Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.

8 December 1941. Kota Bharu. Malaya.

Sergeant Tommy Docherty cursed his luck. His Matilda II had been working with B Company of sepoys from 3rd Bn 5th Mahratta Light Infantry, but the constant rain had made everything marshy. The driver, Noel Woods, had misjudged the depth of a stream, and they were now stuck, the engine flooded, and the hull of the tank with a foot of water in it. The other two tanks in the troop were off somewhere else with other sepoys, so there was no chance of a tow.

The B Company Commander came to the turret hatch. Subedar Namdeo Ghadge couldn’t help smiling at Docherty’s use of very colourful language. For the previous week the two men had been working together closely training the Company in cooperation with the tank. Ghadge was always very proud of his spoken English, but Docherty was a man from somewhere called Paisley, and sometimes Ghadge didn’t think he spoke English at all. “The fucking fucker’s fucking fucked” wasn’t a phrase that Ghadge understood very well, but the tone of voice behind it did emphasise that Docherty wasn’t a happy man.

Ghadge’s pride his command of the English language wasn’t shared by Docherty. Half the time he didn’t understand a single word, and the other half he just smiled and nodded as if he did. Now the Subedar was smiling and saying something unintelligible. If he wasn’t up to his bollocks in cold slimy green water, maybe he might of have made more of an effort to understand what the wee Gunga Din wanted, but right now he had other things on his mind.

The persistent taping on his shoulder eventually made Docherty stop berating Woods for a moment, and there was Ghadge pointing excitably towards the treeline. Growing up in Paisley, Docherty thought he knew rain, but not like this. Peering through what appeared to be a curtain of rain, the crack of a bullet passing and flashes from the direction Ghadge was pointing to, silenced Docherty. It took him an eternity to realise that people were actually shooting at him, trying to kill him. Then he was aware that the sepoys were returning fire, and suddenly his training took over. A quick boot to the shoulder of his gunner, Corporal Pat Currie (oh how they enjoyed that name since they started working with the Indians). “Wake up man, enemy front, two hundred yards, co-ax, open fire!” Turning to Ghadge he gave him a thumbs up sign, then closed the hatch and started fighting his tank.

The good news was that he was in a perfect hull down position. The bad news was that he was in a perfect hull down position without the engine running or any juice to power the turret traverse. He was also pretty sure that the radio had shorted out, and that there wasn’t any help coming. Currie had opened fire with the co-axial. The loader, Jimmy McMahon, was trying to sort out the ammo belts. The 2-pdr was pretty useless at this point, but at least the Besa was working well. Curry was having to use the manual traverse to keep the machine gun cutting along the tree line. Docherty told Curry to watch his ammo, while he tried to get an idea of what was happening. There was no way of working that out with the rain soaking the periscope view. Docherty knew he needed Ghadge’s help, so he opened the turret, to find the aforementioned Subedar smiling at him still from the rear of the turret. The Indian officer gave him a thumbs up sign, and then pointed to the left. When Docherty saw what he was looking at, he called down to Currie to cease fire at the treeline and shift to a new target to his left at 9 o’clock.

The Japanese, that was the only folk Docherty could think of who wanted to kill him, had been using the tree line as a base of fire, and what seemed like at least a hundred of them were flanking the Sepoys with what to all the world looked like a bayonet charge. Traversing the turret manually was slow, and it felt like forever before the Besa barked again. Ghadge gave him another thumbs up sign and jumped off the tank. Docherty could see one of Ghadge’s platoons were moving to protect the flank.

Woods was no use to anyone in the tank at this point. Docherty told him to clear the tank, pick up a few sepoys and head back to the airfield. He needed to tell the senior officer what was happening, and then bring back as much ammunition as he and the sepoys could carry. If he saw anyone who could give them a tow out of the stream, then that would be useful too. From its brackets on the turret beside him, Docherty took the fancy new machine pistol they’d been issued with and threw it to Woods ‘just in case’. Woods expressed his unhappiness in a particularly eloquent manner, to which Docherty replied, “Fuck off and don’t get killed.”

