October 20th – November 4th 1938 – Germany - Kristallnacht
Garrison
Donor
October 20th – November 4th 1938 – Germany - Kristallnacht
Late October spelt the end for the dismal crowd of conspirators plotting the overthrow of Hitler. The postponement of military action against the Czechs had robbed them of much of their momentum and with time to contemplate the potential consequences of failure many of the plotters were doing their level best to backpedal on whatever commitments they might have made. The final straw for the potential coup came when a remark by Hitler was passed to one of the prime movers in the conspiracy, General Halder, ‘I know the spirit of Zossen, and I will crush it once and for all’. Hitler was referring to what he saw as the defeatist attitudes of the Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH) the Army High Command. To Halder it was obvious Hitler knew something and he panicked and destroyed all his documents on or around the 25th of October. Even had Halder not panicked at this moment it is questionable whether the military officers, who had sworn an oath of allegiance to the Fuhrer, would really have had the will to do what would have been required to overthrow Hitler.
Those outside the circles of the plotters who had been warning of a premature war had been relieved at the postponement of hostilities brought about by Chamberlain’s plea and with fresh negotiations not due to take place until mid-November the argument was being put forward that the winter weather would probably hinder Luftwaffe operations and military action against the Czechs might have to be postponed until Spring. This would also allow time for further efforts to persuade the Poles to support an attack in pursuit of their own territorial claims and to exploit the ethnic divisions inside Czechoslovakia. Hitler remained unwaveringly belligerent; he would brook no delays beyond those necessitated by the final round of negotiations unless they fulfilled all his demands.
This led to some of those opposed to immediate war to try a different approach, or rather return to a well-worn one, blaming the Jews. Specifically in this case the proponents of this line of argument claimed that it was the Jews who were inciting the British and French into a more belligerent stance to provoke war [1]. It was a transparent ploy that had been tried before, but in the aftermath of Hendon and the rumours about sabotage now swirling around Berlin a new variant was put forward. The mysterious saboteurs were part of a Jewish cabal who intended to assassinate Chamberlain, blame Germany for it, and precipitate war when the Reich’s preparations were incomplete. This argument did nothing to sway Hitler from his pursuit of war, instead it provoked a horrifying tragedy by providing Hitler with an excuse to vent his pent-up frustration and anger at the continual delays to his plans for the Czechs. On the 1st of November he made the speech that ignited the horrors of Kristallnacht [2]. Between the 1st and 3rd of November hundreds of Jews were murdered and businesses laid waste. In the aftermath Goering would express his distaste for the whole event, not because of the death toll but because of the cost of making good the damage to properties that the Nazi’s had planned to confiscate.
The British embassy in Berlin was inundated with reports of murder, assault, arson, and rape from every corner of Germany. These reports were easily confirmed as the Nazi’s revelled in their barbarism, they wanted everyone to see how the ‘treacherous Jews’ were dealt with. The reports made their way to London by diplomatic dispatch and were soon in the hands of the Cabinet. By this point Chamberlain had been transferred to a convalescent home in the Kent countryside. He had made a steady recovery and seemed to be adjusting well though not without some periods of despondency, which was hardly unexpected in the circumstances, and it had been decided that the best therapy for this was allowing a gradual return to his responsibilities as PM. This took the form of visits from his staff and cabinet members to brief him and relay his wishes to London. The number of memos and notes emanating from Kent was in fact becoming a source of exasperation in Whitehall, though it did help to quell any ongoing speculation about his fitness to continue in office.
On the evening of the 3rd a hastily convened party was dispatched to meet with Chamberlain, trying to get to him before he learned of events in Germany through press reports. This group included several members of the diplomatic and intelligence services, though not Halifax who seems to have been bypassed in this instance. Chamberlain’s reaction to the awful accounts of what had been unleashed seemed to be one of sadness rather than anger, almost as if he were in mourning. He gave no hint that evening of how he intended to respond to what seemed unequivocal proof that Adolf Hitler was not a ‘man of sound character’ and that the German people seemed to have eagerly embraced his call to violence. The only certainty on the evening of the 3rd was that with the rearranged meeting with Hitler barely three weeks away Chamberlain would have to respond, and quickly.
[1] Yes, they really did try that in OTL, here they just work in the accident to give the appearance of more substance.
[2] |You can assume that with minor changes for the inciting event this is pretty much the same speech as OTL.