I'll be honest Carl, I'm fairly ignorant of the details of the US defending the Philippines, and the following operations in the south west Pacific, but I know I'm going to learn a lot more as I write this timeline, I can't very well ignore this theatre, being as it has significant bearings on Malaya/Singapore. I would have been surprised to hear that New Caledonia, or Fiji which I'd consider a comparable island, would have any serious industrial capability. Was Brisbane or Sydney not preferable to Wellington?

Its not clear, but my best guess today is Wellington was outside the interdiction zone of Japanese air forces and light naval forces based in Fiji Samoa. The east coast of Australia would have been at the south edge of the interdiction Zone. Looking at the globe its not much more distance from the US west coast to Wellington with or without Japanese in F/S, but there is a larger detour to Brisbane. What other reasons there are I cant say.
 
Just two OTL questions, if you don't mind:
1. Did the Japanese strategically export the bikes and spares knowing this would be their main transport for the invasion? If so, that took some significant foresight.
2. Did the British regularly entrench to defend the blown river crossinga? Or blow them and retreat to other locations?
 
Just two OTL questions, if you don't mind:
1. Did the Japanese strategically export the bikes and spares knowing this would be their main transport for the invasion? If so, that took some significant foresight.
2. Did the British regularly entrench to defend the blown river crossinga? Or blow them and retreat to other locations?
1) You are assuming, years in advance, any planning the Japanese might have carried out. Until mid-1941 Japanese planning was for an advance to the NE, not the SW. They were intent on taking over Eastern Siberia. Until the US and then UK and the DEI instituted an embargo on exports of oil to Japan in responce to the occuputation of French Indochina. They then started planning to take over DEI and Malaya/Burma in a lightening operation to propel their planned invasion of Russia. Even at it's height, the Pacific operations were dwarfed by forces in Manchuria and China.

2) The Commonwealth believed in the myth of the impenetrably of the Jungle, so any defences they planned to tended to be fairly shallow. They were often manned by inexperienced troops as well. The result was that the Japanese were often able to outflank their defences and to create roadblocks behind them. The result was that the Indian and often occasionally British troops would often panic and retreat willy-nilly in front of them. The Indian Army was not the Army that Wavell had commanded in North Africa. It has been massively expanded and not very well trained.
 

nbcman

Donor
I'll be honest Carl, I'm fairly ignorant of the details of the US defending the Philippines, and the following operations in the south west Pacific, but I know I'm going to learn a lot more as I write this timeline, I can't very well ignore this theatre, being as it has significant bearings on Malaya/Singapore. I would have been surprised to hear that New Caledonia, or Fiji which I'd consider a comparable island, would have any serious industrial capability. Was Brisbane or Sydney not preferable to Wellington?
According to HyperWar, there were limitations on available labor that slowed construction of bases in Australia.


The major concern, however, was the development of facilities in Australia which would permit that island continent to serve as a secure base to support naval and military counter-offensives against the enemy. In April 1942, immediately after the command areas in the south Pacific were redefined, a board consisting of Australian and American representatives was convened to determine base-development requirements. It was understood from the beginning that Australia would provide the necessary construction labor and operating personnel and that the United States would be called on to supply only the materials and equipment that could not be obtained locally. Within a few weeks, plans had been formulated which appeared to satisfy the estimated requirements of the combined services and requests were forwarded to the United States for the materials and equipment which would not be available in Australia. Shipments were slow to arrive, however, and in the meanwhile the outcome of the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway had so changed the military situation that a thorough revision of the plans for base development was in order.

The general effect of the change was to shift major developments northward. The ports of Adelaide and Albany ceased to be important from a military standpoint, and Melbourne declined in importance as a center of activity after naval headquarters for Australia was moved to Brisbane in July 1942.

For the remainder of this first year of the war, work proceeded slowly on naval facilities, handicapped by Australia's severe manpower shortage. Base facilities for submarine maintenance and repair were put under way at Brisbane and Fremantle; PT-boat bases were developed at Cairns and at Darwin; repair and maintenance facilities to service escort vessels were established at Sydney and Cairns; and naval air bases were developed at Brisbane, at Perth, and on Palm Island, just northwest of Townsville. Moreover, a considerable amount of storage and supply space was obtained by lease of existing Australian facilities.

