This prep work may be "boring" to some, but without it, the men there are doomed. The training, the leadership, the cadre, the infrastructure and equipment. That's what changes a mass of men into an army, or at least brigades and divisions in one.
 
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an opened door leading to the big veranda at one end, the windows on either side were opened, although the blinds were pulled, in an effort to allow a draft of wind to draw through without the heat of the sun coming in. Two big electric fans lazily swirled around, helping create an impression of cooler air.
I remember a quote from Lee Kuan Yew who believed that modern air conditioning was the secret behind Singapore's incredible economic growth from the 1960s onwards, before that point he believed efficient work was impossible for most of the day and that fundamentally limited development in the region. It seems like Gort and his staff would agree with that. :)
 

Coulsdon Eagle

Monthly Donor
I've been quite surprised by the attention being paid to my timeline, and all the interesting comments, but I am quite aware that some of this stuff is a bit boring. I'm writing it, to try and explain why we get to where we do end up (eventually), and that my timeline is plausible. Personally, I cant wait to get to the 'action' but there's a lot more mundane stuff to write about first. However, as was historically, anything that happens in Malaya, is bound, in some way or shape, to how things progress in North Africa, and I will be updating on events there , keeping everything in perspective. So I will try and write a few 'action' stories, when commenting on the Middle East. Anyway, here's another story to keep us going.

This prep work may be "boring" to some, but without it, the men there are doomed. The training, the leadership, the cadre, the infrastructure and equipment. That's what changes a mad of men into an army, or at least brigades and divisions in one.
I'm with Geordie - this class of post is not boring, it is essential so that we readers can follow how the changes to OTL can be made. Looking at most of the "Allies do better" threads the ones that stand out are those with this granular level of details. I agree, it may seem boring to write (I hope not) - and I would love to read dreadnought-on-dreadnought action - but they are the mortar that binds the bricks of the tale.
 
I've been quite surprised by the attention being paid to my timeline, and all the interesting comments, but I am quite aware that some of this stuff is a bit boring. I'm writing it, to try and explain why we get to where we do end up (eventually), and that my timeline is plausible. Personally, I cant wait to get to the 'action' but there's a lot more mundane stuff to write about first. However, as was historically, anything that happens in Malaya, is bound, in some way or shape, to how things progress in North Africa, and I will be updating on events there , keeping everything in perspective. So I will try and write a few 'action' stories, when commenting on the Middle East. Anyway, here's another story to keep us going.
Not boring at all, it is very entertaining to read and informative.
 
Not boring at all, it is very entertaining to read and informative.
Indeed the issues of Motor transport is an important aspect

For example

Without the captured M/T from the Malaya/Singapore garrison its unlikely that the IJA could have sustained the invasion of Burma!

Had the 2nd NZ Division had its allocation of M/T on Crete (mostly abandoned/destroyed in Greece) it could have reacted far faster to the German airheads......same with the British forces trying to stop Rommel during Sonnenblume
 
Agreeing with the previous posters. Even something as prosaic as "the RAF gets most of the cement" translates into more all-weather runways. An important factor in the rainy Malayan climate.
 
I'm with Geordie - this class of post is not boring, it is essential so that we readers can follow how the changes to OTL can be made. Looking at most of the "Allies do better" threads the ones that stand out are those with this granular level of details. I agree, it may seem boring to write (I hope not) - and I would love to read dreadnought-on-dreadnought action - but they are the mortar that binds the bricks of the tale.
Compare to the TL "England expects", in which the real focus was on how the RN improved its gunnery and signals, leading to a decisive victory at Jutland.
 
This prep work may be "boring" to some, but without it, the men there are doomed. The training, the leadership, the cadre, the infrastructure and equipment. That's what changes a mass of men into an army, or at least brigades and divisions in one.
This. While 10,000 extra troops may look impressive on paper (and unfortunately may deceive London into thinking Malaya is stronger than it is), without adequate training, effective command and decent equipment they're just more paper battalions that will be shredded in the Japanese offensive.

And time is already scary short...
 
