And yet, during the one battle IOTL (Second Naval Guadalcanal) where a golden opportunity presented itself for the IJN cruiser and destroyer force to cripple the big US Navy battlewagons with their formidable torpedoes... nothing of the sort was done.
True, but that was a strange battle. The Japanese didn't expect to encounter battleships, so they were unprepared. At first Kondo thought he was dealing with cruisers. They planned a bombardment, and escort run, and thought they'd have little opposition. The IJN took out 3 of the 4 USN DD's screening Washington & South Dakoda but were taken off guard by the massive firepower they were dealing with. Both Washington & South Dakoda were fast enough to dodge all the torpedoes launched at them. The Japanese divided their ships into too many groups and had no coherent plan of action, and Kondo broke off the battle before his objectives were achieved.

Seeing Kirishima mauled, and disabled, like the Hiei a few nights before may have unnerved Kondo. All he could think of was getting away from Guadalcanal before daylight, would bring attack from American aircraft. 1st & 2nd Guadalcanal were hardly the best performances of the IJN. It's little wonder that after the battle the IJN Command decided to pull the plug on Guadalcanal. They had to tell the Army they could no longer sustain the shipping losses in supporting the troops on the Island. Guadalcanal was a logistical nightmare, and the army troops had good reason to call it, "Starvation Island."
 
True, but that was a strange battle. The Japanese didn't expect to encounter battleships, so they were unprepared. At first Kondo thought he was dealing with cruisers. They planned a bombardment, and escort run, and thought they'd have little opposition. The IJN took out 3 of the 4 USN DD's screening Washington & South Dakoda but were taken off guard by the massive firepower they were dealing with. Both Washington & South Dakoda were fast enough to dodge all the torpedoes launched at them. The Japanese divided their ships into too many groups and had no coherent plan of action, and Kondo broke off the battle before his objectives were achieved.

Seeing Kirishima mauled, and disabled, like the Hiei a few nights before may have unnerved Kondo. All he could think of was getting away from Guadalcanal before daylight, would bring attack from American aircraft. 1st & 2nd Guadalcanal were hardly the best performances of the IJN. It's little wonder that after the battle the IJN Command decided to pull the plug on Guadalcanal. They had to tell the Army they could no longer sustain the shipping losses in supporting the troops on the Island. Guadalcanal was a logistical nightmare, and the army troops had good reason to call it, "Starvation Island."
And there's my point.

For all their talk of bold, aggressive strokes in the setting of kantai kessen, the majority of IJN commanders acted with perplexing timidity during truly crucial engagements, or when faced with equal to superior opposition.

A grand total of twelve torpedoes was launched at the American battlewagons during Second Naval Guadalcanal, truly a far cry from the overwhelming fifty-to-ninety torpedo salvoes they unleashed at Java Sea, and as you point out, the engagement was broken off before the objectives were achieved (in a virtual repeat of both Savo and First Naval Guadalcanal) - for all Kondo's worry about being caught by American aircraft during the daytime, the US carriers were still licking their wounds after Santa Cruz and the Cactus Air Force really did not have the clout to inflict major damage upon his ships.

As I often like to say, Guadalcanal WAS the decisive battle that the IJN sought; they failed to recognise this fact and failed to go all-out to win that battle.

Unless we place people like Hara, Tanaka or Jisaburo Ozawa (the closest IJN equivalents to Bull Halsey) at the helm, I think the cautious-to-muddled IJN decision making from Kondo, Mikawa, Abe and even Yamamoto himself really ought to typify most Pacific War alternate history scenarios.

But anyway...
 
I've been reading a lot of WWII US submarine-focussed fiction recently and there appears to be a universal agreement that there were significant problems with these warhead firing mechanisms which BuOrd was well aware of. Is this true and if so, can anyone explain why it took so long to rectify the problem?

It seems like BuOrd had some major issues with denial.

Drachinifel's take on it is here
 
The Japanese did that on a number of occasions. Savo Island, Tassafronga Point, and Kolombangara. Czarnecki came to that figure simply by taking the number of torpedoes fired divided by how many ships they hit. Daylight Battles like Java Sea, Komandoorski Islands, and Samar bring the score way down. While true that misses the larger point that everything depends on the circumstances. As you said yourself against maneuvering ships torpedoes more often miss. When the Japanese had the element of surprise and were able to get off a torpedo attack before the enemy could react the hit rate went way up.

