Al Grito de Guerra: the Second Mexican Revolution

Narrative Interlude #9
Parque Bicentenario
Mexico City, Federal District
March 21, 1994
11:15 AM

Ernesto Zedillo shivered with agitation as he walked along the unkempt pathway. Shoulders bunched up almost to his ears, gaze set straight ahead to avoid the sinister eyes he was sure were watching him from behind every trash can and tree branch, Zedillo could feel his nerves dancing the zapateado on the back of his neck as he adjusted his arm, keeping the leather-bound binder carefully concealed beneath his blazer.

He was really worrying himself too much. With his graying hair, wire-rimmed glasses, and near-constant look of befuddlement, the rabbity economist was probably one of the least conspicuous men in North America. Besides, Mexico City’s finest had far more profitable things to worry about than an ex-cabinet secretary taking a midday stroll through the park. And, yet, Zedillo couldn’t help but fear that his every step struck the ground with enough force to shake the Earth below it, alerting the entire capital to the fact that he carried in his hand the dynamite that would blow the corrupt edifice of PRI power to smithereens and bring the entire system crashing down in massive a ball of flame.

As he walked, he lamented just how far he’d seen the PRI fall over the course of his career. Until age fourteen, Zedillo had been a humble mechanic’s son from Mexicali, just another boy adrift in the wayward poverty of Mexico’s outermost fringes. Then, the system, recognizing talents Zedillo himself hadn’t even noticed, had plucked him out of the rabble and whisked him off to Mexico City, putting him through high school, the National Polytechnic Institute, and Yale’s Department of Economics on full scholarships. In his time at the Central Bank and the Budget Secretariat, he’d seen more than his share of partisan sleaze, but the politicos had typically let him and his colleagues do their work without too much hassle. By now, though, the PRI had degenerated to such an extent that it was unrecognizable. The system had always had a kleptocratic edge to it, but now, the average priísta seemed to have no other objectives in life but to gorge himself on public resources. The PRI had never been particularly kind to the opposition, but now, it seemed that all independent political organization was punishable by imprisonment, while the faintest whisper of dissent meant a swift visit from one of Secretary Hank’s OIP goon squads. And while the seedier elements of el sistema had always had nebulous ties to the drug trade, these days Zedillo found himself wondering whether the Government Secretariat even bothered sending DFS agents paychecks anymore.

Zedillo had hoped he could forget his disgust with the system by resigning from the Cabinet. But he knew from his old colleagues at the Budget Secretariat—his old subordinates, really, though Zedillo didn’t like to think in those terms—that the depravity of the system had reached heights that were impossible to ignore. Despite Manuel Bartlett’s best efforts to conceal it, his Faustian bargain with the drug cartels had become common knowledge among the high-ranking bureaucrats (someone had to actually manage the government’s ultra-top-secret accounts, after all), and when Zedillo first caught wind of it, he’d refused to believe it. For all that Manuel Bartlett was a ruthless, domineering authoritarian, the man had always seemed to truly believe he was acting in the best interests of Mexico. For Bartlett to knowingly, consciously barter away the country's national security to a cabal of murderous drug lords was simply unthinkable. Zedillo had pleaded with his former coworkers for proof, and, out of respect, they’d handed it over. And as the former Budget Secretary pored over the thick sheaf of charts, rubrics, and bank statements, he had gradually forced himself to accept that the regime’s most generous supporters were international criminals.

As terrifying as this truth was, Zedillo knew better than to expect his fellow bureaucrats to do anything about it. Not because they were fierce, partisan loyalists—indeed, after enduring four straight years of outrageous graft and fiscal depravity, many had told Zedillo point blank that they would be voting for Porfirio Muñoz Ledo. But however these men had come to feel about the system, they were still part of it. Some had been born into it, the sons of well-to-do families whose UNAM acceptance letters had come enclosed with the thank-you letters from local PRI fundraising committees. Others, like Zedillo, had worked their way up, scrimming and scrounging for years until the established powers finally noticed them and gave them a spot in the hierarchy. But wherever they came from, for these men to betray the PRI’s darkest secrets—not just by whispering them into each others’ ears, but by releasing them to the world—would mean undermining the order to which they had devoted their entire professional lives. Now, if someone else were to expose those secrets, they certainly wouldn’t rush to defend the system, nor would they weep for its demise. But neither would they go out of their way to risk their careers or their reputations. These weren’t men of action, they were men of reaction.

For twenty years, Zedillo had been the exact same way. The mindset had stayed with him even after he left the cabinet; the thought of single-handedly torpedoing the Mexican political system shook every bone in Zedillo’s instinctively conservative body, and when he’d first received the incriminating binder, he had kept it hidden under his pillow for months, fearing the enormous repercussions if its contents escaped to public scrutiny. But the great, imposing ziggurat of PRI hegemony was best viewed from the outside, and as an insider-turned-outsider, Zedillo had been forced to accept that some systems are worth destroying, no matter what sort of Shelleyan monster takes their place.

Zedillo was suddenly brought back from his ruminations when he saw the woman sitting on the appointed park bench, casually clad in shorts and a white muslin shirt. She turned to look in his direction and he did everything he could to avoid returning her gaze; as his feet brought him closer, the binder he still carried beneath his jacket seemed to grow heavier and heavier with every step. Finally, as he prepared to pass the bench, he undid his button, stiffened up and prepared to make the drop.
__________

Xanic von Bertrab bristled as she saw the man out of the corner of her eye. She turned to look, but she could barely believe her eyes. Was he…was he wearing a suit? To the park? In thirty-degree weather?

Well, at least she knew for sure that it was him. Come to think of it, now that she was actually looking at the guy, she had a tough time imagining him sashaying down the street in jeans and a camiseta.

The leather-bound object poking out from underneath the man’s jacket snapped Xanic back into focus. As the man approached the bench and opened his blazer, Xanic calmly turned to face forward. The man passed and the binder fell out and struck the bench with a thud loud enough to alert anyone who was paying attention; luckily, no one was paying attention. Xanic quickly scooped up the binder and deposited it into her lap while the man buttoned up his jacket and scurried along down the path. Xanic waited until he had disappeared around a corner, then got up and started back in the opposite direction.

She couldn’t hide the binder under a jacket, so instead she held it close to her chest like a sacred talisman. If the mysterious, suited man had told the truth during their phone conversation, then the information in this binder, when paired with the river of muck Lydia and Xanic had raked up in their months-long hunt for evidence, would be enough to shatter the international community’s trust in Manuel Bartlett, crush Señora Sephora’s chances of winning the presidential election, and quite possibly set the PRI at war with itself. But only if the entire world could be made to see it. And that meant getting it back to the two-room rathole Xanic and Lydia rented quickly, safely and without any distractions. So, when Xanic exited the park and got onto the street, her first and only priority was keeping the binder safe. But with every step, it seemed to grow hotter and heavier in her hands. She was holding what might end up being the biggest single scoop in Mexican political history. How could she reasonably expect herself not to immediately tear it open and start devouring its contents? Every second she resisted the urge was a singular agony.

For perhaps seven minutes, Xanic withstood the compulsion to stop and read and read and read until her eyeballs burst from the strain. But resistance was futile. Finally overtaken by impatience, Xanic ducked into an empty alleyway, leaned against a mud-brick wall, and opened to the first page…


Mexico City, Federal District
April 5, 1994
3:03 PM

“So you will support us?”