The front of the turret received regular bullet strikes against it, which meant that Docherty wasn’t keen on putting his head out of the hatch. The persistent banging on the hatch however was obviously something important. The smiling face of Subedar Ghadge was waiting, and he excitedly told Docherty something about what was going on. Docherty smiled and nodded, thinking to himself ‘not a clue what he’s on about.’

Eventually the sweeping hand gestures began to make sense. The sepoys were moving forward, and he seemed to be gesturing for covering fire. Another near miss made both men duck, so Docherty gave a thumbs up and closed the hatch. Currie at the same moment called a misfire and he and McMahon began the clearance procedure. Docherty warned McMahon to make sure the ammo belts were dry before loading, to which McMahon replied, “what with?” Everything in the tank was soaking, so Docherty just shrugged and said, “do your best”. He ordered Currie to fire the main gun in the direction of the tree line, and while McMahon worked on the Besa, Docherty loaded for Currie from the ready rack, which was thankfully still above the water. What effect the 2-pdr was having on the Japanese could only be guessed at, but at least it was something.

McMahon called out that the co-axial MG was clear and Currie, having been warned to watch for friendlies moving forward, began to hose the treeline as best he could. A flare went up, which was one of the pre-arranged signals from the infantry to cease fire. Currie worried that he had just about burned out the barrel of the Besa, and McMahon noted that he was on the last tin of ammunition for it. Docherty opened the hatch to see better. The rain seemed to have lightened slightly, or at least Docherty could see a bit better.

Some sepoys were carrying back wounded men, and Docherty could see flashes that meant someone was on the receiving end of artillery, he just hoped it was the japs and not the sepoys. There was very little he could do about anything, but he got out the tank and had a look at their situation. He was totally bogged down, and the marshy ground around would make getting a successful tow out difficult. He looked around the battlefield and wondered where Gunga Din had got to. Then he wondered where Woods and got to. He jumped back onto the tank and stood up on the turret trying to make out what was happening. When Pat Currie asked “Do you think there’ll be snipers?” Docherty immediately realised that there was a war on and standing straight in full view wasn’t his cleverest moment.

An hour later Woods arrived back, but on the back of another Matilda II. Docherty recognised Sergeant Morris and grimaced. He was never going to hear the end of this in the sergeants’ mess. Sure enough, Morris and his crew started the expected imprecations. Currie’s response of bailing out empty ammo tins and expended cartridges soon shut Morris’ men down. Another half-hour later, after two attempts, Docherty’s tank was back on dry land. A lorry from the Light Aid Detachment had arrived and the mechanics were working with Woods to dry out the engine and get it started. A spare barrel for the Besa was put in, and the ammo storage refilled. The radio did need replaced, so the Light Aid squad called the tank unserviceable and Docherty had the ignominious experience of being towed backwards to the airfield. At least when they go there, they could get a dry uniform, something to eat, and stay out of the rain in one of the hangers while the tank was fixed up. Jap planes had been bombing the place on and off, most of the Australian flown Hudsons had disappeared.

Docherty couldn’t believe how happy he was to see Subedar Ghadge lead a much-reduced company back to their starting point. The Indian officer explained at great length just exactly what his Company, and the rest of Battalion had done when the left Docherty’s tank. Docherty didn’t really understand any of it, but the Japs wouldn’t be heading to the airfield. “All dead” were the first words that Docherty really understood. The japs were all dead. He slapped the Subedar and the back, gave him the ‘thumbs up’ and repeated “all dead!” The two men laughed and laughed. That had been an interesting day.
I'm trying to figure out what original timeline operations have been cancelled to do this, and the only thing I can think of which might make sense is Wake, which would be a bit of shipping and a few troops that could be sent in the direction of Malaya instead. (Edit: although not all shipping, if the IJN on the way back from Pearl was refuelling there and the fuel tankers needed escorts? (Further edit: I have a vague feeling one of the naval timelines on this forum mentioned the IJN carrier divisions historically refuelling somewhere between Hawai'i and Wake.))
Which will be great news for ornithologists if the Wake Island Rail survives with no Imperial Japanese occupation...
 
