Not that hard to do, a thin steel tube closed at one end and a lot of ball-bearings and bits of scrap metal. Stick that in the case with some propellant a done.
Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.
- Thread starter allanpcameron
- Start date
Which on its first shot ruins the gun lining so subsequent shots probably go anywhere but where they were aimed. And don't even try to fire an AT round out of the same tube.
Yes, they could be made but the tube needs to be the precise thickness to split after it exists the gun & not before & the contents need to be better balanced than some random scrap.
Precise machining, but still far simpler to produce than any other type of round.
Australian factories produced large amounts of 25-pdr and 4-inch AA ammunition throughout the war. They could have produced 40 mm canister but didn't because canister doesn't work out of rifled barrels.
Really , someone should have told the Americans that , the M5 37mm in ,for example the M3 Stuart, came with one.
Eventually came with one - probably adapted from the 37mm TRP guns they used in WW1 and between the wars
It had a cannister round because the early gun armed US tanks did not have an MG and the French already had a Cannister round for it
The M3 Stuart having 'All of the machine guns' initially did not need cannister
Also Cannister ruins a barrel - obviously troops would not care about that but peace time bean counters do.
During the Battle of the Philippines the M3s only had AP rounds and they had to McGyver up some HE rounds later in the campaign by using the HE warheads from TRP ammunition as I understand it - the TRP guns being used by the Philippine army.
M5 37mm AT Gun Cannister ammo started production in April 42 and HE ammo in Feb 1942
So unless it was kit bashed, M3 Stuarts would only have APC rounds in Dec 41
marathag
Banned
Lead shot, so won't hurt the barrel even if the can splits too soon. Case is also probably mild steel, that won't hurt the barrel
"4-inch AA ammunition"? Never heard of the round. Australia produced 2 Pounder, 25 Pounder and other ammunition throughout the war. We imported 37mm ammunition for the M3 Stuart tank. A tank which must be said was a bit of a failure when we did use it at Buna and Sandiananda during the Battle of the Bridgeheads. I'm not sure if it had 37mm Canister rounds at the time but it proved a bit of a flop.
... yeah, about that. Australia made case shot for the 2 pounder. The initial requirement was met by taking the 37mm M2 canister projectile and loading that into a 2 pounder cartridge. There was a plan to manufacture a proper 40mm 2 pounder case shot, but I don't know if that went ahead as I think the usage rate of the 37mm version might not have been high enough.
And even though a 37mm canister would be loose going down the 2 pounder barrel, it worked as it was supposed to and was issued.
11 December 1941. Jitra, Malaya.
allanpcameron
Donor
11 December 1941. Jitra, Malaya.
While Operation Matador, as it had originally been conceived, had been taken off the table, Lieutenant-General Heath (GOC III Indian Corps) had ordered three spoiling attacks. “Krohcol” (10th Brigade) had successfully fulfilled its mission to stop a Japanese advance from the direction of Petani. Major-General Murray-Lyon had committed to two other operations. The simplest of these involved an armoured train, manned by a platoon of the 2/ 16th Punjab and some engineers. The train party reached Khlaung Ngae, in Thailand, blew a 200-foot railway bridge on the line to Singora, and then withdrew to Padang Besar.
The second was "Laycol" (a column taken from the command of Brigadier William Lay [OC 6th Indian Infantry Brigade]). Since the objective of this column was limited to slowing the enemy, giving time for the rest of 11th Division to prepare, it was a much smaller column than Krohcol. Comprising just two companies, and the carrier platoon of 1/8th Punjab, with one Matilda II infantry tank, along with anti-tank guns and engineers. Laycol (commanded by Major Eric Andrews) advanced along the Changlun road towards Ban Sadao, eight miles beyond the frontier on the way to Singora, reaching it at dawn on 9 December, taking up defensive positions north of the village. Although they hurriedly prepared positions, the day passed quietly.
Andrews sent a section of three carriers forward towards Khlaung Ngae where the railway bridge had been destroyed to find out what was happening. From what could be gathered from the locals, the Thai military and police had attempted to resist the Japanese invasion at Singora, but it seemed that an armistice was declared to begin 12:00hrs. The good news seemed to be that the Japanese landing force had taken losses, though it wasn’t clear what exactly had been lost, but obviously not enough.
