December 5th – December 30th - Germany - War Postponed
The outcome of the Munich conference had as previously mentioned left Hitler angry and somewhat bemused as to how he had been denied his war by the ‘wily’ Chamberlain. The sense he had been tricked simply stiffened his resolve that the agreement had only postponed the destruction of Czechoslovakia. He remained determined that Czechoslovakia be removed from the map as soon as possible. German representatives in Bratislava were already working to foment secessionist sentiment among the Slovaks, finding a ready audience with the likes of Józef Tiso [1], who would become the leader of the breakaway Slovak Republic and collaborate with the Nazis in imposing their racial policies in Slovak territory. Far from rallying around the Czechs its neighbours were already pressing their own territorial claims, with Poland going so far as to invade Czechoslovakia on the 28th of December and seizing what they called the Zaolzie territory. Hitler had reason to hope that this might lead the Poles to accept German overtures for an alliance, though these hopes would be dashed in short order, the Poles were not about to tie themselves to Nazi Germany so long as it laid claim to Polish territory.
As it happened Hitler’s demands for the dissolution of Czechoslovakia by force as soon as possible provoked none of the anxiety, or scheming, it had in September for several reasons. Firstly, The Munich Agreement had physically stripped away the Czech border defences. Secondly internal tensions meant it was unlikely Czechoslovakia could even muster the whole of its army if they did decide to contest an invasion. Thirdly, and most importantly, the agreement proved that the British and the French would not go to war over Czech sovereignty. Able to launch attacks from multiple fronts against a country in disarray OKH was confident the Wehrmacht could occupy Czechoslovakia without unduly straining their limited resources. Goering jovially voiced the opinion that the mere threat of unleashing the Luftwaffe’s bombers on Prague would be more than enough to bring them to their knees.
When news of the passage of the MTA and the new military procurement plans reached Berlin Hitler presented a public face of being unimpressed by these actions, dismissing them as ‘window dressing’ designed to bolster ‘English’ morale and of no practical consequence, Britain was first and foremost a naval power after all and its army was insignificant. Behind closed doors it was a very different matter. Hitler was convinced that Munich had been nothing but a ploy by the British to play for time and address the inadequacies of their armed forces. By resisting his calls for an immediate move against the Czechs his subordinates had played into Chamberlain’s hands, and he made his displeasure crystal clear in a series of bruising meetings with von Brauchitsch, Halder and other staff officers. His response to the increased funding for the British forces was to demand an increase in Germany’s own armaments production that would dwarf anything the British could achieve, in the short term at least.
The branches of the Wehrmacht duly obliged with grandiose plans that did indeed put Chamberlain’s proposal in the shade. The Heer’s plan call for more artillery and more ammunition first and foremost, increasing tank production was certainly included but it was not regarded as a critical priority. The overwhelming bulk of the tanks in the German arsenal were the Panzer I and Panzer II Light Tanks. The former being another machine gun armed vehicle, though arguably a better machine than the MK VI B Light. The Panzer II was a more powerful machine with a 20mm cannon; however it was still regarded as an intermediate machine and the role of fighting other tanks was intended to be filled by the Panzer III, early models of which was already in production, but with only a few dozen completed by the end of 1938. The Panzer IV had also entered production and despite later better armed, models proving highly effective against other tanks later it was intended purely as an infantry support vehicle in 1938 and was only equipped with a short barrelled 75mm howitzer [2].
For the Luftwaffe Goering offered up bombastic plans for the construction of thousands of Ju 88 bombers alongside the proven Bf 109 single engine fighter and the Bf 110 twin engine fighter, the latter intended to serve as a long-range bomber escort. Neither the Bf 110 [3] nor the Ju 88 [4] would live up to the expectations placed upon them when they entered combat, but in 1938 they were both seen as key in improving the capabilities of the Luftwaffe, which fell far short of the dire predictions circulating in London.
The Kriegsmarine certainly proposed building more U-Boats, though priority remained with the creation of a powerful surface fleet. Admiral Raeder essentially ignored the clear warning from the Sudetenland Crisis that any notion of war being postponed until the mid-1940’s was simply unrealistic. That Raeder’s stuck to his plans probably reflected Hitler’s enthusiasm for large surface ships and the fear that if Raeder expressed any doubts about their utility, well then the funds allocated to the Kriegsmarine programs might be reallocated to the Heer and the Luftwaffe rather than being used for U-Boats and more practical surface ships.
As dramatic and ominous as these targets for thousand of bombers and tanks sounded it was, to quote Shakespeare, ‘all sound and fury signifying nothing’. All of them were doomed by the fundamental economic and resource limitations that had derailed previous nearly identical proposals for rapidly increasing arms production. Above all else the Reich’s steel industry could not meet the demands being placed on it. Civilian production, export industries, new industrial capacity, such as synthetic oil plants, the railways and the building of fortifications all had a call on the available production and while some might airily suggest cuts in the civilian sector the steel used in those industries was not being used to create luxuries for the ordinary German citizen but to make things like stoves and farm tools. Increasing the steel ‘ration’ of the Wehrmacht could only be done at the expense of German families and the exports that raised much needed foreign currency or could be bartered with friendly nations [5].
The industries of the Reich certainly tried to meet Hitler’s demands, they had little choice after all, but they would fall far short. The truth was that the Nazi military machine was reaching the limits of what could be done in a peacetime economy regardless of how ruthlessly the state regulated production and raw material allocation. Germany’s enemies could ramp up their rearmament and overtake Germany if they wished to do so, and the evidence from London and Paris suggested that was exactly what they intended to do. Sooner or later whatever advantages the Wehrmacht might enjoy would be eroded and this prospect increasingly weighed on Hitler’s mind.
[1] Short bio of Tiso here:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jozef_Tiso
[2] The Wehrmacht proved remarkably stubborn about sticking with this separation of functions even though to the casual observer their similarities were far more pronounced than their differences.
[3] The Bf 110 would later prove to be an effective night fighter but as a daylight bomber escort it proved a failure when faced with modern single engine fighters. Efforts to replace it were undertaken but the Me 210 suffered serious issues that rendered them death traps.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Messerschmitt_Me_210
[4] The Ju 88 was supposed the be the schnellbomber the Luftwaffe so desperately wanted, but by the time it entered service fighter evolution had overtaken it and combined with early technical issues it was a severe disappointment during its early deployments.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Ju_88
[5] I can’t come close to doing justice to the topic of the Nazi economy and some of you can already guess which book I am going to suggest for further reading if you really want to understand the subject:
Wages of Destruction
. Its the same reason I decided against giving Frank Whittle more funding sooner or having an earlier Mosquito, the RAF would take extra funding and put it into more 'sensible' projects. Again if anyone has a solid argument otherwise to justify earlier jet fighters or Mosquitos I would love to hear it.