General Jesús Gutiérrez Rebollo’s bald head was shiny enough on its own, but the globules of sweat which had emerged on his scalp in response the stuffiness of the room and the glare of the overhanging light made it even more reflective. As he nodded his response to Porfirio Muñoz Ledo’s question, little pinpricks of light danced and bounced off his head, magnified through the wide lenses of his coke-bottle glasses.

General Vinicio Santoyo Feria, seated beside General Gutiérrez, spoke up. “If, after the presidential election, you need us to ensure a peaceful and harmonious transfer of power,” Santoyo said, “we’ll be there.” General Alfredo Navarro Lara, seated to the left of his colleagues, signaled his agreement.

Porfirio Muñoz Ledo returned Navarro’s nod. “I sincerely appreciate your commitment to democratic principles,” he replied, more than a bit disingenuously. “Now,” he began, clearing his throat, “what will you gentlemen be expecting in return? Federal appointments, perhaps? If I do win the presidency, I’ll certainly need men of honor and integrity to run the Defense Secretariat.” That single criterion alone would have excluded all three Generals from government service, but beggars couldn’t be choosers.

Not that it mattered anyway. “Oh, fuck no,” said General Gutiérrez as the other generals physically recoiled at the thought of that much work. “All we want is for you to end this stupid war against the carranclanes down south. Send us up north where the narcos are.” Porfirio’s jaw tightened as he spared a glance to the left. Malcolm (or whatever the CIA operative’s real name was) was watching tufts of smoke twist and climb their way out of the end of his cigarette. Had he caught the hidden meaning?

If he hadn’t, he would in a moment. Ending the war against the Zapatistas would be no trouble at all, but giving the Army free license to fraternize with the cartels was going to be a lot more problematic. Still, Porfirio had known this was coming. The loyalties of these fine men in uniform lay with the highest bidder, and if the opposition presidential candidate wanted their support, he’d better be prepared to shell out for it.

“You’d like to fight the drug syndicates?” Porfirio asked, grinning in faux admiration. “How very noble of you. Naturally, I assume you’d prefer a free hand in dealing with them—no pesky bureaucrats breathing down your necks about little trivialities and technicalities, right?” That got Malcolm’s attention. Nothing had moved but his eyes, but they were drilling a hole into Porfirio’s skull.

General Santoyo cleared his throat. “Well, of course, senador, if we were to speculate in any legitimate business ventures during our service,” he replied as the trail of smoke from Malcolm’s cigarette tapered off, “we hope that your government would respect those interests.”

For several years in the mid-1980s, General Santoyo had been Chief of Staff to the Defense Secretariat, serving as the Army’s official liaison to the press and earning a reputation as a smooth talker. Then, in 1985, with the drug trade rapidly spiraling out of control, Miguel de la Madrid had transferred General Santoyo to the nation’s narcotics capital of Guadalajara to show how serious he was about solving the problem. After four years spent snorting coke and cavorting with prostitutes alongside Mexico’s best-renowned drug lords, Santoyo’s strenuous devotion to Army work had been replaced by an addiction to the luxuries of the high life. But beneath the materialistic shell, the way with words remained.

Porfirio shifted in his chair and stole a glance back at Malcolm, who was now staring at the three men in uniform with extreme suspicion. Now came the tough part. Porfirio needed to give the generals what they wanted, so that he could count on their support in case things got ugly on election day. But if he wanted to have anything resembling an effective presidency, he’d also need a whole lot of goodwill from the big, not-always-friendly giant up north, which was personified in this room by Malcolm. If he gave these uniformed greedbags too much freedom to putz around with drug lords, Washington’s trust in him would be poisoned before he even stepped into Los Pinos. Porfirio had already decided how he was going to thread this needle—he just had to pray that it would work.

He sucked in a breath. “Of course, General,” he said, soothingly. “You can rest assured my administration will respect your property rights.” He resisted the urge to check in on Malcolm, who was surely glaring with horror. “Yours,” he continued, “and no one else’s.”

General Navarro furrowed his brow. Porfirio spoke on, swapping out the smooth, euphemistic tone for flat, unadorned matter-of-factness.

“If I win, you three can do whatever the hell you want. I’ll set the Army loose on the cartels for a while, let you and your underlings fool around with the traffickers, buy your vacation homes and hold your coke-fueled orgies.” Malcolm was probably balling his fist tight enough to bend his cigarette in half. Hopefully, the next part would cool the CIA envoy’s passions.

“But you all know I can’t let that go on forever,” Porfirio continued. “I won’t stand for it, and our fine friends up north,” he nodded to Malcolm, “certainly won’t stand for it. A year or two at most, and the knives are going to come out. Now, everyone in this room will be safe—I swear to God that as long as I’m President, you three can extort and abuse and profiteer until your hearts give out. But don’t go around telling all your underlings that they have the same privileges. When federal agents pull Captain Pepito out from under a pile of hookers with his nose covered in cocaine, don’t expect me to come running to the rescue.”

Silent air as the generals took in the terms of the offer, exchanging a cryptic, hushed series of whispers, shrugs and nods. Porfirio, meanwhile, finally spared a glance at Malcolm. He was the picture of serenity, watching the generals murmur in perfect quietude as the trail from his cigarette thinned and died off. After a minute or two of whispering, General Santoyo turned back to Porfirio and spoke up. “Senator,” he began, “we have considered the virtues of your proposal, and they are numerous. But there’s one part of it that we can’t bring ourselves to countenance. If you maintain the power to effectively prosecute lesser officers, what assurance do we have that you won’t turn that power on us once your authority is secure?”

Dammit.

Well, it was a good point. Porfirio rested his elbows on the table and clasped his hands, using his thumbs as a makeshift chin rest. The silence hung hot in the cramped room, and to escape the generals’ probing gazes, Porfirio dared another glance at Malcolm. His brow was bent in contemplation. Was he—was he going to say something?

Shit. Porfirio started to panic. If he let this CIA spook dictate his policy to the men whose support he needed desperately, what reason would they have to suspect he was anything more than George Bush’s puppet? What reason would they have to respect him or his promises?

Malcolm’s lips parted. He drew in a breath and readied his vocal cords. Overtaken by impulse, Porfirio slashed through the humid silence, almost yelling: “HOW ABOUT THIS!”

The generals flinched. Malcolm stopped short. Porfirio tightened his jaw.

Well, he’d have to say something now. Hopefully it didn’t come out too crazy.

“How about this,” he repeated, considerably calmer this time. Then he launched into an improvised spiel. “If I win, then I make you three my drug czars. Undersecretaries of Defense or something like that, or maybe I’ll make a whole new secretariat and put you in charge. Either way, it’ll pay well.” As every new facet of the plan revealed itself, Porfirio noticed each of the generals becoming visibly more excited.

“You’ll all preside over an unprecedented decline in cartel activity—that won’t be hard at all, since Caro and Carrillo are too busy killing each other at the moment to do any business, and it’ll take at least a year or two for their henchmen to pick up all the pieces.” The words were coming out as fast as Porfirio could think of them. “As for the power, do whatever you want with it. Skim as much off the traffickers you can, do all the cocaine your shriveled old livers can handle. I’ll even send you on business trips if you want—five-star suites at the Washington Hilton, all on the government’s tab.” General Navarro’s eyes lit up. The words were spilling out so fast now, Porfirio was struggling to avoid tripping over his own tongue.

“Then, in a year or two, you’ll all retire with honor. Buy yourselves retirement homes—I mean, hell, buy yourselves retirement compounds—burn any file that makes you nervous about incrimination, and ride off into the sunset with your trophy wives and military pensions.” Porfirio paused for a breath and a grin. Wrapping up his pitch, he finally permitted himself to slow down: “Power. Prestige. Generous salaries, and not too much work”, he recapped, holding up his hand and ticking off a finger for each perk. What do you think?”

