23rd October – 29th October 1941– Libya – The Axis Counteroffensive – Part II – Operation Alexander
The decision to name the Axis offensive Operation Alexander, after Alexander the Great the man who had founded the city that was the ultimate goal of the offensive, was both bombastic and questionable in security terms, though Sepp Dietrich was hardly the only German officer to overestimate the secrecy of the Wehrmacht communications systems. The name did cause some occasional confusion, as well as amusement, in British ranks given the it was also the name of the General in overall command of the British forces. The plan called for an attack on the northern sector of the Sirte Line while the LSSAH, 22nd Panzer and the Italian Ariete Armoured Divisions made a sweep around the southern flank of the British position, where, according to Wehrmacht intelligence, the defences were anchored by what the 8th Army believed to be ground unsuitable for large scale operations. Scouts from the Afrika Korps had probed the area and concluded that the British had overestimated the difficulties of the terrain. The Axis forces also wanted to take advantage of the reports that issues with moving supplies and access to water had forced the British to thin out the defences at Sirte.
It may come as no surprise that the assumptions that Operation Alexander were almost entirely false. It was largely based on intelligence from sympathetic sources behind British lines that often amounted to no more than gossip and rumour, largely based on deliberate misinformation spread by the British. One example of misdirection was the British openly transporting troops away from Sirte by truck during the day, only for them to march back by night. Likewise armoured reinforcements were moved forward by night in small groups to minimize noise. The information about the ground south of the defensive positions was a deliberate leak, precisely to encourage the Axis forces to try and make a breakthrough there. It is possible to make too much of British ingenuity in such deception operations, they succeeded because the information they leaked played into Axis expectations, the Germans and Italians wanted to believe what they were hearing, and conversely, they wilfully ignored anything that bring this favourable picture into doubt. General Apell for one was dubious, particularly questioning an estimate that the British might have as few as 120 running, but his concerns about this and other intelligence were dismissed even though the tank numbers seemed to have been nothing more than pure guesswork based on the difficulties the Axis forces were experiencing in repairing and maintaining their own vehicles [1].
The attack was originally set for the 18th of October but was postponed until the 23rd as a supply convoy was delayed and saw one cargo ship carrying munitions sunk by the submarine
HMS Upholder. The northern arm of the attack was to be led by the Italian X Corps, formerly part of the Italian 5th Army now being used as a source of reinforcements for 10th Army. X Corps consisted of 3 divisions that had not been involved in the earlier fighting and were more or less at full strength. Almost as soon as they moved out X Corps they ran into trouble, coming under attack from the British Desert Air Force (DAF) and when they reached what should have been clear lanes through the British minefields, they found them anything but clear and the passages that did exist had been pre-ranged by British artillery. When X Corps finally advanced beyond the minefields and began to attack the British boxes light artillery and mortar fire was directed at the leading elements alongside heavy machine gun fire. Over the next few days, the attack ebbed and flowed with a number of the British positions finding themselves temporarily surrounded, though only a few were actually overrun, and it was becoming clear to the senior officers of X Corps that the British were far stronger than they had been led to believe.
The British were also deploying companies of Matilda tanks supported by infantry mounted on Universal Carriers and light trucks to put in local counterattacks and relieve several of the threatened defensive positions. By the 26th the attack in the north had completely bogged down. This though was not a serious blow to the overall plan, the primary goal of the attack in the north had been to pin the British in place and draw off whatever reserves they might have. The knockout blow was intended to be struck by the three armoured divisions swinging around the southern end of the position and this prong of the attack was launched on the 25th. As they made their sweep all seemed to be going well for the first day, until they hit the defensive system the British had christened the Grouse Moor. This was a series of positions with well dug in anti-tank guns arranged in a sawtooth pattern, allowing them to create a crossfire. The anti-tank positions were covered by artillery from the rear and minefields and obstacles to the front and positioned nearby ready to intervene was the whole of 2nd Armoured Division, equipped with all the available 6pdr armed Crusaders and Valentines [2].
The British had been expecting this attack, they had after all presented a tempting opportunity and Dietrich had seized on it in pursuit of a decisive victory and a Field Marshal’s baton if it truly went well. The minefields were not wholly unexpected by the advancing armour and Dietrich was only too willing to push his engineers to clear paths through them, regardless of loss. The opening of an artillery barrage as the three divisions cautiously advanced through the minefields were far more unexpected. Dietrich had place the LSSAH in the centre of the advance, with the 22nd on the left of the SS division and the Ariete to their right. The Ariete was the weakest of the three formations as it was still heavily dependent on tankettes and even more understrength the 22nd Panzer after the losses during Operation Compass and suffered badly at the hands of the anti-tank guns as it pressed forward. Under fire from the British gunline all three armoured divisions began to shift eastward, looking to flank the Grouse Moor or at least find a weak point they could break through. This led to the Ariete running head on into the advancing 2nd Armoured Division and the ensuing action was completely one sided. The tanks of the Ariete lacked any weapons that could damage the Valentines at all and they struggled against the Crusaders. In less than an hour of combat what was left of the Ariete was scattered and to all intents and purposes it had ceased to exist.
The engagement with the Ariete had at least provided a warning to the Afrika Korps divisions and Dietrich ordered the 22nd to close up with the LSSAH. Dietrich was directing the operation from a Panzer IV modified as command vehicle, far too close to the front of the action and far too exposed for such a senior officer. As the 22nd was joining up it was forced to expose itself to heavy fire from British artillery and anti-tank guns, having already suffered owing to the minefields. In the ensuing engagement the inevitable happened, at least two 6pdr shells struck Dietrich’s tank killing him and his crew, sparking years of argument over which tank scored the killing blow. This loss did nothing to persuade the LSSAH to withdraw, indeed in the confusion of the battle its questionable if they even realized Dietrich had been killed. In the end it was the 22nd breaking off that forced the LSSAH to follow suit. 2nd Armoured Division had also suffered heavy losses in the fight, but by drawing the Panzers onto the gun line they ensured that the Germans had by far the worst of the exchange [3]. The battle had been devastating for the Afrika Korps. The Ariete was wrecked and 22nd Panzer wasn’t much better off. The LSSAH hadn’t suffered as badly but the day after the action at the Grouse Moor it could bare muster 40% of its starting strength and where the British were able and willing to quickly replace the losses suffered by their armoured forces the Afrika Korps could expect no such reinforcement, especially not with the Ostheer suffering brutally as it crawled its way towards Moscow in the depths of a Russian weather. The failure of the armoured flanking attack was not though the end of Operation Alexander [4].
[1] Dietrich wants his own Sickle cut that will bag the main British force at Sirte, forgetting that the British have already seen that trick.
[2] The Italian attack is being broken up and dispersed, though as far as Graziani is concerned it doing its job of keeping British focus to the north.
[3] In effect O’Connor has adopted what would have been Rommel’s favourite tactic, using his tanks to bait the enemy into range of a gun line.
[4] Another case where it’s a bit light on notes because this battle is so divergent from OTL.