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I'm trying to figure out what original timeline operations have been cancelled to do this, and the only thing I can think of which might make sense is Wake, which would be a bit of shipping and a few troops that could be sent in the direction of Malaya instead. (Edit: although not all shipping, if the IJN on the way back from Pearl was refuelling there and the fuel tankers needed escorts? (Further edit: I have a vague feeling one of the naval timelines on this forum mentioned the IJN carrier divisions historically refuelling somewhere between Hawai'i and Wake.))
Which will be great news for ornithologists if the Wake Island Rail survives with no Imperial Japanese occupation...
Brunei/Sarawak?
 
Brunei/Sarawak?
Problem is that there's oil there. I can't see them cancelling that unless they're really confident of being able to roll something else very quickly and then move there. I think it might be one of the closest available oil fields (at least as the aircraft flies - land masses might get in the way of ships) to Imperial Japan's home islands.

Edit: difficult for me to be sure without a globe, but I think the Philippines might lie on the direct line from Sarawak to the home islands. The Celebes might be closer for shipping.
 
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I'm trying to figure out what original timeline operations have been cancelled to do this, and the only thing I can think of which might make sense is Wake, which would be a bit of shipping and a few troops that could be sent in the direction of Malaya instead. (Edit: although not all shipping, if the IJN on the way back from Pearl was refuelling there and the fuel tankers needed escorts? (Further edit: I have a vague feeling one of the naval timelines on this forum mentioned the IJN carrier divisions historically refuelling somewhere between Hawai'i and Wake.))
Which will be great news for ornithologists if the Wake Island Rail survives with no Imperial Japanese occupation...
Why does anything need to be cancelled? Kota Bharu was a landing OTL. The Japanese were contested heavily but managed to force a breach. Here, they ran into an Indian unit which served in Africa OTL, and a bunch of tanks which weren't there as well.
 
Problem is that there's oil there. I can't see them cancelling that unless they're really confident of being able to roll something else very quickly and then move there. I think it might be one of the closest available oil fields (at least as the aircraft flies - land masses might get in the way of ships) to Imperial Japan's home islands.

Edit: difficult for me to be sure without a globe, but I think the Philippines might lie on the direct line from Sarawak to the home islands. The Celebes might be closer for shipping.
It's a couple of weeks delay, as they can shift forces from their drive through the eastern DEI to take nort Brunei.
 
Why does anything need to be cancelled? Kota Bharu was a landing OTL. The Japanese were contested heavily but managed to force a breach. Here, they ran into an Indian unit which served in Africa OTL, and a bunch of tanks which weren't there as well.
Because this isn't the original timeline, and given that the British are visibly stronger than they were in the original timeline, by whatever maths the Imperial Japanese figured out whatever forces were necessary to commit to Malaya in the original timeline, if they're invading Malaya at all in this timeline (edit: with anything remotely resembling their original goal of conquer all Malaya and move on Singapore*) then they should be using more than in the original timeline.
No the Imperial Japanese don't know what happened in the original timeline, but they know how many troops they think that they will have to use to defeat so many thousand British led troops, and since the British have charge of more forces than they did in the original timeline, the Imperial Japanese calculation of how many they will need to defeat them should be higher. (And that's based simply on quantities, and assuming that the Imperial Japanese haven't been paying attention to quality of British troops and vehicles, or the fact that the British led forces have just been wrapping up (by winning) the campaign in now-previously-Italian Africa.)

As I said a page or two back, an Imperial Japanese high command point of view post for what decisions they're making and what they're otherwise doing in this timeline, and why, should be interesting reading.

Edit: * Although their goals and ambitions in Malaya and for Singapore for now might be much more limited than in the original timeline for all that we know, at the time of this post.
 
