So question, the OTL early Soviet Union decriminalized homosexuality along with repealing others tsarist laws, though it got recriminalized under Stalin.

What's the situation like in TTL Soviet Russia?
Hmmm...

Hadn't considered it, but I would expect a decriminalization to still go through. The social stigma likely remains and there is probably plenty of other ways people are harrassed and persecuted in, but I doubt it is recriminalized. There hasn't been the same need for a "moralistic" stance to gin up support for the government, so I think it remains legal in the Soviet Republic.
 
Update Thirty-Seven (Pt. 2): Dancing To A New Tune
Dancing To A New Tune

539px-Jacques_Arthuys_Portrait.jpg

Jacques Arthuys, Leading Figure of the Union de la Droite

A Republic In Trouble​

The period in France following the Two Rivers Crisis was to see ever further political chaos as the hot seat of the President of the Council changed on a seemingly monthly basis. Ultimately, the most significant impact of the Two Rivers Crisis in France was to be the introduction of the Union de la Droite as a fully-functioning part of the political establishment, an equal partner in numerous governmental coalitions and increasingly a potential leading player in French politics. However, one thing which was clear to all was that the system, following an extended period of post-Great War stability, had been firmly thrown into chaos. The result of this constant shifting back and forth between various unstable political coalitions from across the political spectrum was to see the empowerment of a post which had ordinarily been placed on the back foot during the Third Republic - the Presidency under Gaston Doumergue. Given the intensely unstable political situation, Doumergue strove to support the management of public affairs with leftist values while maintaining a conservative guideline - with the result that he was able to find a working relationship with almost every single one of his counterparts during his years as President of France. An affable and courteous man, he proved a deft hand at managing the political situation, supporting successive government changes while ensuring a constant adherence to his own principals, in the process amassing a level of popularity with the general public which few in the country could boast. However, the one faction which Doumergue would find overtly hostile to his leadership, and which would serve to undermine multiple coalitions, was the ardent arch-Catholic Union de la Droite, who vocally denounced the President for his Protestantism, his political intriguing and what they perceived as his clear bias towards the left. In fact, Doumergue was the only Protestant head of state that France had known since the conversion of Henri IV more than four-hundred and fifty years prior, and as such was in a position to generate considerable acrimony from the Catholic Right who saw a Protestant spider seated amidst a web of politics in Paris, spinning conflict and chaos all in the name of maintaining his own power. While a crude twisting of the facts, there was some truth to these charges, as Doumergue was able to shape the political situation according to his wishes, toppling Presidents of the Council when they challenged him and constantly shifting his overt support between coalition members on the basis of who could grant him what he wanted. Ultimately, a measure of stability would be restored in early 1936 with the ascension of Louis Barthou as President of the Council of Ministers. A close Doumergue ally from the Democratic Alliance, Barthou was a trusted partner who Doumergue finally felt held sufficient power to back for the leadership position, forming a relatively stable coalition behind him which was able to begin bringing order to the chaos. The restoration of a moderate, republican, government which rapidly showed itself to hold little regard for the political extremes and dictated a policy of moderation and establishmentarianism swiftly drew outrage from both the left and right. Léon Blum's repeated failures to form a functioning government coalition after his initial dismissal in 1932 had allowed for the ascension of more radical elements of the SFIO who questioned why they should listen to the ramblings of the bourgeoisie, and not bring about a worker's republic. Headed by the radical Albert Treint, this faction called for the Communists of the SFIO to "pluck the socialist poultry" from their own party - in effect demanding a total shift in policy onto a path of hardline Communism and a purge of their more moderate members. Further enflamed by the removal of Trotsky and resultant ideological consolidation of the Soviet Republic, Treint was to prove a peerless provocateur who waged an open war against the older and more moderate voices of Blum, Souvarine and Frossard. The result was an open brawl within the left-wing between moderate and radical wings, which soon escalated to clashes between associated street gangs - although it was not long before this conflict further engulfed the ever combative right-wing ligues of the UD, who leapt at the chance to bash in the heads of Communists. A similar combativeness had spread to the right, where a key dividing point within the Union de la Droite, namely over whether to adopt a Republican or Monarchist outlook, resulted in near-constant factional strife within the party. Had it not been for the deft if merciless political prowess of the industrialist-ideologue Jacques Arthuys who rapidly rose to challenge the power held by Maurice Pujo and Charles Maurras, the party might well have splintered apart under the pressure. Possessing money, a dedicated following which counted far-right stalwarts like Georges Valois, Hubert Bourgin and Charles Albert amongst their number, and contacts to well-positioned military figures through Marshal Louis Franchet d'Espèrey's Chief-of-Staff Francois de la Rocque, Arthuys was able to set forth a far more clean-cut image than well-known radical bomb-throwers like Maurras and Pujo. Over the course of the 1930s he was able to use his wealth to make contacts with the Duc de Guise, Jean d'Orléans, who all French monarchists had by and large come to support, while looping past Mauras - adopting what elements of Mauras' ideology he liked and discarding what he didn't, while wholly sidelining the former firebrand by the time of Barthou's appointment in 1936. With his position increasingly secure internally, Jacques Arthuys was able to shift his attentions towards undermining the Barthou Government and Doumergue while cleverly working to improve the popularity of the monarchy amongst the French populace through a series of publicity campaigns which utilized not only the monarchy's image and his own, to mention nothing of his growing flock of famous supporters', but also brought the Catholic Church itself in to begin changing the public outlook. As the geopolitical circumstance began to shift in his favor, Arthuys made the final necessary preparations for his planned rise to power (7).

If French politics were chaotic, then French society could only be considered anarchic during these years. As had been the case for centuries, the key fracture point in French society lay between the urban and rural, Paris and the Hinterlands, the bourgeoisie and the farmer, but during the first half of the 1930s these divisions were to find ever more internal divisions and uncertainty. In the industrial cities of northern and eastern France, foremost amongst them Paris, a vibrant and combative working class culture re-emerged from the doldrums of suppression with a wide variety of social organizations, from sports associations and youth organizations to neighborhood clubs and reading groups, aiding in the mobilization of society to active politics. Frequent labor unrest, and the resultant shocks to the economy, were to engender enmity with the conservative rural populace who nevertheless found themselves increasingly drawn to the culture and excitement of the cities as consumer goods, foremost amongst them the radio, became available to the general public. The veterans of the Great War, more so in most other countries, were to remain a cohesive societal force in France with veterans meeting up on a regular basis to reminisce on their achievements and sacrifices while lamenting the state of their great nation. Notably these organizations, which had been so politicized from the start, increasingly found themselves decoupled from the political infighting, instead mostly serving as important civil society organizations after the most radical elements shifted their attentions to the street gangs and ligues which remained deeply engaged in the politics of the period. During this period French literature would find itself invigorated by the presence of a broad spectrum of talented thinkers and writers who presented a complex and interconnected web of theories about how to shape French society for the future. A common theme in these years was a feeling of anarchic uncertainty as the weaknesses of the Third Republic became clear to all, while a clear warning of what would happen should the Peoples of France fail to find unity was demonstrated by the constant crises faced by the British across the Channel. While the economy remained robust in its growth, and increasing economic ties to the Latin Bloc countries presented new and exciting economic opportunities, there was little doubt that the massive empire carved out by Germany in Eastern Europe placed France at a considerable disadvantage. While Briand and Stresemann had done much to ease tensions between France and Germany, an underlying current of unease could not help but influence French society. In particular the German openness towards the Soviet Republic and Communism in general was to cause much consternation and fear in France, with educators and right-wing ideologues publicly condemning the proliferation of German Proletkult works, both translated from Russian and German originals, which resulted in a small but vibrant subculture primarily centered on Lille and other surrounding industrial towns and cities. The outbreak of open violence during the years between 1934-1937 between leftist factions and far-right ligues, with street fights, riots and open clashes, was to prove a sign of the worries marking French society - with many condemning the violence as a sign of the failings of the Republic. During these years the monarchist movement, increasingly dominated by Jacques Arthuys, would shift its focus towards a more mainstream appeal which saw not only the cooptation of the Catholic Church as a platform, but also efforts to appeal to the urban working class and the petit bourgeoisie, bringing a new dynamic to the societal tumult. As priests in urban parishes began to preach the word of monarchism and integralism, a profusion of social services under the banner of Jean d'Orléans, often backed by the non-partisan support of veterans organizations, began to provide food, housing and community to segments of the urban populace who had been lost in the mi. As a result, growing level of sympathy for the monarchy now began to emerge in the bastion of leftist sentiment - the northern cities. While Charles Maurras and other rabid demagogues launched scathing attacks upon anything and everything which stood in opposition to Catholic Monarchist Supremacy, a far more cultured, respectable and insidious branch of the right under Arthuys made the argument for why the restoration of the Monarchy would resolve all of French society's ills. Paul Claudel, the well-known poet and dramatist, would present an appealing image of devout Catholicism through his works which received significant sponsorship from both the Church and Arthuys while the writers of the Jeune Droite, who had largely become enamored with Arthuys, presented article after article strengthening the Arthuysian ideology which was being formed during these years. Marrying populist elements of land reforms, social reforms and collective ownership with a firmly hierarchical, devoutly Catholic and monarchist framework which retained a veneer of democracy, Arthuys formed one of the more appealing visions of monarchism to emerge in France. Notably he distanced himself from Maurras' public support of a violent overthrow of government and sought to moderate the movement's more overtly destructive tendencies. In effect, Arthuys was responsible for mainstreaming the Union de la Droite more than any other, successfully integrating a number of disparate right-wing parties and draining support away from Republican right wing, such that by the time of Barthou's appointment the UD had emerged as the single largest force on the right, dwarfing all contenders (8).