In the scenario I set up the British had no reason to think they were in danger of a torpedo attack. They thought they had the element of surprise and were trying to set up a gunnery battle. Why would they be taking evasive action? Evasive action spoils your own fire solutions, ships want to be stable platforms when they fire guns. In the Scenario the IJN DD's sighted the oncoming BB's first and planned to attack them. By the time Willis knew of the presence of the destroyers he thought they were too far away to be a serious threat. Even if they did launch a long-range torpedo attack when he turned his battleline north, he'd be spoiling their firing solution, and presenting a narrow target. The Allies had no idea how fast the Type-93 torpedo was, or what kind of range it had. Not understanding that their mental calculations were completely thrown off.

The Japanese DD's didn't see the screening CL's, and DD till they started their attack run because they were so much smaller than the battleships. Besides they were afterthoughts, and unimportant to their mission. Japanese doctrine was for DD's to slip past escorting ships and use their torpedoes against capital units. The destroyers then turned away at high speed and made smoke so they could reload their tubes to attack again. Why stay to engage in a gunnery duel with a stronger force?

Still, this is just what I thought up, and not established fact, and your free to make any criticism. What you've put forward is a reasonable argument, but I think your underestimating the high rate of proficiency the Japanese had especially early in the war. You're also not counting the sense of superiority the Allies had regarding the Japanese, and how it set them up for defeats on land, sea, and air.
Again your scenario is too perfect

As to your examples Savo Island was embarrassing and was more due to the incompetence and fatigue (if we are being polite) of the Allied force - particulalrly its commanders.

The Battle of Tassafaronga - again incompetence with the USN swapping IJN Destroyers for USN Crusiers

Kolombangara - as above except it was USN DD that was swapped for an IJN CL (although 3 Allied CLs were damaged)

As for underestimating the Japanese and their torpedoes by April 42 the allies had fought them in the following battles

Badung Strait - which was a handful of torpedoes with 1 hit

Java Sea - the single long range hit on Kortenaer demonstrated the range and power of Japanese torpedoes to the allies but also their inaccuracy at long range which was not known at the time given the mass of torpedoes fired

Sunda Strait - This was an execution of 3 fleeing Allied ships by superior Japanese forces which had surrounded them at night and the torpedo attacks took place at ranges down to 3000 odd yards

During these battles the Japanese had demonstrated excellent night fighting capabilities and demonstrated the effectiveness of their torpedoes

Also until 43 IJN Doctrine was to fire half salvos reassess then reattack then withdraw to reload - rinse and repeat

So April 42 - unless the RN was staffed by lead drinking idiots then there would be no underestimation of the Japanese by the British

If I was too look for a real world example it would be Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal - 2 alert battle lines in a night fight - but without the electrical failures SoDak experienced or the inexperience of the 4 US Destroyers who got curb stomped early on in the fight - leaving the 2 BBs to fight alone 1 of which crippled itself - this battle saw 51 launches for 2 hits (1 each on 2 destroyers) - 3.9% hit rate

Edit : Ninja'd by Seckmet_D above who makes the same point


I accept that the British looked good fighting the Italians at night but the Japanese where also flattered fighting the USN at night
 
MacArthur was a sacred cow; FDR was never going to sack him. That would cause a political blood bath he didn't want to deal with, especially at the beginning of a long hard war.
I agree with that - I was behind a couple of Americans in France queuing up for a bus recently and fascinatingly they were discussing Big Mac and why he was not sacked

One of them concluded that Roosevelt appreciated that he was a darling of the republican party as well as the 'deep south' democrats and so in order to maintain cross party unity stood him up as a hero rather than a villain

Now I have had people on here shoot the idea down but it resonates with me and I can see how it happened - the US people needed a Hero not a villain at the time
 

Driftless

Donor
I wouldn't matter. McArthur would still be an American hero, and the Allied Commander for the SW Pacific would have to be an American. We have to see where this TL leads, but it very hard for me to conceive of Malaya holding out with everything around it being held by the Japanese, or the Commonwealth forces defeating the Japanese in Burma.