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Because this isn't the original timeline, and given that the British are visibly stronger than they were in the original timeline, by whatever maths the Imperial Japanese figured out whatever forces were necessary to commit to Malaya in the original timeline, if they're invading Malaya at all in this timeline (edit: with anything remotely resembling their original goal of conquer all Malaya and move on Singapore*) then they should be using more than in the original timeline.
No the Imperial Japanese don't know what happened in the original timeline, but they know how many troops they think that they will have to use to defeat so many thousand British led troops, and since the British have charge of more forces than they did in the original timeline, the Imperial Japanese calculation of how many they will need to defeat them should be higher. (And that's based simply on quantities, and assuming that the Imperial Japanese haven't been paying attention to quality of British troops and vehicles, or the fact that the British led forces have just been wrapping up (by winning) the campaign in now-previously-Italian Africa.)

As I said a page or two back, an Imperial Japanese high command point of view post for what decisions they're making and what they're otherwise doing in this timeline, and why, should be interesting reading.

Edit: * Although their goals and ambitions in Malaya and for Singapore for now might be much more limited than in the original timeline for all that we know, at the time of this post.
Quite so.

The Japanese initial goals might be reduced to controlling Northern Malaya, to safeguard Thailand and a thrust into Burma. With the intention of basing sufficient airpower to render Singapore unusable as a Fleet Base by the RN.

Taking it and the rest of Malaya could wait until the operations in Borneo, Java, the Celebs and other Dutch East Indies islands are completed. With a hope that the Allied naval forces, including TTL Force Z, are eliminated in the campaign.
 
Placing my 'Imperial Japanese Thought Processes Hat' on for a few moments (I hope you appreciate this, because this is not a comfortable hat to wear.)

We- They (sorry, hat after-effects) still view the USN as their main naval adversary. But they main have switched their thinking to view the UK/Empire/Commonwealth as their main land adversary.

We also know that the IJN/IJA love their Rube-Goldergian operational planning, where the same Division is used in three different places for three different operations in the span of a month, all of which are assumed to proceed as per schedule and inflict no meaningful losses.

I also- They also really want that oil.

So. I'm imagining a general strategic plan something along the lines of:

1. Simultaneous landings in the Philippines and Malayan Peninsula, which will go well.

2. Philippines forces will secure them, but for the moment have second call for supplies. Naval forces have fun playing 'Make the Yankees' life hell'.

3. Forces in the Malayan Peninsula and diplomatic efforts get the Thais on side; array forces to hold along the Burmese flank, swiftly advance down the Peninsula, take Singapore.

4. Now that both the Philippines and Singapore have been taken, we can start moving in on the DEI from both East and West. They will be taken at our leisure.

Addendum: I deeply apologise. I failed to add in a number of feints.
 
Maybe, but the Dutch didn't do anything like that OTL. Also, having all the oil-wells doesn't mean a dot if the Enemy still has a fleet base operational nearby.
Having possession of the oil wells does at least mean that the Imperial Japanese can start fixing them if they have been demolished. (And Wikipedia claims (with a couple of references) that the British had a scorched earth policy in Sarawak, although frustratingly doesn't indicate if it was implemented.)
Wikipedia said:
...As Sarawak had a significant number of oil refineries in Miri and Lutong, the British feared that these supplies would fall to Japanese control, and thus instructed the infantry to carry out a scorched earth policy.[83][84]
 