A few advance operating bases, particularly for submarines and PT boats, were also established during this period, at Merauke, on the southern coast of Dutch New Guinea, on Thursday Island in Torres Strait, and in Exmouth Gulf.

By the end of 1942, however, it was apparent that the shortage of manpower and materials in Australia was hampering the base-development program beyond the point of tolerance, and in January 1943 a request was made that naval construction battalions be assigned to expedite the construction work. In response to that request the 55th Battalion arrived in Brisbane on March 24, 1943.

NZ as noted would be far from a Japanese advance plus it had the advantage of excellent harbor facilities, a large floating dock, and sufficient labor to upgrade harbor facilities via the New Zealand Public Works Department.


In the opening months of the war, Auckland was chosen as a major fleet anchorage for the U.S. Fleet, and it was planned to develop these facilities to provide for ship repair, training and rehabilitation of combat units, and hospitalization of sick and wounded from forward areas, and to maintain air cover for the allied fleets.

Auckland is on North Island, one of the two principal islands of New Zealand, about 1,200 miles east of Australia. Under the circumstances it was decided that the construction of the additional facilities needed for the defense of the base and the support of the U.S. naval forces in the area would be carried out with materials furnished by the United States to the New Zealand Naval Board, and that the U.S. Navy would provide experts to supervise the installation and initial operation of the facilities built, but that the actual installation and service operations would be performed by New Zealand personnel. The New Zealand Public Works Department was the construction agency for all government departments.

Consequently, no construction battalions were assigned to New Zealand for construction work. However, the 25th Battalion, which arrived in Auckland on March 11, 1943, attached to the Third Marine Division, and stayed for four months, gave aid to a local contractor in the construction of MOB 6. In April 1943, CBMU 501 and CBMU 502 were assigned to Auckland and took over maintenance and minor repair work on all U.S. facilities there.

In April 1942, the Navy ordered an officer to Auckland as port director, charged with responsibility for developing a main naval base, including headquarters for the Commander of Allied Forces in the South Pacific, Vice Admiral Robert A. Ghormley. When the line of U.S.-held bases moved rapidly northward, ComSoPac headquarters in Auckland were closed on November 8, 1942, and were moved to Noumea, New Caledonia. Auckland thereafter had the scope of a minor base.

Housing Facilities. -- By May 1942, the increase of U.S. naval activities in the Auckland area had caused a serious problem in connection with the housing of personnel.

On June 3, work was begun on a 500-man camp at Mechanics Bay to provide a receiving barracks for the area. On land donated at no cost by the Harbor Board, the New Zealand Public Works
Department built four 112-man barracks, one C.P.O. dormitory, galley and mess hall, ration storehouse, boiler plant, laundry, recreation building, and officers' quarters. The first barracks were occupied on June 19, and the camp was completed by December.
At Camp Domain, New Zealand, workmen constructed facilities for 1,000 men, to be used by headquarters personnel, Marines, and convalescents. This project was also completed by December 1942.

Later, at Victoria Park, a 1200-man camp consisting of 166 eight-man huts, 30 four-man huts, 2 thirty-man quarters for officers, and other necessary facilities was built for Seabee use. However, the camp was occupied by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps personnel.

To house the personnel assigned to ammunition depots at Kauri Point and Motutapu, small camps were constructed. Numerous other hut camps were constructed in the area for the Marine Corps. For example, a 1200-man camp was erected at the Tamaki railway station, location of the Third Base Depot of the Marine Corps.

Harbor Facilities. -- One of the main reasons for the choice of Auckland as a naval base was its excellent harbor facilities. However, the drydock facilities for major and intermediate types of ships were so meager that the Calliope Graving Dock at Davenport, owned and operated by the Auckland Harbor Board, was enlarged to take heavy cruisers of the Indianapolis class. The only two other graving docks in the area capable of docking heavy cruisers, were the Woolwich and the Cockatoo Island docks at Sydney, Australia. There were also two large floating docks, one at Wellington, N.Z., and one at Newcastle, Australia. Unfortunately, the overhang of the bow and the stern of heavy ships in these docks would have been undesirable for a cruiser in a damaged condition, and the depth over the blocks would have been insufficient.