I agree with that - I was behind a couple of Americans in France queuing up for a bus recently and fascinatingly they were discussing Big Mac and why he was not sacked

One of them concluded that Roosevelt appreciated that he was a darling of the republican party as well as the 'deep south' democrats and so in order to maintain cross party unity stood him up as a hero rather than a villain

Now I have had people on here shoot the idea down but it resonates with me and I can see how it happened - the US people needed a Hero not a villain at the time

I'm going to disagree with the idea that Mac was bullet-proof as the top dog, if Malaya etal hold longer. I think we take that idea of Mac as the supreme leader as a lock, but seen in context of our history. There wasn't much other choice at the time in OTL.

(A) If things go even a little better in Malaya, then the Commonwealth leadership is going to look better by comparison to the US being bottled up on Bataan
(B) Mac gets extracted and Wainwright is left to hold out on Bataan. If the Commonwealth is still holding the Japanese at bay (even as a temporary stay of execution), then some of the shine comes off Mac's star. The "I shall return" statement looks more like bravado from a guy who got out, rather than a hero.
(C) The US needs heroes, so the boys on Wake get puffed up even more, Wainwright gets puffed up even more. Depending on how long Malaya holds, then the aviators and Frank Fletcher get puffed up for their "victory" at Coral Sea.
(D) Mac remains in place in Australia, but I think he gets surpassed in the US public eye by those other events.
(E) Mac bridling at being pushed off the front page, blusters his way into being assigned to lead US efforts in China.



*Edit* I'll leave my comments at that. This is off on a tangent from the main theme of the OP
 
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Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
It'll be very interesting if The Philippines falls, but the rest of the Japanese expansion efforts not only fall flat, but vastly overextend the scarce resources the Japanese retain. You can be here Singapore will also have a fearsome submarine force which will do even more damage to the Japanese Merchant Navy because they'll have torpedoes that actually work!
Hi Bookeater, was you suggesting the submarines of the US Asiatic Fleet rebase at Singapore?

What might be even more interesting is if MacArthur ends up being sacked following this development. Who would replace him, and would the Philippines be bypassed as a result during the subsequent American resurgence?

If there was no reason to sack MacArthur on the fall of the Philippines historically, I can't see why Singapore holding out longer would bring about his sacking, the US forces put up a very heroic effort in Bataan, (and will do in my TL) he'll be ordered out (unlike Maj Gen Gordon Bennett) because he is too favourable to lose.

Even if they eventually succumb, if Malaya and Singapore hold out much longer than the PI, where would that have left MacArthur in the Allied hierarchy going into late '42-early '43? Gort and company would look like the competent warriors and Mac just might not look so good in comparison. Part of putting Mac in charge of the SW Pacific was for US political purpose, but with a better defense of Malaya, Singapore, and Burma, then the British leadership would definitely have the cachet over Mac (IMO). I can't imagine Mac sitting still for operating under the theater command of Lord Gort, or would it have been Wavell? Walter Kruger would still have been a great choice for the top US Army field commander.

The US gets it's leadership role opportunity with Operation Torch, late in the year, with Ike and eventually Patton in overall command of the western bookend and Alexander & Monty running the eastern operations.

^^^ninjaed - kinda

OK, so lets just surmise that ABDA does still get formed, and Gort is likely to take command, as Wavell did historically. The area it commanded was huge, including Burma, Thailand, French Indo-China, Hong Hong, Formosa (Taiwan), the Philippines, Malaya, the whole of the Dutch East Indies, and the top part of Australia, including Darwin, but stopping just west of Queensland. That's a lot for one HQ to control!

It didn't cover Papua New Guinea, New Britain, and the anchorage of Rabaul, the Solomon Islands, and eastern Australia, not to mention New Zealand and Fiji. With the Allies anxious to divide part of the war or potential war zone into separate unified commands, your going to need a South West Pacific command too. And the basic rule of thumb to me is, whoever contributed the most in a theatre, commanded it.

So ABDA has the majority of the British assets in it, along with all the Dutch, some US units left over from the retreat from the Philippines and reinforcements caught in passage, and quite possibly the Australian I Corps defending Java, if Malaya has held. But whats going to defend South West Pacific Command. Well the Australians have their home defence forces, a few naval assets, but the rest is going to be the US forces as was committed historically. You might argue that Blamey could command it, but more likely it would have to be an American. FDR has just ordered MacArthur out of the Philippines, unless he's sick or wounded, its hard to see past giving him the command. And don't forget Guadalcanal historically didn't happen until August 1942, the Allies effort in holding the rump (Java) of the Dutch East Indies is going to draw a lot of reinforcements to it, as it will the Japanese trying to take it. The South West Pacific command might be something of a backwater, MacArthur is left kicking his heels!
 