Because this isn't the original timeline, and given that the British are visibly stronger than they were in the original timeline, by whatever maths the Imperial Japanese figured out whatever forces were necessary to commit to Malaya in the original timeline, if they're invading Malaya at all in this timeline (edit: with anything remotely resembling their original goal of conquer all Malaya and move on Singapore*) then they should be using more than in the original timeline.
No the Imperial Japanese don't know what happened in the original timeline, but they know how many troops they think that they will have to use to defeat so many thousand British led troops, and since the British have charge of more forces than they did in the original timeline, the Imperial Japanese calculation of how many they will need to defeat them should be higher. (And that's based simply on quantities, and assuming that the Imperial Japanese haven't been paying attention to quality of British troops and vehicles, or the fact that the British led forces have just been wrapping up (by winning) the campaign in now-previously-Italian Africa.)
As I said a page or two back, an Imperial Japanese high command point of view post for what decisions they're making and what they're otherwise doing in this timeline, and why, should be interesting reading.
The thing is, from my point of view, there have been a number of different sources who say that the Japanese were already working on the principle that the British were weaker than they actually were. The other side of that coin is that there are also sources that say that the Japanese had excellent intelligence. It could be a distinction between White troops and Asian troops.
So, I accept your basic principle that the Japanese would take into account the British reinforcements, but from
here I think this is crucial:
First, Tsuji's research suggested the peninsula's roads would be the center of the battlefront, and the flanks would extend no more than a kilometer to the left or right due to dense jungle.5 Second, intelligence reports indicated most of the defending troops were not of the highest calibre. Third, he was aware of the "Japanese habit of flinging more troops into the battle than could possibly be maintained." Yamashita calculated that three divisions was the maximum that could be fed, equipped, and supplied ammunition.6 Based on this recommendation, the 25th Army was created with three divisions assigned:
5: Masano Tsuji, Singapore: The Japanese Version (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961), pg 48
6: Arthur Swinson, Four Samurai (London: Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., 1968) pp 94-95

I've listed below some of the first set (sorry didn't take a note of which websites the first two came.
Yamashita undertook his most important campaign with troops who lacked up-to-date weapons and equipment, and were in fact heavily outnumbered. Japanese intelligence actually underestimated the size of the opposing forces. But numbers were not the key to victory.
Yamashita pinned his hopes on intelligence reports which suggested that the Allied forces on the island numbered only 40,000. It was wrong. There were almost 120,000 of them waiting for the Japanese.
Japanese intelligence on the British in Malaya was faulty, but in a way that actually helped the Japanese. The British were estimated to have perhaps 30,000 to 50,000 troops in the peninsula, rather than the 88,600 that were actually present on 8 December 1941. The Japanese commander, Yamashita Tomoyuki, later commented that "our battle in Malaya was successful because we took the enemy lightly." His intelligence chief, the notorious Tsuji Masanobu, put it more pithily: "Ignorance is bliss" (Marston 2005). Encouraged by their underestimate of British strength, the Japanese deployed just three divisions against Malaya (the 5, 18, and Imperial Guards Divisions) and even these took over a month to fully deploy against the British. The initial drive down the peninsula would take place with the equivalent of just two divisions. (http://www.pwencycl.kgbudge.com/M/a/Malaya.htm)


This is from The Pacific War Companion, Ed Daniel Marston, Osprey Books 2005, from Chapter 3 by Tomoyuki Ishizu and Raymond Callaghan:
Yamashita.gif


Anyway, there's still a long way to go, and I hope it won't go too far from believability.
Allan
 
The thing is, from my point of view, there have been a number of different sources who say that the Japanese were already working on the principle that the British were weaker than they actually were. The other side of that coin is that there are also sources that say that the Japanese had excellent intelligence. It could be a distinction between White troops and Asian troops.
So, I accept your basic principle that the Japanese would take into account the British reinforcements, but from
here I think this is crucial:


I've listed below some of the first set (sorry didn't take a note of which websites the first two came.






This is from The Pacific War Companion, Ed Daniel Marston, Osprey Books 2005, from Chapter 3 by Tomoyuki Ishizu and Raymond Callaghan:
View attachment 771605

Anyway, there's still a long way to go, and I hope it won't go too far from believability.
Allan
Sounds like in your planning for them you may be more realistic than the actual Japanese were 😁
Of course having 'perfect' knowledge of both sides (as you're allocating them) does help. Although it may be more of a problem getting into the mindset of commanders who have only partial intelligence to go on.
 

marathag

Banned
Sounds like in your planning for them you may be more realistic than the actual Japanese were 😁
Of course having 'perfect' knowledge of both sides (as you're allocating them) does help. Although it may be more of a problem getting into the mindset of commanders who have only partial intelligence to go on.
I would not be surprised that the better British Army performance in the War is disregarded by the IJA. After all, they lost in France, and lost in Greece, but had wins against the Italians with small German assistance in Africa. What the IJA thinks of the Italians, they had some experience with some Chinese units who had been assisted by Italy before the Tripartite Pact cut those contacts, so would not be surprised by their loss. Italians had a hard time with against Ethiopia.
IJN might have more concern on the increased number of RN assets in the East, but they were hardly in the driver's seat for setting policy for what the IJA would do for planning their land operation., other than possible have to send more units to cover the IJA landings.