It was decided therefore, late in 1942, that the Navy should undertake to extend the length of the Calliope Graving Dock by 40 feet. This work was planned by the U.S. Navy, and accomplished by the New Zealand government under reverse lend-lease. The work required about six months for completion and was done without interfering with the use of the dock.[/quote}
 
MWI 40123021 The Army’s Plan for Malaya’s Defence

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
1940, Monday 30 December;

They had been on the road, so to speak, for three days, not just visiting units stationed in Northern Malaya, but looking at the terrain they might fight on. They were back in Penang now, at the Eastern & Oriental Hotel, in a private room. Dinner was finished and it was just the three of them, Lord Gort, his CoS, Maj Gen Richard Dewing and Lt Gen Arthur Percival. Comfortably seated in rattan chairs they began discussing the Army’s plans for the defence of Malaya.

“So, Arthur, you know Malaya well, having served here for three years, what were your thoughts?”
“Uh well Lord Gort sir, from a purely military point of view, and putting aside our clear lack of forces, going on the offensive, with a pre-emptive invasion of the Kra Isthmus, would be the most advantageous. It’s so much more preferable to fight on Thai soil than our own. Capturing the port of Songkhla would be most important, as it’s the only port south of Bangkok that significant amounts of supplies could be landed through. With that taken, an attacker would have to use the single line rail track, and a poor road network back to Bangkok, that must be well over 500 miles. The small port south of that, Pattani, should also be taken at the same time.”

“Arthur, old boy, in private conversation you may address me as Tiger. And what about the defensive option”
“The defensive option? er, Tiger, the best position in the northwest is Gurun, around Peak Kedah. The central mountains come down quite close to the sea, on your right, leaving a narrow stretch of land, partly covered in plantations, which the main road north and the railway run through. To the left is Peak Kedah and the sea. A very good defensive position could be built here, and with observation posts on the Peak, artillery would dominate the wide-open paddy fields that lay in front.

It has a back door we must defend, namely what is locally called ‘The Ledge’ it’s a small road running from Pattani, down through Yala and into the mountain range, crossing the border near a place called Kroh, before turning west and coming out of the mountains south of Sungei Petani.

In the Northeast, the problem holding the Kelantan province is that we rely on a single line railway for 300 miles, making our forces stationed there very vulnerable, however the RAF airfields being built there will be able to interdict any seaborne invasion force. If an invasion force is defeated all well and good, however if it was to be successful, we could quickly lose the entire North Eastern forces.”

“Dickie, your thoughts please”
“Yes Tiger, not wanting to pour cold water onto Arthur’s ideas but, regarding the offensive option, I’m afraid Her Majesty’s Government wouldn’t entertain any pre-emptive invasion of Thailand. The Colonial Office has been making great efforts to get the Thais into our camp, any rumour that we are considering invading them would truly destroy those efforts. With regard to the defensive option, apart from giving up the Alor Star airfield, the Governor, Sir Andrew Caldecott, would have an absolute fit if we suggested we intended to just give up the state of Perlis and most of Kedah, it would be politically totally unacceptable.”

“Umm yes Dickie, your quite right about both options, I’m afraid Arthur old boy, we’re going to have to defend, and a lot closer to the border. Any ideas?”

“Umm I see, ah, the Jitra position is probably the best we could do, I had thought of it as a forward position, and not the main line of defence. It still means losing Perlis, but it’s in front of the Alor Star airfield. And I suppose we would place the forward positions up close to the border, so Perlis and its capital Kangar are initially covered. It would mean a lot of defensive works, and still wouldn’t be particularly strong, I guess it depends on how strong the opposition is as too how well the line would fare. And we would still have Gurun as our back stop if all else fails.

But Tiger, we do need a lot more troops to effectively defend Malaya, at the moment we’d be hard pushed to stop anything more than a troop of boy scouts coming down the main highway”

“Yes, yes Arthur, I quite get the point, but London do know this, and I’m assured their doing everything they can. We’ll continue with what we’re doing, but I do like the idea of the Gurun backstop, and occupying the Kra Isthmus is a capital idea, if only eh!
 
