Sure, you can keep making the point that the Allies should have understood the capabilities of the Type-93 torpedo after the first few battles of the war, but they didn't. So, in a night battle no one should form a battleline in visual range, because you're setting yourself up for a mass torpedo attack, but they did. In the case of my scenario a British force would never be steaming line ahead because a mass torpedo attack could come out of the darkness at any moment from undetected destroyers. The British admirals were very smart, and absorbed their lessons instantly, unlike the stupid American, Australian, and New Zealander commanders.

So, how would a British admiral fight a night battle with the Japanese in April 1942? Does he know the Japanese have better optics? How does he deploy his ships? He still has to close to visual range to shoot, so how does he fight as a unit? If you'd like, please take my scenario and rewrite it like you think a smart British admiral would fight it. Just have the British change course 45 degrees every 5 minutes and almost all the Japanese torpedoes will miss. Of course, then the actual battle may never happen because you'll never catch up to the retreating Japanese before daylight, or even find them.
Challenge accepted

Upon detecting the approaching British ships and not knowing their full composition (the IJN had no idea the sneaky British had a secret base in the Indian Ocean), because they are not a hive mind and don't have the internet from 2023, the IJN Commander reluctantly orders the crew of the cripple to grab the Emperors portrait and abandon ship.

Once done the poor old thing is put down before the IJN fleet which is a looooonnnggggg long way from home and repair facilities etc cut's its losses and bugs out.

Nearly a century later strangers on the internet will argue over whether the Japanese fleet commanders should have gone full Leroy Jenkins or not
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Nearly a century later strangers on the internet will argue over whether the Japanese fleet commanders should have gone full Leroy Jenkins or not

Hi Cryhavoc101, you've unwittingly given away your generational age, us older chaps on the eastern side of the pond, would probably better relate to going "The Full Monty"
 

Errolwi

Monthly Donor
The closest analogy I have for the RN was the defence and then Evacuation of Crete - probably the most costly single battle in the RNs history (and certainly WW2) - it probably should have stopped trying to evacuate Army forces some days before it did in the face of German Air Superiority
The NZ Prime Minister (while in Cairo with various Generals who has been lying to him and Freyberg) looked Cunningham in the eye and asked to have a final run, and Cunningham sent a very beaten up cruiser and two destroyers. The Stukas had been withdrawn and they weren't attacked, several percent of NZs deployed military force didn't end up POWs . Nice thank you note to the RN Med Fleet from the NZ Government.
 
No, in my post I assumed the Japanese were in northern Malaya. The Japanese invaded Java in late February and destroyed most the ABDA Fleet on Feb 27 in the Battle of the Java Sea, and its immediate aftermath. After that nothing was going to stop the fall of Java, and Sumatra. Only a few Allied ships survived by slipping away to Australia. No more significant naval resistance in the NEI's was possible. The Commonwealth army holding Singapore would have no effect on Sumatra, unless you think they can cross over the Straits of Malacca to join the battle there. To do that you need maybe a division sized force to try and hold off the Japanese. That just puts another 100lb weight on the back of the army in Malaya, if they have to defend Sumatra to.
Nonsense. Look where Singapore is in relation to Sumatra and it should be clear if Singapore holds, attacking Sumatra is a problem. OTL the vast majority of the troops used came from the forces freed up after the fall of Singapore. Obviously these would not be available if Southern Malaya is still in British hands.
You don't seem to be able to realise that Singapore being still allied post 15th Feb means the Battle of the Java Sea could be butterflied. The Japanese just cannot do as per OTL unless they are ignoring Singapore, which as Singapore was the highest value target in their thinking, they will not be doing.
The Japanese just don't have the logistics or reserves to keep the OTL schedule of operations if they are held up in Malaya, troops, ships and supplies have to be diverted. So once timetables slip, everything has to change. Its the main weakness of the concentric operation approach they had, if it does not go as expected, the wheels fall off pretty badly and quite quickly it starts to snowball. Japan played a high risk game, OTL they got away with it, maybe not ITTL.
 
