible landing beaches. With 9th Brigade in and around the triangle of airfields, he had an effective counter-attack force. Heath had authorised 9th Brigade to have three troops of Matilda II Infantry tanks, which would give them even greater effectiveness. Should it be necessary, 9th Brigade could also be used to move into Thailand towards Japanese landing beaches. In addition, 1st Duke of York’s Own Skinners Horse, 5th Division’s Reconnaissance Regiment had been provided to 9th Brigade. Equipped with Indian Pattern Carriers, some light tanks and universal carriers, it gave Brigadier Bernard Fletcher (CO 9th Indian Infantry Brigade) a useful tool to carry out his role.
Once the talk about Malaya had been completed, Lieutenant-General McLeod (GOC Burma Army) also reported having received reinforcements, allowing him to prepare better. With the surrender of the Italian forces in East Africa, 11th African Division had been withdrawn initially to Kenya. The threat of Japanese aggression had been a strong argument between Auchinleck and Wavell for moving the African Division to Burma, just as the 5th Indian and 6th and 9th Australian Divisions were also released from Middle East Command.
The 1st West Africa Infantry Brigade group had sailed in August 1941 to Rangoon. The 21st East Africa Infantry Brigade group followed in September and finally the 22nd East Africa Infantry Brigade Group arrived at the beginning of November. The arrival of the African troops had given McLeod a battle-experienced Division to add to his 1st Burma Division. The African troops were coping quite well with the new environment, and Major-General Charles Fowkes was keen to have 11th African Division continue to show its abilities. McLeod had placed 11th African Division forward based around Moulmein, covering the road from Thailand. The problem of protecting the RAF stations that protected Rangoon in the Burmese province of Tenasserim was still unsolved. Fowkes was working particularly hard at protecting the crossings of the Salween River, the first main barrier protecting the rest of Burma.
McLeod noted that while the African Division was a great help, the Burma Division, his other main force was weak. It was short of just about everything in terms of artillery, signals, engineers, medical and transport units. Also, its training was sorely lacking, especially at Brigade level. The need to protect Burma, like Malaya, was a question of resources, and McLeod knew that his command was sorely lacking.
General Auchinleck was already aware of the problem, ACM Brooke-Popham had been urging him to find more forces from India to reinforce both Burma and Malaya. The problem was that while he had five Indian Infantry Divisions at various stages of being formed, and none of them would be capable of being put into the field until 1942 at the earliest. Three Indian Infantry Divisions, including Major-General Bill Slim’s 10th Indian Infantry Division were tied up in ‘PAI force’ (Persia and Iraq force). Having secured the oil infrastructure in Iraq, they had cooperated with the Soviets in the occupation of Persia. Now they were sitting around in case the Germans broke through the Caucasus mountains. Given half a chance Auchinleck would withdraw one of these three and use it to reinforce Burma, and Slim’s Division would be his first choice. He could then send 17th Indian Infantry Division to Persia where it could continue its training. With the end in sight in Libya, Wavell would still have more than enough forces. He would need to consult with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, but he felt he had a strong argument. Bringing Major-General Slim to Burma, would give McLeod a good candidate for a Corps commander for 10th Indian and 11th African Divisions.
Lieutenant-General Percival noted that the British 18th Infantry Division were sailing directly from Britain, WS 12Z had arrived at Durban and due to sail directly to Singapore to arrive by Christmas Day. The plan was for this Division to join the two Australian Divisions as II Australian Corps. Having five full Divisions in Malaya would be close to that which would be required to hold the territory and protect Singapore.
ACM Brooke-Popham noted that the reinforcements that had arrived in Malaya and Burma were most welcome, but there were still areas under his command that were in dire need of even the minimum of protection. He really wanted to strengthen the Sarawak and Borneo force. Looking at the forces available, he requested that Percival and Heath would agree to send two more battalions to make the force on Borneo a Brigade. There were two Punjab Battalions (3rd Bn, 16th Punjab Regiment and 5th Bn, 14th Punjab Regiment) in Heath’s organisation that could possibly be spared. These had originally been assigned to Krohcol before 10th Indian Infantry Brigade had arrived. Lt Col Henry Moorehead (OC 3/16 Punjab) would be a suitable acting Brigadier to take over the Sarawak force.