MWI 41010208 The Western Squadron

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
1941, Thursday 02 January;

It was more of an administrative role than anything else, but the workload and the importance of the location called for its creation, and Layton was happy to authorise it. Called the Western Squadron, it was based at Penang, with a secondary base at Port Swettenham, and was responsible for the west Malayan coastline. He was less satisfied with who he had to command it, Capt JG Fraser, the SNO for Penang, who had been called out of retirement in 1939 was the man for now, but Layton was concerned that as the command grew, so Fraser would struggle more. Part of that was due to the fact that the staff Fraser had was too small and very inexperienced, and part due to Fraser’s age and health.

And as to the ships that made up the Squadron, well again that also was a matter of concern. The fact was after 16 months of war, with the Empire standing alone, and the large losses the Royal Navy had sustained, there simply wasn’t the numbers and quality of ships to be had, so “make do” was very much the watchword of the day. The threat was the merchant raider, sowing mines, and preying on lone merchant ships. The mines would be countered by auxiliary minesweepers, while local patrols, although no match, one on one, with a raider, would be able to raise the alarm, and in the Straits of Malacca, the betting was the Navy would quickly hunt the raider down.

Four requisitioned small coastal steamers provided the patrol element, HMS Kampar, Larut, Mata Hari and Pangkor, while also working as armed traders, with the obligatory 4-inch gun and a couple of Lewis Machine Guns, supported by the RFA Tien Kwang, a requisitioned coastal tanker. While five requisitioned small whalers made up the Penang Minesweeping Group, HMS Hua Tong, Jeram, Malacca, Sin Aik Lee and Trang. Further forces were promised, but what and when was left unsaid, while assistance from the RAF was also talked about.
 
Called the Western Squadron, it was based at Penang, with a secondary base at Port Swettenham, and was responsible for the west Malayan coastline.
OTL, the Japanese made amphibious flanking attacks along the west coast, using I presume captured vessels. One would think that any organized RN presence would prevent that. Perhaps the Western Squadron will do so.
 
For those who are much more knowledgeable of the OTL order of battle, can anyone provide rough background on DEI and Australian sea forces? I had previously read that Australia had a decent fleet even in 1939, but don't know enough about the politics of how something like forward deployment to Singapore would have been viewed. Thanks in advance, Matthew.
 
For those who are much more knowledgeable of the OTL order of battle, can anyone provide rough background on DEI and Australian sea forces? I had previously read that Australia had a decent fleet even in 1939, but don't know enough about the politics of how something like forward deployment to Singapore would have been viewed. Thanks in advance, Matthew.

This here is 1939:

ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY

(Captain W. R. Patterson, Commodore 2/c, RN, who relieved Rear Admiral W. N. Custance, CB, RN on 2 September; Admiral Custance expired from lingering illness on 13 December 1939 on board steamer ORONTES while returning to the UK)

(Rear Admiral J. G. Crace assumed Flag Australian Navy on 1 November 1939; Patterson retained command of CANBERRA)​



Heavy cruisers - CANBERRA (Flagship Patterson who also commanded CANBERRA) departed Sydney on patrol 3 September, AUSTRALIA (Captain R. R. Stewart, RN) was refitting at Cockatoo Island, trials completed 29 September 1939.



Light cruisers - SYDNEY (Captain J. W. A. Waller, RN who was relieved on 16 November by Captain J. A. Collins, RAN) at Fremantle, HOBART (Captain H. L. Howden, RAN) departed Sydney on patrol 3 September, PERTH (Captain H. B. Farncomb, RAN) departed Portsmouth on 26 July, called at the New York World's Fair on 4 August, and arrived Kingston on 21 August en route to Australia, but Admiral Meyrick was able to retain her in the America and West Indies Command. PERTH was at Port of Spain on 3 September.



Recommissioned on 1 September 1939 - light cruiser ADELAIDE (Captain H. A. Showers, RAN) had been paid off, now refitting at Garden Buoy, Sydney



Destroyers - VAMPIRE (Cdr J. A. Walsh, RAN) departed Port Philip 3 September for patrol off Cape Otway, VENDETTA (Lt Cdr G. L. Cant, RAN) departed Sydney on patrol 3 September, VOYAGER (Lt Cdr J. E. Morrow, RAN) departed Townsville on patrol 3 September.