Challenge accepted

Upon detecting the approaching British ships and not knowing their full composition (the IJN had no idea the sneaky British had a secret base in the Indian Ocean), because they are not a hive mind and don't have the internet from 2023, the IJN Commander reluctantly orders the crew of the cripple to grab the Emperors portrait and abandon ship.

Once done the poor old thing is put down before the IJN fleet which is a looooonnnggggg long way from home and repair facilities etc cut's its losses and bugs out.

Nearly a century later strangers on the internet will argue over whether the Japanese fleet commanders should have gone full Leroy Jenkins or not
Boy that was easy.
 
Nonsense. Look where Singapore is in relation to Sumatra and it should be clear if Singapore holds, attacking Sumatra is a problem. OTL the vast majority of the troops used came from the forces freed up after the fall of Singapore. Obviously these would not be available if Southern Malaya is still in British hands.
You don't seem to be able to realise that Singapore being still allied post 15th Feb means the Battle of the Java Sea could be butterflied. The Japanese just cannot do as per OTL unless they are ignoring Singapore, which as Singapore was the highest value target in their thinking, they will not be doing.
The Japanese just don't have the logistics or reserves to keep the OTL schedule of operations if they are held up in Malaya, troops, ships and supplies have to be diverted. So once timetables slip, everything has to change. Its the main weakness of the concentric operation approach they had, if it does not go as expected, the wheels fall off pretty badly and quite quickly it starts to snowball. Japan played a high risk game, OTL they got away with it, maybe not ITTL.
The bulk of the Japanese army that invaded Java was made up by the 48th & 2nd Divisions. Before the invasion the 2nd came from Manchuria, and the 48th from Manila. None of the troops invading Java came from Malaya. When the 48th became available after the fall of Manila the invasion of Java could begin. British troops holding Malaya would have no effect on Japanese operations against the NEI. The NEI and their oil fields were the main focus of the Japanese first phase operation, not Singapore. Malaya, and the Philippines were operations to keep their flanks safe. The Japanese couldn't know that Singapore would fall on Feb 15, and didn't base their wider plans on such an assumption. If it takes longer to capture Singapore, ok it takes longer. In fact, they were surprised they took Singapore so quickly.
 
Interesting thought that if Bataan holds out longer and fleet boats are used for resupply does that make the awareness of the duffness of the mk XIV that much longer to surface?
Not likely. However long Bataan holds out won't really affect fleet boat operations. It took well into 1943, and a several command changes to finally make it clear to the powers that be that there were some serious problems with the Mk-14 torpedo.
 
A Mate of mine had a series of 'West point Battle map' books (or something west point anyway)

One of them was on the Pacific war and in discussing the IJN I always recall a particular description it made

It went something along the lines of "The IJN sought to imitate the Royal Navy in all things from its inception and did so in all things, training, leadership and physical courage, it even copied the uniforms and mannerisms of the RN officer class including the mannerisms and traditions of the officers mess. However it failed to copy the most important characteristic 'Moral courage'."

It took me some years before I understood what that meant - it was very clear that the IJN leadership was the biggest weak link particularly when it came to Moral Courage

Repeatedly the IJN commanders put their and the services honour ahead of hard nosed common sense except in those occasions when they should have gone all in (and generally did not)

There was a number of battles where the IJN should have continued to attack but instead retreated (Eg Savo Island?) and a number where they continued to attack when they ought to have not done so (Eg Midway and the obvious one Leyte Gulf) and in both cases either diminished a victory or made defeat worse than it should have been.

Your example of Guadalcanal is case in point - the IJN might very well have come out on top regarding ships sunk etc but while they did tend to exchange US Crusiers for IJN Destroyers the issue with this score sheet is the USA could absorb those losses - Japan could not - there should have been a line in the sand when the IJN leadership put a stop to it.