I'm going to disagree with the idea that Mac was bullet-proof as the top dog, if Malaya etal hold longer. I think we take that idea of Mac as the supreme leader as a lock, but seen in context of our history. There wasn't much other choice at the time in OTL.

(A) If things go even a little better in Malaya, then the Commonwealth leadership is going to look better by comparison to the US being bottled up on Bataan
(B) Mac gets extracted and Wainwright is left to hold out on Bataan. If the Commonwealth is still holding the Japanese at bay (even as a temporary stay of execution), then some of the shine comes off Mac's star. The "I shall return" statement looks more like bravado from a guy who got out, rather than a hero.
(C) The US needs heroes, so the boys on Wake get puffed up even more, Wainwright gets puffed up even more. Depending on how long Malaya holds, then the aviators and Frank Fletcher get puffed up for their "victory" at Coral Sea.
(D) Mac remains in place in Australia, but I think he gets surpassed in the US public eye by those other events.
(E) Mac bridling at being pushed off the front page, blusters his way into being assigned to lead US efforts in China.



*Edit* I'll leave my comments at that. This is off on a tangent from the main theme of the OP
Fair enough - other US Commanders where 'put to the sword' namely Kimmel and Short who didn't have such support back in the States

And given how Adm Fletcher was treated after the Solomon's campaign.....ahhh don't get me started

Anyway as you say out of scope for TTL
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
It'll be very interesting if The Philippines falls, but the rest of the Japanese expansion efforts not only fall flat, but vastly overextend the scarce resources the Japanese retain. You can be here Singapore will also have a fearsome submarine force which will do even more damage to the Japanese Merchant Navy because they'll have torpedoes that actually work!
Hi Bookeater, I think you mean US subs fall back to Singapore

If Singapore holds Hart will move his Subs there rather then Western Australia.
Which is what Butchpfd goes with

I'm not in your camp on this one, initially the US naval forces fell back to Soerabaja (Surabaya) and tried to operate from there, before falling back to Western Australia, initially using their tenders. Geographically, Singapore doesn't offer really anything better that Soerabaja, and the Naval dockyard wouldn't be able to service the USN submarines. I feel fairly sure the USN and RN, and the Dutch naval torpedo's were not interchangeable, so fuel and food/water aside, supplies for the US Submarines comes from the Western Continental coast of the USA, that's a long way. With Singapore holding, and some of the RN and Dutch submarines still in operation, they would be given the western part of the war zone to patrol, while the US would probably be given the eastern side. The USN high command would push hard for this, wanting complete control of their own forces.

He still going to base them in Australia. Singapore would be subjected to regular bombing and would have impossible supply problems. Everything going to Singapore would first have to run a blockade. Geography gives you only a few entrances into the South China Sea. The Straits of Malacca, the Sunda Straits, the Lombok Straits, or around the East end of Timor into the Banda Sea and the Japanese had them blocked. Submarines could go there but not supply ships.
So I go with what you say Belisarius, but purely on logistical reasons, not concerns over access via these waterways.


That's why no relief could ever get to the Philippines. It's just not a realistic idea.
Now this is a real big talking point for me. Historically Java fell by the 12th March 1942, and the Philippines held until the 8th May 1942, that two moths later. With the Allies holding out longer, re-supply to Bataan must surely continue by US submarine, removing a number of these from active patrol. Just how well they can help supply American forces, how much longer might the defences hold is certainly a big question!
 
Also, the longer the Philippines hold out, the more logistics support becomes available as well as transport to move it and evacuate wounded...
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
I've been reading a lot of WWII US submarine-focussed fiction recently and there appears to be a universal agreement that there were significant problems with these warhead firing mechanisms which BuOrd was well aware of. Is this true and if so, can anyone explain why it took so long to rectify the problem?
Hi Wolf of Badenoch, the video link is a good start, and might be all you need

It seems like BuOrd had some major issues with denial.