Recommissioned 1 September 1939 - destroyers STUART (Cdr H. M. L. Waller, RAN, S.O. Destroyers), WATERHEN (Lt Cdr J. H. Swain) both at Garden Buoy, Sydney, ammunitioning, storing, and cleaning ship



Sloops - SWAN (Lt Cdr E. J. Prevost, RAN) and YARRA (Lt Cdr W. H. Harrington, RAN) at Sydney
 
According to HyperWar, there were limitations on available labor that slowed construction of bases in Australia.


That could eventually be overcome with mechanized USN Construction Battalions, but not in 1942. Or most of 1943.

NZ as noted would be far from a Japanese advance plus it had the advantage of excellent harbor facilities, a large floating dock, and sufficient labor to upgrade harbor facilities via the New Zealand Public Works Department.


If Wellington or the other ports have a lot of dry storage-wharehouses, thats yet another reason. The ad hoc forward bases of 1942-43 suffered from a lack of useful dry storage. Consequently material rotted in open air dumps, or sat in cargo ship holds for months, wasting transport days for each ship as a overpriced storage shed.
 
That could eventually be overcome with mechanized USN Construction Battalions, but not in 1942. Or most of 1943.



If Wellington or the other ports have a lot of dry storage-wharehouses, thats yet another reason. The ad hoc forward bases of 1942-43 suffered from a lack of useful dry storage. Consequently material rotted in open air dumps, or sat in cargo ship holds for months, wasting transport days for each ship as a overpriced storage shed.
I'm surprised to read that. I had believed that the Quonset and Nissen pre-fab buildings had been available in sufficient amounts. Or there wasn't enough of those buildings until late 1943 going into 1944?
 
I'm surprised to read that. I had believed that the Quonset and Nissen pre-fab buildings had been available in sufficient amounts. Or there wasn't enough of those buildings until late 1943 going into 1944?

That. Industrial mobilization of the US was playing catch up in 1942. Kleins 'A Call to Arms' has a 800 page primer on US industrial mobilization. The relevant takeaway here is Congress shorted the military funds for true industrial mobilization in 1940-41, and refused to pass any effective legislation allowing the Federal government to prioritize allocation of resources or production priorities. Interfering the the Free Market was anathema then. Investors were demanding their factories aim for the high profit consumer market that was reviving those years & military contracts got the remnants. The vast cornucopia of military production came in 1943 after legislation in early 1942 allowed the Federal government to establish central planning and dictate resource allotment. It took the better par of 1942 to get industry reoriented from a consumer orientation to a war winning orientation.

One example of the problem was that the base line Protective Mobilization Plan of the War Department had the US Army expand to 1,600,000 men in ten to twelve months. But, Congress had never budgeted significant funds to maintain a infrastructure for those, nor for the four million plus men to be mobilized in the second year. The first million men mobilized spent 1941 building barracks, training grounds, and school rooms. The full construction was not completed until 1944. Shortages of construction labor were a major reason for that. Back in 1920 Army CoS Marsh proposed to Congress the preservation of a training infrastructure, including a equipment pool for close to two million men. Congress refused. Subsequent budgets for the War Department failed to adequately fund a infrastructure for the existing Army and National Guard of 500,000 to 600,000.
 
MWI 41010615 Learning To Drive The RASC Way

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
1941, Monday 6 January

It had started as an offer from a car salesman in Singapore, while having a drink with a Major in the RASC. The Major had been complaining of the shortage of drivers, and their quality of driving, regaling tales of misfortune. The car salesman, a private in the SSVF, had little work, and benevolently offered to tutor a couple of drivers, using his Austin 7, which was accepted. Taking three learners, one at the wheel and two in the back, and rotating them hourly at the wheel, he taught all three to drive in a week. The Major was impressed and it quickly became a working relationship.

Using his Singapore model as the example, following the massive changes to the Volunteers in March, the Major was given the authority to recruit more of these middle-aged drivers from the motor trade, as driving instruction corporals in the RASC, using requisitioned small Austin and Morris cars. The course also taught basic car maintenance, which was included in the weeks training program.

The initiative was a great success, and driver training courses began to be rolled out in all the major towns, as both Malay and Chinese drivers joined Europeans in signing up to the RASC. Learner drivers came from British, Australian, Indian, Malay and Chinese units in the Army, as no one had enough drivers, and units were hard pushed to train new drivers themselves.