Given the overweening power of the German military-industrial complex, military and defense policy were of absolute critical importance to French politics. During the 1920s this had resulted in the well-known if controversial, for his role near the end of the Great War, Marshal Phillippe Pétain in the formulation of military policy. A strong proponent of a strong military in the aftermath of the Great War, Pétain envisioned a large armored land force and an expansive air force capable of going toe-to-toe with the rapidly developing German military, but given the economic exigencies of the period most of these plans were placed on the back burner, with only a piecemeal adoption of various defense plans proposed by a variety of prominent French marshals and generals securing approval. Much effort during this period would go into the incorporation of Wallonia into French military plans and the rebuilding of the border defenses with Germany and particularly Italy, where the threat of Communist spill-over across the border led to what at times seemed like an over-investment in the region. During the 1920s Pétain maintained a decent working relationship with the government, at varying times serving as Minister of War, Head of the Supreme Council on National Defense and in his last appointment before retirement was able to secure his appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the French Air Force which he had been amongst the most ardent supporters of in prior years. Under Pétain's guidance, the French Air Force was to develop into a robust and well-managed wing of the military specializing in aerial defense - particularly fighter aircrafts, scouting and ground combat. Pétain's retirement was to coincide almost perfectly with the start of military troubles for the French. In a move aimed to allow for an inflated armored force, the French military procurement offices had decided to build their new forces with cheap, poor-quality steel which was to prove insufficient to the task first in the Georgian Campaign and, more worryingly for the French, in the struggle to suppress the Indochinese Revolt. The incoming left-wing government under Édouard Herriot was to lead a shift in funding for the military, with a significant reduction in particularly colonial forces undertaken to help finance some of the various state programs being undertaken by the left-wing government. That government's collapse in response to the Indochinese Revolt and the rotating carousel of governments which followed were to throw the French military into disarray as they struggled to find any sort of partner to cooperate with. Ultimately it would be the re-appointment of Philippe Pétain as Minister of War which helped bring a level of stability to the matter, serving in the post in successive governments uninterrupted from 1934-1937 on the basis of his strong bipartisan reputation and clear unwillingness to involve himself in non-military issues. Most significantly, his reputation as neither an extreme Catholic or Monarchist, as contrasted with many of his peers, made him a safe bet for all Republican factions to support in the office. During this period Pétain was able to initiate a significant reorganization of the military's resources, reintroduce large-scale military training maneuvers, expanded the military's training period and recruited large numbers of specialists and non-commissioned officers in a bid to re-introduce a level of professionalism to the force following its weakening in the early years of the decade. With Marie-Eugène Debeney as Chief of the General Staff during the 1920s, Pétain had been able to maintain tight control over the military even when not a part of it - Debeney having been one of Pétain's closest friends and allies in the army, but in the early 1930s Debeney had been replaced first by the long-time colonial administrator and Marshal Louis Hubert Lyautey, who was in turn replaced by the incredibly talented Marshal Louis Franchet d'Espèrey in 1934. Pétain's greatest rival after Foch's departure from the military and an ardent ultra-royalist with strong ties to the Arthuysian movement within the Union de la Droite in the form of his Chief-of-Staff Francois de la Rocque, Pétain and d'Espèrey would prove desperately combative towards each other, with a resultant formation of factions within the Military. It is worth noting at this point the role d'Espèrey had adopted in the years since the Great War, serving on positions of importance primarily in France proper with stints as commander of the forces on the Italian Border, as Chief of the General Staff and as Vice President of the Superior War Council - in effect the two single-most important positions in the Army. In this time he had emerged as the leading light of the conservative wing of the military, as contrasted with the bi-partisan, non-political Pétain, and maintained close contacts with the august Marshal Foch even after the latter's departure from the army. While Pétain and d'Espèrey's relationship would deteriorate to the point of barely being able to make it through a meeting without one or the other storming out, the pair would prove crucial to further strengthening French military power, working to maintain France's grip on Indochina and greatly improving not only the training and planning capabilities of the military but also significantly improving the quality of equipment and vehicles available to the Army (9).

An important underlying current to all of these developments was the bitter and bloody Indochinese Revolt which was waged throughout the 1930s as the constant swings of fortune in the conflict had dire repercussions at home. The escalation of the conflict following the initial unrest and the Tonkin Rising and the concerted efforts to suppress the uprising over the following couple years, culminating in the reconquest of Tonkin, had greatly escalated the immense resources needed to fight the conflict and increasingly turned the conflict from an ordinary colonial conflict into the gravest challenge to French authority since the Great War. While the initial year or so of conflict had seen soldiers on the ground primarily from the French Foreign Legion and various colonial auxiliaries, as the scale of the war grew the French state found it necessary to call upon the French Army itself, setting the stage for what would prove to be an ever more costly debt paid in French blood. With the appointment of Charles Huntziger and the subsequent successes in reclaiming Hanoi and large sections of Tonkin, the mood in France improved greatly as the prospect of bringing to an end a costly and long-lasting conflict rose to the fore. It would be a failure to capitalize on the ending of the First Conventional Phase of the Revolt which was to once more send French politics into chaos. While the Two Rivers Crisis resulted in important governmental shifts, it was to be the subsequent fighting in Indochina which would end more than a dozen different French governments. With every failure a scapegoat would need sacrificing, with the result that before long it was Huntizger's head on the chopping block. However, Huntziger's removal was to be but the first in a rotating carousel of French generals to ruin their reputations in Indochina. As the scale of the fighting exploded in scale once more with the arrival of Chinese Communists from across the border, the drain on French manpower grew increasingly worrying. While the French were able to make-do with auxiliaries and professional soldiers, a point eventually came when talk of whether to call upon French conscript forces to aid in the fighting rose to the fore. A bitterly contested topic, discussion of the issue would consume much of the political debate during 1935 and early 1936 until the rise of the Barthou Government saw a decisive abandonment of any talk of conscripts fighting in the Vietnamese jungles. However, while the outbreak of the Japanese Civil War in March of 1936 was viewed with worry and concern, it would take until the October Revolution for the shifting fortunes of war in Japan to impact the conflict in Indochina. The entry of the Chinese Communists into the Indochinese conflict had brought with it a significant strengthening of Communist forces within the rebel movement, and the rise of the People's Shogunate suddenly established a foreign force with significant reasons to get involved in the conflict on the side of the rebels. For the first time since the start of the Revolt, the rebels had the prospect of true foreign backing and support. The Fall of Japan was to send shockwaves through French society, greatly energizing both the far-left and far-right. Street gangs and ligues once more took to the streets, protests erupted across much of France both for and against the course of the Indochinese conflict while questions of whether it was even worth holding on to emerged into the public discourse. The Barthou Government was to react with considerable alacrity, publicly backing the Loyalist faction in the Japanese Civil War and urging on the British entry into the conflict with great vigor. A renewed surge in French troops in Indochina was undertaken, this time including French conscript forces, coinciding with the spread of rebellious sentiment outside of Vietnam proper, into the Laotian population in particular, with the conflict once more escalating to a peak in violence. The government turned to the Navy for support, which had largely been left gravely underfunded in favor of funding the Army and Airforce - both of which were viewed as being of significantly greater importance in any conflict with Germany, promising greatly increased naval investments and the preparation of naval forces to help protect French interests in Indochina. However, before this force could be dispatched, news of the Battle of the East China Sea became public knowledge sending the public into a hysterical anti-Communist swing. The naval taskforce was dispatched under the assumption that Indochina would be the next focus of expansion for the Communist hordes while debate over whether the government was prosecuting the war properly or not once more rose to the forefront (10).