I
This. While 10,000 extra troops may look impressive on paper (and unfortunately may deceive London into thinking Malaya is stronger than it is), without adequate training, effective command and decent equipment they're just more paper battalions that will be shredded in the Japanese offensive.

And time is already scary short...

Their efficacy probably depends upon the role you ask them to play. If they are asked to deploy independently as trained infantry you're likely right - they'll likely get steamrolled against battle-hardened Japanese troops. If instead they are given garrison roles to man entrenched positions around key cities, airfields, naval bases, or other key assets or resources, with regular infantry and artillery in support, that's a different story. First, by freeing up other regular infantry, you have a larger fieldable army to manoeuvre (including potentially making an amphibious landing in the Japanese rear). Second, in entrenched positions, even against superior troops, they will likely inflict casualties at least on a 2:1 ratio. So if adding 10,000 troops, that means as wild speculation that could require 20,000 additional Japanese casualties to overcome. That attrition incurred as the Japanese attempt to make their way South may be critical. I should add that after Nanking, the soldiers of Chinese descent may become as fearsome an asset, as the Japanese attackers.
 
Granted, they wont be first-rate infantry, but they will likely slow the Japanese up to some degree. Since we know that the Japanese advance on Singapore in OTL was days away from stalling, days matter.
 
Food and ammunition was a big player in the battle for Malaya the more ammunition the Japanese use in each battle the less they have when the reach Singapore. As to the food well the Japanese travel light and make use of anything they can get their hands on to eat scorched earth tactics spring to mind the less food in their bellies the weaker they are.
 
Their efficacy probably depends upon the role you ask them to play. If they are asked to deploy independently as trained infantry you're likely right - they'll likely get steamrolled against battle-hardened Japanese troops. If instead they are given garrison roles to man entrenched positions around key cities, airfields, naval bases, or other key assets or resources, with regular infantry and artillery in support, that's a different story.
True, to a point. If they can be used for rear-area garrison and non-combat roles so as to free up more first-line troops for the battle zone they may prove useful.
OTL, the British suffered hideously from penny-packet syndrome, with isolated companies/battalions/brigades deployed in mutually non-supporting positions at what were believed to be chokepoints, and duly getting overrun or outflanked. Simply having enough troops available to keep a tactical reserve or hold a more continuous front would be a huge improvement.

But if undertrained/under-equipped troops are deployed to the battle zone in anything other than an static defensive role, they will fall apart rapidly, particularly when faced with Japanese infiltration tactics. And the history of the OTL Malaya Campaign is of British/Australian/Indian troops holding static defensive positions - and often scoring tactical successes against Japanese frontal attacks - and then getting outflanked and forced to retreat, at which point everything goes to hell and all that is left is a rabble of desperate fugitives stumbling through the jungle.

Granted, they wont be first-rate infantry, but they will likely slow the Japanese up to some degree. Since we know that the Japanese advance on Singapore in OTL was days away from stalling, days matter.
Quoth Arthur Percival: The young Indian recruits were helpless. They did not even know how to take cover, and there were not enough officers to control them. (This was referring to the teenaged Indian recruits of the 45th Brigade, who were destroyed by the Japanese at Muar). Sending second-string infantry to slow up the Japanese was what was tried OTL, with results we all know. It does no good at all to slow the Japanese by a few hours, or inflict a few hundred casualties, if the price is another battalion or brigade cut to ribbons in the inevitable retreat. And OTL even the first-line Commonwealth units rarely slowed the Japanese for long - there was always another axis of advance, or a tactical amphibious landing to outflank them and force yet another retreat.

Food and ammunition was a big player in the battle for Malaya the more ammunition the Japanese use in each battle the less they have when the reach Singapore
True, so make sure you don't abandon any supply dumps to the enemy. But logistics works both ways - I suspect (but may be wrong here) that the reason the bulk of the Commonwealth were kept in the south while the luckless 11th Indian Division was fighting its delaying actions in the north was down to lack of transport and the poor infrastructure in most of Malaya.