At the end of April, the RASC introduced further courses for lorry driving, and the art of towing, now using a number of Army vehicles, having to take some drivers from their own ranks to deepen the pool of experienced instructors. Not everyone was taught by the RASC, some learnt within their units, but having the certificate, and being able to say ‘I learnt to drive the RASC way’ was an opening to new employment after the war.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
I wanted to write a little bit on the skill of driving, something we mostly take for granted these days, but back then, the majority of people didn't drive, indeed for many in the higher echelons of society, it was considered rather beneath them. Also, Western Europeans, and indeed Americans, growing up in a greater technical environment, were more able to quickly absorb the training requirements of vehicle maintenance, than say an Indian recruit. That isn't to say they couldn't learn, it just took longer, but one of the great beneficiaries of war, driven by need, was peoples, who would have had no opportunities in learning these new skills, with associated better pay rates, now were being trained in those skills, and for free!
 
I wanted to write a little bit on the skill of driving, something we mostly take for granted these days, but back then, the majority of people didn't drive, indeed for many in the higher echelons of society, it was considered rather beneath them. Also, Western Europeans, and indeed Americans, growing up in a greater technical environment, were more able to quickly absorb the training requirements of vehicle maintenance, than say an Indian recruit. That isn't to say they couldn't learn, it just took longer, but one of the great beneficiaries of war, driven by need, was peoples, who would have had no opportunities in learning these new skills, with associated better pay rates, now were being trained in those skills, and for free!
In his memoir of the Burma theater, George McDonald Fraser mentioned the fearless KAR truck drivers who brought supplies over the mountain trails from India. I doubt if they had learned to drive in Africa.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
I've been quite surprised by the attention being paid to my timeline, and all the interesting comments, but I am quite aware that some of this stuff is a bit boring. I'm writing it, to try and explain why we get to where we do end up (eventually), and that my timeline is plausible. Personally, I cant wait to get to the 'action' but there's a lot more mundane stuff to write about first. However, as was historically, anything that happens in Malaya, is bound, in some way or shape, to how things progress in North Africa, and I will be updating on events there , keeping everything in perspective. So I will try and write a few 'action' stories, when commenting on the Middle East. Anyway, here's another story to keep us going.
 
MWI 41010618 Recruitment Gains Pace

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
1941, Monday 06 January;

They sat around a highly polished rosewood table, decorated in inlayed Chinese carvings of different woods, in the first-floor room, at the end of a wing of Flagstaff House, an opened door leading to the big veranda at one end, the windows on either side were opened, although the blinds were pulled, in an effort to allow a draft of wind to draw through without the heat of the sun coming in. Two big electric fans lazily swirled around, helping create an impression of cooler air.

They had been here since 2pm, both Lord Gort and Lt Gen Percival fresh after lunch, following another Monday morning, General War Council meeting at Government House. Present with them was Gort’s GSO1, Colonel Fawcett, and the senior staff officers of Percival’s Malaya Command, Brigadier General Staff (BGS), Brigadier Kenneth Torrance, Deputy Adjutant General, Brigadier Thomas Newbigging, Assistant Quartermaster General, Brigadier Hubert Lucas, each with an aide. On the table in front of each of them, was a copy of a large typed report, detailing their various inputs, to discuss the way forward.

Late last week they had received a cable from London authorising the expansion of local recruitment for the Army, taking Malays, Chinese and Indians in Malaya, as well as the Chinese in Hong Kong. It was a positive answer to the report Gort had sent the War Office detailing the good reports he’d had over the latest recruitment intakes, along with the growing needs of the Forces out here in the Far East for yet more men. The authorisation for additional funds didn’t go as far as he would have liked, but nevertheless it allowed for a generous expansion.

Like the RAF and Royal Navy, the Army had recruited locally before, but those initiatives had always been limited, small additions, for specific units. They had never had a permanent dedicated unit for training them. But now they did and as a result, they intended to quickly move away from just recruiting for the three infantry regiments, the Malay, Singapore (Chinese) and Hong Kong (Chinese) Regiments, to pretty much all arms and services in the Army, with sections created in the Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers and support services, i.e., the RAOC and RASC. There were limitations on what they could do owing to the language barrier, people able to speak English and either Malay or Chinese were in much demand.