At 21:00hrs a Japanese reconnaissance column of thirty-five vehicles, preceded by tanks, and with headlights blazing, bore down on Laycol’s positions. Four of the tanks were knocked out by the Matilda II and the anti-tank guns. The Japanese infantry, who had dismounted at the beginning of the action, were soon engaged in an enveloping movement. The order not to get involved in anything more than delaying actions meant that Major Eric Andrews ordered his force to withdraw immediately. The engineers had set demolition charges on a number of places that would deny the road to motor transport. As they withdrew, they destroyed three bridges, that would take the Japanese time to replace.
Crossing back over the Malaya border, Andrews had his force take up positions to once again slow the Japanese force. The destruction of the bridges had obviously effectively delayed the Japanese as well as they had hoped. By the evening of 10 December there was still no sign of the vanguard of the Japanese force.
Lieutenant-General Heath had reviewed Murray-Lyon’s plans for defending Jitra, and had made some simple suggestions to improve the way he had laid out his force. Murray-Lyon didn’t have much in the way of experience, except from the Great War and action on the North-West Frontier. Heath showed him how he could make more use of his artillery and to think less of holding a line, and more of a defence in depth. Heath had tried, since he arrived in May, to share with the two generals commanding the Indian Divisions, David Murray-Lyon and Arthur Barstow, some of what he’d learned in East Africa. He had appointed some of the staff officers from 5th Indian Division onto 9th and 11th Indian Division’s staff to have some experience present when planning operations.
One of the fundamental problems Heath had discovered since arriving in Malaya that there was a feeling that the Japanese army was not considered an effective fighting force, having lost to the Soviets at Khalkhin Gol in 1939 and the fact that they were unable to defeat the Chinese army. Heath however had the feeling that the Japanese would have learned a great deal from their time at war. The Indian army was used to small wars with limited numbers. Many of the men in 9th and 11th Divisions were new recruits who hadn’t even had that experience. Many of the regular officers with experience had been sent to firm up the vastly expanding Indian Army. Therefore, many of the junior officers under his command were hastily promoted to fill the posts.
Heath was pleased that Murray-Lyon had taken his advice. While infantry could easily enough work round flanks through ‘impenetrable’ jungle, the motor transport couldn’t. Keeping control of the road was therefore Murray-Lyon’s main task. Gazelle Force in East Africa had given Heath the idea of using some of his infantry tanks and all of his light tanks as a mobile force, working with a couple of the Division’s carrier platoons. These would be the links between the various Battalion positions, making sure that if the enemy got round the flank and appeared in the rear of a position, then the tanks and the carrier platoons would counter these roadblocks to keep the road open.
Lt-Col Michael Hedderwick (CO 11th Bn RTR) had been worried about the way in which his unit was being parcelled out in penny packets and had challenged Lieutenant-General Heath about the way he was using up his men and tanks. With only one squadron of 18 tanks in each of the two Divisions Heath admitted that he was taking a chance adding a troop here and there, even a single tank on some occasions. What he had managed to do was to keep six tanks (the squadron HQ and one troop) together as part of each Division’s reserves. Heath reckoned that six Infantry Tanks working together would probably be strong enough to take on just about anything the Japanese would throw at them. Hedderwick saw his reasoning, but he was aware that Malaya Command hadn’t had much experience of tank warfare, and he worried that his men would pay the price for being used in ineffective ways.
At 08:00hrs on 11 December, Major Andrews’ 'Laycol' sent a motorcycle messenger to say that there was a strong Japanese column moving over the border into Malaya. Andrews had set up his force into two parties. One Company, with an anti-tank gun and the Matilda II tank would engage the enemy, the second Company would be in a supporting position further back along the road. Each company would leapfrog the other back to the Battalion’s main positions around Changlun, with the tank providing covering fire.