Porfirio expected another thoughtful pause, but there was none.

“We’ll do it!” Exclaimed General Navarro with childlike enthusiasm. The hasty nods of the other two officers confirmed that the sentiment was unanimous. Malcolm was characteristically silent, but his widened eyes betrayed a sense of humbled shock and awe.

It was only then that Porfirio Muñoz Ledo realized what exactly he had said to the assembled officers. He had just auctioned off a position of immense power and influence to men he knew were rotten to the core, in exchange for political support. Would Manuel Bartlett even stoop that low?

Porfirio reached out to shake General Navarro’s outstretched hand. Yes, Manuel Bartlett most certainly would stoop this low. And if he did, it would be for no other reason than to maintain his desperate grip on power. Porfirio, on the other hand, had made this deal with devil because the country required it of him. Mexico simply could not take another six years of PRI despotism, and so Porfirio simply had to win the presidential election. And to do that, he had to shake hands with crooked, greedy generals. It was unsavory, it was dodgy, and it was disreputable. But it was for the good of Mexico, and that outweighed all else.

Right?

Porfirio froze mid-handshake.

Bartlett would say the exact same thing.

That much, Porfirio knew for sure. Embarrassing as it was to admit, Manuel Bartlett and Porfirio Muñoz Ledo went way back. Despite the vast political gulf which divided the two men today, there had been a time when they had both been young, rising stars in the PRI hierarchy in search of alliances and allegiances. They had never been particularly close, but they’d rubbed shoulders plenty of times, and over the decades, Porfirio had gotten to know Bartlett just about well enough to make personal judgements. Manolito’s fanatic, almost religious devotion to the ruling party had always seemed just a little bit…out there. Yet it had always seemed rooted in the firm belief that eternal, unchallenged PRI hegemony was the best-case scenario for Mexico. Sure, every one of Bartlett’s corrupt decisions was designed specifically to preserve and perpetuate his own unrivaled dominance. But behind Bartlett’s Nietzschean will to power, Porfirio realized, there lay a sincere, earnest conviction that by trampling over free speech, spitting on democracy and locking up everyone who looked at him funny, he was doing what was right for Mexico. Bartlett was wrong, of course. But then, how did Porfirio know that he was right?

General Navarro, slightly confused by the stiffness in the opposition senator’s arm, nevertheless shook it and passed it on to his colleague. Under his breath, Porfirio sighed. Well, he didn’t know. He couldn’t know, not in complete and total certainty. All he could do was believe in his heart of hearts that his being elected president would indeed be the best thing for Mexico, and hope with equal might that history ended up agreeing with him.


Mexico City, Federal District
April 12, 1994
3:03 PM


Sam Dillon, chief correspondent for The New York Times’s Mexico City bureau, shut the binder and looked back across the table.

“This is…” he trailed off while he rummaged around in his journalistic vocabulary for a suitable adjective.

“This is fucking huge.” Sam’s wife and co-correspondent, Julia Preston, [1] got it in two.

Lydia Cacho nodded. “It will be fucking huge, if you convince your editors to print it.”

Julia nodded in contemplative agreement. “You say you got this from a government employee?” She asked in her slightly-broken Spanish.

“Not just an employee,” Xanic von Bertrab replied. “A Secretary. Well, a former Secretary. Ernesto Zedillo, he ran the Budget Secretariat for two years under los hermanos Salinas.”

Julia’s eyes widened. “That certainly helps this,” she noted. “If it came from a small employee of the government, that would be less trusting. But from a former Secretary, that will mean a lot more.”

“But there is still a problem,” Sam sighed in his considerably more disjointed Spanish. “The banking records you have produced to us here, they are only saying one half of the story. You prove that these bank accounts have been contributing donations to the PRI, yes, and that these accounts are probably being puppeteered by the narcos. But it is not certain completely. Before publishing, we would have to prove this almost until no doubt.”

Xanic clenched her jaw and looked over at Lydia, who simply stared.

“Second,” Sam continued, “you do a good job to document that these governors are corrupt in favor of the narcos. And you show that these governors were all appointed by Bartlett after the money transfers were happening. But this does not say that the one thing has caused the other. What is it? Cum hoc ergo propter hoc.” That confused Xanic a little bit (she had never taken a Latin class). “Even if Julia and me give these findings to our editors, I have no guarantee that it will be printed.”

If she had been paying attention to her husband’s objections from the beginning, Julia probably would have agreed with him. But she hadn’t been. Her mind had been elsewhere—in the dense, sprawling Mexico City suburb of Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl, whose air was continually poisoned by the garbage-filled sea of sewage which had colonized the adjacent lake bed. While Sam explained the problems with Xanic’s and Lydia’s scoop, Julia had been walking with Alejandra Pérez, an eighteen-year-old native of Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl who saw no point in using civic organization to improve her city’s atmosphere because under the PRI system, “no one in power would pay any attention to us”. As Sam outlined his objections, Julia had been wandering the small mountain town of Santa Catarina Juquila, whose people had been saving up what little money they had for over fifteen years, in hopes of bribing the local PRI bureaucracy into building them the hospital they so desperately needed. [2] And just as Sam was wrapping up his second point, Julia had been interviewing Rosario Ibarra de Piedra, a mother-turned-activist whose only son had disappeared into a prison camp in 1975, and who was still searching for him almost twenty years later despite never having received the slightest shred of answer from any PRI administration.

When Julia finally roused herself back to the present moment, Sam was finishing up his spiel. “I know this findings are of great importance, but there is a large danger associa—”

We’ll do it!

The sudden change in volume made Sam’s heart do a cartwheel.

“I don’t know how, but we’ll do it! We’ll convince them to put this all in print!” Julia affirmed, breathless. “One way or another, we’ll make sure that before the election is happening, everyone in the world is going to know Manuel Bartlett is a corrupt son of a bitch!”

Xanic and Lydia smiled in unison. Sam turned and stared at his wife, stunned. He tried to respond, but was cut off once again.

“I don’t care what you say, Sam, we’re doing this,” Julia informed him in English in the same tone she used when he forgot to bring his dishes to the sink after dinner. “We’re bringing this straight to Max Frankel’s desk and we’ll threatening to resign if he doesn’t print it. I know the scoop has problems, Sam. Every scoop does. But this is way, way too big to start fussing over every little bit of journalistic procedure in the AP handbook. If we want the PRI to lose, we have to break this story. We’re the only ones who can, and if we don’t, then we’ll be leaving an entire nation out to rot!”

Sam didn’t even bother opening his mouth this time. There was no stopping her now. “Every night for the last six years, you’ve nagged me about how much trouble you have getting to sleep. Well, how in the hell do you expect to get a good night’s sleep ever again in your life if you ignored an opportunity to help overthrow a dictator as vicious as Genghis Khan?”

Sam sunk back into his chair. He didn’t even bother nodding, he knew what was going to happen.

Julia turned back to face Lydia and Xanic. She smiled and spoke once more to them in Spanish. “You can depend on us. We will make sure everyone reads your story and knows to see Bartlett and the PRI as just as corrupt as they truly are.”