As always, Hong Kong was the priority, indeed here the restriction on recruitment was only really governed by the need for more trainers, clothing, equipment, and the ability of existing units or newly forming ones to absorb the large numbers of newly trained. Indeed, the very units that needed more personnel, were largely having to train them themselves, either within the unit or detaching Officers and NCO to training schools.

In addition, many more Officers and NCOs were required, and this wasn’t easy, the few ECO’s from the UK and Dominions were snapped up, but young and not so young gentlemen from the Colony itself were being given a three-month course at the OTCU in Singapore, and with a crisp new uniform presented as the answer. That might had worked if they had the backing of an experience NCO, but these were all too often recently promoted from the ranks, having been identified as a seasoned soldier well versed in the ways of the Army, with some leadership qualities. That was fundamentally the brake on the recruitment expansion in Hong Kong.

For Malaya, things were a little easier, the Malay Regiment, already in existence, was able, admittedly by using the Indian Army’s practice of ‘milking’ the existing battalion of an experienced cadre, to build the new companies for the second battalion. Secondly there was much more room to develop training camps around the country, as opposed to cramming everything into Kowloon and on Hong Kong Island. That wasn’t to say things were easy, but here expansion was held back by budgets as much as by the shortages of experienced Officers and NCO’s.

Recruitment had originally been set at six platoons of 40 men each, in basic training for 6 weeks, for each of the three regiments, but initially, only Hong Kong was able to do this, the other two started with four platoons. But now things had settled down a bit, issues on training within the courses had been ironed out. Now, set before them was a plan to expand recruitment to 16 basic training platoons in each Regiment, 18 for Hong Kong, increasing training platoon numbers on a stepped progress. On completion of basic training, a selection processes would draw considerable numbers out, identified by some particular characteristic or civilian skills, for transfer into the other corps, leaving the rest to continue into infantry training with their respective regiments.

Brigadier Lucas was speaking, “The Public Works Department has nearly completed the expansion and construction of the training camp at Port Dickson, just the last three sections of the camp, which should be done by May. This means we will be able to house just over 1200 instructors and recruits here. I would suggest we continue to conduct all basic training for Malay’s at this camp, but we now have the capacity to increase recruitment significantly. And this with continuing the infantry training for the Malay Regt on the same site”. He paused to sip water from the glass in front of him, before continuing.

“Camp Fuyong, the training camp for the Singapore (Chinese) Regt just outside Seremban is still progressing, but is not expected to be complete until August, again able to accommodate 1200, however that is not hampering the training. The reason is we have had to give priority to the completion of the big RASC camp with its numerous workshops, which is on the other side of the branch railway sidings. Again, all basic training as well as infantry training can be at Camp Fuyong. The extra recruits from any expansion of the recruitment program can be accommodated under canvas for now”.

Brigadier Newbigging picked up the discussion, “Staffing the Port Dickson camp has been relatively trouble free, and as you can see we can manage the expansion quite well, however, at Camp Fuyong we don’t enjoy the existence of a unit to milk, and here we are having to use cadre from the Federal Malay State Volunteers, as well as a few from the Straits Settlements units, but in the main these need training too, so in many cases we have British instructors giving training through the use of interpreters, a less than satisfactory arrangement”.

Brigadier Torrance came in now, “because of the aforementioned problems, although we will be creating new fully manned companies, they will require a lot more training, as well as a need of being issued better equipment than they currently have, and so will not be ready for full operational duties for the foreseeable future”.

Brigadier Lucas quickly jumped in “we are able to equip these new companies with sufficient rifles, bayonets and side arms, but other than a few grenades and one Lewis machine gun per platoon, I have nothing else to give them. Unfortunately, all current planned shipments of arms to arrive are already allocated firstly to the Australians, and then the Indian regiments”.

There was a silenced pause, clearly all had been said about these camps, Lord Gort gave a nod of approval and then Percival cleared his throat, “moving onto the other arms, the engineers first”

Brigadier Torrance replied, “I’ve had discussions with the Chief Engineer, Brigadier Pennycuick, and he is confident he will be able to accommodate the four Engineer training platoons, despite also providing training for battalions of the Indian Pioneer Corps. He has some more building additions required for the Batu Cave cantonment, just needs authorisation for the material, and will construct them with the new recruits, a learning on the job process, so to speak”.