It was under these circumstances that the all-important 1937 Presidential and Legislative Elections neared. The five years since the last elections had been amongst the most chaotic in recent memory, with stability only secured early in the previous year. As the elections neared, the political field began to become clear. On the right and far-right sat the large and powerful Union de la Droite, firmly Monarchist, Catholic and Integralist in outlook. In the center lay an array of political affiliates of both center-right and center-left orientation and firmly Republican beliefs spearheaded by the sitting President Doumergue and his partner in government Louis Barthou - even if faced with prominent rivals to leadership in the forms of Camille Chautemps, André Tardieu and Édouard Daladier. Finally, the left was large but disorganized, many supporting center-left figures like Daladier, Chautemps and Léon Blum, but even more adhering to the aims of the radicals surrounding Albert Treint. As the election season came under way, the greatly strained political situation only grew more combative as Arthuys convincingly argued that the Third Republic was failing and that the establishment of a Constitutional Convention to address the situation was the only possible solution to the problems facing France. He condemned the weakness, partisanship and instability of the Republic, painting a picture of unity, strength and morality under a restored Monarchy, only to be met by bitter rebukes from the left and center. The political debate would rise drastically in tension in the months prior to the election. It was at the height of these tensions that a little remarked upon case in the judiciary suddenly rose to the fore. Serge Alexandre Stavisky was a Russian-born Jew who had grown up in France, making a living as a café singer, nightclub manager, a soup factory worker and the operator of a gambling den before he secured the management rights to municipal pawn shops in Bayonne in the early 1930s. During this time he had made inroads into French financial circles, getting involved in ever more egregious cases of fraud while repeatedly paying off newspapers, lawyers, politicians and many others for protection. At one point Stavisky even succeeded in getting several large and influential life-insurance companies to buy up millions of francs worth of false bonds by using his political connections as surety. In late 1936 his luck finally gave out and he was placed under arrest by Paris Police when he tried to sell junk bonds to an important Parisian pension fund. From there the investigation undertaken by the Paris Police Force under the direction of the notoriously right-wing Prefect of the Paris Police, Jean Chiappe, was to gradually reveal an ever more astonishing web of corruption and criminality extending all the way into the heart of Louis Barthou's government - most significantly in the form of Interior Minister Camille Chautemps, himself one of the most prominent Republican politicians of the day. As the Parisian newspapers grew ever more fixated with the case and Stavisky's life of crime was gradually exposed, it soon became clear that the Barthou and Doumergue Government had been struck a devastating blow. Anti-Semitism, Stavisky's ties to the political establishment, the sheer scale of his crimes and the heated political environment all combined to greatly enflame the political situation as protests erupted across much of France under the direction of right-wing ligues. Arthuys would pounce upon the opportunity granted to him, using the Stavisky Affair as yet more proof of the corruption endemic to the Third Republic and pressed home the need for change. With himself slated to serve as President of the Council, Arthuys turned to Count Bernard de Vésins as his running-mate to serve as President of France. A man of right-wing, catholic and monarchist beliefs de Vésins was famous for his great personal integrity, upright personality, noble bearing and considerable courage - having been rewarded with the Legion of Honour and Croix de Guerre 1914-1919 with palm and star for his service during the Great War. Presenting a convincing counterpoint to the scandal struck Centrist government, de Vésins made for a likable and trustworthy candidate despite the leeriness of many towards the monarchist movement as a whole. As such, when the elections occurred on the 8th of April 1937, the Union de la Droite was able to secure their greatest results ever, securing nearly 200 seats in the legislature along with some 130 seats for their various allied parties, with the centrist parties experiencing a precipitous collapse of support while the Left and Far-Left was left splintered by their internal divisions, losing a significant degree of support. Vésins would win the Presidential elections with relative ease while Jacques Arthuys rose as President of the Council (11).

With the government now in hand, it did not take long before the new government put on pressure for a National Assembly to debate a new constitution. Under ever growing pressure, and dogged by the continued persecution of the Stavisky Affair, the republicans floundered in their attempts to hold the line, ultimately resulting in the calling of a National Assembly of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies on the 18th of October 1937. From the beginning, the proposed constitution was under the control of the new government, who aimed to undertake a complete reshaping of French Society by proposing the restoration of the Monarchy and the overturning of the Third Republic. The new constitution called for the ascension of Jean d'Orléans, Duc de Guise, as King of France, replaced the President of the Council with the post of Prime Minister, to lead the government at the discretion of the monarchy and the acceptance of the legislature - which was reduced to a single chamber with significantly raised barriers of entry to parties in the Chamber - now requiring a full 5% of votes to be eligible for entry. It entrenched Social Welfare, Social Unity, Monarchism and Catholicism as pillars of the state and set the term of office at four years while greatly strengthening the position of what would become the Premiership in an effort to tackle the weak central authority established in the constitution of the Third Republic. By most measures, the Constitution retained the democratic principles which had come to define French society during the past century and a half, drawing heavily on inspiration from the workings of the Boulangists of the late 19th century. It placed greater strictures on the processes of government and sought to greatly strengthen the state while weakening the actual power of the legislature by greatly expanding the powers of the executive branch of government considerably. A number of other measures were further included, primarily borrowing heavily from corporatist and integralist ideologies, which sought to create cooperation between industries and corporations according to their branches of activity, introduced a minimum wage and paid holidays while upholding women's right to vote - believing them to be a potential key constituency of the Arthuysian movement given that they were perceived to be more conservative and catholic in outlook than many of their male counterparts. All in all, the Arthuysian Constitution which emerged melded together a great number of different ideas from across the political spectrum - the social welfare of the left, the unifying force of Catholicism, the democratic veneer of Constitutionalism and the strong executive power of Integralism. The new constitution was to be signed into law on the 21st of November 1937, with the prospective king arriving in Paris on the 30th. The events which were to follow would draw the entire attentions of the world, with Paris swarmed by an ever growing cavalcade of reporters from around the globe all searching for the latest bit of news to share with their readers about the course of events in France. While in conservative circles the ascension of the new monarch was greeted with great acclaim, with particularly the countries of the Latin Bloc holding public celebrations of the affair, it was greeted with considerable worry by figures in both Germany and Britain, who expressed their concerns about what an ascendent and combative far-right government in France would mean for national and international security. Nobility and royalty from across Europe streamed to attend the events, with Crown Prince Wilhelm and his sons Wilhelm and Louis Ferdinand representing the German Hohenzollerns while the young and dashing King Edward VIII of Britain made a sensation out of his participation, drawing an astonishing train of reporters eager to inform their readers of the King's every move. While the Pope refrained from attending the affair, he dispatched his close advisor and successor as the Archbishop of Toledo, Enrique Plá y Deniel, to represent him instead. For the coronation itself, it was decided to hold the event in the Cathedral of Reims, the traditional crowning site of countless French Kings, and was undertaken by the conservative Archbishop of Reims Louis-Augustin Marmottin in a grand ceremony which was recorded and televised across much of Europe, with rolls of the event finding their way to theaters around the world. A spectacular show put on to demonstrate the renewed vitality of the French state, Arthuys and his companions spared no expense in making the affair amongst the most decadently expensive and awe-inducing in modern memory, stunning observers and convincing many into a belief in the message Arthuys wanted spread - namely that a new day was dawning for France and that nothing would be the same against. The extended ceremony begun on the 31st of December with a ceremonial funeral for the Third Republic and lasting until the 9th of January 1938, as the Orléans Monarchy was restored to power and Jacques Arthuys swiftly elevated to the post of Prime Minister soon thereafter. The January Monarchy had begun (12).