OTL, bleeding the Japanese on their advance south was what Percival tried with his blown-bridge-and-ambush-strategy and it didn't work. The defenders lost far more than the attackers and defeat fed on itself. By the time the Japanese reached Johor - which is the point where the best British and Australian units were committed to the battle - coordination had collapsed, desertion and defeatism were rampant and everyone had bought into the myth of the Invincible Japanese Jungle Fighter. Morale can count for as much as bullets and a whole lot more than numbers - as the Japanese proved at Singapore.
 
MWI 41011011 SS Egra Arrives

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
1941, Friday, 10 January;

The single ship, SS Egra, having met convoy WS 4B, heading for the Suez, in Mombasa, and transferred over personal destined for the Far East, slipped into Singapore. Despite the Home Forces, and North Africa having priority, this was the beginning of the promised steady trickle that was coming to the Far East. They’d left back in mid-November, too short a time to really reflect the small change in strategy that Churchill and the CoS had agreed, but it would be a start.

On board were a number of specialists, about 30 staff officers for the newly forming GHQ Far East, AHQ and Malaya Command staffs. They were mostly recently promoted, but fully trained in the more senior roles they would hold. These HQs would need a lot more staff than these, but the plan was to run a lot of short-term courses and fill a number of lower-level positions from locally recruited or Australians, older men with good civilian experience in administrative roles in logistics, coming in as ECO’s. The more technical and military roles would be more difficult to fill.

And as part of this upskilling of locally recruited talent, the OCTU in Singapore was taking on a significant expansion. A small cadre of Officers and NCO’s taken from UK OCTU’s had arrived to expand Singapore’s OCTU unit. Roberts Barracks, Singapore was releasing more buildings for this as well as the staff training that would be held there.

But there was also a take, as for every give there always had seemed to be a take. The majority of personnel carried on board were replacement drafts for the Army, RAF and Royal Navy. Those they replaced were time served experienced men, who would return back to the UK to help provide cadres around which new units would form. This weakened the forces out here in the short run, but promotions among those left helped to fill the gaps along with the back filling of newly trained who would learn the ropes.

And the real commitment that was made, was this would be the last time significant numbers of men would be sent back to the UK, from now on they would just expand. And the CoS had Churchill’s word on that!
 
They do have if things kick off at the same time 9 months to get up to speed.

And of course we know we can count on Churchill's word. (at least if Brooke can help it).
 
Little help on the acronym soup:
NCO - Non-Commissioned Officer
OCTU - Officer Cadet Training Unit

But what is an ECO? o_O
 
MWI 41011313 Improving The FMSR

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
1941, Monday 13 January;

It was the seventh weekly meeting of the General War Council, they’d met the Monday between Christmas and New Year, for a short meeting, but were back to the full morning, the Monday afterwards. It was the same format, an executive first then the full council later in the morning. Caldecott had settled back into Singapore life, almost as if he’d never been away, he had such an easy manner with everyone, but still managed to get things done. Layton was the old hand now, five months into it, while Gort, Park and Percival were still trying to get use to the climate. Nevertheless, this format of governance seemed to work well. The Executive meeting just between the five of them and the Secretary, meeting earlier, helped smooth over conflicts of interest within the services and with civil government.

Today, after quite a few minor items of mundane business earlier on the agenda, the War Council had moved to the main item of business, discussing the FMSR (Federated Malay States Railways), and agreeing some changes to be put in place. This was due to it becoming a prominent concern, following the closure of the main line for two days in December, south of Ipoh, caused by a landslide brought on by heavy rains. It had help focus their minds on the vulnerability of the railway as both Gort and Park had been on a train stuck for several hours waiting for the FMSR to back the trains into stations, allowing them to get off, and journey on by car. A previous council had been discussing this, and a couple of sub committees, one headed by the General Manager of the FMSR, and a second by a Colonel of Royal Engineers, had been formed to discuss requirements and capabilities, they had reported back, and there were a number of points that they had agreed could be improved.