Sergeant Arthur Hickson, commanding the tank “Milly”, was worried about having enough ammunition for the co-axial machine gun. While he had brought more than the usual amount, at the expense of some of his 2-pdr ammunition, there was always the fear that there wouldn’t be enough. The RTR support units had wondered how best to service their charges which were so spread out. In this case, a universal carrier had been provided with cans of petrol and ammunition reloads was being held at Changlun ready to replenish the tank when it arrived back.
The other two tanks of Hickson’s Troop were at Jitre, one each with the 2nd Bn East Surrey Regiment and 1st Bn Leicestershire Regiment. As his tank worked back from one position to the next, Hickson and his gunner had managed to knock out at least three enemy tanks. A couple of lorries had also been machine gunned, but still the Japanese advanced. The final pull back was to the 1/8th Punjab main position at Changlun. As the tank arrived in friendly lines, the first artillery shells started falling on the forward elements of the Japanese. Under the cover of this bombardment, Hickson was glad to get into a hidden position and begin to replenish the ammo and fill up on fuel. The driver did a spot of tightening of various nuts, and checked the engine, adding some more oil.
Laycol was now back to simply being part of 1/8th Punjab Regiment. Major Andrews came over thank Hickson and his men, and make sure, that like his own men, they had got some food and hot tea. Finding that Hickson was doing fine, Andrews returned to the Battalion HQ. Lt-Col Bates was happy with how things had gone. Although the two Companies that Andrews had taken forward had suffered a few casualties, the spirit of the men was good, though tired. Bates’ orders were to hold Changlun, but to withdraw in good order through Asun, where they would pass through a Gurkha Battalion and back to the main 6th Indian Brigade positions at Jitre.
A runner from Battalion HQ found Hickson and passed him a message to attend an Officers Call at the HQ. When he arrived, Bates wanted to have Hickson do what he had done with Andrews’ Column. The tank would cover the withdrawal of the battalion Motor Transport, then do the same with the Gurkhas at Asun. Hickson nodded that he understood, but was aware that he and his crew were vulnerable if something happened to the tank. Timings were worked out, and signals confirmed, Bates wished everyone good luck, and Hickson went back to his tank.
Informing the crew of the plan, they also nodded their understanding, and got back to work, knowing that their lives depended on making sure everything was in tip top condition. Hickson had noted a position that would give the tank some cover, but with good visibility, and as soon as the crew was ready, they moved into their position and waited. The British artillery from somewhere behind them was still firing, but a heavy shower at 16:00hrs hid a Japanese assault until the last minute.
Japanese medium tanks, followed by infantry in lorries burst out of the rain and onto the forward positions of 1/8th Punjab. Hickson was as surprised as everyone, but his gunner fired at the front tank as soon as he saw it. There were four 2-pdr guns with the Battalion, and although one of them was overrun, the other three, with Hickson’s tank, knocked out the leading tanks. The sepoys, after their initial shock, were quick to respond, and they began to take a heavy toll of the Japanese infantry.
The Japanese troops, presumably from a Reconnaissance Regiment, moved to find and turn the Punjab’s flanks. Lt-Col Bates had kept his force in quite a tight formation, with the Motor Transport and support troops in the centre, and four infantry companies forming a square around the town. When the signal to begin withdrawing was given the first few vehicles moving south towards Asun came under fire from both sides of the road. The Japanese infantry had infiltrated around the Punjab’s position and were now blocking the road out of town.
Lt Col Bates’ plan was now threatened, he ordered Major Andrews to use his company to clear the road. A runner arrived at Hickson’s tank and passed him a message, asking for his support. It was clear that using the tank would be the easiest way to break the roadblock, and since the anti-tank gunners were still effective, Hickson ordered the driver to move out. Reaching the edge of town, Andrews had the Battalion’s carrier platoon ready to follow up. Once the ambush was cleared, Hickson would stay put until the rest of Battalion passed, then, as planned, protect the rear of the column.
The Japanese infantry had nothing that could harm the Matilda II tank with them. An artillery piece, firing over open sights, could stop Milly, but rifles, hand grenades and mortars were ineffective. With a full load of ammunition, and a fresh barrel in the Besa MG, the Japanese roadblock was completely overwhelmed, with the arrival of the Bren gun carriers adding their fire, and the Company’s 2-inch mortars adding their weight of fire, the Japanese who weren’t killed, melted back into the jungle.