Footnotes:
(7) There are a couple key things to take out of this section. First of all the protestant Doumergue has been able to significantly strengthen his position playing an ambiguous role of both stabilizer and destabilizer while empowering himself throughout. The French left's leadership finds itself challenged by young and radical leaders who are increasingly fed up with the status quo and view their leaders' methods as a failure. I should note the bit about plucking socialist poultry is from one of Treint's OTL quotes. Finally, we have the big one - Arthuys' rise to prominence on the Right. I know that he seems to come out of left-field with little in the way of buildup, but he is one of the figures who has been involved with the right-wing ligues throughout this period and who has steadily been amassing power before just exploding out of seeming nowhere. There are plenty of examples of figures like this out there, so I don't think it is particularly out there for a clever and capable wealthy right-winger to use the opportunity to rise to the top on the backs of Maurras and Pujo's hard work.

(8) French society is very much in flux during this time and notably is not quite the cultural powerhouse of the past, instead finding itself influenced from foreign lands instead - most prominently with the off-branch of the Harlem Renaissance, Integralist elements out of Spain and Proletkult out of Germany. Literary dialogue is strongly influenced by ideology and disagreements are common and explosive. While the veterans organizations succeeded in distancing themselves from the political struggles, Arthuys is able to largely coopt them in his mission to mainstream the monarchy. In general, Jacques Arthuys should be seen as a deeply calculative figure who knows how to play people off each other to make the most gain for himself and his movement. He is slick and charismatic, which puts him in good standing whether he is dealing with ardent right-wing Republicans or hard-core Monarchists.

(9) IOTL the Interwar Period for France was basically one long series of budget cuts which ended up fundamentally undermining the military capabilities of the French Army. ITTL things play out a bit differently. While there is a similar need for reduced military investments early in the 1920s, over the course of the decade Pétain in particular is able to secure improved financial resources from the Briand government and, perhaps most significantly, is able to secure the formation of an independent Air Force - a move championed by Pétain IOTL but which failed. Here he has much closer connections to the government and is the foremost figure in the army bar none, Foch having been ejected and Joffre well on his way out while d'Espèrey is only just beginning his rise to prominence during these years. The left-wing government of Hérriot makes budget cuts to the military, but it nothing on the scale of OTL, and when Pétain is able to secure his appointment in 1934 he is able to repair much of the damage. In general while the French army is smaller than the German one, it remains one of the premier military forces in the world as a result of these shifts. However, we see the way in which politics are also spilling over into the military with the rivalry between the two great military leaders.

(10) As in the past the focus here is not really on the conflict in Indochina itself, but rather the way in which the conflict shapes French politics, military and society - Indochina will be dealt with in more detail independently. In this case we see the ever growing French investment into the conflict and the growing disenchantment with the way the conflict is being handled. While the war swings back and forth multiple times, causing repeated changes in government as successive Presidents of the Council are forced to take responsibility, the Japanese Civil War really sends things firmly off the rails. With the October Revolution and the rise of the People's Shogunate, the situation shifts firmly against the French for the first time, raising the specter of Japanese intervention in the conflict.

(11) The Stavisky Affair plays out a bit differently IOTL, but a lot of the stuff he gets involved in here is firmly OTL. I know it is a bit screwy the way I have it playing out, but considering the butterflies I don't think it is out of the realm of possibility that Stavisky would be able to keep his fraud going for a while longer (IOTL his actions drew note in 1934). Notably, instead of him committing suicide while on the run as happened IOTL, ITTL he is caught and swiftly begins to squeal about all of his government contacts in an attempt to lessen his sentence - well remembering what happened during the Dreyfus Affair. A couple lucky breaks coupled with political acumen and a surging tide of support allow Arthuys and the UD to sweep into power with significant good will at their back.

(12) I know the constitutional change happens swiftly here and surprisingly painlessly, but the 1937 elections largely come to be seen as a referendum on the issue itself, and the monarchists are able to use that to their advantage, using the momentum behind them to secure the situation in their favor. The constitution which results is surprisingly democratic all things considered, but it is worth remembering that once you are in power it is often quite easy to twist things in your favor. Importantly, while the French monarchy is restored, the real power ends up going to the executive branch under the Prime Minister. In this new system of government it is the Prime Minister who is the most powerful figure and as long as he can maintain his support in the legislature, he is the key figure in power. The monarchy is not completely toothless like in Great Britain, but it is very limited in what real power it possesses. In this section we also really start to see the divergences in ecclesiastical appointments which have resulted from the much more conservative and integralist outlook within the Papal Catholic Church, with Enrique Plá y Deniel and Louis-Augustin Marmottin rising to positions of significant power within their respective churches - securing their seats earlier than IOTL. Enrique Plá y Deniel was acknowledged as the most arch-reactionary of the conservative bishops of Spain during the Civil War - which is saying something - and was a close associate of Isidro Gomá y Tomás IOTL - TTL's Pope Pius XI. Marmottin has been a stalwart of the far-right in the French Church ITTL and as such receives the backing of Pope Pius XI when the time to make an appointment to Archbishop of Reims comes around. Worth noting that IOTL Marmottin was almost removed from his posting during the French Liberation for his political affiliations and actions during the Second World War.

End Note:
And with that we start to get a glimpse of the emerging international pattern which will set in with the rise of the People's Shogunate. I really hope that everyone finds Arthuys an interesting figure to have rise to power, and that the new French Monarchy lives up to people's expectations. This was one of those ideas I had rather early on, wanting to explore the idea of a restored French monarchy in the 1900s, but it proved surprisingly challenging to work out. If you go back, you will be able to see that I have been laying the ground work for this for quite some time. I did consider various other outcomes, from a restored Republic to a Leftist surge to the front or an actual civil war, but I personally think this is the best way forward. With the addition of France to the already rapidly expanding list of Integralist states, we finally start to reach a point where the Latin Pact and its affiliates can serve as a proper international power bloc.
 
With France being more anti-German it will force Germany to look for allies? Maybe more focus on lessening tension with Russia? Maybe even dealing with Japan to create more troubles for France in their colonies?

Is Sidney relly a British agent in this timeline or something else?
 
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With France being more anti-German it will force Germany to look for allies? Maybe more focus on lessening tension with Russia? Maybe even dealing with Japan to create more troubles for France in their colonies?