They did not

The closest analogy I have for the RN was the defence and then Evacuation of Crete - probably the most costly single battle in the RNs history (and certainly WW2) - it probably should have stopped trying to evacuate Army forces some days before it did in the face of German Air Superiority.

What the Japanese did went wayyyyy beyond and no amount of "Kantai Kessen" special sauce or super torpedoes could paper over it.
It's easy to find fault with the Japanese leadership and put it on a lack of "Moral Courage", whatever that's supposed mean. Afterall, they made many mistakes, and they did lose the war. But using the same standards what would that say about the "Moral Courage" of Allied generals, and admirals? Allied coalition commands were difficult to manage, interservice rivalries were bitter, personality conflicts were common, and pride, and arrogance often led to serious mistakes. On their side the Japanese interservice rivalries were worse, personality conflicts sometimes worse, and pride, and arrogance defiantly worse.

The IJN took serious risks to support the army but had the Moral Courage to pull the plug on the Guadalcanal Campaign when loses became prohibitive. I have no idea what you mean by going too far at Midway. The IJN had the Moral Courage to face superior Allied forces to evacuate the army from Guadalcanal, and Kiska, and other islands in the Solomons. At Leyte Gulf if not for the arrogant, and closed-minded stupidity of Halsey Taffy 3 wouldn't have had to be saved by the mistakes made by Kurita in his exhausted state of mind. In the end Kurita had the Moral Courage to not let his command commit suicide for the pride of the navy high command.

The Germans, and Japanese had far more of a warrior culture than the Anglo Saxon Powers did, and far more aggressive governments. It's not surprising that breed harder training, and good tactical doctrine. The Allied managerial style of war proved superior in the long run for the same reasons it gave them superior economies. Yes, in retrospect the Allies were almost sure to win the war, but it would be unfair to denigrate their military leader's skill or courage in battle.

The Moral Courage argument can be made about them supporting the evil causes they fought for, and atrocities they committed. It was a Moral failing not to kill Hitler, and to carry out orders to commit war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The Japanese rampaged across Asia, and the Pacific bringing mass destruction, and death everywhere they went. Even in the armed forces a culture of brutality prevailed against servicemen, where seniors would beat juniors. That showed a lack of Moral Courage, not their courage in battle.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
OK so I posted this
1941, Tuesday 29 July;

The first of four aircraft peeled off and went into its dive. On the low hill they watched as it aimed for its target, an 80-foot white painted cross on the field in front of them. They counted the seconds, one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, ah there’s the release, the change in tone of the Merlin engine as it worked hard, doing its best to pull the aircraft out of its dive. And still falling came two black objects, bombs, eleven, twelve, thirteen, fourteen, bang! Two large sand bags ruptured on impact, spilling sand 100 feet away from the cross, while the aircraft, having fully pulled out of its dive, flew across them, right to left.

And already a second aircraft was on its way, having started its dive twelve seconds after the first. The young pilot, Sergeant Eddie Alworth fully focused, the adrenaline pumping through him, as he held his dive. Again, the same count, this time the sand bags were 60 feet away, but more to the right, then the third and finally fourth aircraft completed their dives, their sand bags all less than 150 feet from the target.

Anarch King of Dipsodes: asks

The target is 80 feet across; did the bags hit within 150 feet of the aiming point (center of the target) or 150 + 40?

and Belisarius II: follows with

Admittedly that's not very good but considering that in a 60 degree dive the pilot probably can't even see the target over the nose of the airplane it's not that bad. That's the problem with "Glide Bombing" as opposed to real divebombing.

OK, so I'm sketchy about dive bombing, defo not an expert! So these are my thoughts, fell free to correct me where needed. Purposely I didn't give a height because of my uncertainty's, but I'd like to think they were diving from about 7,000ft. What their dive speed would be I don't know. Whatever angle they dive at, I'd expect them to have visual sight of the target, until it get time to release the bomb. The greater the angle of dive is to 90%, the more accurate the hit will be, but progressively as the angle off 90 increases, so gravitational pull will drop the bomb shorter, and this is without factoring in any wind. So the shallower the dive, the more the pilot will have to begin to pull out of the dive and a split second later, release his bomb, to compensate that, a skill they will need to develop. I'm also unsure of their release height, can't be lower than 2,000 feet I'd guess.