The weight of the Japanese efforts from the north increased, and Lt Col Bates was relieved when the last couple of lorries carrying the rear-guard passed him at the tank’s position. Taking off in a carrier Lt Col Bates made all sorts of promises about medals and mentions in despatches. Hickson was just keen to get himself and his crew back to friendly lines. With the gun pointed over the rear deck, the driver gunned the engine and got Milly up to her top speed heading to Asun.
Once more a barrage of artillery shells blanketed the road, obviously there was a Forward Observer somewhere calling in coordinates. Hickson brought Milly to a stop and went to find the HQ of 2nd Battalion, 1st Gurkha Rifles, and their commanding officer, Lt Col "Jack" Fulton. Fulton had been briefed by Lt Col Bates on his way through the position.
There was a bridge on the road over a stream wired for demolition just north of the village. Fulton had positioned two companies on either side of the road using the stream as their forward positions. Each company had an anti-tank gun sited down the road. There were also a couple of anti-tank rifles spread out among the troops. In addition, Fulton had managed to get a battery of four mountain guns from 22 Mountain Regiment RA to provide immediate support.
Fulton mentioned to Hickson that he planned to blow the bridge when the first Japanese tank was on it. Fulton noted that Hickson didn’t look happy, and asked why. Hickson pointed out that if the charge didn’t blow, then the forward Japanese troops would have all the momentum. The bridge wasn’t exactly the biggest bridge in the world, and although the stream was in full flow because of the rain, it wasn’t exactly the English Channel. Between the tank’s 2-pdr, and the two towed anti-tank guns, plus the mountain howitzers, Hickson thought if he was attacking this place, his fear would be being knocked out at range. This would mean the infantry would need to attack over open ground without tank support. Lt Col Fulton had almost no experience of working with tanks, and he hadn’t thought of it from a tank’s perspective. He agreed, and ordered the Royal Engineer officer to detonate the explosives when the Japanese were first spotted.
In the event it was just as well. When the plunger on the detonator was pushed, nothing happened. The tank and anti-tank guns engaged the Japanese tanks, and the four howitzers put down a barrage on the road behind them. Meanwhile the Royal Engineers went out to see what had happened to their explosives. Eventually the found the broken connection and the bridge was successfully destroyed. The Ghurka infantry were facing off their Japanese opponents, who, as Hickson had noted, were advancing without the support of Japanese tanks.
Fulton’s men had noted that most of the enemy in the front had gone to ground, but were fixing them in position with rifle and machine gun fire. The flanking movement that Fulton had been warned about was being opposed by a platoon of Ghurkas of either side of the position, each platoon trying to cut into the Japanese side as they bypassed the main force. The Ghurkas were badly outnumbered, but they gave a good account of themselves. With the position nearly surrounded, Fulton gave the order for his Battalion to withdraw, he wanted to use the last hour of daylight to his best advantage. The two Companies that had been defending the stream had taken casualties which slowed the process of loading the Motor Transport down. The gunners from the Mountain Regiment and the Anti-Tank Regiment were all set to move, when once more the Ghurka Battalion found a blocking force to their rear.
Hickson had a feeling that that might happen and had moved back from covering the road to the north, to prepare to lead the Motor Transport south. When he got the order, Hickson’s driver took the tank down the middle of the road, with the gunner training his Besa MG on the left-hand side of the road. A burning lorry marked the spot that the Japanese had set up, the lorry having been rolled into the middle of the road, with various tree trunks and other material forming a roadblock. With the gun blazing, the driver aimed the tank at the centre of the roadblock and pushed the tank as fast as it would go.
Pushing the roadblock was successful in as far as it allowed the Motor Transport to drive through the Japanese ambush with a minimum of losses. However, in doing so, the tank had thrown a track. As the last carrier passed, Hickson and his crew jumped on board, having tried to destroy the tank as much as they could. It would have been easy enough to repair, but that wasn’t an option in this case. When the carrier brought him into Jitre, Hickson and his men sought out the Light Aid Detachment, and after contact with Lt-Col Michael Hedderwick, their CO, Hickson and his men were ordered back to the main depot. There weren’t any spare tanks, but their usefulness was too great to be used as infantrymen.