Is Sidney relly a British agent in this timeline or something else?
The Germans are going to be rather interested in building friendships, but there are a variety of constraints upon them in the endeavour - namely that they are still viewed as a rather significant threat to the European order by those who sourly remember the Great War. Even so, the Germans still have a rather significant network of allies and vassals stretching across the entire European continent and well into the Middle East. Remember that they are still allied with Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire, as well as vast powers Zollverein, so it is not like they are completely without friends. As for Russia, there are plenty of people who would love to lessen tensions, but there is the question of whether you can actually trust the Soviet regime. There are considerable fears about Communist expansion, quite poignantly realised with the expansion created by the Shogunate, which will need to be addressed. We will be covering Germany in the next update which should hopefully answer some of these questions in greater detail though.

I think there is one thing that needs to be made clear - France is not mindlessly Jingoistic or Revanchist under the Arthuysian regime. They are not OTL Nazis who built their entire regime on the conquest of Europe. The main goal of the Arthuysian government is to rebuild France into a powerful and united state capable of returning to its past as a premier global power. Another thing to remember is that there are far more things in common between France and Germany than between Germany and the Shogunate. Germany possesses a large and profitable colonial empire, so there is almost no way that they would go out and actively support the anti-colonial movement which the Shogunate very much champions. It would take truly dire circumstances for anything like that to even come into consideration.

As for Sidney Reilly, he is part of British Intelligence and was present in Russian during the Civil War. However, given the changes to the international circumstances of TTL from OTL, he wasn't anywhere close to as involved in trying to topple the regime. Instead he spent some time in Ireland helping to suppress the Irish Revolt before travelling to the United States and to India on various occasions. He spent time in Istanbul during the leadup to the Two Rivers Crisis as well, but since then has largely spent his time in Britain. While still a rather ardent anti-Communist, he isn't anywhere close to as involved in the fight against the Soviets ITTL (again, caused by the vastly different international circumstances). Finally, he has spent a good deal of time in Germany as well, spying on them while getting involved in the large cross Zollverein trade network, where he has amassed a nice little fortune.
 
I am waiting for communist influence in India and the butterfly effects.

Will France try to impose Catholicism in their colonies due to a new regime change?

Is the ghadar party still exist or they shifted from America? In canon timeline, the Indian immigrant community outside India greatly assisted in the revolutionary movement particularly the student community. Is it the same here?

I am hoping the British will gun down Gandhi. His utopian mindset is not useful right now. Better he serves as a martyr for the people.

Is there any attempt are made to include dalits in the united party?

How much of the racial theory valid here? Aka Aryan theory in Asia and Europe?
 
I am waiting for communist influence in India and the butterfly effects.

Will France try to impose Catholicism in their colonies due to a new regime change?

Is the ghadar party still exist or they shifted from America? In canon timeline, the Indian immigrant community outside India greatly assisted in the revolutionary movement particularly the student community. Is it the same here?

I am hoping the British will gun down Gandhi. His utopian mindset is not useful right now. Better he serves as a martyr for the people.

Is there any attempt are made to include dalits in the united party?

How much of the racial theory valid here? Aka Aryan theory in Asia and Europe?
India should be coming up in Update 39, we need to get through the second half of 37 about Europe and 38 about the Americas first.

The spread of Catholicism in the colonies was a foundational reason behind the establishment of the French Colonial Empire - and remained a key focus up into the 1900s, so I am not sure how this would be a change. We are going to see a resurgence in proselytisation and a continued emphasis on the assimilation of the native populace to French culture.

I don't think the Ghader Party will be a major influence, but they are present and a part of the independence effort. I would expect the international independence movement to be somewhat more fractured than IOTL though.

Uhh, honestly that is pretty out of line, particularly considering Gandhi was murdered IOTL - just in poor taste the way you framed your statement. That being said, the British are probably going to keep him locked up for the time being - no reason to kill him for precisely the reason you gave. They do not want to make him into a martyr, any more than his continued imprisonment has.

I don't think we see quite the same concerted effort to involve the Dalits as occurred IOTL, primarily given the rather crucial role Gandhi played in giving them a platform and voice in the independence movement. I would expect the circumstances for the Dalit to be worse ITTL inside the independence movement, but not to a massive extent.

There are definitely adherents to some of those theories, but they haven't quite caught on in the political sphere to the extent they did IOTL. There are elements of it in the German Freedom Party and the DNVP, but they aren't all that influential. As for elsewhere, I think that the Hindu nationalist wing of the Independence movement might subscribe to some of this. However, just in general we haven't seen those sorts of theories catch on to the extent they did IOTL.
 
I’m not surprised at the end of the Third Republic, though I was expecting that it would only happen after France loses in Indochina (and that the transition would be a bit more messier). Now the newly established monarchy has inherited the war in Indochina, but since a defeat there would a huge blow so early in its life, I assume France will manage to defeat the rebels. Since Chinese insurgents are a big contributing factor in this whole thing, I could see France asking the Chinese government for military support, since I doubt China would be happy with a communist country right next door that could serve as a potential base of operations for Chinese rebels for years to come.

Anyway, with the restoration of the monarchy (and the end of the liberal constitutional order) in France, that means Britain and the US are now the only remaining ‘liberal democracies’ among the great powers (and the US is now the only remaining liberal republic of any importance). While Germany has liberalized in some ways ITTL, it has traditionally always defined itself in opposition to western (especially Anglo-) liberalism, and lacks the missionary zeal to spread liberal ideals across the world that Britain, France and the US have shown throughout the last 200 years. In fact, France, Britain and the US have traditionally been regarded as a kind of ‘trinity’ of liberalism, the leaders of the ‘free world’ so to speak (though France has always been the least stable of the three), so it’s interesting to see how things develop with France going a different path.

I think in many ways liberalism ITTL is undergoing an even bigger crisis than it did IOTL during this period, since ITTL the distinction between liberalism and illiberalism isn’t quite as stark as it was IOTL. The difference between countries like Germany, Britain and France (and even Russia) ITTL seems to be a difference in degree, not a difference in kind, as it was the case IOTL, where there was a clear contrast between western democracies and central and eastern European totalitarian states. This lack of contrast makes it harder for liberal societies to identify or define a clear enemy to unite against. It also lowers the ideological barriers for liberal countries to implement illiberal policies.
 
Do you think it is possible for Dalits influenced by communism? Bose and Nehru and Jinnah not supporters of the caste system. Is it not possible for them to include Dalits in the united party? They are radicals, most conservatives after all outside the united party? Ambedkar getting invited to the united party quite possible.
 
I find it hightly doubtful France restore the monarchy. It was a dead issue and even the separation of church and state was highly supported OTL. And well, i also doubt that Arthuys would manage to get a majority in the assembly. Pretty much all political parties where against the Monarchy (or just find it a dead issue) to the point that De La Rocque OTL knew that calling for a monarchy would mean the death knell of his party.

It's also extremely cliché to have a French Monarchy post-WWI and tbh i don't think you justified it enough. The monarchy was death for decades by that point
 
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I’m not surprised at the end of the Third Republic, though I was expecting that it would only happen after France loses in Indochina (and that the transition would be a bit more messier). Now the newly established monarchy has inherited the war in Indochina, but since a defeat there would a huge blow so early in its life, I assume France will manage to defeat the rebels. Since Chinese insurgents are a big contributing factor in this whole thing, I could see France asking the Chinese government for military support, since I doubt China would be happy with a communist country right next door that could serve as a potential base of operations for Chinese rebels for years to come.