I wasn't writing to suggest great accuracy in this post, they are hitting 100 ft plus the 80ft cross, but we have only just begun, a couple of weeks into it, with, as mentioned a fatality, one aircraft and pilot flying into the ground, which is sure to make the other novices to this discipline somewhat nervous. But this is early days.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
@Fatboy Coxy before the action starts, it would be really nice to have a comparison between the OTL and TTL forces that Aliies have at their disposal and (if possible) infrastructural developments as well.

Great Work!
Hi Triune Kingdom: yes I agree, I need to provide an OOB to help people understand how the battles unfold. I think I'll have to give it a thread mark, for those who follow the story but not the comments, will probably have to break in down into a few posts owing to size.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
The bulk of the Japanese army that invaded Java was made up by the 48th & 2nd Divisions. Before the invasion the 2nd came from Manchuria, and the 48th from Manila. None of the troops invading Java came from Malaya. When the 48th became available after the fall of Manila the invasion of Java could begin. British troops holding Malaya would have no effect on Japanese operations against the NEI. The NEI and their oil fields were the main focus of the Japanese first phase operation, not Singapore. Malaya, and the Philippines were operations to keep their flanks safe. The Japanese couldn't know that Singapore would fall on Feb 15, and didn't base their wider plans on such an assumption. If it takes longer to capture Singapore, ok it takes longer. In fact, they were surprised they took Singapore so quickly.
Hi Belisarius II:, I agree that Java could be invaded before Singapore fell, but not so Sumatra, until Java falls. Historically the IJA paratroopers that were used in the battle of Palembang, were staged out of either Kahang or Kluang airfield in Johore, I can't remember which.
 
Warning
The bulk of the Japanese army that invaded Java was made up by the 48th & 2nd Divisions. Before the invasion the 2nd came from Manchuria, and the 48th from Manila. None of the troops invading Java came from Malaya. When the 48th became available after the fall of Manila the invasion of Java could begin. British troops holding Malaya would have no effect on Japanese operations against the NEI. The NEI and their oil fields were the main focus of the Japanese first phase operation, not Singapore. Malaya, and the Philippines were operations to keep their flanks safe. The Japanese couldn't know that Singapore would fall on Feb 15, and didn't base their wider plans on such an assumption. If it takes longer to capture Singapore, ok it takes longer. In fact, they were surprised they took Singapore so quickly.
Were you stoned when you wrote that as it makes no sense? What has that got to do with a post on Sumatra, the vast bulk of whose invaders were the Imperial Guard coming from Malaya after the fall of Singapore. Pretty funny you think the Japanese focus was an operation only launched after the fall of Singapore. nearly 3 months after the invasion of Malaya. It used less than half the forces , almost as if they realised that getting oil out from the DEI required that Singapore was neutralised first ( similar reasoning to why they decided neutralising the Philippines was vital).
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Well this old east ponder is simply down with the kids yo

Said with a baseball cap sat on head sideways, jeans hanging on below hips, and serious attitude!

Kids are off school, half term here from Monday, and I have two of them, fortunately they're only six and three, but what they want, and what I can cook, for dinner, can be a bit problematic!
 
OK so I posted this


Anarch King of Dipsodes: asks



and Belisarius II: follows with



OK, so I'm sketchy about dive bombing, defo not an expert! So these are my thoughts, fell free to correct me where needed. Purposely I didn't give a height because of my uncertainty's, but I'd like to think they were diving from about 7,000ft. What their dive speed would be I don't know. Whatever angle they dive at, I'd expect them to have visual sight of the target, until it get time to release the bomb. The greater the angle of dive is to 90%, the more accurate the hit will be, but progressively as the angle off 90 increases, so gravitational pull will drop the bomb shorter, and this is without factoring in any wind. So the shallower the dive, the more the pilot will have to begin to pull out of the dive and a split second later, release his bomb, to compensate that, a skill they will need to develop. I'm also unsure of their release height, can't be lower than 2,000 feet I'd guess.