Xanic beamed. Lydia beamed even wider and removed the arrows from her eyes, giving Julia the rare honor of being embraced, rather than pierced, by a Cacho stare. Both journalists were overcome by a feeling which washed over them and warmed them right down to the bone: catharsis. A sudden, soothing sense that their untiring efforts over the preceding months—the emotional and physical hunger they’d endured, the countless late nights that far too often bled into early mornings, the endless hours spent scrounging for evidence and chasing tantalizing trails of evidence into pitiful dead ends—had been worth it. That their shared passion for plucking needles of truth from haystacks of deception had at long last paid off. That finally, finally, someone with just the right connections was going to fast-track their mammoth of a scoop to the absolute apogee of global journalism for the entire world to see.

If only, Xanic and Lydia fretted as one mind, that feeling were strong enough to assure them that it would be enough to swing the election.
__________

[1] It’s at this point that I’d like to say a massive thank you to Julia Preston and Sam Dillon. Their book Opening Mexico: The Making of a Democracy was what got me into Mexico in the first place, and out of every source I’ve used to research this project, it is far and away the one I’ve referenced the most. The book has also given me in-depth character studies of relatively obscure, but extremely unique and talented individuals whose stories I’ve put to good use in this timeline. Hopefully this little tribute here makes up a little bit for the immense service Preston and Dillon have rendered to me and to the English-speaking world by chronicling Mexico’s transition to democracy in an engaging and in-depth way.
[2] A word about that: in OTL, Santa Catarina Juquila did eventually get its hospital, a twelve-bed clinic which cost $2 million and took seven years to build. It opened on September 27, 1999, and then-President Ernesto Zedillo himself was there to cut the ribbon. Three days later, an earthquake hit, the hospital’s flimsily-constructed walls split right down the middle, injuring ten patients (over $1.7 million of the budget had been siphoned off by corrupt officials), and the building had to be condemned. It’s a pretty illustrative, if very depressing, anecdote about how impoverished Mexicans were hurt by endemic corruption.
 
You do an unparalleled, amazing job of portraying the depths of corruption in '90s Mexico in colorful fashion. Keep up the great work!
 
Good grief, Mexico needs the clean up

That's an understatement.

As horrible of a human being as Bartlett is, he is ultimately the product of an equally rotten society.

Even Poor Porfirio has to negotiate with drug dealers pretending to be soldiers in order to get anywhere.
 

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Awesome update
But shouldn't those journalists be worry about someone tipping off the government about what they found? I mean someone in the printing room could delay the paper and call the government.
 
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Awesome update
But shouldn't those journalists be worry about someone tipping off the government about what they found? I mean someone in the printing room could delay the paper and call the government.
I'm glad you liked it! As for Lydia and Xanic, they would definitely be worried about that if they were handing over their findings to a Mexican newspaper. Fortunately, Sam Dillon and Julia Preston work for an American newspaper, The New York Times, whose employees feel no sense of loyalty to the Mexican government and no need to inform Manuel Bartlett that his empire is about to go down in flames. So there really isn't much need to worry about them tipping off the government!

On another note, I've retconned the Venezuelan bits in Part 21 to remove the implausibilities pointed out by @Danifa94. Hopefully it's a bit more believable now.

Hold on to them tight. The next update is the election of 1994, which, as you've all probably guessed, is essentially the "climax" of the whole timeline: secrets revealed, bad deeds punished. Get ready for some serious shit, (just as soon as I can motivate myself to stop procrastinating and finish the damn thing)!
 
I'm glad you liked it! As for Lydia and Xanic, they would definitely be worried about that if they were handing over their findings to a Mexican newspaper. Fortunately, Sam Dillon and Julia Preston work for an American newspaper, The New York Times, whose employees feel no sense of loyalty to the Mexican government and no need to inform Manuel Bartlett that his empire is about to go down in flames. So there really isn't much need to worry about them tipping off the government!

On another note, I've retconned the Venezuelan bits in Part 21 to remove the implausibilities pointed out by @Danifa94. Hopefully it's a bit more believable now.


Hold on to them tight. The next update is the election of 1994, which, as you've all probably guessed, is essentially the "climax" of the whole timeline: secrets revealed, bad deeds punished. Get ready for some serious shit, (just as soon as I can motivate myself to stop procrastinating and finish the damn thing)!

That’s great to hear!

As for the Venezuela part of the story, I would be interested in comparing what was changed from the original post to the one we have now.

Even though you mentioned that your story is mostly centered on Mexico, I still enjoy reading the parts about how the world is affected by this timeline’s P.O.D.

My favorite is Gorbachev stopping the August Coup. This makes me wonder: What did you decide on the fate of the Soviet Union? Does it still exist as a “Union of (Soviet) Sovereign States”, or did it eventually fall, more or less, like it did OTL? I tend to go with the former, but since it’s your story, you have the right to make a determination on that question.

I forgot to ask you a few more things from the beginning. How do you view the flow of immigration from Mexico to the U.S., given whats been going on during Mexico’s “Second Revolution”? Is there a larger influx of people or was the border shut down, if not tightly controlled to allow a smaller amount of people to immigrate? Would news agencies in the United States and around the world describe Immigration from Mexico as a bunch of “refugees fleeing war-torn Mexico” between 1988 to 1994?

That last question fascinates me because it could affect a big chunk of a generation of Mexican Americans never being born in the USA or the generation that is born is simply larger than OTL.
 
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As for the Venezuela part of the story, I would be interested in comparing what was changed from the original post to the one we have now.
Basically, Hugo Chávez's followers don't form a new political party, being as they are mostly in jail. The left-wing void is instead filled by the pre-existing party La Causa Radical, whose candidate in the presidential election of 1994 is Andrés Velásquez rather than Aristóbulo Istúriz, while Democratic Action nominates Claudio Fermín as OTL. Velásquez receives about 23% of the vote and picks up 4 states rather than 6, and Oswaldo Álvarez Paz still wins the presidency. La Causa's winner in 1998 is Francisco Arías Cárdenas rather than Velásquez, and his margin is very narrow. Effectively, though, the result is the same: a generally stable, three-party democracy in Venezuela that nevertheless alienates many people and causes them to seek out alternative political ideas.

My favorite is Gorbachev stopping the August Coup. This makes me wonder: What did you decide on the fate of the Soviet Union? Does it still exist as a “Union of (Soviet) Sovereign States, or did it eventually fall, more or less, like it did OTL? I tend to go with the former, but since it’s your story, you have the right to make a determination on that question.
I've decided to leave most of the specifics to the imagination, but the gist is this: the August Coup is nipped in the bud, the Union Treaty is signed on time, and the USR is formed. But this does very little to restore the power which had been steadily bleeding away from Moscow for over a decade, and practically nothing to reverse the terminal decline of the Communist Party. Gorbachev is still the President as of 1994, but his clout is dubious in pretty much every remaining region of the country. Gorbachev's turn against the hard-liners in 1991 means the reformers are in a much stronger position within the CPSU, but his attempts to assert their dominance and reform the Party's internal structure has not gone very well at all. The Party is on the verge of collapse or has already collapsed in essentially every Republic; in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, the political scene is quickly becoming a fight between conservative, religious nationalists and neoliberals, while in Central Asia, the established party heads have guarded their power very effectively by jumping off the sinking ship that is the CPSU and forming . Gorbachev still entertains a faint hope of forming a breakaway "Socialism with a human face" party and running for re-election in 1995, but this looks more and more like a fruitless endeavor, particularly as St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoly Sobchak looks increasingly likely to win.