Drachinifel's take on it is here
Hi The Mole's Revenge, link didn't work, did you mean this one
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
British and US Mobilisations was to build a full unit (be it Battalion Brigade Division etc) and then a year to 18 months later split it into 2 units and fill up the gaps with recruits, promoted officers and promoted NCOs - continue training rinse and repeat

The British did this with the 13 TA Divisions - doubling them to 26 in or about 1939

Early war the problem with that was that units trained to a certain standard and then were effectively decimated

So perhaps I am being harsh but I would have preferred that the PH army follow the above method but anyway not that important to this TL
Hi Cryhavoc101, so I look at the word Mobilisation in the simple sense of activating the current reserve, like the European armies did at the beginning of the First and Second world wars, in tranches. That's what I think was happening in the Philippines, except their reserves were a lot worse off for training and equipment. than say the French in 1939. Then what comes next is the mobilisation of the nation, and the need to create new units, which brings us to your point of splitting units in half and back filling with new recruits, or the milking of units, which was so famously (infamously?) done to the British Indian Army. And that milking is most defiantly an issue in our TL.
 
MWI 41072911 Wann’s Divers

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
1941, Tuesday 29 July;

The first of four aircraft peeled off and went into its dive. On the low hill they watched as it aimed for its target, an 80-foot white painted cross on the field in front of them. They counted the seconds, one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, ah there’s the release, the change in tone of the Merlin engine as it worked hard, doing its best to pull the aircraft out of its dive. And still falling came two black objects, bombs, eleven, twelve, thirteen, fourteen, bang! Two large sand bags ruptured on impact, spilling sand 100 feet away from the cross, while the aircraft, having fully pulled out of its dive, flew across them, right to left.

And already a second aircraft was on its way, having started its dive twelve seconds after the first. The young pilot, Sergeant Eddie Alworth fully focused, the adrenaline pumping through him, as he held his dive. Again, the same count, this time the sand bags were 60 feet away, but more to the right, then the third and finally fourth aircraft completed their dives, their sand bags all less than 150 feet from the target. Air Commodore Archie Wann lowered his binoculars onto his chest, and looked at his adjutant, a small nod and smile indicating his pleasure in the improvement, as indeed it was.

He was enjoying life, the sentenced man given a reprieve, as he felt had happened, getting the posting to Malaya. His career was in the field of army support, and he’d made efforts in that direction, unsuccessfully, in France, commanding the 75th Bomber Wing of the Advanced Air Striking Force, in developing closer co-operation with the Army. The losses over Sedan had been blamed on the aircraft flown, a bad type, but he didn’t prescribe to that view, thinking there was a lot more to it than just blaming an aircraft as bad. He’d spent time in Northern Ireland, developing an army co-operation system, and had provided a detailed document, the Wann – Woodhall report, but the RAF wasn’t interested, it was all about fighter defence, and developing the heavy bomber force, and so his career had stalled.

But here he was, Park having given him licence to put in practice what he preached. The arrival of RAF 226 squadron with her Fairey Battles in March, and the creation of the Canadian Article VX squadron, 404, in June, equipped with the same aircraft, gave him the men and machines. They were over strength, and with more pilots and aircraft to come, but he was creating a reasonable training plan for them, with the plan going forward, of creating a second Canadian Battle Sqn, 414, spawning off of 404, sometime in September. With the promise of the third squadron, he had now created a new wing for the Battles, the 7 RCAF, under Group Captain Sydney Pope, a former commander of 226 Sqn and a veteran of France, who was proving a useful subordinate.

Wann had given some thought to how he could improve the performance of the Battle, and had changed tactics, they would dive bomb their targets now. The Fairey wasn’t the perfect aircraft for this role, he didn’t expect them to perform an 80-degree dive, but he did want to get to 60. After 60 degrees the Fairey had proved to be somewhat unstable in a dive, a few turning onto their backs while going into the dive. To help with this he’d also had some alterations made, firstly he’d replaced the basic gun sight with one which could be better used for dive bombing, and also added a dive angle indicator. Secondly, he’d had the central fuel tank removed, just using the wing tanks, as he didn’t need a range of 1000 miles, and the central tank was an unnecessary fire risk. Nowadays, the planes had self-sealing tanks, something they hadn’t had in France, as well as some basic armour plating around the pilot, all being retro fitted here in Malaya.

Training the crew was of the upmost importance, and again he’d had some thoughts about that. He’d removed the navigator, operationally most aircraft wouldn’t be carrying one, just a pilot and rear air gunner, but at the moment, needing them to learn the art of dive bombing, it was just the pilot. He’d lost one aircraft and pilot, late in pulling out of the dive, but as pilot competencies grew, so he’d introduced the air gunner. To date he’d transferred two pilots and one air gunner to his Blenheim squadrons, due to the fears of diving they had been unable to overcome in training. But he’d also worked hard on creating a esprit de corps among the crews, making the point to them that their bombing would always be more accurate and effective than the Blenheim squadrons.

