I'm not sure that before the war ether sides submariners would really discuss such secret information. The Americans didn't yet know they had those problems, and I don't know if the British would talk about the problems they were having with magnetic detonators. At least in the USN magnetic detonators were considered secret technology. It's not so much that they don't trust each other, but they don't know what would leak. You couldn't know what Anglophobes, Right Wingers, Isolationists, or America Firsters could do with that information.
Malaya What If
- Thread starter Fatboy Coxy
- Start date
Initially Singapore is a better base then the DEI. DEI were short of supplies overcrowded ports, and until Late spring of 1942 dependent on the parts and torpedoes on board the surviving tenders of the Asiatic Fleet Sub tenders, Holland and Otus and Destroyer tender Black Hawk and civilian contracted cargo ship Gold Star . Initially they went to Darwin but it was too far, and bounced to Java and back to Darwin winding up at Freemantle in Western Australia.
The focus of Japanese advance was to the DEI and Singapore so moving USN Subs there if Singapore holds provides a much closer operational base. USN supplies to Freemantle came via the Indian ocean, or from the West coast via South Australia.
The torpedo Mafia (Bu Ord and Torpedo Factory) told everyone from FDR down that all torpedoes were tested and perfect. the issues were with the commanders and crews, and refused to allow anyone else to test the torpedoes and detonators. It wasn't until Pacific Sub force under Nimitz's direct authorization performed tests in late 1942 were the issues found and not fixed until early 1943. ( This is an entire AH story)
Submariners looking at a war will cover all their bases. Hart wanted to be on a more or less war footing from mid-summer 1941. He was just too short of ships and his Marine force stuck in China.
Wolf of Badenoch
Donor
Thanks to all who responded. I'm offering Mk X1V torpedos as mt Mastermind special subject.
I think your making some very valid points. What I think was happening to the IJN by the middle of the Guadalcanal Campaign was both confusion, and fatigue. Confusion because they were multi-tasking, instead of focusing on what they'd been obsessively training to do for 20 years which was to defeat the USN. Fatigue due to the length of the campaign, and the number of successive operations they were engaging in. Even a fine sword can be dulled by misuse. Many of their fine destroyers were being used as fast transports, and others were being used to escort them, along with slow transports, and barges; Tokyo Expresses, and Ant Runs.
Pre-war strategy called for the IJN to fight a defensive battle of attrition in waters dominated by friendly aircraft, and submarines. They wanted the USN to come to them. Once the 1st Marine Division landed on Guadalcanal the IJA wanted to expel them, and the navy needed to transport the troops, keep them supplied, and support them with shore bombardments which they had little training in. The Problem was the Japanese never understood how many marines were on the island. At first, they thought there was only a reinforced regiment, so only a few thousand troops could handle the problem. So, the land battle kept escalating, and the navy was forced into a battle of attrition, having to do things they were never trained for, and having to steam into American dominated waters to do them.
At the same time the Combined Fleet using Truk as its forward base was still waiting to fight that decisive battle that never happened, and only feed ships into the Solomons in drips, and drabs. The Japanese steaming down the Slot were feeling themselves increasingly vulnerable to Allied attack. They realized the Allies almost always knew they were coming and could be waiting in ambush for them. They could be attacked by subs, PT Boats, or cruiser destroyer groups, and they had the pressure of having to be gone by first light to avoid air attacks. This couldn't help but have a psychological effect on the admirals commanding covering forces. They became increasingly cautious and had to keep in mind that this was a secondary campaign, and their ships would be needed for the decisive battle that was yet to come.
So, yes, you're right after Savo Island the Japanese didn't fight the way their doctrine taught them to. They should have concentrated on gaining control of the waters around Guadalcanal and starved the marines. They should have seen it as an opportunity to draw the USN into the decisive battle they wanted in order to save the marines. Only after that would they send in troops to reclaim the island. Freed of all these other tasks the IJN would've had a much better chance of gaining a significant victory in the South Pacific. Instead, they let themselves bleed to death in the Solomons during 1942/43 losing 36 destroyers, and hundreds of thousands of tons of merchant shipping. And they weren't really doing the army any favors by leaving them to starve on Guadalcanal.
But how do the supply ships get to Singapore if the Japanese hold Northern Malaya, Java, and Sumatra? Freighters couldn't survive in those waters.
Interesting thought that if Bataan holds out longer and fleet boats are used for resupply does that make the awareness of the duffness of the mk XIV that much longer to surface?
Look , if Sumatra has fallen , Singapore has already as well, Singapore cannot be held in that instance. If Singapore holds then the Japanese should not be in Sumatra and so there is a sea route. So the answer is, the question is pointless, its an impossibility.
There is no reason why Sumatra can't be taken by the Japanese without first occupying Singapore. Just as it was OTL.
???? Singapore fell 15th Feb , Sumatra was invaded 14th Feb ie after Singapore was neutralised and fell officially 28th March.
Sumatra can realistically only be invaded from the south china sea, passing down the east coast of malaya and singapore, or from java.
The japanese plan was to take sumatra before java, so malaya/singapore would need to be taken or neutralised first.