While Operation Matador, as it had originally been conceived, had been taken off the table, Lieutenant-General Heath (GOC III Indian Corps) had ordered three spoiling attacks. “Krohcol” (10th Brigade) had successfully fulfilled its mission to stop a Japanese advance from the direction of Petani. Major-General Murray-Lyon had committed to two other operations. The simplest of these involved an armoured train, manned by a platoon of the 2/ 16th Punjab and some engineers. The train party reached Khlaung Ngae, in Thailand, blew a 200-foot railway bridge on the line to Singora, and then withdrew to Padang Besar.
The second was "Laycol" (a column taken from the command of Brigadier William Lay [OC 6th Indian Infantry Brigade]). Since the objective of this column was limited to slowing the enemy, giving time for the rest of 11th Division to prepare, it was a much smaller column than Krohcol. Comprising just two companies, and the carrier platoon of 1/8th Punjab, with one Matilda II infantry tank, along with anti-tank guns and engineers. Laycol (commanded by Major Eric Andrews) advanced along the Changlun road towards Ban Sadao, eight miles beyond the frontier on the way to Singora, reaching it at dawn on 9 December, taking up defensive positions north of the village. Although they hurriedly prepared positions, the day passed quietly.
Andrews sent a section of three carriers forward towards Khlaung Ngae where the railway bridge had been destroyed to find out what was happening. From what could be gathered from the locals, the Thai military and police had attempted to resist the Japanese invasion at Singora, but it seemed that an armistice was declared to begin 12:00hrs. The good news seemed to be that the Japanese landing force had taken losses, though it wasn’t clear what exactly had been lost, but obviously not enough.
At 21:00hrs a Japanese reconnaissance column of thirty-five vehicles, preceded by tanks, and with headlights blazing, bore down on Laycol’s positions. Four of the tanks were knocked out by the Matilda II and the anti-tank guns. The Japanese infantry, who had dismounted at the beginning of the action, were soon engaged in an enveloping movement. The order not to get involved in anything more than delaying actions meant that Major Eric Andrews ordered his force to withdraw immediately. The engineers had set demolition charges on a number of places that would deny the road to motor transport. As they withdrew, they destroyed three bridges, that would take the Japanese time to replace.
Crossing back over the Malaya border, Andrews had his force take up positions to once again slow the Japanese force. The destruction of the bridges had obviously effectively delayed the Japanese as well as they had hoped. By the evening of 10 December there was still no sign of the vanguard of the Japanese force.
Lieutenant-General Heath had reviewed Murray-Lyon’s plans for defending Jitra, and had made some simple suggestions to improve the way he had laid out his force. Murray-Lyon didn’t have much in the way of experience, except from the Great War and action on the North-West Frontier. Heath showed him how he could make more use of his artillery and to think less of holding a line, and more of a defence in depth. Heath had tried, since he arrived in May, to share with the two generals commanding the Indian Divisions, David Murray-Lyon and Arthur Barstow, some of what he’d learned in East Africa. He had appointed some of the staff officers from 5th Indian Division onto 9th and 11th Indian Division’s staff to have some experience present when planning operations.
One of the fundamental problems Heath had discovered since arriving in Malaya that there was a feeling that the Japanese army was not considered an effective fighting force, having lost to the Soviets at Khalkhin Gol in 1939 and the fact that they were unable to defeat the Chinese army. Heath however had the feeling that the Japanese would have learned a great deal from their time at war. The Indian army was used to small wars with limited numbers. Many of the men in 9th and 11th Divisions were new recruits who hadn’t even had that experience. Many of the regular officers with experience had been sent to firm up the vastly expanding Indian Army. Therefore, many of the junior officers under his command were hastily promoted to fill the posts.