He turned and walked under the awning set up to give shelter from the sun, his next flight was due in a quarter of an hour. He was convinced the accuracy would improve immeasurably on the cross target, but he needed to come up with some more difficult exercises, without killing anyone and damaging morale. The working with fighter escorts was going to be a next step, but he didn’t foreseen problems, just needed time. What was a greater issue was the whole concept of air-ground communications, his attempts with radio to date had been miserable, the sets were unreliable, poor maintenance, spares in short supply, and atmospheric conditions all colluding to thwart him, but if you were to ask him, life had changed for the better, he was developing his doctrine for air support, and it was going well!
 
I've been reading a lot of WWII US submarine-focussed fiction recently and there appears to be a universal agreement that there were significant problems with these warhead firing mechanisms which BuOrd was well aware of. Is this true and if so, can anyone explain why it took so long to rectify the problem?
That's the $64,000 question. There are many explanations, but what I would say is the problem with the Mk-14 torpedo was inadequate testing. A torpedo cost $10,000, and budgets in the 1930's were pretty tight. Extensive live fire tests would've shown how unreliable the torpedo was. The effort to develop a magnetic exploder seemed so promising that the USN went for it, but like other navies they found the technology just wasn't there yet.

Beyond that a defensive psychology developed in the naval torpedo station in Newport RI, that was responsible for developing, and testing torpedoes. This was basically run as a closed shop that didn't want to accept any criticism of their product. If the torpedoes weren't performing well in the fleet, it must be user error, not a technical fault. If the torpedoes failed to explode, or they ran too deep it was the fault of the captains and crews using them. Similar problems were discovered with the Mk-13 arial torpedo, and Mk-15 surface ship torpedo, and all of them needed major modifications to make them operate properly. Once fixes were made these torpedoes tore the enemy up. USN Subs sank 1/3 of the IJN Fleet in WWII, as well as most of their merchant marine tonnage.
 

Driftless

Donor
There was also a kind of unholy link between local Rhode Island politicians protecting Federal funds flowing into the area and the senior staff at the Torpedo Station protecting their jobs. One hand washing the other. That see-no-evil conflict of interest has been a recurring issue for US military procurement forever. Well, I suppose other militaries contend with the same issues, but we've raised it to an evil artform.
 
The target is 80 feet across; did the bags hit within 150 feet of the aiming point (center of the target) or 150 + 40?
Admittedly that's not very good but considering that in a 60 degree dive the pilot probably can't even see the target over the nose of the airplane it's not that bad. That's the problem with "Glide Bombing" as opposed to real divebombing.
 
That's the $64,000 question. There are many explanations, but what I would say is the problem with the Mk-14 torpedo was inadequate testing. A torpedo cost $10,000, and budgets in the 1930's were pretty tight. Extensive live fire tests would've shown how unreliable the torpedo was. The effort to develop a magnetic exploder seemed so promising that the USN went for it, but like other navies they found the technology just wasn't there yet.

Beyond that a defensive psychology developed in the naval torpedo station in Newport RI, that was responsible for developing, and testing torpedoes. This was basically run as a closed shop that didn't want to accept any criticism of their product. If the torpedoes weren't performing well in the fleet, it must be user error, not a technical fault. If the torpedoes failed to explode, or they ran too deep it was the fault of the captains and crews using them. Similar problems were discovered with the Mk-13 arial torpedo, and Mk-15 surface ship torpedo, and all of them needed major modifications to make them operate properly. Once fixes were made these torpedoes tore the enemy up. USN Subs sank 1/3 of the IJN Fleet in WWII, as well as most of their merchant marine tonnage.
Officers such as Tommy Hart who crossed the Torpedo Factory Mafia ( Very Very Heavy Political Power)suffered damage to their careers. IMO if RN subs had been stationed at Singapore, courtesy calls by USN subs to Singapore and RN Subs visiting Manila at some point in conversations the faulty magnetic exploders of the RN will be brought up. At this point Hart will probably order tests and the results will show faulty magnetic detonators, and possibly the depth setting issues. If the detonators are deactivated that's 1/3 of the MK XIV issues solved and if the depth problems are found too that's 2/3rds fixed.
 
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