Even if the plan was changed in the light of events, and Java was taken before Sumatra was attacked, it would be difficult for the japanese to take western sumatra without taking malaya/singapore first.
I really cant see how the japanese can deny the mallaca straits and the java sea without holding malaya and singapore.
The japanese plan was to take sumatra before java, so malaya/singapore would need to be taken or neutralised first.
Even if the plan was changed in the light of events, and Java was taken before Sumatra was attacked, it would be difficult for the japanese to take western sumatra without taking malaya/singapore first.
I really cant see how the japanese can deny the mallaca straits and the java sea without holding malaya and singapore.
I think you are going on the basis that Singapore only holds out at the causeway, IMO this timeline will lead to a hold line further north, possibly a line from Batu Pahat to Kluang to the coast. If Singapore holds this line with aviation reinforced that allows ships to make the night runs along the Malacca Straight. Also holding Singapore may butterfly the loss of the Northern Half of Sumatara.
The American ships still have the option of withdrawing to Western Australia if necessary. Hart was a pragmatist. Also OTL at the time of the loss of Repulse and PoW, the USS Blackhawk AD was enroute with a division of 4 American destroyers to join Admiral Phillips as per agreement.
No, in my post I assumed the Japanese were in northern Malaya. The Japanese invaded Java in late February and destroyed most the ABDA Fleet on Feb 27 in the Battle of the Java Sea, and its immediate aftermath. After that nothing was going to stop the fall of Java, and Sumatra. Only a few Allied ships survived by slipping away to Australia. No more significant naval resistance in the NEI's was possible. The Commonwealth army holding Singapore would have no effect on Sumatra, unless you think they can cross over the Straits of Malacca to join the battle there. To do that you need maybe a division sized force to try and hold off the Japanese. That just puts another 100lb weight on the back of the army in Malaya, if they have to defend Sumatra to.
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
Hi Sekhmet_D:, I don't consider the naval battles of the Guadalcanal campaign as being truly Kantai Kessen, ie "The Decisive Battle", with a fleet vs fleet clash. Instead, these were encounter battles, but why I mentioned the Kantai Kessen is to point out that the Japanese invested a lot of time and money in developing their night fighting capabilities.
With their carrier borne aviation assets lost, in repair, or newly forming, they were left with having to fall back on what they considered their strong suit, night fighting. If the carriers and their air groups had survived Midway, they would have been the main shield, allowing the sea borne reinforcement of Guadalcanal to go ahead. A consideration all the Japanese admirals had to take was where they might be come daylight, and having to face the Cactus Air Force, which allowed the USN to get away with providing a smaller carrier support effort.
The night time battles were all encounters, both sides aware there might be enemy ships about, but strength and deployment was always very questionable. I've heard the battles be described as knife fights, and USS Washington, opening up on Kirishima at 9,000 yards is almost unheard of, Cape Matapan excepted. Launching of torpedo's wasn't always a simple option, guns a much quicker one. Given that initial confusion of the encounter, commanders on both sides above all, firstly, had to be very lucky. And even then they were reliant on signals from other ships, to help give a good understanding of what was going on. Quite a number of ships on both sides failed in that respect, and for numerous reasons.
I think most people would agree with you that the Guadalcanal Campaign was the decisive one, but it was a campaign of attrition more than anything else. The IJN allowed itself to be drawn into something it should never have tried, in my opinion, but perhaps the early success of Savo Island blinded it, and like a gambler, who's had a little success, they continued coming back, hoping for better.
So rating the performances of the Japanese Admirals, I'm mindful of the confusion presented to these guys, at those night battles. Yamamoto was pretty clear about it, dismissing Hiroaki Abe, although how he was meant to keep a clear head while his flagship Hiei, became the focal point of American fire, might be a little unfair on him. Kondo followed, and although he continued to hold commands, that was purely because of his personal connections, and personally I feel he was a poor admiral. It always struck me how far back he held the Southern Distance Force (battlecruisers Kongo and Haruna) when Force Z ventured north. It could be said he was supremely confident the torpedo bombers would deal with them, but if he was called upon to act, I feel he was too far north to make that interception. A more aggressive commander might have had more success in the Guadalcanal battles, but with these battles seemingly decided on a roll of dice, they might have lost heavier too.
Sure, you can keep making the point that the Allies should have understood the capabilities of the Type-93 torpedo after the first few battles of the war, but they didn't. So, in a night battle no one should form a battleline in visual range, because you're setting yourself up for a mass torpedo attack, but they did. In the case of my scenario a British force would never be steaming line ahead because a mass torpedo attack could come out of the darkness at any moment from undetected destroyers. The British admirals were very smart, and absorbed their lessons instantly, unlike the stupid American, Australian, and New Zealander commanders.
So, how would a British admiral fight a night battle with the Japanese in April 1942? Does he know the Japanese have better optics? How does he deploy his ships? He still has to close to visual range to shoot, so how does he fight as a unit? If you'd like, please take my scenario and rewrite it like you think a smart British admiral would fight it. Just have the British change course 45 degrees every 5 minutes and almost all the Japanese torpedoes will miss. Of course, then the actual battle may never happen because you'll never catch up to the retreating Japanese before daylight, or even find them.
why would java and sumatra be in Japanese control? Borneo most likely but with Singapore holding and the RN still in theater I doubt the IJA could take them in the 1st place and certainly couldn't supply any occupation forces if they managed to capture them.