Heath was pleased that Murray-Lyon had taken his advice. While infantry could easily enough work round flanks through ‘impenetrable’ jungle, the motor transport couldn’t. Keeping control of the road was therefore Murray-Lyon’s main task. Gazelle Force in East Africa had given Heath the idea of using some of his infantry tanks and all of his light tanks as a mobile force, working with a couple of the Division’s carrier platoons. These would be the links between the various Battalion positions, making sure that if the enemy got round the flank and appeared in the rear of a position, then the tanks and the carrier platoons would counter these roadblocks to keep the road open.
Lt-Col Michael Hedderwick (CO 11th Bn RTR) had been worried about the way in which his unit was being parcelled out in penny packets and had challenged Lieutenant-General Heath about the way he was using up his men and tanks. With only one squadron of 18 tanks in each of the two Divisions Heath admitted that he was taking a chance adding a troop here and there, even a single tank on some occasions. What he had managed to do was to keep six tanks (the squadron HQ and one troop) together as part of each Division’s reserves. Heath reckoned that six Infantry Tanks working together would probably be strong enough to take on just about anything the Japanese would throw at them. Hedderwick saw his reasoning, but he was aware that Malaya Command hadn’t had much experience of tank warfare, and he worried that his men would pay the price for being used in ineffective ways.
At 08:00hrs on 11 December, Major Andrews’ 'Laycol' sent a motorcycle messenger to say that there was a strong Japanese column moving over the border into Malaya. Andrews had set up his force into two parties. One Company, with an anti-tank gun and the Matilda II tank would engage the enemy, the second Company would be in a supporting position further back along the road. Each company would leapfrog the other back to the Battalion’s main positions around Changlun, with the tank providing covering fire.
Sergeant Arthur Hickson, commanding the tank “Milly”, was worried about having enough ammunition for the co-axial machine gun. While he had brought more than the usual amount, at the expense of some of his 2-pdr ammunition, there was always the fear that there wouldn’t be enough. The RTR support units had wondered how best to service their charges which were so spread out. In this case, a universal carrier had been provided with cans of petrol and ammunition reloads was being held at Changlun ready to replenish the tank when it arrived back.
The other two tanks of Hickson’s Troop were at Jitre, one each with the 2nd Bn East Surrey Regiment and 1st Bn Leicestershire Regiment. As his tank worked back from one position to the next, Hickson and his gunner had managed to knock out at least three enemy tanks. A couple of lorries had also been machine gunned, but still the Japanese advanced. The final pull back was to the 1/8th Punjab main position at Changlun. As the tank arrived in friendly lines, the first artillery shells started falling on the forward elements of the Japanese. Under the cover of this bombardment, Hickson was glad to get into a hidden position and begin to replenish the ammo and fill up on fuel. The driver did a spot of tightening of various nuts, and checked the engine, adding some more oil.
Laycol was now back to simply being part of 1/8th Punjab Regiment. Major Andrews came over thank Hickson and his men, and make sure, that like his own men, they had got some food and hot tea. Finding that Hickson was doing fine, Andrews returned to the Battalion HQ. Lt-Col Bates was happy with how things had gone. Although the two Companies that Andrews had taken forward had suffered a few casualties, the spirit of the men was good, though tired. Bates’ orders were to hold Changlun, but to withdraw in good order through Asun, where they would pass through a Gurkha Battalion and back to the main 6th Indian Brigade positions at Jitre.
A runner from Battalion HQ found Hickson and passed him a message to attend an Officers Call at the HQ. When he arrived, Bates wanted to have Hickson do what he had done with Andrews’ Column. The tank would cover the withdrawal of the battalion Motor Transport, then do the same with the Gurkhas at Asun. Hickson nodded that he understood, but was aware that he and his crew were vulnerable if something happened to the tank. Timings were worked out, and signals confirmed, Bates wished everyone good luck, and Hickson went back to his tank.
Informing the crew of the plan, they also nodded their understanding, and got back to work, knowing that their lives depended on making sure everything was in tip top condition. Hickson had noted a position that would give the tank some cover, but with good visibility, and as soon as the crew was ready, they moved into their position and waited. The British artillery from somewhere behind them was still firing, but a heavy shower at 16:00hrs hid a Japanese assault until the last minute.