Percival interrupted “I’d just like to add, Lord Gort, if I may, that will in no way impact on the additional training schools he is running for both Indian Sappers and the Indian Pioneer Corps, both of who will continue to send men for further training courses, in total, Batu Caves will be able to accommodate 700 men in constructed barracks, any more will have to be in tents”.

Gort nodded, and looked over at Lucas, who continued the discussion, “Brigadier Pennycuick has already given me a detailed list of materials, which I will begin sourcing and providing this week, the only thing I will struggle with is the cement, as you know the RAF have a very significant portion of whats shipped in, but almost everything else I can provide quite quickly”. Lucas looked up at Percival who took the cue, “thank you Hubert, moving onto artillery, Thomas, if you please”

Newbigging began again “currently we have a camp at Port Swettenham that has an artillery range across the marshes, that with tentage, can hold two regiments of Artillery. We have identified a new site at Rawang, just north of Kuala Lumpur, over ground that had previously been used for tin mining. It has the potential to give us an excellent camp with several artillery ranges. We have a basic camp there at the moment, but are gradually developing the area. I would suggest, for now that the proposed new light batteries of the Malay and Singapore Regts are founded at Port Swettenham, allowing already formed formations to exercise at Rawang”. He stopped talking, allowing Lucas to come in.

“The light batteries will be equipped with 18 pounders, four to a battery, possibly later we could issue 4.5-inch Hows, depending on other unit upgrades. They will be allocated Canadian built artillery tractors, but again are not high priority, so perhaps by the end of the year, but no promises”. Lucas stopped and looked around, ready to answer any questions. Maybe his information was sufficient, or maybe the heat in the room was draining people of enthusiasm, but no questions came.

Percival cleared his throat, “hem, thank you Gentlemen, that leaves us the RAOC and RASC, Thomas, if you may”. Newbigging began again. “Both the RAOC and RASC would greatly benefit from recruitment from both Malay’s and Chinese. We are suggesting they take four platoons each intake, two Malay, two Chinese, selected after their basic training is completed. That’s the most they can absorb, initially they may struggle a bit, but I’m sure the Corps become comfortable with training and absorbing them”. Again, Newbigging turned to Lucas to comment.

“Yes, we have looked at their organisations, and the RAOC will be able to accommodate a training facility at its Taiping Camp, while the RASC can do the same at its Ipoh camp. Both camps will need further development, but I am confident, using tentage initially, they can start as soon as they first recruits finish their basic training”.

Percival now spoke “Lord Gort, with these increases in native recruitment, by the end of the year we will have recruited over 3500 Malays and 3000 Chinese into service, together with an additional of over 1200 of each in training. Given the newly increased budget, this is the most we will be able to expand by, it is a significant improvement on what we had, and will go a long way to improving our forces.”

“Thank you, Arthur, gentlemen, the plan is excellent, well thought out and soundly based, no doubt a lot of work has gone into it. I’m please to say I accept it, by all means implement it at once.”
“Err Lord Gort, Sir, there is one matter I’d like to press you on, on behalf of myself and my officers present” Percival paused, awaiting Gort’s reply, “Go on Arthur”.

“As you said, ‘a lot of work has gone into it’ and at a time when Malaya Command HQ has never been so stretched as of now, we simply don’t have enough trained and experienced men within it, the officers here have worked right through the weekend, they’ve had to do a lot of the junior grade work, simply because their junior officers don’t know how, or worse, they don’t have a junior officer covering those particular roles. Lord Gort, Sir, we must have more trained staff officers added to the Command, as, I fear, in a time of crisis, the few trained officers we have would collapse under the pressure of it all.”

“Yes, Arthur, and for the record, you have continually advised me on that poor state of affairs, the War Office recognises the need for more trained staff. Unfortunately, trained staff officers are in short supply everywhere, we are still recovering from our losses in France. Formations need to be rebuilt, and new ones raised, the lion’s share of trained staff officers will be going to those I’m afraid. However, the War Office assures me there will be a steady trickle of officers coming our way, and by the end of summer, you will have seen an easement of your predicament. Again, gentlemen, I commend you all on your good work, thank you.”
 
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