I wasn't writing to suggest great accuracy in this post, they are hitting 100 ft plus the 80ft cross, but we have only just begun, a couple of weeks into it, with, as mentioned a fatality, one aircraft and pilot flying into the ground, which is sure to make the other novices to this discipline somewhat nervous. But this is early days.
I'll do the best I can. A real dive-bomber like the JU-87 Stuka, SBD Dauntless, and the Aichi D3A (Val) were designed from the start for steep diving. A dive-bomber would typically start a dive from 10-15,000 ft. and enter into a 75–85-degree dive, and pullout between 1,500-2,000 ft. Dive speed would build up to around 280mph, which is about 410 ft per second, so the pilot only has 4 or 5 seconds to pull out. Faster than that would stress the wings and make it very hard to pull out of the dive, which is very bad news. To keep the speed down these aircraft had dive brakes to retard their powered fall. These are special flaps that are lowered to produce added drag to slow the aircraft. The also have release devices to toss the bomb away from the plane, along with special bomb sights.

It's safe to say this kind of flying isn't for the faint of heart. It requires iron nerves, excellent reflexes, strong arms to pull back on the stick, a good sense of timing, and a very strong stomach to handle the negative G's. Good pilots can put a bomb inside that 80ft target, or less. That's usually good enough to hit a ship, or a land target like a bridge, or enemy troop emplacement which is what made them so dangerous. That's not to say 10 dive-bombers would hit 10 targets, nobody is that consistently good, and there are many factors that can affect bomb accuracy, but it was far more accurate than conventional horizontal bombing.

It was this accuracy, or economy of force that so appealed to Hitler, who backed Ernst Udet's absurd order that all German bombers would have divebombing capabilities. Now other aircraft would go into shallow dives, and fire guns, rockets, or bombs on a target, and this type of attack has replaced divebombing, but to put a dumb bomb on a small target nothing beats divebombing. The problem with the middle ground between dive-bombing, and a shallow dive was referred to as Glide Bombing. The main problem as I said was the pilot would lose sight of the target under the nose of his plane.

That's why the USN's Vindicator dive-bombers have the bad reputation they have, because the marine pilots that flew them at Midway weren't fully trained dive-bomber pilots, so they glide bombed, and didn't hit anything. The Vindicator was used by the French in 1940 and did good service. It was the only dedicated Allied dive-bomber in the Battle of France.

So, taking RAF pilots in aircraft not designed, or equipped as dive-bombers, and teaching them to glide bomb won't to effective, but it is something they may try anyway, because they didn't know any better. It's not that it would be worthless in a land battle, but they won't have the accuracy of real dive-bombers. Training real dive-bomber pilots takes a long time, and it's best to learn from the guys who already do it. The RAF just didn't have dive-bombing as big part of their doctrine.
 

Driftless

Donor
I'll do the best I can. A real dive-bomber like the JU-87 Stuka, SBD Dauntless, and the Aichi D3A (Val) were designed from the start for steep diving. A dive-bomber would typically start a dive from 10-15,000 ft. and enter into a 75–85-degree dive, and pullout between 1,500-2,000 ft. Dive speed would build up to around 280mph, which is about 410 ft per second, so the pilot only has 4 or 5 seconds to pull out. Faster than that would stress the wings and make it very hard to pull out of the dive, which is very bad news. To keep the speed down these aircraft had dive brakes to retard their powered fall. These are special flaps that are lowered to produce added drag to slow the aircraft. The also have release devices to toss the bomb away from the plane, along with special bomb sights.