I forgot to ask you a few more things from the beginning. How do you view the flow of immigration from Mexico to the U.S., given whats been going on during Mexico’s “Second Revolution”? Is there a larger influx of people or was the border shut down, if not tightly controlled to allow a smaller amount of people to immigrate? Would news agencies in the United States and around the world describe Immigration from Mexico as a bunch of “refugees fleeing war-torn Mexico” between 1988 to 1994?
Ah yes, this was one of the things I initially planned to delve deep into but never ended up having a good chance to. Many Americans do see the immigrants as refugees deserving of sympathy, but not so much from a war-torn country, but they are increasingly seen as fleeing adverse economic conditions and political repression. Since 1990, almost 1.5 million Mexicans have crossed the border into the United States, mostly poor farmers who got hung out to dry when pretty much every single welfare and assistance program was hacked into oblivion and they could no longer afford to keep their farms. Many of the newcomers are also seasonal migrants from areas like Aguascalientes, where work is only plentiful during certain months of the year. Most years, they would spend six months working in Mexico, head up north, spend six months working in America while sending money to their wives and daughters back home, then heading back south. Now, though, pretty much all such migrants who can make it to America stay there.

This has elicited mixed political responses in America. The border has not been shut down, though there has been a sizable reinvestment in the INS's security budget and many border state sheriffs are running miniature roundup operations to varying degrees of success. Legal immigration from Mexico has been greatly ramped up, although not everyone is in agreement—Pete Wilson in California is leaning even harder into the anti-immigration stuff, while some more hardline conservatives in Congress have started clamoring for a border wall, and their voices are getting aired louder than they otherwise might as Gingrich & Co. sound the cry of Revolution. Overall, though, the establishment isn't kicking up too much of a fuss. Many Americans's visceral distrust of Manuel Bartlett translates into a broad sympathy towards even the illegal immigrants, and the economy is finally beginning to grow again so that, by 1994, the fear of job theft isn't quite as potent as it otherwise would be.

The Presidential election, though, will have a significant effect on the migration patterns. If Elba Esther Gordillo wins, then the flow is likely to continue, but if PML pulls out a victory, many potential migrants will put their travel plans on hold to see if things really change.
 
I've decided to leave most of the specifics to the imagination, but the gist is this: the August Coup is nipped in the bud, the Union Treaty is signed on time, and the USR is formed. But this does very little to restore the power which had been steadily bleeding away from Moscow for over a decade, and practically nothing to reverse the terminal decline of the Communist Party. Gorbachev is still the President as of 1994, but his clout is dubious in pretty much every remaining region of the country. Gorbachev's turn against the hard-liners in 1991 means the reformers are in a much stronger position within the CPSU, but his attempts to assert their dominance and reform the Party's internal structure has not gone very well at all. The Party is on the verge of collapse or has already collapsed in essentially every Republic; in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, the political scene is quickly becoming a fight between conservative, religious nationalists and neoliberals, while in Central Asia, the established party heads have guarded their power very effectively by jumping off the sinking ship that is the CPSU and forming . Gorbachev still entertains a faint hope of forming a breakaway "Socialism with a human face" party and running for re-election in 1995, but this looks more and more like a fruitless endeavor, particularly as St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoly Sobchak looks increasingly likely to win.

How is Soviet Russia doing economically? Has it managed to complete its economic transition, or are people still waiting in line to buy bread?

Ah yes, this was one of the things I initially planned to delve deep into but never ended up having a good chance to. Many Americans do see the immigrants as refugees deserving of sympathy, but not so much from a war-torn country, but they are increasingly seen as fleeing adverse economic conditions and political repression. Since 1990, almost 1.5 million Mexicans have crossed the border into the United States, mostly poor farmers who got hung out to dry when pretty much every single welfare and assistance program was hacked into oblivion and they could no longer afford to keep their farms. Many of the newcomers are also seasonal migrants from areas like Aguascalientes, where work is only plentiful during certain months of the year. Most years, they would spend six months working in Mexico, head up north, spend six months working in America while sending money to their wives and daughters back home, then heading back south. Now, though, pretty much all such migrants who can make it to America stay there.

This has elicited mixed political responses in America. The border has not been shut down, though there has been a sizable reinvestment in the INS's security budget and many border state sheriffs are running miniature roundup operations to varying degrees of success. Legal immigration from Mexico has been greatly ramped up, although not everyone is in agreement—Pete Wilson in California is leaning even harder into the anti-immigration stuff, while some more hardline conservatives in Congress have started clamoring for a border wall, and their voices are getting aired louder than they otherwise might as Gingrich & Co. sound the cry of Revolution. Overall, though, the establishment isn't kicking up too much of a fuss. Many Americans's visceral distrust of Manuel Bartlett translates into a broad sympathy towards even the illegal immigrants, and the economy is finally beginning to grow again so that, by 1994, the fear of job theft isn't quite as potent as it otherwise would be.

The Presidential election, though, will have a significant effect on the migration patterns. If Elba Esther Gordillo wins, then the flow is likely to continue, but if PML pulls out a victory, many potential migrants will put their travel plans on hold to see if things really change.

So, if you were to run a Trump-style campaign, you wouldn't have broad popularity across the US?
 
Roberto, every time I see an alert that you post in this thread, I go through a rollercoaster of excitement. Just wanted you to know how much I love this timeline.
 
How is Soviet Russia doing economically? Has it managed to complete its economic transition, or are people still waiting in line to buy bread?
Mostly the latter, although things are slightly better than OTL since the 500 days initiative is not cut short.

So, if you were to run a Trump-style campaign, you wouldn't have broad popularity across the US?
Not the kind of mass support that Trump was able to muster in OTL, that's for sure.

Sorry the next update is taking a while—I started a new job recently and it's been eating up most of my time. But rest assured that it's on its way, and that when it's done we will finally witness the calamitous election of 1994!
 
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Part 22: 1994 Mexican presidential election
On April 29, 1994, The New York Times broke a story that tore through Mexico’s political landscape like the earthquake of September 1985 had torn through Mexico’s physical landscape. Using information supplied by an anonymous, formerly high-ranking government official, Times reporters Julia Preston and Sam Dillon (writing on behalf two Mexican journalists whose identities had been concealed) revealed that, in exchange for financial donations from various drug cartels—particularly those headed by Amado Carrillo Fuentes and Miguel Caro Quintero—Mexican President Manuel Bartlett had knowingly appointed corrupt officials as governors of various Mexican states, specifically with the intent of aiding and abetting the drug cartels. The article further charged that Bartlett had turned the DFS into a breeding ground for cartoonish levels of violence and corruption, to the point that it was not so much a security agency as it was a loose, warring confederation of coke-addled mercenaries whose loyalties lay with whichever drug lord paid them the most. In other words, Bartlett had subjected his prerogatives as President to the fickle whims of international crime lords, for no apparent reason aside from political and financial gain.

First reactions to the article were of disbelief. Even before the story broke, the American people had trusted the Mexican government about as much they trusted O.J. Simpson’s lawyer. But selling off Mexico’s entire national security apparatus to Al Pacino’s character from Scarface? That seemed beyond the pale, even for Manuel Bartlett. Yet, as the Times’s report was substantiated in the international press and confirmed by a hastily-compiled State Department report in June, and as Bartlett’s government seemed incapable of producing any evidence to back up its half-hearted denials, the national mood morphed into an uncontained, fiery rage. Since 1992, the deluge of drugs flowing in from Mexico had scourged American cities and towns and ruined hundreds of thousands of Americans’ lives. And when the American people found out that Manuel Bartlett had not only failed to stop this avalanche, but in fact had exploited it for personal enrichment, they didn’t want measured, diplomatic retribution—they wanted revenge.