Anyway, with the restoration of the monarchy (and the end of the liberal constitutional order) in France, that means Britain and the US are now the only remaining ‘liberal democracies’ among the great powers (and the US is now the only remaining liberal republic of any importance). While Germany has liberalized in some ways ITTL, it has traditionally always defined itself in opposition to western (especially Anglo-) liberalism, and lacks the missionary zeal to spread liberal ideals across the world that Britain, France and the US have shown throughout the last 200 years. In fact, France, Britain and the US have traditionally been regarded as a kind of ‘trinity’ of liberalism, the leaders of the ‘free world’ so to speak (though France has always been the least stable of the three), so it’s interesting to see how things develop with France going a different path.

I think in many ways liberalism ITTL is undergoing an even bigger crisis than it did IOTL during this period, since ITTL the distinction between liberalism and illiberalism isn’t quite as stark as it was IOTL. The difference between countries like Germany, Britain and France (and even Russia) ITTL seems to be a difference in degree, not a difference in kind, as it was the case IOTL, where there was a clear contrast between western democracies and central and eastern European totalitarian states. This lack of contrast makes it harder for liberal societies to identify or define a clear enemy to unite against. It also lowers the ideological barriers for liberal countries to implement illiberal policies.

It is precisely the fact that the transition occurs when it could prove most messy that appealed to me. Now we will see how the new French government try to address the challenges of Indochina. I do find it interesting that you state that a defeat would be so massive of a blow that the French will be forced to defeat the rebels. While I am in complete agreement that the new government will need to win the war in Indochina if they want to maintain their popularity (or at least find a graceful way to step out of it), there is very little certainty about their eventual victory or defeat. All of that is before we take into consideration that this is the conflict most likely to evolve into a much larger crisis as the Japanese, Chinese and various Western powers start to make their moves in that regard.

That is a fascinating angle to consider, and not really one which had occurred to me before you mentioned it, however you are very much correct in that the circumstances and development of Liberalism as an ideology have been changed considerably. You are definitely correct in your statement that liberalism isn't anywhere close to as starkly defined as IOTL - I think that both France and Germany will be considered semi-Liberal ITTL, at least for the time being. While they are monarchies with active and moderately influential monarchies, they are far from absolutist, with the majority of power seated in an at least theoretically democratically elected leader. In fact, I think we are going to see a divide between "Anglo-Liberalism" and Continental "Liberalism", sort of covering France, Germany and much of the Zollverein. I don't think we see the stark divide between eastern/western Europe either - it is more of a gradient if that makes sense, with France at one end and the Don at the other, spanning the continent (and excluding the Soviets).

Anyway, I really enjoyed this comment and the thoughts it provoked! :)

Do you think it is possible for Dalits influenced by communism? Bose and Nehru and Jinnah not supporters of the caste system. Is it not possible for them to include Dalits in the united party? They are radicals, most conservatives after all outside the united party? Ambedkar getting invited to the united party quite possible.

The Dalits are one of the populations most primed to accept Communism in India, so I expect they could end up playing a considerable role. I am not saying that Dalits aren't a part of the United Party, but rather that they don't feature anywhere close to as prominently. While the Parties are for the most part ostensibly anti-Caste System, it is one of the issues which has been sidelined due to its controversy (alongside the various other ideological, ethnic, social and economic issues which divide the party). You should think of the United Swaraj Party as less of a unified organization and more as a broad umbrella which brings together everyone in favor of complete independence from the British.

I find it hightly doubtful France restore the monarchy. It was a dead issue and even the separation of church and state was highly supported OTL. And well, i also doubt that Arthuys would manage to get a majority in the assembly. Pretty much all political parties where against the Monarchy (or just find it a dead issue) to the point that De La Rocque OTL knew that calling for a monarchy would mean the death knell of his party.

It's also extremely cliché to have a French Monarchy post-WWI and tbh i don't think you justified it enough. The monarchy was death for decades by that point

The French Third Republic of TTL has gone through a series of highly divisive and controversial crises since the end of the Great War, to the point that trust in the Republic as a system has been gravely wounded. Just consider the end of the Great War ITTL, when order nearly collapsed entirely and repeated murderous purges of various factions played out in Paris, or the fact that people for the most part view the Great War as a colossal failure, and a costly calamity which left the country far worse off than it was previously. It has had nigh-on twenty years of ongoing street fights and riots breaking out on a regular basis. This is not the France of OTL post-Great War - it is another beast entirely. The far-right grew piecemeal throughout the 1920s, drawing in a variety of groups which eventually began to consolidate, before entering the mainstream and starting to gradually coopt the rest of the political right-wing. It is at this point that the particularities of the internal factions of the far-right come into play, alongside the far greater international status of monarchical states ITTL. Remember, this is not OTL where the last monarchies of any real stature were stamped into the ground, their way of government disproved and their method of state tossed on the rubbish pile. Germany, a powerful monarchy which seems to have recovered far swifter than France, stands as one of, if not the, strongest states in the world. In Spain, a new monarchical state seems to have rejuvenated a state which everyone had written off, to say nothing of the major gains made by monarchical states in Eastern Europe or Asia. Monarchism is not viewed as an old, failed, model of government in this world, but rather as a mechanism which can introduce a considerable amount of stability into the state - something France needs more than anything at this point in time. France ITTL has had a gradually rotting Republican edifice which has grown ever more unpopular as time has passed.

The end result is that the one thing everyone can agree upon by the late 1930s is that the Third Republic model is not working. There are some who continue to back the Republican model (even those who speak in favor of the Third Republic), but the vast majority of these figures have just been implicated in a truly massive corruption scandal which is exposing the fundamental inequities and corruption which has come to engulf the political establishment. You can look at what that did to the Italian political establishment when the Tangetopoli Scandals tore through their political establishment. The Republican center is in utter crisis, and there are few who are willing to vote for them. Then you are left with the far-left and far-right. On one hand you have the Communists and Socialists, who are literally at each others' throats, and some of who continue to actively call for the overturning of the state in favor of the establishment of a Workers' Republic, with the Red Terror that implies. I haven't really gotten into it yet, but the Japanese Red Terror is going on as these events are happening in France, and the Japanese Red Terror is going to scare the shit out of just about everyone because it is the first time we really see the sort of OTL Terror play out. ITTL The Russian Red Terror was sort of swallowed up by the horrors of the Civil War and as such didn't leave as major of a mark, but the Japanese Terror is going to be playing out in all the international media, heightening fears about what a Communist takeover might mean. All that leaves is the far-left which has been swallowed wholesale by the Union de la Droite and Jacques Arthuys. While the Arthuysians are explicitly monarchist, you should look at them as more of a latter-day Boulangist movement than outright Absolutist Monarchists. The Prime Minister is the most powerful figure in the new Arthuysian state, not the Monarch, and that is how it is understood by everyone involved.

A French Monarchy post-WW1 might be a trope - but there is a reason tropes become tropes, they are usually fascinating ideas. What I try to do is approach those tropes with my own unique flair in hopes of breathing some new life into them and taking them in unexpected directions.

Finally, I just want to state that while the actual transition of power and establishment of a monarchy occurs without too much difficulty, this is more because of how swiftly all of this is accomplished (there is something like three months between the idea of a constitutional rearrangement being raised and the Monarchy being restored) than its popularity. The French left is very much an active force, and likely to present a considerable challenge to the new government, while the Republicans are likely to spend some time trying to recover and consolidate before they return to being an active political force.

I hope that I have made my case convincingly enough. Do let me know if there is anything specific you want me to get into or disagree with.
 
I think it's impossible the way you see it. The left (and the center and even potion of the right) has centered their ideas of being against the monarchy, there has been decades of cultural education about the Revolution, the republic and so on. You would need an harsh peace (unlike the negociated peace of this alt WW1), an economical collapse (which didn't happened unlike OTL) and a political collapse (which mostly seem like a slighly worse IIIth republic and similar to OTL 4th republic) and even then if the Union de la Droite is trying to implement a monarchy (without a direct majority as it seem it did), there would certainly be a civil war. The monarchy was, by that point, widely disliked, seen as "ancient" and demonized by the years and years of the republic.

