Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.

And since there is no need for the OTL Malta Convoys, USS Wasp can be transfered to the Pacific immediately. The USN will have 3 carriers at the Battle of the Coral Sea, with butterlifes hatching along the way.
There won't be a Battle of Coral Sea. If Malaya hold, it will receive the full-six carrier attention of the KB.

I wouldn't be so sure. As discussed elsewhere a Europe first approach is still likely for the US and there will be significant operations in the Med in summer 1942, operations that the US will want to be a part of and if they don't bring meaningful forces to the party they'll be forced to take a politically unacceptably subordinate role. A Carrier gives you weight and while Admiral King will kick and scream he serves at the pleasure of the President and Roosevelt will be looking at the big picture, a picture that does not include the US taking a subordinate role to the British.
The only possible actions in the Med. right now are amphibious, and the British don't have the capability to land the massive numbers that would require any sort of contribution from the US.
 
There won't be a Battle of Coral Sea. If Malaya hold, it will receive the full-six carrier attention of the KB.
Do you think that if the Royal Navy retreats behind the Malay barrier the Kido Butai will hang around in the South China Sea attacking land based targets?
 
Do you think that if the Royal Navy retreats behind the Malay barrier the Kido Butai will hang around in the South China Sea attacking land based targets?
Coral Sea was fought to try to isolate Australia. If Malaya holds, there's no point.

I do wonder if the US will bother with the Doolittle Raid. If the KB gets mauled by the British (in an ITTL equivalent of the Indian Ocean Raid), they might start true offensive operations earlier.
 
17 December 1941. Miri, British Borneo.
17 December 1941. Miri, British Borneo.

The arrival of the Japanese had been expected. When they arrived, the destruction of the oil fields at Miri and Seria and the refinery at Lutong had been completed. The arrival of 3rd Bn 16th Punjab Regiment and 2nd Bn 14th Punjab Regiment the previous week had allowed Acting Brigadier C.M. Lane, [CO SARFOR (Sarawak Force)] to go back to plan A. The 2nd Battalion 15th Punjab Regiment had been preparing for the invasion for most of 1941. As their CO, Lane had recognised the impossibility of holding fixed positions in the terrain he was supposed to protect. Lieutenant-General Percival had countermanded this plan, instructing Lane to hold the Bukit Stabar Airfield seven miles south of Kuching, which became known as Plan B. Handing over responsibility for the defence of the airfield to Lt Col Henry Moorehead (CO 3rd Bn 16th Punjab Regiment, plus 5th Bn 14th Punjab Regiment), Lane had split the 2/15th Punjab into its four companies which would operate independently at various points.

The destruction of the oil facilities and landing strip had begun as soon as war had been declared on 8 December. Most of the demolition party and vital pieces of equipment had been shipped out on 13 December, but Major Slatter’s B Company had withdrawn from the oil field and had taken up ambush positions around likely landing sites and obvious targets. He had a platoon at Seria, along with an armed police detachment, but his main force near Miri. The plan was to give the Japanese a bloody nose, then withdraw to a rendezvous point on the River Baram. Slatter had a detachment of Dyak tribesmen from the Sarawak Rangers who would help the Punjabis deal with travel through the jungle.

In Brunei and Labuan the decision had been made not to resist a Japanese invasion, with the police to remain only on internal security duties. Anything of use to the enemy with regards oil had to be destroyed, and this order was carried out.

The Japanese lost about forty men due to high seas as they were transferring from their troop ship to the landing barges. Before coming ashore at both Miri and Seria, Major Slatters men managed to hit another barge with 3-inch mortar rounds and the fire from two VB light machine guns, causing another forty deaths and more wounded. As the two parts of his Company melted back into the jungle, they had delayed but not stopped the invasion. Six sappers from 34th Fortress Company, Royal Engineers, under Lieutenant ‘Tubby’ Hancock had stayed with Slatters’ Company and had left behind a number of booby traps which caused the Japanese more casualties and more delays.

Elements of the story in italics differ from OTL.
 
Wasn’t part of the reason Wasp was assigned to the Atlantic that she was considered too vulnerable to damage, and it was thought the Germans were less likely to be able to damage her? IIRC she was only moved to the Pacific when damage to other carriers at Corral Sea left the USN short handed. If this is the case, wouldn’t Wasp stay in the Atlantic until that happens ITTL?
 