And, for once, the establishment agreed. Though a few Congressmen and senators bowed to pressure from corporations which did business in Mexico, [1] most politicians of both parties were soon racing to see who could come up with the most interesting adjectives with which to condemn Manuel Bartlett’s crimes. The lingering bad taste of the Gulf War meant that a full-scale military intervention was off the table, but everything short of that was fair game. For weeks, Congress debated every possible proposal, from cutting off diplomatic relations to a naval blockade of Mexican ports, until finally settling on something a bit more restrained: sanctions. On June 15, the MEXICO ROGUE STATES Act [2]—passed with near-unanimous support in Congress and signed by President Bush the same day—went into effect. Inspired by the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, the MRSA imposed a harsh regime of tariffs and quotas on just about every Mexican import, banned the sale of arms and munitions to Mexico, froze Mexican government assets in the United States, and forbade companies whose boards of directors contained any active members of the PRI from being listed on U.S. stock exchanges. And while U.N. Ambassador Winston Lord could not quite convince the Security Council to do to Mexico what it had done to Iraq three years earlier, twenty-three countries across Europe and the Americas imposed sanctions of their own, both due to pressure from the State Department and sheer horror at Manuel Bartlett’s active role in abetting the drug trade. These measures differed in severity from country to country, but they all had two things in common: all of them went into effect before the Mexican presidential election on August 21, and were to remain in effect only as long as the “criminal regime of the Institutional Revolutionary Party”, as President Bush called it in a speech July, was in place. By creating what amounted to an embargo, Mexico’s largest trading partners were leveraging their economic might to create an embargo on Mexican goods, hoping to embolden Porfirio Muñoz Ledo’s presidential campaign and kick Manuel Bartlett and his kleptocratic friends out of power.

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Although Senator Henry Cisneros had been Manuel Bartlett’s most fierce and vocal critic in Washington for years, he criticized the international embargo on Mexico, arguing that it would hurt Mexico’s people more than its government. Nevertheless, he voted for the Rogue States Act when it was put before the Senate in May.

Shocking and damning as this news was, pessimists the world over surmised that Bartlett would bluff, lie, cheat, deny, rig, cover-up, and suppress his way to untouchability, and that his regime founded on fraud and crime would long endure. But they missed one crucial factor—this time, Bartlett had pissed off the billionaires.

Whether he realized it or not, Manuel Bartlett’s power had always been insured by the tacit support of Mexico’s ultra-ultra-wealthy. That upper crust within the upper crust, the owners of Mexico’s largest conglomerates and corporations, had supported el partido oficial since the 1940s, head-over-heels in love with the stability and protectionism provided by PRI administrations. Even as Miguel de la Madrid and Carlos Salinas’s dismantling of the social safety net incited riots and recessions that were very bad for business, the great corporate magnates continued to throw their weight behind the PRI out of sheer inertia and fear of the alternative. But as Bartlett’s increasingly ludicrous antics alienated country after country and destroyed any chance of an advantageous trade deal, the copper and car magnates began to wonder to themselves whether they were really getting their money’s worth. And after Carrillogate caused almost all of their overseas customers to cut economic ties with Mexico, these shrewd businessmen took a long, hard look at the situation and made a cost-benefit analysis.

Saturday, July 16, 1994 was a surprising evening for viewers of TV Azteca, a formerly state-owned broadcaster now owned by the magnate Ricardo Salinas Pliego, who also operated a large network of export factories along the U.S. border. [3] Rather than the typical soap opera or poorly-dubbed Jean-Claude van Damme movie, those who tuned in on that night were instead treated to El poder detrás del trono, a two-hour-long documentary which chronicled in vivid detail the political career and rise to power of Manuel Bartlett. Hastily-developed but well-written and masterfully edited (Salinas would later admit to having paid Paramount Pictures over six million dollars to produce it), the film presented Bartlett as a despot of Shakespearean proportions, projecting onto him the most sinister qualities of Brutus, Richard, Claudius and Iago. After a broad overview of Bartlett’s past sins, from his role in the murder of Kiki Camarena in 1985 to his supposed masterminding of the death of Cardinal Juan Jesús Posadas Ocampo, the film delved deep into the charges leveled against Bartlett by the international community. Through a series of slightly-questionable interviews, dramatic soundtrack choices and editing flourishes, the film eventually concluded that Bartlett had not only struck a corrupt, financial bargain with the cartels to preserve his own power, but had spent the proceeds on sports cars, yachts and Mediterranean mansions. There was little, if any, truth to this last assertion, but its effect on the millions who heard it was undeniable; by the time a furious President Bartlett ordered the film banned from public television, hundreds of thousands of VHS copies had already been sold at open-air tianguis markets everywhere from Tuxtla to Tijuana.

While Televisa, the main state-affiliated TV broadcaster (owned by the Azcárraga family, which was spectacularly rich but had few interests abroad) remained loyal to the government, TV Azteca’s ratings skyrocketed as it dispensed a continuous stream of anti-PRI content in the weeks leading up to election day—including interviews with Octavio Paz, Carlos Monsiváis and half a dozen other influential academics who denounced the PRI and urged Mexicans not to vote for it. But the hidden war of wealth against Bartlett and the PRI did not confine itself to the visual arts. In the weeks before the presidential election, banking magnate Kamel Nacif Borge saw to it that huge binders loaded with incriminating evidence showed up at newspaper offices in Chihuahua, Guadalajara, Monterrey, Cancún and many other cities, identifying over a dozen PRI governors as puppets of Amado Carrillo Fuentes or Miguel Caro Quintero and willing pawns in the international drug trade. The charges also went went well beyond what the New York Times had revealed in April, containing proof that PRI presidential nominee Elba Esther Gordillo had, while serving as Labor Secretary, accepted hefty bribes from magnates looking to buy up government assets (since Nacif himself had been one such magnate, he had no trouble coming up with this proof). And while newspapers all over the country were putting the sordid details of PRI corruption in print (encouraged to break from self-censorship by the wads of U.S. dollars that came packaged with the evidence), Telmex owner Carlos Slim occupied himself with strictly humanitarian pursuits: paying Mexico’s unemployed—of which there was no shortage as the embargo set in—to pass out flyers, put up posters, and canvass entire neighborhoods for Porfirio Muñoz Ledo.


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In the last few weeks before the presidential election, anti-PRI slogans began to show up everywhere in Mexico City, including, suspiciously enough, in the windows of military vehicles. Army spokesmen insisted that these messages were the work of “political vandals” and not at all reflective of the military’s position in the presidential election.

More cynically-minded historians tend to focus solely on this sudden glut of cash, arguing that the presidential election of 1994 was just a typical case of the moneyed elite guarding their interests. But to take this view is to ignore the very real and impactful actions taken by the common people in the weeks leading up to election day. For the preceding five years, the Mexican people had, by and large, lived in docile fear of the PRI jackboot. Aside from brief, periodic bursts of localized unrest, organized protest had mostly disappeared since 1989. Even as the people’s remaining faith in the PRI was ripped to shreds and public places became forums for increasingly open anti-government chatter, most ordinary Mexicans had declined to take to the streets, resigned to the belief that the PRI’s hold on power was eternal and that open dissent would only invite repression and brutality.

But the embargo changed everything. As country after country cut economic ties with Mexico, the value of the peso cratered, unemployment leapt overnight, and food prices doubled, tripled, and then quadrupled in less than three weeks. For millions of otherwise-apolitical men and women, their tolerance of PRI excesses ended when they could no longer feed their families, and when they read in their local papers about the full extent of Manuel Bartlett’s vast corruption and found that their wages could barely procure enough beans and corn tortillas to sate their children’s hungry bellies, they decided that enough was enough. By early August, all across Mexico, practically every city was swelling up with protesters. Not ideologues, guerrillas or ward heelers, but millions of schoolteachers, factory workers, farmers, and streetside junk-hawkers who, after five years of silence, were starting to remember how to use their voices.