Japanese medium tanks, followed by infantry in lorries burst out of the rain and onto the forward positions of 1/8th Punjab. Hickson was as surprised as everyone, but his gunner fired at the front tank as soon as he saw it. There were four 2-pdr guns with the Battalion, and although one of them was overrun, the other three, with Hickson’s tank, knocked out the leading tanks. The sepoys, after their initial shock, were quick to respond, and they began to take a heavy toll of the Japanese infantry.
The Japanese troops, presumably from a Reconnaissance Regiment, moved to find and turn the Punjab’s flanks. Lt-Col Bates had kept his force in quite a tight formation, with the Motor Transport and support troops in the centre, and four infantry companies forming a square around the town. When the signal to begin withdrawing was given the first few vehicles moving south towards Asun came under fire from both sides of the road. The Japanese infantry had infiltrated around the Punjab’s position and were now blocking the road out of town.
Lt Col Bates’ plan was now threatened, he ordered Major Andrews to use his company to clear the road. A runner arrived at Hickson’s tank and passed him a message, asking for his support. It was clear that using the tank would be the easiest way to break the roadblock, and since the anti-tank gunners were still effective, Hickson ordered the driver to move out. Reaching the edge of town, Andrews had the Battalion’s carrier platoon ready to follow up. Once the ambush was cleared, Hickson would stay put until the rest of Battalion passed, then, as planned, protect the rear of the column.
The Japanese infantry had nothing that could harm the Matilda II tank with them. An artillery piece, firing over open sights, could stop Milly, but rifles, hand grenades and mortars were ineffective. With a full load of ammunition, and a fresh barrel in the Besa MG, the Japanese roadblock was completely overwhelmed, with the arrival of the Bren gun carriers adding their fire, and the Company’s 2-inch mortars adding their weight of fire, the Japanese who weren’t killed, melted back into the jungle.
The weight of the Japanese efforts from the north increased, and Lt Col Bates was relieved when the last couple of lorries carrying the rear-guard passed him at the tank’s position. Taking off in a carrier Lt Col Bates made all sorts of promises about medals and mentions in despatches. Hickson was just keen to get himself and his crew back to friendly lines. With the gun pointed over the rear deck, the driver gunned the engine and got Milly up to her top speed heading to Asun.
Once more a barrage of artillery shells blanketed the road, obviously there was a Forward Observer somewhere calling in coordinates. Hickson brought Milly to a stop and went to find the HQ of 2nd Battalion, 1st Gurkha Rifles, and their commanding officer, Lt Col "Jack" Fulton. Fulton had been briefed by Lt Col Bates on his way through the position.
There was a bridge on the road over a stream wired for demolition just north of the village. Fulton had positioned two companies on either side of the road using the stream as their forward positions. Each company had an anti-tank gun sited down the road. There were also a couple of anti-tank rifles spread out among the troops. In addition, Fulton had managed to get a battery of four mountain guns from 22 Mountain Regiment RA to provide immediate support.
Fulton mentioned to Hickson that he planned to blow the bridge when the first Japanese tank was on it. Fulton noted that Hickson didn’t look happy, and asked why. Hickson pointed out that if the charge didn’t blow, then the forward Japanese troops would have all the momentum. The bridge wasn’t exactly the biggest bridge in the world, and although the stream was in full flow because of the rain, it wasn’t exactly the English Channel. Between the tank’s 2-pdr, and the two towed anti-tank guns, plus the mountain howitzers, Hickson thought if he was attacking this place, his fear would be being knocked out at range. This would mean the infantry would need to attack over open ground without tank support. Lt Col Fulton had almost no experience of working with tanks, and he hadn’t thought of it from a tank’s perspective. He agreed, and ordered the Royal Engineer officer to detonate the explosives when the Japanese were first spotted.
In the event it was just as well. When the plunger on the detonator was pushed, nothing happened. The tank and anti-tank guns engaged the Japanese tanks, and the four howitzers put down a barrage on the road behind them. Meanwhile the Royal Engineers went out to see what had happened to their explosives. Eventually the found the broken connection and the bridge was successfully destroyed. The Ghurka infantry were facing off their Japanese opponents, who, as Hickson had noted, were advancing without the support of Japanese tanks.