How did the Japanese escort the landings at Broneo. The historic escort has already been sunk.

Did they go bravely into the dark unescorted or did they steal forces from elsewhere.

Also I note that the last post was not threadmarked.
 
Wasn’t part of the reason Wasp was assigned to the Atlantic that she was considered too vulnerable to damage, and it was thought the Germans were less likely to be able to damage her? IIRC she was only moved to the Pacific when damage to other carriers at Corral Sea left the USN short handed. If this is the case, wouldn’t Wasp stay in the Atlantic until that happens ITTL?
Pretty much, she was built weak and they knew it (although the second happy time probably meant she was at risk even in the Atlantic). Problem was (much like HMS Hood) getting her fixed up to be safe would require extensive yard time and she couldn't be spared. End result wasn't quite as spectacular as Hood but still resulted in dead ship.

Ultimately though all the pre war American carriers were not that wonderful and mostly existed to buy time to get the Essex class into service. Luckily in the battles of OTL 1942 they were carefully exchanged for many more Japanese ships with the result being Japan crippled even before Essex arrived and two pre war ships surviving the entire conflict.
 
Pretty much, she was built weak and they knew it (although the second happy time probably meant she was at risk even in the Atlantic). Problem was (much like HMS Hood) getting her fixed up to be safe would require extensive yard time and she couldn't be spared. End result wasn't quite as spectacular as Hood but still resulted in dead ship.

Ultimately though all the pre war American carriers were not that wonderful and mostly existed to buy time to get the Essex class into service. Luckily in the battles of OTL 1942 they were carefully exchanged for many more Japanese ships with the result being Japan crippled even before Essex arrived and two pre war ships surviving the entire conflict.
three ships made it. you forgot ranger
 
Pretty much, she was built weak and they knew it (although the second happy time probably meant she was at risk even in the Atlantic). Problem was (much like HMS Hood) getting her fixed up to be safe would require extensive yard time and she couldn't be spared. End result wasn't quite as spectacular as Hood but still resulted in dead ship.

Ultimately though all the pre war American carriers were not that wonderful and mostly existed to buy time to get the Essex class into service. Luckily in the battles of OTL 1942 they were carefully exchanged for many more Japanese ships with the result being Japan crippled even before Essex arrived and two pre war ships surviving the entire conflict.
Eh, the Yorktowns weren’t too bad.
 
three ships made it. you forgot ranger
Sorry (although in my defense she's easy to forget).

Eh, the Yorktowns weren’t too bad.
Treaty ships that quickly became to small and under equipped for their job. Although the really problem was lack of hulls which saw the fleet almost wiped out over the course of 1942. Luckily while they had more and more modern designs the Japanese proved appalling at DC and easy to trick and so the US was able to sink their carriers at a rate of about 4 to 1.
 
Treaty ships that quickly became to small and under equipped for their job. Although the really problem was lack of hulls which saw the fleet almost wiped out over the course of 1942. Luckily while they had more and more modern designs the Japanese proved appalling at DC and easy to trick and so the US was able to sink their carriers at a rate of about 4 to 1.
'Treaty ships' is also a criticism that can be levelled against the Illustriouses. the 16' hanger height of the latter, and the impossibility to increase this really limited what it could carry in the late war.
 
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The RN and the USN pursued different design philosphies. The RN ships were designed to operated close into defended airspace in and near Europe as well as overseas in the Indian and Pacific oceans. The USN made their carriers lighter weight and designed to be easily repairable with wooden decks. The RN designed their carriers with armoured decks. The RN were more survivable, the USN less so. When a Kamikaze hit a RN carrier, it was "All hands man brooms" and swept it's wreckage overboard and continued flight operations once the flightdeck was clear. When a Kamikaze struck a USN carrier, the carrier invariably had to return to the dockyard for a new flightdeck and a new hangar. Which was better? USN could run the engines of their aircraft up down below in the hangar before they came on deck, the RN wasn't able to. USN could carry more planes, the RN fewer. You take your choices and you wear them.
 