And once the people had their voice back, they used it to enormous effect. On July 31, a week after El Diario de Juárez revealed that Chihuahua Governor Miguel Lerma had personally pocketed over $17 million in his corrupt dealings with the cartels, a crowd of 19,000 protesters assembled in the state capital of Chihuahua and overran the governor’s mansion, forcing Governor Lerma to flee the scene a DFS helicopter. On August 3, protesters in the state of Morelos tried to do the same, only to find out that the cartoonishly corrupt governor Jorge Carrillo Olea had already left the state two days earlier (he would be arrested in Costa Rica less than a month later). [4] Only a truly massive Army contingent outside Los Pinos saved President Bartlett from a similar fate during the first weeks of August.

Bartlett’s immediate instinct was to crush the protests with the same brutality he had used as Government Secretary back in 1988. He soon found, however, that he could not simply call up a few hundred men with guns to crush the demonstrations within an hour. The DFS had tied itself so intimately to the cartels that it no longer functioned as a security organization (or any kind of organization, for that matter). Almost all of the DFS’s manpower was concentrated in Chihuahua, Sonora and Baja California, where individual units were too busy fighting opposite sides of the Caro-Carrillo drug war to heed orders from Mexico City. As the hot, August days ticked on and Mexican streets began to swell with angry men and women with sharp stones and sharper slogans, Bartlett increasingly found himself relying on the Army, which had a suspiciously light touch in dealing with protesters—for some reason, even when Bartlett ordered his generals to rain fire and brimstone onto the protesters, the troops who showed to the protests up didn’t seem to do much more than observe the demonstration and make sure that they didn’t do too much in the way of property damage.

Zocalo1994.jpg


By 1994, the radical student network which had provided an organizational foundation for the Army of Mexican Liberation was mostly moribund. However, enough active members remained in Mexico City to organize a 220,000-person, anti-PRI rally in the Zócalo two days before the presidential election.

Yet, even despite these difficulties, Bartlett remained in denial that the PRI could possibly lose. Right up until the end of July, the President assured himself that, for all their noises of discontentment, the people knew deep down that only el partido oficial was capable of running the country right, and that, come election day, they would flock as they always had to the sole, rightful standard bearer of the Mexican Revolution. But when he finally sat down for a long-overdue meeting with Liébano Sáenz, Elba Esther Gordillo’s campaign manager, he was petrified by what he heard. For one thing, the PRI’s support among organized labor had almost totally disappeared. In decades past, the government-backed unions had been a bedrock of PRI support, supplying millions of votes election after election. By now, though, Bartlett had so thoroughly angered organized labor with his ruthless agenda of privatizations and strikebreaking that most of the powerful unions had no interest whatsoever in cooperating with the partido oficial. The few unions which were still loyal to the PRI (such as the National Teachers’ Syndicate, which Elba Esther Gordillo herself had headed up until she became the Secretary of Labor) were utterly despised by their rank-and-file for their subservience, to the point that their endorsement would do more harm than good for Gordillo’s chances. And even if the PRI had still had the solid support of its lapdog unions, independent unions on the Acuña model had cut so far into their mobilizing power that most would have been incapable of bringing more than a fifth of their members to the polls.

Even after hearing this unsettling news, Bartlett still tried to tell himself that victory was certain, clinging desperately to the hope that the PRI’s most loyal voter bloc, the voto verde or “green vote” from rural areas, would pull it out for Gordillo. But after twelve long years of cutbacks, selloffs and privatizations, first under de la Madrid, then the Salinas brothers and finally under Bartlett himself, the PRI had destroyed just about every social program that had won it mass support from the countryside in decades past. Under normal circumstances, the PRI might have filled in the gaps with an avalanche of goodies from the state welfare agencies, but those were equally broke or nonexistent after years of budgetary dismemberment. This meant that the ejidatarios (impoverished farmers stuck raising corn or coffee on state-owned plots of land) could no longer be held hostage by benefit-withholding PRI bureaucrats; they were free to vote their conscience, or, more accurately, their aching bellies. Of the PRI’s traditionally loyal voter blocs, this left only the vocational middle class—the very same teachers, telephone workers, electricians and accountants who were currently fuming in the streets of every major city, burning Bartlett’s image in effigy.

Eventually Bartlett forced himself to accept that a certain amount of fraud would be necessary to ensure a PRI victory. But as he tried to summon up the PRI’s infamous election-stealing powers in early August, he realized, to his growing terror, that the vast, intricate political machine which had successfully rigged the election of 1988 had since imploded into a chaotic, disorganized mess. The chronic decline of PRI-aligned unions and farmer’s groups certainly hadn’t helped, nor did but the one man most responsible for the collapse of the PRI’s organizational structure was none other than its most fervent, faithful devotee: Government Secretary Carlos Hank González. The great-grandaddy of the PRI hardline, Hank was a dinosaurio of the party’s old-school populist tradition, deeply suspicious of Carlos Salinas, Miguel de la Madrid, and the other young, new-wave technocrats which had taken over the party in the mid-1980s. And when Bartlett made Hank head of the Office of Political Integrity—a department charged with ferreting out and punishing disloyal party members—he unleashed holy hellfire on the PRI’s nouveau riche. Since 1991, Hank used his position to purge from the party rolls almost every high-ranking member he deemed insufficiently loyal, or too well-educated, or simply too young. Three years later, over twenty thousand young, ambitious priístas had been eliminated by Hank’s ideological purity drive and tens of thousands more had fled the PRI out of fear or disgust, leaving a party infrastructure made up mostly of old men with oodles of loyalty but almost no sense of how modern presidential campaigns were run. When Bartlett began frantically contacting state-level PRI affiliates in mid-August in an attempt to organize a bit of last-minute voter fraud, what he saw horrified him: the party’s most dynamic campaigners—the ones with contacts in working-class neighborhoods, the ones with the youthful energy and motivation to go out and print extra ballots for the few remaining loyal priístas, round up dependable poll-watchers, and intimidate local opposition activists—were gone, often with no one to replace them. In many towns and neighborhoods there were simply no loyal priístas left to bring out the vote, no one to stuff the boxes with PRI-marked ballots, and no one to fudge the numbers if they didn’t come out right. In short, at the grassroots, the PRI was dead.

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As his campaign reached its final stage, Porfirio Muñoz Ledo recruited several prominent opposition figures to campaign for him, including pro-democracy activist Sergio Aguayo, labor organizer Julia Quiñónez, leftist intellectual Carlos Monsiváis, and even (after months of persuasion) a reluctant Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas. Here, Muñoz Ledo stands aside as Cárdenas addresses a crowd in Veracruz in July.

