9 June 1942. Moscow CCCP
allanpcameron
Donor
9 June 1942. Moscow CCCP
Timoshenko’s news to the STAVKA was not only unwelcome, but as far as Stalin was concerned, following the loss of Sevastopol and the whole of Crimea, close enough to treason.
Comrade General Fedorenko (Chief of the Armoured Forces Administration) had resurrected combined-arms mechanised units. Four Tank Corps had been created, each consisting of three tank brigades, a truck mounted infantry brigade, a reconnaissance battalion, a battalion each of mortars, multiple rocket launchers, anti-aircraft artillery, as well as combat engineers and eventually a transport company. Each Tank Brigade was equipped with 32 Medium T-34s and 21 Light (BT 7 or T60). With an authorised strength of 7800 men, and 168 tanks, the tank corps were thought to be similar to the weakened German Panzer Divisions. Fedorenko intended it that way, and had plans to combine these tanks corps into tank armies that would allow the deep operations that Soviet operational doctrine called for. Of the first two of these, 5th was operational and 1st would be by July.
Timoshenko brought the unwelcome news that 21st and 23rd Tank Corps had been totally destroyed, along with three Rifle Armies, by the Germans, who were now pushing forward towards Voronezh on the upper Don River. The problems they faced were that the intelligence had underestimated the size of the German presence. Movements of German reinforcements had been totally missed, so the attack towards Kharkov had been doomed from the start. The loss of Crimea meant that the Luftwaffe had concentrated both the 2nd and 4th Air Fleets which gave them total command of the skies, making aerial reconnaissance impossible.
Stalin was convinced that once the Germans had crossed the Don at Voronezh they would turn north to once again attack Moscow. He therefore denied requests for reinforcements to be sent south to aid Timoshenko’s Southwestern Front. Timoshenko added his worry that the German troops who had captured Crimea would be in a position to either cross the Kerch Strait and threaten Rostov from behind, or be added to the attack, giving the Germans the capacity to head both north to Moscow and southeast towards the oil fields of the Caucasus.
This did nothing to convince Stalin to change his mind, the Germans were coming for Moscow, that was obvious. Timoshenko would have to make do with what he had. The lessons of the previous summer had been learned to some degree. The Germans would attempt to encircle the Red Army wherever possible. Timoshenko had permission to pull his forces back in a timely manner to prevent them being lost. Once the Germans turned north, then Southwestern Front would be in a position to attack the German flank and rear.
Timoshenko knew that his most competent and effective mobile force had already been lost, even before the full German attack. The ability to make effective withdrawals in the front of the enemy, without air superiority would be nightmarish. He needed to get back to his HQ and start working on a realistic plan of trading terrain for time.
Timoshenko’s news to the STAVKA was not only unwelcome, but as far as Stalin was concerned, following the loss of Sevastopol and the whole of Crimea, close enough to treason.
Comrade General Fedorenko (Chief of the Armoured Forces Administration) had resurrected combined-arms mechanised units. Four Tank Corps had been created, each consisting of three tank brigades, a truck mounted infantry brigade, a reconnaissance battalion, a battalion each of mortars, multiple rocket launchers, anti-aircraft artillery, as well as combat engineers and eventually a transport company. Each Tank Brigade was equipped with 32 Medium T-34s and 21 Light (BT 7 or T60). With an authorised strength of 7800 men, and 168 tanks, the tank corps were thought to be similar to the weakened German Panzer Divisions. Fedorenko intended it that way, and had plans to combine these tanks corps into tank armies that would allow the deep operations that Soviet operational doctrine called for. Of the first two of these, 5th was operational and 1st would be by July.
Timoshenko brought the unwelcome news that 21st and 23rd Tank Corps had been totally destroyed, along with three Rifle Armies, by the Germans, who were now pushing forward towards Voronezh on the upper Don River. The problems they faced were that the intelligence had underestimated the size of the German presence. Movements of German reinforcements had been totally missed, so the attack towards Kharkov had been doomed from the start. The loss of Crimea meant that the Luftwaffe had concentrated both the 2nd and 4th Air Fleets which gave them total command of the skies, making aerial reconnaissance impossible.
Stalin was convinced that once the Germans had crossed the Don at Voronezh they would turn north to once again attack Moscow. He therefore denied requests for reinforcements to be sent south to aid Timoshenko’s Southwestern Front. Timoshenko added his worry that the German troops who had captured Crimea would be in a position to either cross the Kerch Strait and threaten Rostov from behind, or be added to the attack, giving the Germans the capacity to head both north to Moscow and southeast towards the oil fields of the Caucasus.
This did nothing to convince Stalin to change his mind, the Germans were coming for Moscow, that was obvious. Timoshenko would have to make do with what he had. The lessons of the previous summer had been learned to some degree. The Germans would attempt to encircle the Red Army wherever possible. Timoshenko had permission to pull his forces back in a timely manner to prevent them being lost. Once the Germans turned north, then Southwestern Front would be in a position to attack the German flank and rear.
Timoshenko knew that his most competent and effective mobile force had already been lost, even before the full German attack. The ability to make effective withdrawals in the front of the enemy, without air superiority would be nightmarish. He needed to get back to his HQ and start working on a realistic plan of trading terrain for time.