Chairman Andrew Caldecott sat in middle of the table, Grimwood to his left. “So, to summarise, One, I will work on providing laws allowing the militarisation of the FMSR to happen quickly in time of war. Two, provide additional funding for the FMSR, partly by directing more monies into their Railways Renewal Fund and Capital account, and secondly directly paying for FMSR rail related imports from Canada from the main Malaya War Fund Account, this will effectively more than double the annual budget. Three, through this council the Food Controller, Director of Public Works Dept and the Director of the Harbours Board Council will provide details of what expansions and improvements they would most desire.

Caldecott looked down the table at the FMSR GM, Leslie Smart, who took a great swallow and continued the summary in a somewhat hesitant voice. “Firstly, the err, FMSR will work with both the military and civilian authorities on planning and implementing the upgrading and developing some parts of the network for things like passing loops, extra sidings, expansion of the rail yards, and increased storage both in warehousing and open yards. This will include sites identified for significant military expansion, or key strategic sites”. He stopped and sipped from a glass of water, before carrying on.

“Secondly, the current rail track maintenance company will be expanded into three, based at Sentul (Kuala Lumpur), Prai (Province Wellesley), and Gemas (Negeri Sembilan), equipped to make major improvements and repair to rail lines, bridges and other rail infrastructure.
Thirdly, at the Sentul Railway Works, to construct new rail stock for military use, especially more flatbed wagons for vehicles, some extra-long flatbed wagons for aircraft. Also more carriages with be adapted for troop transportation, and the conversation of two steam engines into armored trains for specific military use.”
And lastly, all orders placed from Canada for rails, wheels and axles, rail cranes, and numerous other steel items required for new rail stock, will be done via the Governor’s Office”. Smart stopped talking, relief that his part was over, excited about what was being agreed for his FMSR, but still somewhat in awe of some of his fellow councilors.

Lord Gort cleared his voice, and began “I will ensure a coordinated military command to manage rail transportation and upkeep of rail network, in time of war, for all three services is formed. In addition, I will provide funds for the raising of a Volunteer Railway Regt RE, from the rail workers in Malaya”.

Eyes now turned to Vice Admiral Layton. “My office will detail what improvements we would desire to the rail network in relation to the Naval Base at Singapore, as well as other stations at Port Swettenham and Penang. I will also provide appropriate guns to be fitted to rolling stock attached to armoured trains”.

Air Vice Marshal Keith Park was next “My command will provide details on wanted expansion of railways to service both current and planned airfields, we will also provide advice and guidance on transportation of aircraft by rail”.

The eyes now turned-on Lt Gen Arthur Percival, “My command will firstly, provide detachments of troops to work with the armoured trains when they are converted. And secondly, provide troops to guard strategic points of the rail network in times of war, we also will provide details of wanted railway expansion to service enlarged or new army camps”.

Andrew looked around at the rest of the council, and satisfied that all were in agreement, said “That’s agreed then, my secretary will have copies typed up and sent out to each of you by close of play today. OK there are no other items left on the agenda, and I’ve had no notice of any other business, so I shall call a closure to the meeting, apologies we have run over, but I’m sure you all agreed the business had to be concluded. Now gentlemen, as I promised at the start of the meeting, and partly in anticipation that we would run over, I have a luncheon laid on for everybody, if you just follow my steward through the main doors, he’ll lead you all to the dining room. Ah Leslie, might I have a moment of your time please”

The GM of the FMSR stood by his chair, concern on his face, and nodded worryingly to Caldicott, as the others filed out of the room. Caldicott put an arm round his shoulder, “Well done Leslie old boy, piece of cake wasn’t it, just like I said it would be. Now let me give you a piece of advice. When we are talking about the FMSR, its capability, network, workshops, engines or whatever, don’t be afraid to say what you think, you are the expert here, and if you disagree with some staff officer from so and so’s command say so. Don’t allow yourself to be, excuse the pun, railroaded into an agreement that you can’t fulfill. And if asked a question, and you don’t know, don’t bullshit these people, be honest and say so, but make sure you know next time, and in good detail. I think in the coming months and indeed the next couple of years, you and your railway are going to be a vital piece in the jigsaw of Malaya’s defence”.
 
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