The Muñoz Ledo campaign, on the other hand, was thriving everywhere. Millions of Mexicans had pledged their votes to Muñoz Ledo; the growing displays of civil disobedience had energized and revitalized the opposition, and in the two weeks before the election, Porfirio used his speaking skills to his advantage, giving two or three rousing speeches a day to enormous crowds of protesters. The political infrastructure of the movement was strong: Muñoz Ledo’s campaign manager Jorge Castañeda had fostered active get-out-the-vote initiatives in every state, and friendly candidates for the Senate and Chamber of Deputies had been recruited to run in 279 of 300 Congressional districts and 30 states, either as members of the PAN, the Popular Socialist Party, or as independent candidates. Just as they had done for Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas in 1988, pollsters Francisco Javier Ovando Hernández and Román Gil Heraldez [5] had assembled a nationwide network of poll-watchers to keep watch for fraud and to ensure that the people would be free to cast their votes as they saw fit. A plentiful supply of cash from the billionaire donors also allowed the campaign to hire tens of thousands of part-time canvassers and flyer-passer-outers to canvass the cities. To reach the more sparsely-populated rural areas, they borrowed an admittedly unsavory tactic from the PRI: bribery. Through July and August, trucks bankrolled by various CEOs and chairmen rolled up dirt roads from the Sierra Madre to the Selva Lacandona, passing out bags of fertilizer, electric generators, and modernized farming equipment in exchange for entire villages’ worth of votes.

By the last week of the campaign, it was clear to anyone with two eyes that a revolutionary change was coming, including, finally, President Bartlett. After weeks of resistance and denial, Bartlett had forced himself to accept that his party had practically no chance in a free and fair election. The thought genuinely terrified him. For all its shortcomings, Manuel Bartlett was earnestly convinced that the PRI was the only party which could carry out the principles of the First Mexican Revolution. To Bartlett, Mexico and the PRI were one and the same, and while he could understand why the people desired a change, he knew nevertheless in his heart of hearts that to transfer power to the opposition would only lead in the end to anarchy, bloodshed, and pseudo-fascism. For the good of the people and for the good of Mexico, the PRI simply had to remain in power. And so, on August 18, three days before the election, Bartlett took a step he had hoped he would never even need to imagine: with a voice of grave solemnity, he asked General Jesús Gutiérrez Rebollo, three-star general, hero of the Spring Campaign and the moral leader of the Army, to order his forces to take control of the country, impose martial law, postpone the election indefinitely, and save the people from themselves.

General Gutiérrez told Bartlett to go fuck his mother.

By most accounts, Manuel Bartlett spent the next 72 hours secluded in his private residence, awaiting the inevitable. Over the preceding six years, under three separate administrations, Bartlett’s sole mission had been to preserve the domination of the PRI by any means necessary. His indefatigable drive had led him to silence almost all political rivals of stature, sell off every social program for which he could find a willing buyer, and turn Mexico into a police state. And yet, in the end, all he had done was destroy the party to which he had devoted his entire adult life.

Then the day finally arrived. Many observers had feared that election day would be pure chaos, but in fact the polling was relatively orderly and peaceful, mostly because the soldiers stationed outside polling places in most populous towns prevented any large-scale unrest from breaking out. And so, on August 21, under the faithful eye of Gil and Ovando’s poll-watching federation, 32 million Mexicans cast their votes as they saw fit. Enrique Krauze described the election of 1994 as “judgement day for the PRI and its sins; the rebirth of Mexico’s civic and political life”. Former Congressman Vicente Fox, ever the intellectual, declared in 2006 that “every chicken in Mexico was coming home not just to roost, but to shit on Manuel Bartlett’s face”.

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In the end, it wasn’t a landslide. It was a disgrace. By a margin of 75 percentage points, Porfirio Muñoz Ledo was the next President of Mexico. Not one single state remained loyal to the PRI, and Elba Esther Gordillo had barely captured more than 10% of the vote (to this day, the PRI’s successors occasionally grumble that Gordillo’s total would have been larger if not for voter suppression on the part of the Army, a claim which has been substantiated to a certain degree). TV Azteca’s first-ever election night special, featuring fancy computer graphics and snappy interviews with Sergio Aguayo, Julio Scherer, and other top political activists and analysts, turned out to be the most-watched television broadcast in Mexican history up to that point. For a few hours after the polls closed, Televisa pretended that the race was up in the air, but after Sinaloa—historically the most loyally green state in the country—gave only 32% of its vote to Gordillo, veteran anchorman Jacobo Zabludovsky announced that the Porfirio Muñoz Ledo had won a shutout victory. It wasn’t the first time that the PRI candidate had won fewer votes in a presidential election (as Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas could attest), but it was the first time that there was no one to lie about the results.

The Congressional elections were equally staggering. In 273 of 300 districts, opposition candidates for the Chamber of Deputies had triumphed over their PRI competitors. The other 200 seats, which were awarded by party-list proportional representation, had gone mostly to the PAN, with only 45 priístas making the cut. The Senate was similar story, with only seven of 64 PRI candidates winning their elections. The bill for six decades of repression, corruption and economic mismanagement had come due, and the PRI had paid it with an electoral wipeout.

The public mood was one of ecstasy. After TV Azteca called the election for Muñoz Ledo, the same streets which had seen massive protests in the preceding weeks before were now filled with celebrators singing patriotic songs and hailing the downfall of the PRI. At his elaborate campaign headquarters in a downtown Mexico City hotel, Muñoz Ledo announced to a crowd of ecstatic supporters that “history has been made. Tonight, we have achieved our revolution.” He was half-right: the old system, with its outdated corporatist structures and utter disregard for freedom of speech and association, had rotted away into nothing. But the Second Mexican Revolution was only partially accomplished. To complete it, a new system would need to be erected in the place of the old. Muñoz Ledo’s assembled supporters kept this in mind even as they celebrated his victory, punctuating their cheers with cries of ¡no nos falles!—“don’t let us down!”

But that could wait a day or two. Right now, it was time to sing, not cry. And when a crowd of 22,000 demonstrators showed up outside Los Pinos on the morning of August 22—in the very spot in which twenty-five protesters had been fatally shot in September of 1988—and found that the Army detachment which Bartlett had employed to guard him had left their posts to join in the celebration, they decided to pay a call on their soon-to-be-ex-President, to wish him well in his future endeavors, and perhaps give him a hand in moving out of the official residence. But after looking under every desk, inside every closet and behind every curtain, the people were stunned to realized that Manuel Bartlett was nowhere to be found. The news quickly spread to the streets, where within hours, stories stories were circulating that Bartlett had been executed by the Army, had fled to Bermuda with a gold bar in each pocket, or had donned a fake beard and sunglasses and joined in the protests himself. These rumors were soon dispelled, however, when the world found out exactly where Bartlett was and what had happened to him.
__________

[1]This kind of pressure would have been a bit more impactful before TTL’s Alcoa bombings in 1992, which caused many large U.S. corporations to divest from maquiladoras south of the Rio Grande and reduced U.S. imports from Mexico by a substantial percentage.
[2] That, of course, stands for Modeling EXtensive Instruments to COmbat Regimes Opposed to the Good of the UnitEd STates, its Allies, TErritories and Security. Eat your heart out, Patriot Act.
[3] And who also bought Alcoa’s industrial complex in Ciudad Acuña after most of it was destroyed in a terrorist attack (See Part 19!)
[4] A similar thing happened in OTL to Javier Duarte, PRI Governor of Veracruz, in 2017.
[5] The very same men who were murdered in OTL but in TTL, as a crucial part of this timeline’s point of divergence.
 
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AHE

Gone Fishin'
“And so, on August 18, three days before the election, Bartlett took a step he had hoped he would never even need to imagine: with a voice of grave solemnity, he asked General Jesús Gutiérrez Rebollo, three-star general, hero of the Spring Campaign and the moral leader of the Army, to order his forces to take control of the country, impose martial law, postpone the election indefinitely, and save the people from themselves.

General Gutiérrez told Bartlett to go fuck his mother. “
Damn what a chad. Mexico could only take so much, and when Bartlett added the final straw to
break it’s back, it kicked him out in glorious fashion.

Great chapter, as always.
 
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