I get what you're trying to do but from what you wrote, Arthuys doesn't have any strong majority, marely a coalition. When he call for basically overthrowing every big success of the left, and the right republican, he should lose his coalition. Because i believe he need others party to rule right ? And the return to Catholiscm would also be another reason for a massive leftist opposition as it was their big success and something that ultimately was widely supported (since everyone remembered the Dreyfus affair). And you're calling them Boulangist, well even more reason for the left (and the republican right and center !) to oppose Arthuys !

And if a monarchist france is a trope on this forum, is because people like the Monarchism system, want to show that france has fallen to the opposite spectrum/on it's way to form a dictatorship... not because it's "interesting". I thought you wouldn't fall into this tropes because up until the, your TL has proven interesting enough and original enough in it's way to write a CP victory that isn't complete and still has France and GB still kicking around without falling into a dictatorship/communism/fascism or in the France without proclaimaing another monarchy/empire...

I think, had you talked more about Arthurys and how the new monarchist movement happened (which is something you generaly do amazingly well talking about how things happened in your TL), it would have been more clear to me and i would have "accepted it" better ^^
 
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I'm pretty surprised that you pulled the trigger on a Restoration. For sure though I knew France was gonna go through some serious shit after this alt-Great War. But I've always been a fan of the Capets and am glad to see them back lol.
 
Is there any Indian party that exists in Burma? Or united party have any influence there? I am asking because Burmese Indians particularly wealthy greatly assisted Netaji during the creation of Azad hind both in monetary and manpower issues. Not just Burma but the whole Southeast Asian Indian community. So is there a party or organization that represents them or united party have any connections with them?
 
I think it's impossible the way you see it. The left (and the center and even potion of the right) has centered their ideas of being against the monarchy, there has been decades of cultural education about the Revolution, the republic and so on. You would need an harsh peace (unlike the negociated peace of this alt WW1), an economical collapse (which didn't happened unlike OTL) and a political collapse (which mostly seem like a slighly worse IIIth republic and similar to OTL 4th republic) and even then if the Union de la Droite is trying to implement a monarchy (without a direct majority as it seem it did), there would certainly be a civil war. The monarchy was, by that point, widely disliked, seen as "ancient" and demonized by the years and years of the republic.

I get what you're trying to do but from what you wrote, Arthuys doesn't have any strong majority, marely a coalition. When he call for basically overthrowing every big success of the left, and the right republican, he should lose his coalition. Because i believe he need others party to rule right ? And the return to Catholiscm would also be another reason for a massive leftist opposition as it was their big success and something that ultimately was widely supported (since everyone remembered the Dreyfus affair). And you're calling them Boulangist, well even more reason for the left (and the republican right and center !) to oppose Arthuys !

And if a monarchist france is a trope on this forum, is because people like the Monarchism system, want to show that france has fallen to the opposite spectrum/on it's way to form a dictatorship... not because it's "interesting". I thought you wouldn't fall into this tropes because up until the, your TL has proven interesting enough and original enough in it's way to write a CP victory that isn't complete and still has France and GB still kicking around without falling into a dictatorship/communism/fascism or in the France without proclaimaing another monarchy/empire...

I think, had you talked more about Arthurys and how the new monarchist movement happened (which is something you generaly do amazingly well talking about how things happened in your TL), it would have been more clear to me and i would have "accepted it" better ^^

Thank you for the comprehensive response. I have actually gone into my notes for the next time I plan to address events in France and pasted the first half of it there to make sure I account for the things you pointed out (although that was the plan anyway :p ). I do think you are being a bit too deterministic about how public perceptions would continue after the PoD and are underestimating quite how chaotic the 1930s end up being. Then again, that might be me not getting it across too well.

One thing I want to make clear is that this is very much a case of the Union de la Droite stealing a march on their opponents while they were distracted, divided and under extreme pressure, and we are going to be seeing a response of some sort relatively soon. The period following the Two Rivers Crisis literally sees France at a peak in tensions reminicent of the worst of the OTL 30s - with repeated near-misses and several planned coups on both the left and right being averted. Things settle down a bit by the second half of the decade, only for the Stavisky Affair to send everything off the rails again. I also really want to stress that the leftists are at the point where they are having open clashes in the streets with each other, and are attacking with more murderous intent in the shadows. They hate each other possibly more so than they do the right.

As for the Monarchist movement, they have constantly been a part of the wider far-right movement I was describing from as far back as the early 1920s. It has been a gradual process, and by the late 1920s the monarchists had largely emerged as the most powerful faction on the right. I know Arthuys comes out of left field, but I want to make clear that he is not one of the front runners, but rather somewhat of a latecomer to the monarchist cause. He is the one who really starts selling the right-wing Republicans on the benefits which will come with Monarchy, and he is devilishly persuasive when doing so. The Arthuysian Monarchists largely come about as a cooptation of the pre-existing Monarchists (see Arthuys successfully sidelining Maurras, Pujo and company) by newcomer former Republicans who have been convinced of Arthuys' cause. From there they largely end up coopting the Union de la Droite (which has grown to be the single largest party on the right - and the largest in France once you take into account the split within the SFIO). By themselves they hold more than a third of all seats in the Chamber of Deputies while a variety of smaller parties primarily regional or ideologically divergent (as in out-and-out Integralists and other figures further to the right after the UD goes mainstream) take up a bit more than half that. These parties are for the most part NOT establishment Republican - the Right-wing Republicans combined have less than 70 seats in the chamber after the elections, largely resulting from them being at the very heart of the Stavisky Scandal, and there are a good deal former Republicans who end up throwing their support behind the Union de la Droite because they view it as a more favorable alternative to the promised Workers' Republic of the far-left. Think early 1930s Weimar Germany for a political parallel more so than France at the time.
 
I'm still not really convinced (i think you didn't take fully into account the cultural and political side of France) but ultimately it's your TL, not mine so it's really your choice !

Well, we shall see what happens next even if i'm sad you decided to take a more dystopian turn to France as usual in post-ww1 TL ^^ And I can't wait to see how Arthuys will convince France, the remnant of the left and the right-wing republican of giving powers to the monarch
 
As I said in an earlier post from a while ago, when it comes to radical political changes, elite support is absolutely crucial. If a political movement, radical or not, has enough support from domestic (or sometimes foreign) elites, then there’s a good chance that such a movement will succeed. If they have significant popular support in addition to that, then implementing wide-reaching political changes isn’t really that hard.

I subscribe to the ‘patron theory’ of politics (or clientelism), which states that almost all significant political, social and cultural changes in history are the result of societal elites patronizing and/or subsidizing particular political, social, religious or artistic movements. There would’ve been no successful Reformation in Germany if Martin Luther didn’t have the support of various German princes (just like there would’ve been no Reformation in England without the support of Henry VIII), nor would there have been a French Revolution without significant support among the first and second estates, or a (OTL) October Revolution without German financial support for the Bolsheviks in 1917. There have been no true ‘grassroots’ movements in history – at least no successful ones – that managed to ‘take over’ and change political paradigms just through popular support. Look at any successful political movement in history – whether peaceful or not – and you’ll quickly find at least some elite support behind it, even if elites only started supporting the movement after it had already reached a certain amount of popularity.

That doesn’t mean that there aren’t other factors that shape society; obviously radical economic and technological upheavals (like the industrial revolution) also force societies to adapt, usually by destroying or rearranging various existing social structures. But these kinds of deep structural changes also usually strengthen new, emergent elites at the expense of existing, entrenched elites, the latter of which often patronize political movements that either seek to stop or reverse those changes, while emergent elites support those who speed up and formalize those changes. In the context of the restoration of the monarchy in France, the question then is if there are enough factions within the French elite that support it. It should also be noted that the changes in France aren’t really that radical – for most people, of all social classes, life will go on as normal, so it’s unlikely that there’d be enormous societal pushback.
 