A Mate of mine had a series of 'West point Battle map' books (or something west point anyway)
One of them was on the Pacific war and in discussing the IJN I always recall a particular description it made
It went something along the lines of "The IJN sought to imitate the Royal Navy in all things from its inception and did so in all things, training, leadership and physical courage, it even copied the uniforms and mannerisms of the RN officer class including the mannerisms and traditions of the officers mess. However it failed to copy the most important characteristic 'Moral courage'."
It took me some years before I understood what that meant - it was very clear that the IJN leadership was the biggest weak link particularly when it came to Moral Courage
Repeatedly the IJN commanders put their and the services honour ahead of hard nosed common sense except in those occasions when they should have gone all in (and generally did not)
There was a number of battles where the IJN should have continued to attack but instead retreated (Eg Savo Island?) and a number where they continued to attack when they ought to have not done so (Eg Midway and the obvious one Leyte Gulf) and in both cases either diminished a victory or made defeat worse than it should have been.
Your example of Guadalcanal is case in point - the IJN might very well have come out on top regarding ships sunk etc but while they did tend to exchange US Crusiers for IJN Destroyers the issue with this score sheet is the USA could absorb those losses - Japan could not - there should have been a line in the sand when the IJN leadership put a stop to it.
They did not
The closest analogy I have for the RN was the defence and then Evacuation of Crete - probably the most costly single battle in the RNs history (and certainly WW2) - it probably should have stopped trying to evacuate Army forces some days before it did in the face of German Air Superiority.
What the Japanese did went wayyyyy beyond and no amount of "Kantai Kessen" special sauce or super torpedoes could paper over it.
Now the things really are getting interesting. RAF component is going to be in a much healthier state then IOTL, along with it all the logistical and technical support it requires to operate. That the Fairey Battles or Bristol Blenheims are perhaps not the most modern aircraft availlable is a fact, but there is much more to war then just weapons, and those other factors favour CW forces immensely.
The appearance of CW aircraft over the battlefield, them bombing the enemy, would help a lot in regards to morale of the troops on the ground. There is also the fact that lessons are being learned, in regards to communications and operations (and all the other things), in such an enviroment, and it exposes them to the issues of operating in an enviroment such as SEA. We have already seen that happen with realization that jungle is not impassable terrain, whatever the rules say, and those things are noticed and changes implemented, and that would likely be true for many of the problems British were facing. Not all will be resolved by the time war starts, be it because of the lack of time, material, men, perhaps not seeing the issue at all, but I dare to say that they seem to be miles ahead of whey there were IOTL.
The fact that there is more capable command staff, as well as more material and actual initiative behind this all, that the CW chances sre higher then IOTL should be felt during the DEI invasion. There have been some cooperation with the Dutch for some time now, and that should also be taken into consideration when discussing what could happen ITTL invasion of the DEI. The morale impact of knowing that the British are backing them up, that they have some experience operating together, and so on, must also be accounted for. If I am not mistaken there has also been some trickledown in military hardware and gear, most notable thing I remember is the ASDIC being fitted to a number of Dutch vessels, along with training alongside RN, and maybe some planes were promised, along with whatever else OP might plan. It may not be much, and is woefully inadequate, but it is so much better then not having anything else.
@Fatboy Coxy before the action starts, it would be really nice to have a comparison between the OTL and TTL forces that Aliies have at their disposal and (if possible) infrastructural developments as well.
Great Work!
The appearance of CW aircraft over the battlefield, them bombing the enemy, would help a lot in regards to morale of the troops on the ground. There is also the fact that lessons are being learned, in regards to communications and operations (and all the other things), in such an enviroment, and it exposes them to the issues of operating in an enviroment such as SEA. We have already seen that happen with realization that jungle is not impassable terrain, whatever the rules say, and those things are noticed and changes implemented, and that would likely be true for many of the problems British were facing. Not all will be resolved by the time war starts, be it because of the lack of time, material, men, perhaps not seeing the issue at all, but I dare to say that they seem to be miles ahead of whey there were IOTL.
The fact that there is more capable command staff, as well as more material and actual initiative behind this all, that the CW chances sre higher then IOTL should be felt during the DEI invasion. There have been some cooperation with the Dutch for some time now, and that should also be taken into consideration when discussing what could happen ITTL invasion of the DEI. The morale impact of knowing that the British are backing them up, that they have some experience operating together, and so on, must also be accounted for. If I am not mistaken there has also been some trickledown in military hardware and gear, most notable thing I remember is the ASDIC being fitted to a number of Dutch vessels, along with training alongside RN, and maybe some planes were promised, along with whatever else OP might plan. It may not be much, and is woefully inadequate, but it is so much better then not having anything else.
@Fatboy Coxy before the action starts, it would be really nice to have a comparison between the OTL and TTL forces that Aliies have at their disposal and (if possible) infrastructural developments as well.
Great Work!