Could that mean a Carrier or even two gets stripped form the Pearl Harbor Raid? The tiny 12,000 ton Ryujo and only slightly larger Taiyo may not be seen as enough to cover the Philippine operation and th attack South into Malaya
 
Could that mean a Carrier or even two gets stripped form the Pearl Harbor Raid? The tiny 12,000 ton Ryujo and only slightly larger Taiyo may not be seen as enough to cover the Philippine operation and th attack South into Malaya
My reading is that land based aircraft in IndoChina were the support of the Malaya campaign, so a carrier isn't really needed. The quickness of the Japanese to reopen airfields in Thailand and Malaya, and the fact they wiped out half the RAF units on the first day, gave them air supremacy.
Allan
 

Garrison

Donor
The thing is, from my point of view, there have been a number of different sources who say that the Japanese were already working on the principle that the British were weaker than they actually were. The other side of that coin is that there are also sources that say that the Japanese had excellent intelligence. It could be a distinction between White troops and Asian troops.
So, I accept your basic principle that the Japanese would take into account the British reinforcements, but from
here I think this is crucial:


I've listed below some of the first set (sorry didn't take a note of which websites the first two came.






This is from The Pacific War Companion, Ed Daniel Marston, Osprey Books 2005, from Chapter 3 by Tomoyuki Ishizu and Raymond Callaghan:
View attachment 771605

Anyway, there's still a long way to go, and I hope it won't go too far from believability.
Allan
Well having worked through these decisions myself...:) I would say given the lack of realism displayed by the Japanese they may well carry on regardless. Even if some intelligence arrives late in the day suggesting the British being stronger than OTL I can readily see it being dismissed. Look at what happened when wargaming for Midway produced unfavourable results, they were simply reversed and the plan went on regardless.
 
9 December 1941. Singapore, Malaya.
9 December 1941. Singapore, Malaya.

Lieutenant Colonel Hector Bastin (CO 9th Division Cavalry Regiment) couldn’t help compare his arrival in Egypt last year with his arrival in Singapore two days previously. When his troops had arrived in Egypt they had arrived with cast off light tanks and bren gun carriers. They’d had plenty of time to disembark, get themselves to a camp and eventually get their fitness back, then reunited with their clapped-out vehicles began to exercise. Eventually when they left Egypt, the men had been happy enough leave all their old vehicles behind. The Italian tanks they’d taken over, and whatever else was still running, had been handed on the Greek Cavalry Division

When their ship had docked in Singapore they had disembarked, amid a certain degree of disorganisation. General Morshead had come down to welcome his men, but his opening remarks to the senior officers were that the Division seemed to have jumped out of the frying pan and into the fire. The possibility of a Japanese invasion of Malaya was now a probability and that time was of the essence to get the men trained and ready. Eventually transport arrived to take the majority of the men to their training camp just outside Johor Bahru. Bastin wanted to keep his own men local, to help supervise unloading their tanks. Brigadier Victor Windeyer, (OC 20th Australian Brigade) asked his old Battalion (2/48th) to likewise stay to keep an eye on the ships and their equipment, he didn’t want anything going missing.

The ships that carried the cavalry’s tanks, and the equipment for 20th Brigade had docked, but it seemed that they weren’t given the priority that Morshead demanded, causing something of furore with the port commander. Bastin had been somewhat bemused to see his GOC ready to start a fist fight the RN officer. Calmer heads prevailed and Morshead was promised that the three merchant ships would be unloaded the next day.

At 04:00hrs 8 December air raid sirens sounded all over Singapore and the men of 2/48th and 9th Cavalry watched in horror as Japanese planes unloaded bombs all over the city. Keppel harbour was one of their targets, and while luckily none of the ships were damaged, a few men had been killed and more injured. The whole lot of men were involved in fighting the fires burning at various places around the harbour facilities. When the RN port captain arrived and met the Australian delegation, the tension mounted very quickly. The whole Brigade could have lost its equipment if the ships had been hit. Progress on unloading the ships was slowed by the damage caused the night before, and some of the dock workers were absent from their work.