It's safe to say this kind of flying isn't for the faint of heart. It requires iron nerves, excellent reflexes, strong arms to pull back on the stick, a good sense of timing, and a very strong stomach to handle the negative G's. Good pilots can put a bomb inside that 80ft target, or less. That's usually good enough to hit a ship, or a land target like a bridge, or enemy troop emplacement which is what made them so dangerous. That's not to say 10 dive-bombers would hit 10 targets, nobody is that consistently good, and there are many factors that can affect bomb accuracy, but it was far more accurate than conventional horizontal bombing.

It was this accuracy, or economy of force that so appealed to Hitler, who backed Ernst Udet's absurd order that all German bombers would have divebombing capabilities. Now other aircraft would go into shallow dives, and fire guns, rockets, or bombs on a target, and this type of attack has replaced divebombing, but to put a dumb bomb on a small target nothing beats divebombing. The problem with the middle ground between dive-bombing, and a shallow dive was referred to as Glide Bombing. The main problem as I said was the pilot would lose sight of the target under the nose of his plane.

That's why the USN's Vindicator dive-bombers have the bad reputation they have, because the marine pilots that flew them at Midway weren't fully trained dive-bomber pilots, so they glide bombed, and didn't hit anything. The Vindicator was used by the French in 1940 and did good service. It was the only dedicated Allied dive-bomber in the Battle of France.

So, taking RAF pilots in aircraft not designed, or equipped as dive-bombers, and teaching them to glide bomb won't to effective, but it is something they may try anyway, because they didn't know any better. It's not that it would be worthless in a land battle, but they won't have the accuracy of real dive-bombers. Training real dive-bomber pilots takes a long time, and it's best to learn from the guys who already do it. The RAF just didn't have dive-bombing as big part of their doctrine.
There's also the psychological impact of that dive bomber pointing directly at yourself, particularly if you have insufficient means to protect yourself(AAA) Ships in motion at sea have both maneuverability and in many cases, some level of AA to blaze away. The "poor bloody infantry" foot soldier may/may not have AA coverage and certainly less maneuverability. Of course, having fighter cover to chew up the dive bombers before they stoop trumps everything.

I have often read that the Germans attached air-flow sirens to the Stukas to create the famous scream to enhance the psychological impact. That had to create great terror for those folks on the ground.
 
MWI 41073115 Maltby’s Review

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
1941, Thursday 31 July;

Major General Christopher Maltby was sweating badly, the heavy rain showers an hour ago had done nothing for the humidity, and although he’d experienced hotter days in India than the 28 degrees today, it had never felt as hot and sticky as this. In part it was his own fault, determined to inspect each gun position of Brigadier McLeod’s fixed defences had meant a lot of hill walking, despite his driver’s best efforts at getting his staff car as close as he could to the guns. With him inspecting the positions was a number of officers, all physically wilting in the heat, trying their best to keep up with the new GOC Hong Kong.

He’d arrived in Hong Kong on the 20th, onboard the SS President, and walked straight into the role, very conscious of the briefing he’d been given by Lord Gort, back in Singapore, where he’d had a stopover on his journey from India. Gort had been here in Hong Kong about a month ago, and had privately not been impressed with what he had seen. There were major changes to the defence forces assigned to Hong Kong, many experienced units, individuals and equipment leaving, to be replaced by local Chinese recruits. But the Governor, Sir Geoffry Northcote, was a 60-year-old man in poor health, and lacked any drive, while Maj Gen Grasett, had turned somewhat native, advocating reinforcing the colony, in the belief that it could be held in the event of war with Japan. Gort had deluded Maltby of those ideas, indeed, his words had been, if the Japanese want Hong Kong, they will take it, you just make them pay a bloody price for it. So, it was clear what his mission was, it was now about moulding what forces he had to achieve that goal.