Fulton’s men had noted that most of the enemy in the front had gone to ground, but were fixing them in position with rifle and machine gun fire. The flanking movement that Fulton had been warned about was being opposed by a platoon of Ghurkas of either side of the position, each platoon trying to cut into the Japanese side as they bypassed the main force. The Ghurkas were badly outnumbered, but they gave a good account of themselves. With the position nearly surrounded, Fulton gave the order for his Battalion to withdraw, he wanted to use the last hour of daylight to his best advantage. The two Companies that had been defending the stream had taken casualties which slowed the process of loading the Motor Transport down. The gunners from the Mountain Regiment and the Anti-Tank Regiment were all set to move, when once more the Ghurka Battalion found a blocking force to their rear.
Hickson had a feeling that that might happen and had moved back from covering the road to the north, to prepare to lead the Motor Transport south. When he got the order, Hickson’s driver took the tank down the middle of the road, with the gunner training his Besa MG on the left-hand side of the road. A burning lorry marked the spot that the Japanese had set up, the lorry having been rolled into the middle of the road, with various tree trunks and other material forming a roadblock. With the gun blazing, the driver aimed the tank at the centre of the roadblock and pushed the tank as fast as it would go.
Pushing the roadblock was successful in as far as it allowed the Motor Transport to drive through the Japanese ambush with a minimum of losses. However, in doing so, the tank had thrown a track. As the last carrier passed, Hickson and his crew jumped on board, having tried to destroy the tank as much as they could. It would have been easy enough to repair, but that wasn’t an option in this case. When the carrier brought him into Jitre, Hickson and his men sought out the Light Aid Detachment, and after contact with Lt-Col Michael Hedderwick, their CO, Hickson and his men were ordered back to the main depot. There weren’t any spare tanks, but their usefulness was too great to be used as infantrymen.
Significantly more successful than OTL, although in complete honesty I'm not sure how much it'll help. What Jitra really needed OTL was for it to stop raining for a few days to give them the ability to actually use their defensive positions instead of having them filled with water and to have functioning communications, which was impossible OTL due to the field phone lines having issues due to said amounts of water.
Even with the changes in positioning and the enemy actually delayed, it's still going to be the weather that's the worst enemy of the defenders.
Even with the changes in positioning and the enemy actually delayed, it's still going to be the weather that's the worst enemy of the defenders.
So begins the death by a thousand cuts. Every delay, every little battle, every bridge blown and rail line cut erodes what little margin for error was in the Japanese plans.
The most striking thing is the lack of panic on the British side. They know that if the Japanese get behind them, the Matilda's will be able to dig them out.
On the other hand, the Japanese armoured units are going to not be happy campers going in to future fights against the British armour. They know how many tanks of their own they've lost against them and so far the only one they've managed to capture so far (that we know of), that was only because it threw a track and had to be abandoned. I think the Type-1 Chi-He is going to be something closer to the 75mm armed Chi-Nu that replaced the earlier tank in production OTL.
The Japanese infantry aren't going to be looking forward to more of the same either. Bushido spirit only takes you so far.
On the other hand, the Japanese armoured units are going to not be happy campers going in to future fights against the British armour. They know how many tanks of their own they've lost against them and so far the only one they've managed to capture so far (that we know of), that was only because it threw a track and had to be abandoned. I think the Type-1 Chi-He is going to be something closer to the 75mm armed Chi-Nu that replaced the earlier tank in production OTL.
The Japanese infantry aren't going to be looking forward to more of the same either. Bushido spirit only takes you so far.
They might have 'captured' one, but can they move it? The engine is almost certainly scrap, as are the tracks, so I imagine it would be an absolute bugger to try to drag anywhere.More interesting question is how will this affect the Japanese tank design now they have access to a 'super heavy'When did they capture one in OTL for the first time.
One good thing about all of this is that there's no (or at least less) panic percolating through the British ranks, better tactics are being shared and adopted, and there's more heavier equipment being used more effectively. It seems to be having the desired effect in slowing the Japanese forces down, at least for now. Whether it will be enough is another question, but as mentioned, every little delay throws the Japanese plans off more and more.