Bastin’s tanks were split between the three merchant ships, one squadron on each. They were the first loaded, and so the last unloaded. Thankfully the cranes on the dockside hadn’t been hit. His own men had been brought back to the dock and as each tank was unloaded a crew and a Light Aid Detachment squad would get it ready to be driven away. All through the night of 8/9 December the roar of Continental radial engines reverberated around the main road through the city as the M3 Stuart tanks of 9th Division Cavalry Regiment raced off Singapore Island towards the AASC depot at Tampoi near Johor Bahru.

The plan had been that the Cavalry and the rest of the Brigade would have a week to get themselves sorted before moving up to their forward positions around Malacca. Now that war had been declared that plan was shelved and General Morshead wanted them at Malacca as soon as possible. He asked Bastin to make sure that his tanks were ready for action. Some officers and men from 8th Division Cavalry Regiment would come to Tampoi to pass on as much intelligence as they could. Once Bastin’s Regiment was at Malacca, Morshead would want them to be working with the Lines of Communications Brigade to keep the roads between Malacca and the north clear of the enemy to give time for 9th Division to fully arrive and take up their positions.

Compared to arriving in Egypt, this had been interesting, even exciting. Bastin was glad he’d been able to spend a couple of weeks leave with his family. There obviously wasn’t going to be much rest in his immediate future.
 
Could that mean a Carrier or even two gets stripped form the Pearl Harbor Raid? The tiny 12,000 ton Ryujo and only slightly larger Taiyo may not be seen as enough to cover the Philippine operation and th attack South into Malaya
Pearl Harbour was 6 or nothing. Even the Japanese at the time knew that.

Perhaps the second Taiyo class carrier might have been taken into service early and and coverted to be a carrier a few months earlier to reinforce one of the landings.

I doubt it though. British success in North Africa might have been too late to provoke a Japanese response.
 
Pearl Harbour was 6 or nothing. Even the Japanese at the time knew that.
This is correct, there is no way the Japanese will conduct the Pearl Harbor attack with anything less than all 6 carriers. It is theoretically possible that they might cancel that attack altogether, but it would badly upset their entire war plan, so it would take a lot for a change like that.
 
The thing is, from my point of view, there have been a number of different sources who say that the Japanese were already working on the principle that the British were weaker than they actually were. The other side of that coin is that there are also sources that say that the Japanese had excellent intelligence. It could be a distinction between White troops and Asian troops.
So, I accept your basic principle that the Japanese would take into account the British reinforcements, but from
here I think this is crucial:


I've listed below some of the first set (sorry didn't take a note of which websites the first two came.





This is from The Pacific War Companion, Ed Daniel Marston, Osprey Books 2005, from Chapter 3 by Tomoyuki Ishizu and Raymond Callaghan:
View attachment 771605

Anyway, there's still a long way to go, and I hope it won't go too far from believability.
Allan
If the Imperial Japanese 'underestimate' in the original timeline was '40,000 enemy troops', though, they should (even with underestimation) be coming in with figures of something like 45,000 or 50,000 in this timeline it seems to me, since there will have been more troops around for their observers to spot.
And if the logistics can only support Imperial Japanese three divisions, then maybe the plan you have lined up for them is advance part of the way down Malaya to secure forward airbases, then leave the air force to do the rest... after all the 'bomber must always get through' right? (And unless I'm confusing this with another timeline, I think this is one where Hitler didn't go full on 'Blitz' on London, so there hasn't really been a demonstration of how much punishment a city can sometimes soak up without surrendering. Although if Holland was still 'bombed into submission' by the Germans with an attack on Rotterdam in 1940* in this timeline, the suggestion will be there that it (edit: - victory by bombing - ) can be done.)

* Again, I don't recall at the moment in which timelines the Rotterdam bombing attack took place.
 
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