Air Vice Marshall Conway Pulford (AOC RAF Far East) was the last to speak and perhaps gave the most negative assessment of the situation. Despite all the efforts of ACM Brooke-Popham to persuade London to strengthen the RAF in the Far East, there was very little to show for it. Promises of reinforcements were still to be seen. 96 crated Tomahawk IIbs were due to arrive in the same convoy that was bringing 18th Infantry Division. It would be well into January before those had arrived, were assembled, tested and the pilots familiarised with them. The request from Admiral Philips for more reconnaissance and fighter cover was something that Pulford wanted to offer, but his resources were so stretched that he couldn’t promise everything that Philips wanted. He was aware that the Royal Navy and RAF had worked out a very efficient and effective support structure in the Mediterranean, but in Malaya that wasn't so much the case.
He was willing to work towards a solution, but there were signs that a great many Japanese fighters and bombers were based in French Indo-China. Even if, and that was unlikely, they weren’t very good aircraft, his own force of fighters and bombers weren’t exactly first class as well as being heavily outnumbered. The other problem was the decision to forward base the majority of his squadrons. It made perfect sense to interdict a Japanese invasion fleet, but if the Japanese were to base themselves in Thailand, his squadrons would be terribly vulnerable. Unlike Malta his squadrons wouldn’t have the advantages of radar and heavily defended airfields with plenty of anti-aircraft guns. Lieutenant-General Mackay added that the experience in Greece was that airfields when abandoned had to be thoroughly destroyed. The Luftwaffe had the bad habit of moving up close behind the ground forces and bringing abandoned bases into operation very quickly. He saw no reason to believe that the Japanese wouldn't do the same. Pulford agreed, but noted that that would be a job for the infantry defending the airfields.
He went on to say that he was being asked to support the navy and interdict the Japanese fleet. Also, to support the army by bombing any troops that landed as well as keeping the Japanese aircraft from attacking the army. As if that wasn’t enough, he also had to defend the civilian population and his own airfields. All this with a total of 161 front line aircraft, of which 60 were Buffalo fighters. The arrival of HMS Ark Royal with her Hurricanes and Fulmars was in fact the greatest boost to the air defence of Malaya yet.
With this pessimistic assessment the meeting broke up. Auchinleck and Brooke-Popham asked Percival to join them at a meeting with Sir Shenton Thomas. As the Governor-General of the Straits Settlements, as well as High Commissioner in Malaya, Brunei, and British Agent for Sarawak and North Borneo, it was clear that he would be essential in working with the civilian population to prepare for war.
At least some of which, Imperial Japanese spies and informants will be reporting back to Tokyo... (Like tanks being seen on airfields, and troopships arriving at ports.)
Not a good time to be an IJ top brass member, looking at a US oil embargo on the one hand (if that has gone down as in the original timeline) and seeing British tanks starting to show up in Malaya on the other. And with the North African campaign having finished at an exceedingly inconvenient time, too, for the IJ on the count of 'do we want to fight them or not'?
Any update on discussions in Tokyo and the vicinity (edit: to show what the IJ 'maths' is) should be highly interesting...
That is a significantly larger naval force than what was sent OTL.
MacArthur: Cooperate? What's that? Some funny Limey dance?
Problem is a lot of the decisions here aren't being made in Tokyo by the Imperial Goverment they are being made by the military and usually at the level of Colonel or major as much as general officers. Who are more than likely to go for the leap and scream approach to this whole problem which will bite them in the ass.
MacArthur: Cooperate? What's that? Some funny Limey dance?
Thats a significant addition, and the fast/slow mix and there's 4 cruisers with them, potentially 8 if you count the Australian surface forces and there's also another 3 Dutch Cruisers and a handful of destroyers as well. The ground situation looks much much better, but the air situation is still dire. The Buffalo's are going to have to do a lot of heavy lifting.
Well if nothing else the Kota Bahru landing will fail. It nearly did Otl and with the extra troops and infantry tanks the Japanese are doomed.
isn't this a bit early for catalinas? the dutch planes at this stage would be Dornier 24s
In practical terms, what were the smallest independent tank and artillery units the UK was capable of transferring from one command to another? In addition, what about transfer of individual teams? So a tank crew or gun crew? I'm just pondering the identification of full divisions not being ready to deploy to deploy to Burma and wondering about the ability to penny packet the gaps until those larger divisions are ready? Specifically where those unit types act as force multipliers stiffening the lighter units already in-place, but perhaps unable to hold ground in isolation.
The combat arms of the British Army are based around regiments and battalions (battalions in the infantry, regiments for the cavalry and artillery) so realistically they're unlikely to transfer anything smaller unless it's an absolutely dire emergency. A company (infantry), squadron (armour) or battery (artillery) could transfer separately but the unit support services (the QM's minions, the mortar and anti tank platoons etc) are all based with the unit HQ.