As I said in an earlier post from a while ago, when it comes to radical political changes, elite support is absolutely crucial. If a political movement, radical or not, has enough support from domestic (or sometimes foreign) elites, then there’s a good chance that such a movement will succeed. If they have significant popular support in addition to that, then implementing wide-reaching political changes isn’t really that hard.

I subscribe to the ‘patron theory’ of politics (or clientelism), which states that almost all significant political, social and cultural changes in history are the result of societal elites patronizing and/or subsidizing particular political, social, religious or artistic movements. There would’ve been no successful Reformation in Germany if Martin Luther didn’t have the support of various German princes (just like there would’ve been no Reformation in England without the support of Henry VIII), nor would there have been a French Revolution without significant support among the first and second estates, or a (OTL) October Revolution without German financial support for the Bolsheviks in 1917. There have been no true ‘grassroots’ movements in history – at least no successful ones – that managed to ‘take over’ and change political paradigms just through popular support. Look at any successful political movement in history – whether peaceful or not – and you’ll quickly find at least some elite support behind it, even if elites only started supporting the movement after it had already reached a certain amount of popularity.

That doesn’t mean that there aren’t other factors that shape society; obviously radical economic and technological upheavals (like the industrial revolution) also force societies to adapt, usually by destroying or rearranging various existing social structures. But these kinds of deep structural changes also usually strengthen new, emergent elites at the expense of existing, entrenched elites, the latter of which often patronize political movements that either seek to stop or reverse those changes, while emergent elites support those who speed up and formalize those changes. In the context of the restoration of the monarchy in France, the question then is if there are enough factions within the French elite that support it. It should also be noted that the changes in France aren’t really that radical – for most people, of all social classes, life will go on as normal, so it’s unlikely that there’d be enormous societal pushback.
While I agree to some extent with the general theory of patronage, I do think you are being a bit too deterministic (I feel that is what I say to everything, tbh so maybe it is me not being quite deterministic enough). I think that the patron theory does explain some of the things which occur during period of significant socio-political change, it also misses a lot of very important elements. Personally, I think that elites can (and usually do) have a major influence on what direction major changes take - but they are normally unable to force those changes on their own.

I have some problems with your specific examples. While not necessarily relevant, I do feel an obligation to point out my disagreement since I have written about both of the periods you are describing :p. I would not view the German princes as the key patronizing elite of the Reformation, but rather the burghers of Germany's major cities as the key constituency pushing forward change. The German Princes were more of a reactionary, constraining force upon those changes than the elites pushing the change (England is a horrible example either way because of how differently the Reformation played out there than just about anywhere else in Europe, but even there you had a decently large lower noble and merchant class serving as the key supporting elite constituency for change). I honestly think that people put way too much emphasis on Germany's financial support of the Bolsheviks during the Russian Revolution - rather, I would point to the relatively small, but influential, elite formed by the revolutionary ideologue class of petit bourgoisie, minor aristocrats and well-educated minorities who turned against their class interests in order to form what would become Russia's Communist elite. In both of these cases you have a smaller, but still sizeable, segment of the middle-class form an elite layer of leadership for a much larger mass movement - with that new elite often explicitly in conflict with the wider middle class from which they came.

All that said, I do appreciate your points and agree with them for the most part, I just can't resist getting nitpicky :p
 
On the discussion about the restoration of the French monarchy, I do have one thing to note:
January Monarchy
With a name like that, it seems to me like the monarchy is not long for this world. If the monarchist right has made use of temporary political disarray among all their opposition, to steal a march and implement their program, then they might quickly find that nothing unites the squabbling masses like a common enemy. The republican political elites may be in disarray, but their voting blocs still exist, and Arthuys could have misjudged the situation. If he delivers some unifying successes, that may be enough to stave off a counterreaction, but with the way Indochina is going, it will be a bottomless pit for blood and treasure, and even in victory I don't see how the French public will see it as anything but a disaster. The danger of a king is that success and failure will both be attributed to him, in the minds of the public, and while a discredited president can be booted, a monarch that presides over failure can only be replaced through a constitutional crisis - so I don't think France's troubles are anywhere near over.
 
On the discussion about the restoration of the French monarchy, I do have one thing to note:

With a name like that, it seems to me like the monarchy is not long for this world. If the monarchist right has made use of temporary political disarray among all their opposition, to steal a march and implement their program, then they might quickly find that nothing unites the squabbling masses like a common enemy. The republican political elites may be in disarray, but their voting blocs still exist, and Arthuys could have misjudged the situation. If he delivers some unifying successes, that may be enough to stave off a counterreaction, but with the way Indochina is going, it will be a bottomless pit for blood and treasure, and even in victory I don't see how the French public will see it as anything but a disaster. The danger of a king is that success and failure will both be attributed to him, in the minds of the public, and while a discredited president can be booted, a monarch that presides over failure can only be replaced through a constitutional crisis - so I don't think France's troubles are anywhere near over.
It was not my intent to signal anything about the length of time under the Monarchy. I was simply using the common naming convention given to post-Revolutionary Restoration monarchy as happened with the July Monarchy.

The situation is going to be a challenge to manage for Arthuys, but I really want to stress that this is not a stupid man, or a man prone to overly risky gambles. He can be bold, as happened with the rather hurried passage of the new constitution, but he made sure to always remain within the legal boundaries, to maintain an air of trustworthiness and moral standing (which, I must reiterate, stands in very sharp contrast to the Republican elite) and he has a slate of legislative reforms which very much appeal to the interests of the traditional Republican voting bloc.

There will be a reaction, likely of sizable proportions, but I really want to stress that the Arthuysians are not a tiny radical faction pushing forward with some intensely hated proposition - they have mass support both in rural and urban France, and are viewed for the most part as people acting with the best of intentions. While dealing with Indochina and staving off a counterreaction from the left are going to be major challenges, I want to make clear that this development is not necessarily unpopular with a significant portion of the French population.

On a more general note, I do want to discuss your point about the differences between a monarchical and republican system. The key here, with the constitutional monarchy, is that the King is shielded from most of the decision-making, and it is thus the Prime Minister who stands to be discredited if he fails to deal with an issue. It only becomes a matter of removing the King once he is actively involved in the work of governance - that was the critical mistake made by Nicholas II in Russia. By taking up personal leadership of the war effort during the Great War, Nicholas became accountable for the conduct of that effort - whereas prior to that moment he had a variety of sacrificial stand-ins available to take the blame when things go wrong. Of course, given the youth of the January Monarchy, a loss of prestige by the current UD government would likely spell the end of the Monarchy as well. However, if the monarchy is able to gain a bit of impetus - lets say pro-monarchical forces hold power for some 20 years or so without the monarchy completely discrediting itself in some way, then it is liable to hold on even when power shifts away from those backing the monarchy. By contrast, I would actually say that Republican structures are far more liable to face constitutional crises or cracks in state legitimacy and authority than monarchies. In a Republic, the fall of a President under ignominious circumstances gravely damages trust in the parliamentary systems which brought them to power originally. By contrast when a Prime Minister in a Constitutional Monarchy falls from power, it sends shockwaves through the parliamentary system, but leaves the stability provided by the monarchy in place. Monarchies in which the monarch does not hold actual governing powers, and as such are much less likely to bear the blame for political miscalculations, are remarkably stable precisely because they allow for parallel tracks of legitimacy - the popular legitimacy of the parliament and the institutional legitimacy of the monarchy. Either one of the two can face crisis, but as long as that crisis is contained to just one of the pillars of legitimacy, the state maintains a significant degree of stability.

In case it wasn't obvious, I am rather fond of the Constitutional Monarchy which has helped guide Denmark through the past two centuries.
 
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