The RN and the USN pursued different design philosphies. The RN ships were designed to operated close into defended airspace in and near Europe as well as overseas in the Indian and Pacific oceans. The USN made their carriers lighter weight and designed to be easily repairable with wooden decks. The RN designed their carriers with armoured decks. The RN were more survivable, the USN less so. When a Kamikaze hit a RN carrier, it was "All hands man brooms" and swept it's wreckage overboard and continued flight operations once the flightdeck was clear. When a Kamikaze struck a USN carrier, the carrier invariably had to return to the dockyard for a new flightdeck and a new hangar. Which was better? USN could run the engines of their aircraft up down below in the hangar before they came on deck, the RN wasn't able to. USN could carry more planes, the RN fewer. You take your choices and you wear them.
It’s not quite as straightforward as that, the bomb hits that the armoured carriers took caused long term structural issues.
 
The RN and the USN pursued different design philosphies. The RN ships were designed to operated close into defended airspace in and near Europe as well as overseas in the Indian and Pacific oceans. The USN made their carriers lighter weight and designed to be easily repairable with wooden decks. The RN designed their carriers with armoured decks. The RN were more survivable, the USN less so. When a Kamikaze hit a RN carrier, it was "All hands man brooms" and swept it's wreckage overboard and continued flight operations once the flightdeck was clear. When a Kamikaze struck a USN carrier, the carrier invariably had to return to the dockyard for a new flightdeck and a new hangar. Which was better? USN could run the engines of their aircraft up down below in the hangar before they came on deck, the RN wasn't able to. USN could carry more planes, the RN fewer. You take your choices and you wear them.
The armoured deck cost down the line, in several different ways. Firstly, overhauls were more difficult, due to having to cut armour out to get at the innards. Secondly, treaty limits meant that the hanger height had to be cut to stay within displacement while still mounting the armour, so its ability to operate the larger late-war and post-war craft was limited. Finally, radar developments in the late 30s and into the 40s meant that the carriers could now spot the enemies further out, thus mitigating at least some of the fears that caused the armour to be added in the first place.

It’s not quite as straightforward as that, the bomb hits that the armoured carriers took caused long term structural issues.
I thought it was the Kamikazes that caused structural issues?
 
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It’s not quite as straightforward as that, the bomb hits that the armoured carriers took caused long term structural issues.
True but they were issues that wouldn't put the Carrier out of action right there and then which was considered more important during the actual war. Obviously post war the RN ships didn't have much life left which saw a massive reduction in the carrier force by the later 1950's.

True. OTOH the RN got into enough so lose several carriers, and see several more severely damaged.
Yeah but most of those losses were either very old and vulnerable (Hermes, Eagle), result of stupidity (Courageous, Glorious) or act of U-Boat (Ark Royal). We didn't lose as many in knockdown drag out fights between two carriers because those weren't the Battles the RN ended up fighting.
 
It’s not quite as straightforward as that, the bomb hits that the armoured carriers took caused long term structural issues.

It's very off the topic of this thread but I've always regarded the structural warping as a bit like crumple zones in cars. Obviously it's undesirable but it's a good problem to have compared having your carrier turn into a raging inferno.
 
And since there is no need for the OTL Malta Convoys, USS Wasp can be transfered to the Pacific immediately. The USN will have 3 carriers at the Battle of the Coral Sea, with butterlifes hatching along the way.
Need to get them in postion first but yeah good point and air cover for Malta is pretty secure for malta given Britain and the Commonwealth have taken Libya as well as new aircraft that can be flown in via Libya as well since they can land aircraft in British Atlantic African ports and fly them across.
 

Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
The debate about whose aircraft carriers were the best, is fruitless, as it fails to take into account the peculiar conditions of the inter war years. The combination of the lack of knowledge about aircraft carriers, the restrictions on carriers imposed by the various treaties, and the lack of a future scope, meant that everyone British, American and Japanese got it wrong to an extent. All the carriers were too small, even the big American and Japanese conversions, all the carriers lacked sufficient underwater protection. And none of them were able to operate the massively increased aircraft size and weight, that the inter war and war years produced. If you could go back in time, and convince your respective government that in addition to simple fixes like angled decks, and air borne air search radar. They need to build carriers of at least 60,000 tons with only side elevators and a minimum three inch armoured deck. Which nation has the facilities to build such a monster, and how are you going to power it. No good using conventional steam plant, even with the best small tube boilers and higher pressure, it’s just going to take up to much room. Britain has only been able to build its two new carriers, because of the major advances in both Diesel engines, and gas turbines, along with their control systems. All the nations that built carriers in the inter war years, and operated them during the war, built what they thought was best, given the restrictions they were under.

RR.
 
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