The first thing that struck him, arriving on the Sunday, was how the lifestyle appeared so peaceful and easy going, Monday morning, in his office, he discovered that the working week was little different. Well, starting at the top of his command, in interviews with senior officers, he had got the message across that the lifestyle was changing, to a far quicker paced one, with Saturdays being part of the working week, as the Command needed to improve and fast. The rest of the week had been one of paperwork, and continued discussions with the same senior officers as to what changes were needed. He was in no doubt he was ruffling a few feathers, certainly the Governor was wishing even more for September and the end of his tenure. This week, better briefed on what he had on paper, he began touring the Garrison, discussing the issues and problems that those units had in real life, seeing a different story to the paper one, and looking for improvements.

He climbed up the concrete steps onto the gun platform for the BL 9.2-inch Mk X gun, deployed for 'counter-bombardment' work, designed to sink warships up to 8-inch gun heavy cruisers. This particular gun sat on the very top of Mount Davis, providing a fantastic view of Kowloon to the northeast right round, past Stone Cutters Island, Victoria Harbour in front, the east shoreline of Lantau Island, and both West and East Lamma Channels, split by Lamma Island, to down south. Maltby stood, hands on hips, gazing around at the sight before him, the view told him how strategically important this fort was.

He turned and faced his entourage, and spoke to the commanding officer of the 24th Coast Battery RA, Mount Davis, “it’s a lovely view you have up here Major Anderson, splendid, and as you said earlier, pretty much everywhere you can see a ship, you can hit it, a key position indeed. Now tell me, all these thick protective concrete bunkers and walls, are kept lovely and clean, how easy do you think they might be spotted from the air, wouldn’t it be a good idea if we hid the guns, maybe with some paint, netting, bamboo screens that could be laid down when you’re in action, just to make it a little bit harder for the Japanese eh!, yes, oh good, now where’s my Chief Engineer, ah yes Colonel Clifford, I wonder if one of your staff officers could be so kind as to arrange the provision of the necessary stocks and some expertise, while Major Anderson will provide the manpower. Lt Col Penfold, are all the batteries in the Western Command this exposed, I was of the understanding that a considerable amount of money had been spent on battery camouflage, I am quite keen to see just where that money was spent.” Penfold and Anderson exchanged quick glances as Maltby turned and began walking back down the steps, “Major Anderson, can you show me the two gun positions you have without guns, might we not make some use out of them?”

He was tired, his legs ached, and he was sure he’d caught the sun around his neck, as well as his cheek bones and nose, but sitting in the back of his Humber, with just his driver and Captain MacGregor, his ADC up front, for company, he could relax and reflect on another busy day of touring. It was the same story everywhere he went, corners cut, shortages, unfinished work, and lack of attention meant much of the fortified defences were not currently good enough, but hard work could fix that. More concerning was the attitudes of many of his officers and men, who saw themselves as in a forgotten backwater, deserted, and ignored. This more than anything, had to be changed, and one way of doing that was his tours, down to machine gun section pillbox inspections, vehicle workshops, as well as the obvious barrack parades, and field training exercises.

And, he reflected, there would be little help from either the RAF or Navy, the former having just three Vildebeest bombers for maritime patrol and observation roles, along with half a dozen assorted Moth biplanes, while the Navy was being steadily reduced, and would soon be down to a couple of gunboats, a few patrol craft, and auxiliary minesweepers along with a motley collection of support vessels, and the two submarines, who would quickly rebase in Singapore on any outbreak of war. Hong Kong’s defence and resistance to any Japanese invasion was firmly in his hands, and with the recent Japanese occupation of southern Indo-China, that invasion was growing increasingly likely.
 
Said with a baseball cap sat on head sideways, jeans hanging on below hips, and serious attitude!

Kids are off school, half term here from Monday, and I have two of them, fortunately they're only six and three, but what they want, and what I can cook, for dinner, can be a bit problematic!
If I went out looking like that I would get sectioned (and quite rightly so)

1676211105938.png


Yeah several of my team have their kids on Half term so have all buggered of for the week - so I guess I will be looking after their projects them
 
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